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Introduction
Susan N. Houseman
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Economic and trade liberalization in developing countries, coupled 
with technological advances that have greatly lowered trade and commu-
nication costs, have fueled an explosion in the volume of international 
trade since the 1990s. Trade liberalization and technological advances 
also have enabled a tremendous expansion in the types of international 
transactions, including trade in services and intangibles and the devel-
opment of complex global supply chains. The accompanying expansion 
of multinational companies has blurred the boundaries of national econ-
omies, and the production of manufactured goods and some services 
increasingly has shifted to emerging economies. While international 
trade in goods and services has long been expanding, the speed and 
scope of recent changes have given rise to the term “globalization.” 
Among the most pressing policy questions in the United States and 
other advanced economies are those concerning the impact of global-
ization: Has globalization fostered productivity growth and well-being 
in advanced economies? Or have the forces of globalization weakened 
key national industries, resulted in widespread worker dislocation and 
wage stagnation, and worsened inequality? Understanding the impacts 
of globalization is critical to fashioning appropriate policies in a rapidly 
changing world. But understanding its impacts requires good data, and 
national statistical systems were not designed to measure many of the 
transactions occurring in today’s global economy. 
The chapters in this volume and its companion, Measuring Global-
ization: Factoryless Manufacturing, Global Supply Chains, and Trade 
in Intangibles and Data, identify biases and gaps in national statistics, 
examine the magnitude of the problems they pose, and propose solu-
tions to address signifi cant biases and fi ll key data gaps. The chapters 
originally were presented as papers at a research conference in 2013 
funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and their authors include 
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   1 2/16/2015   8:31:35 AM
2   Houseman
researchers from academic institutions and statistics agencies in the 
United States and other countries. 
Shifts in the location of production and associated trade patterns 
have been driven to a large degree by lower prices in emerging econo-
mies. The research in this volume focuses on biases in price indexes 
that may arise from the growth of globalization, building on work pre-
sented at an earlier Sloan-funded conference in 2009.1 Price indexes 
likely fail to capture price drops that consumers and businesses enjoy 
when they shift purchases to lower-cost foreign suppliers—a gen-
eral problem termed “sourcing substitution bias” that results in an 
understatement of real import growth and an overstatement of real 
gross domestic product (GDP) and multifactor productivity growth. 
Another source of bias arises from the fact that the use of imports in 
the economy is not tracked. Errors in the allocation of imports to indus-
tries and fi nal consumption, which is required in the construction of key 
industry statistics, may have become more important as the volume and 
uses of imports in the United States and other advanced economies have 
grown. Such errors can lead to biases in input price indexes and asso-
ciated biases in measures of real output and productivity growth. The 
decline of transportation costs also may have imparted a bias to price 
indexes for imports, particularly low-cost imported products. 
Another source of bias to price indexes may arise when price 
changes associated with a new product or model are not observed. 
To avoid such biases for domestic product prices, the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics has used hedonic indexes to adjust prices for changes 
in product attributes, particularly for products experiencing rapid 
technological advances. With the growing volume of imports in tech-
nologically advanced product lines, the fact that hedonic indexes have 
not been used for imported products may be imparting a signifi cant 
bias to import price indexes in certain product segments. At the same 
time, adjusting prices of domestically produced products for quality 
improvements has meant that price defl ators in certain industries—in 
particular computers and semiconductors—are rapidly falling, and, cor-
respondingly, their real value-added is rapidly increasing. As a result, 
relatively small industries (in nominal terms) drive measures of real 
GDP and productivity for aggregate manufacturing. One consequence 
of the use of hedonic indexes has been widespread misinterpretation of 
real output and productivity growth measures in U.S. manufacturing. 
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In addition to examining the theoretical nature of price-index biases 
that have been exacerbated by the growth of globalization, the chapters 
in this volume estimate the magnitude of various biases to price indexes 
and to real output and productivity growth in the United States and 
other countries. The fi ndings point to a number of signifi cant concerns, 
and the authors propose concrete solutions to address the biases, which 
include changes in the way some price indexes are constructed and the 
introduction of a new price survey. 
The second conference volume extends the analysis to several other 
measurement issues arising from the growth of globalization. The frag-
mentation of production has given rise to so-called factoryless goods 
producers (FGPs): fi rms that design and market products but outsource 
the manufacturing of their products, often overseas. Several chapters 
consider the implications of a proposal to reclassify U.S. FGPs in the 
manufacturing sector. The growth of global supply chains often ren-
ders traditional international trade statistics misleading. Other chapters 
review new data on trade in value-added, which are designed to more 
accurately depict the volume of international trade and the stages of 
production performed in each country. Chapters in the second volume 
also examine the classifi cation of output of multinational corporations 
in national statistics and, with the advent of the Internet, the explosion 
of international trade in data. 
BIASES TO PRICE INDEXES: THEORY
In “Sourcing Substitution Bias and Related Price Index Biases,” 
Alice Nakamura, Erwin Diewert, John Greenlees, Leonard Nakamura, 
and Marshall Reinsdorf provide a thorough examination of biases to 
price indexes, with a special emphasis on biases resulting from the 
growth of international trade. A set of price index biases Nakamura et 
al. collectively label “sourcing substitution biases” arise from the meth-
odology the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and statistical agencies in 
other countries use in constructing price indexes. In particular, the BLS 
collects periodic price quotes for very specifi c products (e.g., a 10.75-
ounce can of Campbell’s soup) sold by a specifi c retail outlet in the 
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case of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), sold by a producer in the case 
of the Producer Price Index (PPI), or purchased by an importer in the 
case of the Import Price Index (MPI). The price changes refl ected in 
the CPI, PPI, MPI, and other price indexes are essentially computed as 
weighted averages of the price changes of product-seller (or purchaser) 
observations (e.g., the price change of a 10.75-ounce can of Campbell’s 
soup sold at the Walmart outlet in Kalamazoo, Michigan) as collected 
in BLS surveys. 
As Nakamura et al. explain, this methodology implicitly assumes 
that the “law of one price” always holds: any observed difference in 
prices between apparently similar products is assumed to be the result 
of differences in product quality. Yet, the law of one price is routinely
violated. Sourcing substitution bias arises when buyers shift from a high-
cost supplier to a low-cost supplier of a good or service. Because price 
indexes are generally derived as weighted averages of price changes of 
specifi c products within the surveyed establishments, price drops that 
purchasers enjoy when shifting from a high- to a low-cost supplier are 
not captured. The rapid growth of low-priced big-box retailers such as 
Walmart and the decline of high-priced small retail stores raised con-
cerns in the past that growth of the CPI was systematically overstated 
(see, for example, Reinsdorf [1993] and Diewert [1998]). So-called 
outlet substitution bias is one type of sourcing substitution bias. 
The dramatic growth of emerging economies, most notably China, 
since 2000 and associated shifts in the location of production have raised 
concerns about other types of sourcing substitution biases. The growing 
share of U.S. imports coming from emerging economies refl ects a shift 
in production away from high-cost suppliers in the United States and 
other advanced economies to low-cost suppliers in emerging econo-
mies. The cost savings enjoyed by consumers or businesses from these 
shifts to low-cost overseas suppliers is not captured in the import price 
index, resulting in an upward bias in this index. In addition, as empha-
sized in several chapters in this volume (Alterman; Fukao and Arai; 
Houseman, Bartik, and Sturgeon; and Nakamura et al.), the import price 
index is used to construct industry input price indexes, which in turn are 
used to compute the growth of industry real value-added. Upward bias 
to the import and input price indexes from shifts in sourcing from either 
high-cost domestic or foreign suppliers to low-cost foreign suppliers 
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results in an upward bias to aggregate and industry real GDP growth 
and certain productivity measures. Nakamura et al. point out that price 
index biases arising from shifts in sourcing cannot be addressed simply 
by altering the formula used to construct the price indexes; the price 
drop associated with the shift to a low-cost supplier is not measured 
under current procedures, and no amount of reweighting of observed 
prices will fi x the problem. 
A closely related problem for price indexes arises from the intro-
duction of new products or models, as is discussed in chapters by 
Nakamura et al., Brian Kovak and Ryan Michaels, and Mina Kim and 
Marshall Reinsdorf. In order to compute a price change for a specifi c 
product sold or purchased by a specifi c establishment, it must be in the 
sample for two periods. When new products or models are introduced 
into price samples, typically it is assumed that the price change for the 
new item is the same as that for closely related ongoing products—a 
procedure called “linking in.” Often, however, price changes coin-
cide with model changes. For example, a company may embed a price 
increase into a new model; to some degree the higher price of the new 
model may refl ect higher product quality and to some degree a pure 
price increase. Because new models are likely to be subject to the link-
ing procedure when they are added to price samples, the price increase 
in this example is missed, a problem called “product substitution bias” 
(Nakamura and Steinsson 2012).
Conversely, Kim and Reinsdorf point out that, particularly for prod-
ucts undergoing rapid technical improvements, the linking in procedure 
may result in a substantial overstatement of price index growth. Unlike 
in other BLS price indexes, hedonic methods to adjust for changes in 
product attributes, and thereby avoid linking in, are not used in the 
construction of import and export price indexes. Consequently, these 
indexes are especially subject to this type of bias.
Similarly, when businesses and consumers shift purchases to a 
lower-cost foreign product, the product typically is not identical to the 
one for which it is substituted. Indeed, the import price index, which 
is based on a survey of importers, treats country of origin as a product 
characteristic. This practice virtually assures that if an importer shifts its 
purchases of particular products, say, from Japan to China in response 
to lower Chinese prices, the Chinese products will be linked into the 
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sample and the price drop for importers missed, no matter how close in 
specifi cation the Chinese and Japanese products. 
The common justifi cation for the assumption that the law of one 
price always holds, which underlies current price index methodology, is 
that arbitrage eliminates any price differences. Building on earlier work 
in which they fi nd large, systematic, and persistent cross-country price 
differences among semiconductor wafers with identical product specifi -
cations (Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels 2013), Kovak and Michaels argue 
that trading frictions may interfere with arbitrage. In “Assessing Price 
Indexes for Markets with Trading Frictions: A Quantitative Illustra-
tion,” they develop a theoretical model describing the price dynamics 
of incumbent and new suppliers when buyers face high short-term costs 
in switching suppliers. Their theory is motivated by the stylized facts of 
semiconductor wafer production in which it is prohibitively expensive 
for wafer design fi rms to switch contract manufacturers for a specifi c 
design because of high manufacturing setup costs. In the short term, 
the incumbent supplier gouges fi rms that cannot switch. Over time, the 
prices of old and new suppliers converge. Importantly, their model can 
explain changes in relative prices when no change in the characteristics 
of the product or service provided by the suppliers has occurred. 
Several chapters examine potential sources of bias to price indexes 
that are unrelated to sourcing substitution or to the introduction of new 
models or products. Benjamin Bridgman examines transportation costs 
for imported and exported goods and their implications for price indexes. 
Usually, the lower a good’s price, the larger the share of its total price 
made up by transportation or specifi c trade costs. Most notably, with 
transportation costs generally falling over time, the price indexes of 
lower-priced goods from emerging economies like China will rise more 
slowly than those for higher-priced products from advanced economies, 
all else being the same. Falling transportation costs, therefore, will tend 
to result in an overstatement in the growth in real (quantity of) imports 
from emerging economies relative to advanced economies. The size of 
trade costs is particularly high in fi nal goods prices, but Bridgman notes 
that as trade costs fall, this source of bias will become less important. 
As discussed in chapters by Jon Samuels, Thomas Howells, Matthew 
Russell, and Erich Strassner and by Kyoji Fukao and Sonoe Arai, a 
different type of bias to the input price index may arise from the fact 
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that statistics agencies generally do not track the destination of imports 
in the economy. Instead, agencies must make assumptions about how 
imported goods and services are allocated between fi nal demand and 
intermediate uses in industries. Typically, statistics agencies assume an 
industry’s use of an imported item is proportional to its overall use of 
the input in the economy—the so-called import comparability or import 
proportionality assumption. For instance, if an industry accounts for 
10 percent of the use of a particular product, then it is assumed that 
it uses 10 percent of the imports of that product. Input price defl ators 
are constructed for each industry as a weighted average of domestic 
and import prices. If the allocation of imported and domestic inputs to 
an industry is incorrect and if price trends of imported and domestic 
inputs differ, industry input price indexes could be signifi cantly biased. 
Because input price indexes are used to compute an industry’s real 
value-added and certain productivity growth measures, these statistics 
could be biased as well. As Fukao and Arai note, however, if one indus-
try is using relatively more of an imported input, another industry will 
be using relatively less. As a result, the biases across industries will 
tend to cancel each other out and so have little effect on the accuracy of 
aggregate GDP or productivity measures. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTS OF
PRICE BIASES
The work in this volume signifi cantly extends empirical research 
presented at the 2009 conference on the magnitude of biases to U.S. 
price index, real output, and multifactor productivity growth measures 
arising from the shift in sourcing to lower-priced foreign manufactured 
goods. In order to estimate these biases, researchers must make assump-
tions about the quality-adjusted price gaps for goods in advanced and 
emerging economies when shifts in sourcing occur. Reinsdorf and 
Yuskavage (2014) utilized apparent inconsistencies between, on the one 
hand, the Consumer Price Index—which the authors point out should 
be less prone to sourcing substitution bias—and, on the other hand, the 
Producer and Import Price Indexes to estimate the bias to the Import 
Price Index for manufactured goods. They fi nd evidence of substantial 
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upward biases to import price indexes in durable goods and selected 
nondurable goods. Although the implication of these biases for aggre-
gate real GDP growth is modest, Reinsdorf and Yuskavage estimate that 
aggregate multifactor productivity growth was overstated by about 10 
percent between 1997 and 2007.
Other prior research used case study evidence along with micro-
data on import prices to assess price differences between manufactured 
goods produced in emerging economies, in intermediate countries, and 
in the United States and other advanced economies. Under various 
assumptions about the price gap, Houseman et al. (2011) estimate that 
between 1997 and 2007, real value-added in U.S. manufacturing was 
overstated by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points and multifactor productivity 
by 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points. Although the bias to real value-added 
growth was a relatively small share of measured growth in the computer 
and electronic products industry, it may have accounted for somewhere 
between a fi fth and a half of the growth in the rest of manufacturing. 
In this volume, authors use a variety of other evidence on price 
declines associated with the shift in sourcing to low-cost foreign sup-
pliers in order to estimate biases to price indexes and to real output 
and productivity growth in the United States and other countries. The 
Japanese government collects unique data on the prices of products sold 
in Japan as compared to other countries, including the United States 
and China. In their chapter, “Biases to Manufacturing Statistics from 
Offshoring,” Fukao and Arai fi nd substantial price gaps for inputs sold 
in developing countries and Japan, not only in products such as apparel 
and textiles but also in machinery. They estimate that large price gaps 
and growth of imported intermediates resulted in substantial underesti-
mates of real input growth and overestimates of multifactor productivity 
growth, especially in Japan’s machinery sector. 
In the appendix to “Measuring Manufacturing: How the Computer 
and Semiconductor Industries Affect the Numbers and Perceptions,” 
Timothy Bartik, Timothy Sturgeon, and I use prior estimates of the 
bias to real value-added growth for U.S. manufacturing (Houseman 
et al. 2011) to estimate the biases to manufacturing real value-added 
growth for each U.S. state. Over the decade ending in 2007, we fi nd 
that adjusting for sourcing substitution bias lowers manufacturing real 
value-added growth rates by 0.1 to 0.7 percentage points, with the larg-
est adjustments occurring in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana. 
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The biases to manufacturing examined in our chapter could result 
from a shift in sourcing of intermediate inputs from high-priced domes-
tic suppliers to low-priced foreign suppliers (offshoring) or from 
high-priced foreign suppliers to low-priced foreign suppliers (shifts in 
import sourcing). Two chapters in the volume—“Import Sourcing Bias 
in Manufacturing Productivity Growth” by Robert Inklaar and “Import 
Allocation across Industries, Import Prices across Countries, and Esti-
mates of Industry Growth and Productivity” by Samuels et al.—focus 
solely on the latter source of bias. 
Inklaar examines what he terms “import sourcing bias” in the man-
ufacturing sector in all major trading countries from 1995 to 2008. To 
estimate cross-country price differentials for specifi c products, Inklaar 
computes unit values of imports from United Nations Comtrade data. 
He acknowledges that this approach has certain drawbacks. One is that, 
whereas the methodology used by statistics agencies assumes that all 
cross-country price differences are attributable to product quality dif-
ferences, the use of unit values assumes the opposite extreme: None 
of the observed price differences refl ect product quality differences. 
Moreover, because unit values are computed on fairly aggregated prod-
uct categories, there is likely to be considerable heterogeneity in the 
products included in them. Despite these caveats, the average price 
differentials that Inklaar fi nds are generally in line with case study evi-
dence, and they fall over the period studied. For the advanced European 
countries, the median price differential from importing a particular 
product from another advanced EU country versus a new EU country 
(the latter having been former Soviet bloc members) or from another 
emerging economy (such as China) was 30 to 35 percent in 1995. That 
price gap had fallen to 10 percent for new EU countries and to 20 per-
cent for other emerging economies by 2008. 
Inklaar estimates that annual multifactor productivity growth for 
manufacturing sectors in 20 advanced countries was, on average, over-
stated by 0.18 to 0.34 percentage points, representing 13 to 25 percent 
of MFP growth over the period. Evidence of import sourcing bias was 
considerably higher in advanced European countries than in the United 
States. Using Inklaar’s methodology, Samuels et al. also report little 
import sourcing bias for U.S. manufacturing. Not surprisingly, Inklaar 
fi nds no evidence of import sourcing bias in emerging economies. 
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Although Inklaar’s fi ndings should be interpreted with caution, they 
suggest that import sourcing bias could be signifi cant in many countries. 
Using detailed data on prices and product characteristics for specifi c 
items, the chapters by Kovak and Michaels and by Kim and Reinsdorf 
are not subject to these concerns and also report large cross-country 
differences in prices, even after carefully controlling for differences in 
product quality. Kovak and Michaels use detailed proprietary transac-
tion price data between fi rms that specialize in the design and marketing 
of semiconductor chips and foundries that specialize in fabricating chips 
for these fi rms. They fi nd large cross-country differences in the transac-
tion prices for chips with identical specifi cations, although the prices 
display some convergence over time. Nonetheless, the authors acknowl-
edge that at least some part of the observed price differentials could be 
the result of differences in the services provided by the fabricators, such 
as the rate at which chips are rejected for quality reasons. In an industry 
such as semiconductors that is characterized by high switching costs in 
the short term, Kovak and Michaels argue that cross-country price dif-
ferentials observed late in the product cycle refl ect time-invariant quality 
differences. Adjusting for quality differences, their simulations suggest 
that semiconductor price indexes substantially understate the true price 
decline because price drops associated with switching to lower-cost pro-
viders in countries such as China are not captured. 
In “The Impact of Globalization on Prices: A Test of Hedonic Price 
Indexes for Imports,” Kim and Reinsdorf use hedonic price index 
methodology to control for cross-country differences in product attri-
butes and to test for the existence of substantial biases in import price
indexes. The authors note that both rapid technological change and 
shifts in sourcing across countries are likely to result in biased import 
price indexes. Products from different countries or products with sub-
stantially new attributes are treated as different products, and under 
the matched model procedures used in the construction of import price 
indexes, price changes associated with a shift in sourcing to a lower-cost 
country or with the introduction of a new product are missed. Hedonic 
price indexes adjust for quality differences between products, allowing 
price changes associated with the introduction of new products or shifts 
in product sourcing to be taken into account. While other BLS price 
indexes sometimes use hedonic adjustments to avoid these price index 
biases, hedonic indexes have not been used to adjust import prices. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the feasibility of hedonic 
indexes for import prices, using televisions and cameras as test cases. 
Kim and Reinsdorf supplement information on product characteris-
tics collected as part of the import price survey with information about 
these products available on the Web. They fi nd evidence of signifi cant 
biases in import price indexes for these product groups, both of which 
were characterized by substantial technical advances and shifts in coun-
try sourcing. For televisions, they estimate an upward bias in the import 
price index of 2.2 percentage points per year, of which 1.3 points derive 
from undermeasured gains from new technology and 0.9 points from 
unmeasured price declines from country substitution; for cameras they 
estimate an upward bias of 10.5 percentage points per year, with 5.8 
points deriving from technology and 4.7 points from country sourcing 
changes. 
The chapter by Kim and Reinsdorf underscores the importance of 
accounting not only for shifts in sourcing but also for technological 
change in those products when constructing price indexes. Failure to 
properly account for technological improvements in imported products 
could result in a signifi cant understatement in the real growth of imports 
and correspondingly in an overstatement of measures of domestic real 
output and productivity growth. By implication, consistent use of 
hedonic price index methodology for domestic and imported products 
is critical.
The use of hedonic indexes raises other concerns, however, as is 
illustrated in my chapter with Bartik and Sturgeon. The U.S. CPI and 
PPI use hedonic indexes to adjust for quality improvements in prod-
ucts subject to rapid technological change, most notably computers 
and semiconductors. Although adjusting for improvements in product 
quality is appropriate, we argue that it has led to substantial misinter-
pretation of U.S. manufacturing statistics. In recent decades, measured 
real GDP growth in U.S. manufacturing has exceeded or kept pace with 
aggregate GDP, except during recessions, and many have pointed to 
these growth statistics as an indicator of manufacturing’s strength in 
the United States. Virtually all of that growth, however, is attributable 
to the computer and semiconductor industries. Although these indus-
tries account for a small share of nominal manufacturing output, their 
prices, when adjusted for product improvements, are rapidly declining, 
and their real value-added growth substantially outpaces that in other 
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industries, thus explaining the outsized effect these industries have on 
aggregate manufacturing statistics. Hedonic price indexes are highly 
sensitive to methodology used. Moreover, using proprietary data on 
global production of computers and semiconductors, we show that the 
United States was declining as a location of production for these prod-
ucts, even while they were driving the apparent robust growth in U.S. 
manufacturing. 
Other problems may arise from the fact that countries generally 
do not track the destination of imports in the economy. The chapters 
by Samuels et al. and Fukao and Arai examine possible biases to input 
price indexes, real value-added, and multifactor productivity resulting 
from inaccuracies in the allocation of imported inputs to fi nal demand 
and to industries as intermediate inputs. Samuels et al. fi nd that, com-
pared to the standard import comparability assumption, allocating 
imports to fi nal and intermediate uses based on broad economic cat-
egories—as proposed by Timmer (2012)—does result in a substantially 
different allocation of imports to intermediate uses for some product 
categories. This alternative allocation does not incorporate any new 
information about import uses in the economy but instead simply varies 
the assumption about their use. In contrast, Japan collects information 
on the destination of imports in the economy. Fukao and Arai exploit 
this information to test how real input and multifactor productivity 
growth for Japanese industries vary under import allocations based on 
survey data, as compared to allocations based on the import compara-
bility assumption, which is used in most countries. They fi nd substantial 
over- and underestimates of real input and productivity growth at the 
detailed industry level, although they note that, by construction, these 
errors will tend to cancel each other out in the aggregate economy. 
It is important to note that errors in the allocation of imports at 
the industry level have potentially important implications for economic 
impact analyses commonly conducted with these data. Analysts often 
use industry data to predict the effects of increases or declines in an 
industry’s output on employment and income at the local, regional, or 
national level. These effects depend critically on industry input-output 
relationships, which govern the spillover effects on employment and 
income in supplier industries. The employment and income effects of 
policies targeting a particular industry, for instance, will be lower as the 
imported inputs used by the industry become greater. 
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SOLUTIONS
To address biases that rapid technological progress and globaliza-
tion have likely exacerbated, several chapters propose fundamental 
changes to the way various price indexes are constructed. Nakamura et 
al. recommend that in many circumstances the BLS depart from its stan-
dard practice of collecting single-point-in-time price quotes for specifi c 
products from specifi c establishments. They point out that the advent of 
UPC codes and electronic communications enables fi rms to easily sup-
ply the universe of transaction prices on specifi c items over the course 
of the month. Averaging these transaction prices within establishments 
would eliminate biases to price indexes that result from sales promo-
tions. Averaging UPC transaction prices across establishments would 
be necessary to address outlet substitution bias in the CPI, the form of 
sourcing substitution bias that occurs when buyers shift purchases to 
stores offering lower prices. Some have argued that pure transaction 
price data do not refl ect auxiliary attributes that products acquire as 
a result of where the products are sold; for example, some consumers 
may fi nd shopping at a small but higher-priced store less time consum-
ing or otherwise more pleasant than at a low-priced big-box store. As 
the authors point out, however, international guidelines explicitly state 
that the unpaid time consumers take in shopping should not be taken 
into consideration in constructing price indexes. 
While the averaging of transaction prices for UPC codes would 
help address outlet substitution bias in the CPI, it would not deal with 
other types of sourcing substitution bias, including biases stemming 
from shifts in purchases to low-cost foreign suppliers. This is because 
no matter how similar the products, UPC codes are unique to a pro-
ducer—domestic or foreign. To address biases in import price indexes, 
Kim and Reinsdorf propose using hedonic indexes in lieu of matched 
model indexes, which miss price changes that occur whenever new 
models are introduced or importers shift to lower-cost foreign suppli-
ers. The authors demonstrate that information already collected as part 
of the BLS import prices program, when supplemented with publicly 
available information on the Internet, is suffi cient to implement hedonic 
indexes, and that biases in matched model indexes can be sizable. 
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The use of hedonic indexes in computing import price indexes 
would only address sourcing substitution biases associated with shifts 
from a high- to a low-cost foreign supplier. To more completely address 
sourcing substitution bias in input price indexes, William Alterman, the 
former BLS assistant commissioner for international prices, proposes a 
new price index that would be based on a survey of input purchasers. As 
noted, input price indexes miss price declines whenever fi rms shift from 
high- to low-cost suppliers of intermediate inputs; these shifts could be 
from a high- to a low-cost domestic supplier, from a high-cost domes-
tic supplier to a low-cost foreign supplier, or from a high-cost foreign 
supplier to a low-cost foreign supplier. When such price drops are not 
captured, the growth of the industry’s input price index, real value-
added, and certain productivity measures are overstated. In theory, 
input purchasers could report a price change, even when they source 
the input from a new supplier. In “Producing an Input Price Index,” 
Alterman reports fi ndings from an initial examination of the feasibility 
of constructing an input price index for materials inputs. Although some 
technical issues along with budget constraints pose signifi cant chal-
lenges to the introduction of a new price survey, Alterman concludes 
that fi elding a sample of materials purchasers is possible and that, in 
general, businesses can periodically report prices on input purchases. 
Nakamura et al. and Kim and Reinsdorf point out that, if implemented, 
such a survey would need to collect data on product characteristics so 
that prices could be adjusted for changes in product attributes whenever 
models or suppliers change. 
 Alterman acknowledges that the proposed input price bias is not a 
panacea. It would not, for instance, capture price declines when fi rms 
outsource or offshore work previously done in-house. This is because 
data on the price for work previously done in-house would not exist and 
so could not be compared to the price from an arm’s-length transaction. 
Moreover, because in offi cial statistics aggregate GDP is computed 
from the expenditure side as the sum of fi nal consumption, investment, 
government purchases, and net exports—not as the sum of value-added 
across industries—a fully implemented input price index would address 
biases from sourcing substitution to real GDP and productivity mea-
sures for industries, but not for the aggregate economy. The use of 
hedonic indexes for import prices, as proposed by Kim and Reinsdorf, 
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would address some of the bias to both aggregate and industry real GDP 
measures from sourcing substitution. Information from biases to the 
input price index or from discrepancies between movements in the CPI, 
PPI, and MPI, as discussed in Reinsdorf and Yuskavage, potentially 
could be used to better address biases to aggregate output and produc-
tivity measures. 
Adjusting prices for changes in product quality, however, also 
may mean that products experiencing rapid technological change will 
dominate movements in aggregate statistics, as Bartik, Sturgeon, and I 
illustrate with the outsized effect that the computer and semiconductor 
industries have on real GDP growth in U.S. manufacturing. To mitigate 
confusion and misinterpretation of the data, we argue that statistical 
agencies should make clear the infl uence certain industries have on 
aggregate statistics—for example, by also publishing subaggregates 
without these industries. 
The case of U.S. manufacturing raises broader questions about how 
to measure competitiveness in a global economy and in an era of rapid 
technological change. Traditionally, economists and policymakers have 
looked to real output and productivity measures to assess an industry’s 
competitiveness. Yet the United States was declining as a location for 
production of computers and semiconductors even while these indus-
tries accounted for the robust output and productivity growth in U.S. 
manufacturing. My coauthors and I argue that international data on the 
location of production are necessary to assess the global competitive-
ness of a particular industry or sector in a country. 
In addition, the fragmentation of production raises diffi cult classifi -
cation issues. For example, although the competitiveness of the United 
States as a location for the production of computers and semiconductors 
has declined, much of the product design work and marketing remains 
in the United States. These activities usually are counted in the research 
or wholesale trade sectors, though they traditionally are integral parts of 
manufacturing. These developments arguably necessitate a rethinking 
about how activities in the economy are classifi ed.
The companion to this volume examines these issues in greater 
depth. Several chapters focus on a recent proposal to classify so-called 
factoryless goods producers in manufacturing, explaining the rationale 
for the proposal, the current prevalence of FGP activities in the United 
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States, and the likely effect of such a change in classifi cation on manu-
facturing statistics. The second volume also reports on recent efforts 
to develop data sets measuring trade in value-added. Value-added of 
a product produced in a global supply chain may be counted multiple 
times in international trade statistics, which measure gross fl ows of 
imports and exports. Electronic components, for example, produced in 
Japan may be exported to China for assembly into fi nal consumer goods. 
The value-added of the electronic components will be counted once in 
Japan’s exports and again in the Chinese exports of consumer electron-
ics. Similarly, bilateral trade statistics can be misleading: Imports from 
a particular country may contain substantial amounts of value-added 
from other countries, and the import content of a country’s exports may 
be sizable. Data on trade in value-added are needed to understand what 
is made where and, ultimately, to assess the competitiveness of national 
industries and activities in the supply chain. Advances in technology 
and communications that have allowed the explosion of trade in manu-
factured products have permitted the rapid expansion of multinational 
companies and of trade in services and intangibles, many of which were 
previously regarded as “untradeable.” Chapters in the second volume 
also examine the thorny issue of attributing output from multinational 
companies to the countries in which they operate as well as evidence 
that trade statistics greatly understate cross-border fl ows of data, raising 
concerns about recent policies in some countries to discourage these 
fl ows. 
Note
1. The conference “Measurement Issues Arising from the Growth of Globalization” 
was held November 6–7, 2009. Summaries of the conference research and of its 
research papers are available at http://research.upjohn.org/externalpapers/7/ and 
http://research.upjohn.org/reports/130/, respectively.
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Price indexes are fundamentally important for understanding what 
is happening to national economies. Unfortunately, for reasons we will 
explain, price-index bias problems seem likely to have grown with the 
evolution of information technologies and accompanying changes in 
business price setting and product-variant development practices, as 
well as with the growth in the amount and timeliness of price infor-
mation available to potential buyers. We argue, however, that specifi c 
changes to statistical agency practices and data-handling capabilities 
can greatly reduce the bias problems we focus on. 
We recommend hybrid alternatives to the conventional price 
indexes. Our hybrid indexes use unit values to combine price infor-
mation for transactions that take place at different prices for homo-
genous product items. The hybrid indexes reduce to the conventional 
price indexes when there is truly just one price per product each time 
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period. This recommendation is in line with the advice provided in 
several international price index manuals such as ILO et al. (2004a,b, 
2009). For example, in the manual for the Producer Price Index (PPI) 
it is stated that “having specifi ed the [product] to be priced . . . , data 
should be collected on both the value of the total sales in a particular 
month and the total quantities sold in order to derive a unit value to be 
used as the price . . .” (ILO et al. 2004a, p. 22).
Some of the prices used in a typical U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
PPI are calculated now in this way. Yet, as a rule, the conventional sta-
tistics agency practice does not measure prices as unit values.1 The con-
ventional practice of national statistics agencies is to collect the price of 
a precisely defi ned product at a particular establishment and designated 
point in time, with this collection process being designed to yield a 
unique price each period for the given product-establishment combina-
tion. (See, for example, BLS [2007a,b,c,d].) 
Throughout the chapter, a short list of terms is used in distinct ways 
that are important to bear in mind: product unit (or “product” for short), 
product unit item (or “product item,” or simply “item”), product con-
tent, index basket product unit (or simply “index basket product”), the 
unit value (or, equivalently, the “unit value price,” or “unit price”), and 
the product content unit value. Our usage of, and need for, these terms 
are most easily conveyed in a specifi c context. We will use the example 
of Campbell’s tomato soup, which is most often sold in a 10.75-ounce 
can, but it is also available in a variety of other can sizes, including a 
15.2-ounce can. 
We defi ne a product by the brand and the company that owns the 
brand, or at any rate that is responsible for the product (if, say, it is not 
marketed under a brand name), and by the precise nature of the product 
content as well as by the specifi c sort and size of packaging the product 
is sold in. A commercial product is assigned a Universal Product Code 
(UPC) by the company responsible for the product. The rules for how 
UPCs are to be assigned are maintained by (and conformity with them 
is monitored by) an international governing body (as we explain subse-
quently), to which a company must belong in order to be able to assign 
UPCs to the company’s products. 
Products of different companies have different UPCs. The rules for 
assigning UPCs also dictate that if either the content or the nature or 
size of the packaging format differs for products produced by a com-
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pany, then separate UPCs must be assigned. The way in which we use 
the term “product unit” or “product” is consistent with how commercial 
products are defi ned for UPC assignment. Hence a 10.75-ounce can of 
Campbell’s tomato soup, which is the most common can size, is a sepa-
rate product from a 15.2-ounce can of Campbell’s tomato soup. 
Each can of the 10.75-ounce size for Campbell’s tomato soup is 
referred to as a “product item” or simply an “item.” No matter how 
short the time period, different items of a product may sometimes be 
sold by different merchants or even the same merchant at different 
prices. For example, the same grocery outlet on the same day could 
sell 10.75-ounce cans of Campbell’s soup at different prices because a 
promotional sale began partway through the day, or because some cans 
had stickers on them for a lower price owing to an earlier promotional 
sale, or because of arrangements such as discounts for customers who 
have coupons. The average of the prices for which items of a product 
are transacted in a stated time period and market area is the unit value 
(or unit price). 
The product content is what is inside a can of Campbell’s tomato 
soup, and that content is the same whether it is a 10.75-ounce can or a 
15.2-ounce can. In many jurisdictions in the United States, a grocer is 
required by law to display for each product not only the per-item price 
for the product, but also the price being charged for a stated unit of 
quantity of the product content, such as a fl uid ounce. The latter sort of 
standardized prices are sometimes referred to as “unit value prices,” but 
they do not result from any sort of averaging of the realized prices in 
different transactions, and this is not what we mean (nor what is meant 
in the index number literature) by the term “unit price” or “unit value.”
Price indexes are defi ned for baskets of products. The basket for, 
say, the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) consists of product cat-
egories. At each retail outlet selected for price collection for the CPI 
program, when price collection is initiated there, the price collector 
chooses, based on outlet information about product sales at that outlet, 
a specifi c product unit for each CPI product category for which prices 
are to be collected there. Each selected product then becomes an index 
basket product for which a price collector attempts to collect a price 
each pricing period. 
Suppose now that a 10.75-ounce can of Campbell’s tomato soup 
has been selected as an index basket product to be priced, period after 
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period, at a specifi c establishment. And suppose that the establishment 
subsequently ceases to sell the 10.75-ounce cans and switches to instead 
selling the 15.2-ounce can format for Campbell’s tomato soup. In this 
situation, the decision could be made to “quality-adjust” the price for 
the 15.2-ounce can so that the observed price for that product item could 
be used as a proxy for the missing price for the 10.75-ounce Campbell’s 
tomato soup index basket product. The simplest such adjustment would 
be to compute the per-ounce price for the soup sold in the 15.2-ounce 
can and then to multiply that times 10.75, with the resulting value being 
used as a proxy price for Campbell’s tomato soup in a 10.75-ounce can.2 
The chapter’s second section, titled “Background Material,” intro-
duces the issues. Section Three, “Basic, Hybrid, and Conventional 
Versions of Laspeyres, Paasche, and Fisher Price Indexes,” provides 
notation and defi nitions used in the rest of the chapter. The Laspeyres, 
Paasche, and Fisher price index formulas are introduced in the basic 
forms in which these are usually presented in textbooks and in the 
economics, accounting, and price-index scholarly literatures. Next we 
develop hybrid price-index formulas that explicitly allow for possible 
price differences in a given time period for homogeneous units of each 
product. We proceed to develop grouped transaction variants of the con-
ventional and hybrid price index formulas that allow us to conveniently 
represent various bias problems for the conventional indexes.  
In the fourth section, “Different Sorts of Price Index Selection Bias,” 
we use our bias formula for a Laspeyres-type price index to characterize 
certain ways in which bias can arise. The biases discussed include the 
recognized problem of Consumer Price Index (CPI) outlet substitution 
bias,3 the CPI promotions bias defi ned in this chapter, and what Diewert 
and Nakamura (2010) defi ne as “sourcing substitution bias” in the PPI 
and Import Price Index (MPI).4 We deal briefl y as well with sourcing 
substitution bias in the proposed new Input Price Index (IPI).
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) produces the price 
indexes we focus on in this chapter. The BLS largely abandoned the 
use of unit values in price index compilation because of advice from 
experts, including the 1961 report of the Stigler Committee (Price Sta-
tistics Review Committee 1961), and research by its own staff (exem-
plifi ed by Alterman [1991]).5 In the fi fth section, “Five Sorts of Bar-
riers to Adoption of Unit Values for Offi cial Statistics Purposes,” we 
examine the problems with unit values that are highlighted in the Stigler 
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   24 2/16/2015   8:31:51 AM
Sourcing Substitution and Related Price Index Biases   25
Committee report and also by Alterman (1991). We explain why the 
main basis of condemnation in those historical reports does not pertain 
to our present unit-value recommendation. 
Nevertheless, there are formidable practical challenges to imple-
menting unit values as we recommend. Producers give their products 
identifying names and Universal Product Codes (UPCs). UPCs have 
come to play ubiquitous roles in business information systems for man-
aging all aspects of the handling of products and their associated cost 
and sales fi nancial fl ows. Once a 10.75-ounce can of Campbell’s tomato 
soup is shipped out from the production facility carrying the UPC that 
Campbell’s has assigned to that product, then that UPC stays with that 
soup can wherever it goes. 
However, along the way from the original producer to the fi nal pur-
chaser, a unit of a product can take on auxiliary attributes that may 
matter to the fi nal purchaser, or to the fi nal user, or both, and that may 
be associated with price differences. For example, some of the cans of 
tomato soup may be shipped by the producer to convenience stores, and 
some may be shipped to superstores.6 
Separate UPCs are sometimes defi ned for products that most users 
might regard as differing only in ways that make no difference to them. 
This issue can arise, for example, with products that differ in ways that 
are necessary for avoidance of a patent infringement ruling but that 
are intentionally the same in terms of all attributes of concern to most 
users. Or a producer might bring out a slightly reformulated product 
with a different UPC and with a price that yields a higher profi t margin.7 
When a producer brings out a new product and discontinues an older 
one, if the product change is trivial, a statistics agency may decide that 
the reformulated version of the product should be treated as a continu-
ation of the original version so that the price increase can be captured. 
We discuss operational issues that arise in situations like these in the 
subsections below that deal with what we refer to as “Impediment 3” 
and “Impediment 4” (see also Reinsdorf [1999]).
How, then, can we best measure price change over time when units 
of precisely defi ned and interchangeable product items are sold at dif-
ferent prices in the same time period and market area? And when is it 
best to treat highly similar but commercially distinguishable products 
as separate products for infl ation measurement purposes? Consideration 
of these questions requires an understanding of the role of measures of 
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infl ation in the compilation of other key economic performance mea-
sures for nations: the topic of Section Six, titled “Infl ation Measurement 
Effects on Other Economic Performance Measures.” Finally, in the sev-
enth section, “Possible Price Measurement Practice Reforms,” we sug-
gest possible changes to conventional price-index-making practices. 
Two brief appendices provide additional materials that some read-
ers may fi nd helpful. In Appendix 2A, we show with a numerical exam-
ple that the featured bias problem in the example cannot be fi xed simply 
by adopting a superlative price index formula like the Fisher.8 Appendix 
2B demonstrates why, ideally, the same product defi nitions should be 
used both for price quote collection and for the collection of the data 
needed to compute value-share weights. 
This chapter is written with three different groups of readers in 
mind. One group consists of those who view the averaging of observ-
able prices for different items of the same product to form unit values 
as an inferior practice. We hope to persuade these readers that for a 
wide class of price index uses, including the defl ation of gross domestic 
product (GDP) components, it is important that the price quotes utilized 
be representative of the prices for the transactions that make up the 
associated value aggregates. 
A second group we hope will benefi t from this chapter are those 
who were already convinced by what early contributors to the price 
index literature—Walsh (1901, p. 96; 1921, p. 88), Davies (1924, p. 
183; 1932, p. 59), and Fisher (1922, p. 318) in particular—wrote long 
ago on the use of unit values in price indexes. These are experts who 
hold the view that there is no need to elaborate on the issues we deal 
with in this chapter. We hope to persuade these readers that there is 
considerable value in having a more explicit exposition of these issues. 
We hope too that these readers will turn their research efforts toward 
helping to develop feasible implementation strategies for the sort of 
approach that we recommend. 
A third group of readers that we hope to engage with this chap-
ter are those not previously acquainted with some of the price index 
bias problems that we focus on, including the sourcing substitution 
bias problems defi ned by Diewert and Nakamura (2010) and for which 
Houseman et al. (2011) provide the fi rst empirical results. We hope to 
provide these readers with a readily understandable exposition of these 
biases. We feel it is crucial for economists at large to understand how 
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these infl ation measurement distortions arise and why they have likely 
become more serious in recent years.
BACKGROUND MATERIAL
In this chapter, we focus mostly on three main price indexes pro-
duced by the BLS: the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the Producer Price 
Index (PPI), and the Import Price Index (MPI). We focus on one aspect 
of conventional offi cial statistics price-index-making and abstract from 
many other important issues in the process. It should also be noted that 
although our discussion will focus on the handling of prices for physical 
products with associated UPC codes, the major price indexes include 
services as well as goods categories.
Knowing some specifi cs of how price indexes are produced is help-
ful for considering price index bias problems. The offi cial price indexes 
used to measure infl ation fi rst aggregate price relatives into elementary 
indexes for narrow categories of products, such as men’s suits or crude 
petroleum. They then aggregate the elementary indexes, in most cases 
employing a Laspeyres or similar formula.9 Price relatives are ratios of 
current to previous period prices for specifi c products sold by specifi c 
establishments. The aggregation formula for an elementary price index 
typically includes weights for the price relatives that refl ect shares of 
the total value of the transactions (and may also take sample selection 
probabilities into account). Similarly, weights that refl ect shares of 
total expenditure for the products covered by each of the elementary 
indexes are used to aggregate the elementary indexes in order to arrive 
at higher-level and overall infl ation measures like the “All Items CPI” 
or the “PPI for Final Demand.”
The CPI is intended to measure the infl ation experience of house-
holds, so the value share weights used for the CPI are based on house-
hold survey information. However, the product units included in the 
CPI basket are priced at selected retail outlets because it is operationally 
easier to collect prices from businesses. 
The PPI primarily measures changes in prices received by domestic 
businesses in selling their products to other domestic or foreign busi-
nesses. Selected products are regularly priced at selected establishments 
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of domestic producers. The PPI value-share weights are based on what 
domestic businesses report as their sales revenues by product. 
The BLS produces the MPI as part of its International Price Pro-
gram. The MPI is intended to be a measure of the infl ation experience 
of domestic purchasers of imported products. Products are priced at 
selected U.S. importer establishments, and the value-share weights are 
based on U.S. survey and customs data for all imports. 
We fi nd it useful to differentiate what we call primary product and 
auxiliary product attributes. We defi ne “primary product attributes” (or 
simply “primary attributes”) as characteristics of an item of the product 
when fi rst sold by the original producer that continue to be characteris-
tics of the product item regardless of where and how it may be resold 
on its way to the fi nal purchaser. We defi ne “product item attributes” 
as “auxiliary attributes” if an item acquires these attributes as a conse-
quence of how it is cared for on its way to the merchant that makes the 
fi nal sale or because of where or how it is sold. For example, being sold 
during a promotional sale is a potentially relevant auxiliary attribute 
of a product item in studies of price evolution and consumer behavior. 
As Hausman and Leibtag (2007, 2009) note, markets typically offer 
consumers product items that are sold by different merchants and have 
differing amenities, with those amenities being one sort of auxiliary 
product item attribute. For the issues we focus on in this chapter, it is 
useful to differentiate auxiliary product item attributes from primary 
product attributes that all items of a product have and that stay with 
those product items wherever and however they are sold.10
BASIC, HYBRID, AND CONVENTIONAL VERSIONS OF 
LASPEYRES, PAASCHE, AND FISHER PRICE INDEXES 
We begin in this section with basic formulas for the Laspeyres, 
Paasche, and Fisher price indexes. These are the usual defi nitions given 
in economics and accounting textbooks and in the relevant scholarly 
literatures, although it is important to note that the U.S. CPI now relies 
on a weighted geometric mean formula to compute elementary indexes 
for physical commodities. We next take up the case of multiple transac-
tions per product. The hybrid price indexes we develop for the multiple 
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transactions case are what we recommend be used: that is, these are 
what we subsequently specify to be the target indexes. 
We next show how our hybrid indexes that can accommodate the 
multiple transactions case can be rewritten to allow for grouping the 
transactions in each period. We then use the grouped-transaction repre-
sentations of our hybrid price index formulas to relate what we label as 
conventional formulas (which embody a key feature of current statisti-
cal agency practice) to our target hybrid indexes. Once we can explic-
itly relate the conventional formulas to our target indexes, we show 
that formulas for various biases of the conventional indexes are easily 
derived. 
Basic versus Hybrid Price Indexes
We denote by n = 1,…, N the products in the index basket for a price 
index. The time period is denoted by t. All the price indexes consid-
ered involve two time periods (e.g., two months for a monthly index), 
denoted as t = 0 and t = 1. Each of the tnJ  transactions for product n in period t ( tnJj ,,1 ) involves a seller k and a purchaser k . Hence, 
for transaction j in time period t for product n, q jt kkn
,
,,  is the quantity of 
the product bought by purchaser k  from seller k. This quantity is given 
in terms of the same units of measure used in reporting the price per unit 
of the product, and that price is denoted by jt kknp
,
,,  . 
In each segment of the chapter, we simplify the superscript and sub-
script notation by showing just the superscripts and subscripts needed 
there. Hence, in the rest of this section, just the superscript t and the 
subscript n are used. The total nominal revenue received or remittance 
paid for product n in period t ( 1,0t ) is thus denoted here by tnR , and 
the total received or paid for all N products is
(2.1) tn
N
n
t
n
N
n
t
n
t qpRR    11 .
The basic Laspeyres price index ( LP ) is given by11
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the basic Paasche index ( PP ) is given equivalently by
(2.3) 
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and the basic Fisher price index ( FP ) is
(2.4) 2/11,01,01,0 )( PLF PPP  ,
where tnS  in Equations (2.2) and (2.3) denotes the value share of tR  for 
product n in period t given by
(2.5) 
t
t
n
N
n
t
n
t
n
t
n
t
nt
n
R
R
qp
qp
S   1
.
From the fi nal expression in Equation (2.2) and also in Equation (2.3), 
and from Equation (2.4), we see that the basic Laspeyres, Paasche, and 
Fisher price indexes are all summary metrics for price relatives for 
product n ( Nn ,,1 ), where a price relative is given by
(2.6) 01 / nn pp .
A price index is always evaluated for a given pair of time peri-
ods (i.e., the given current and comparison periods) and a given mar-
ket area. To evaluate a basic price index formula like the Laspeyres 
given by Equation (2.2), each specifi ed product covered by the index 
can only have one price in each time period. Historically, competitive 
forces have been appealed to (i.e., the “law of one price”) as a justifi ca-
tion for this one-price-per-product approximation to reality for a given 
time period and market area. Yet many businesses no longer set their 
prices on a product-by-product basis (if, indeed, they ever did that). 
Rather, they use pricing strategies aimed at maximizing their overall 
rate of return on their product sales. Hence product items typically end 
up being offered for sale at differing prices within a given market area, 
sometimes even by a single supplier.12 Kaplan and Menzio (2014) use 
a large data set of prices for retail store transactions and show that the 
coeffi cient of variation of the average UPC price is 19 percent. The 
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rapid rise of online retail seems likely to give rise to even greater oppor-
tunities for complex pricing strategies (Tran 2014). 
Allowing for Multiple Transactions per Product at Multiple Prices
Suppose that there are multiple transactions per product (i.e., mul-
tiple product items are sold) each period and product items can sell for 
different prices in these transactions. Suppose, too, that we have the 
price and quantity details for the item-level product transactions. For 
these data to be used for price index evaluation, either we need a way 
of choosing one representative price for each product (the conventional 
approach), or the raw transactions-level data must be represented using 
some sort of price and quantity summary statistics. We use the word 
“must” because, in general, even if the number of products is the same, 
the number of product items sold usually will not be the same from 
one time period to the next. If we have an acceptable way of choosing 
a single transaction each period for an index basket product item, then 
it is those transaction prices that can be compared using a price index. 
Or, alternatively, some summary metric must be used for the transac-
tions data, and then the values of that summary metric can be compared 
using a price index. Generating price observations that can be used to 
form price relatives, and in this manner can be compared over time, is 
a necessary step in constructing price indexes using raw transactions 
data, including scanner data.
The existence of multiple prices for a product in a time period can 
cause two kinds of bias in a conventional price index. The “formula 
bias” problem arises if a single price is selected to represent the mul-
tiple prices that exist in a given time period, and if the formula for the 
elementary price index is an arithmetic average of price relatives calcu-
lated as the ratio of the selected price for Period 1 to the selected price 
for Period 0. When multiple prices are present in the population and a 
single price is selected to represent the population in the price index, 
the price that is used in the price index becomes a random variable. 
Assuming that the two random variables are not perfectly correlated, 
the expected value of a ratio of random variables is an increasing func-
tion of the variance of the denominator, so the greater the variance of 
the price observations, the greater the upward bias in the average of 
price relatives. In the CPI of the United States and many other coun-
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tries, formula bias is avoided by using geometric means to form the 
elementary indexes. The geometric mean of a set of price relatives is the 
same as the ratio of geometric means of the prices, so a geometric mean 
elementary index is, in effect, a ratio of average prices. The variance of 
the denominator will be so small that formula bias is not a problem if 
many price observations are averaged and the index is calculated as a 
ratio of the average prices. 
The second kind of bias that can occur if a single price is used to 
represent the multiple prices that are present in a time period is that 
the behavior of the selected price may be unrepresentative of what is 
going on with the distribution of prices that are available to buyers. It 
is this problem that the rest of this chapter will focus on. Neverthe-
less, it should be noted here that the unit-value approach that we will 
recommend for reasons of maintaining sample representativeness also 
has benefi ts for eliminating formula bias and improving the statistical 
properties of the index. (For additional background on formula bias, see 
McClelland and Reinsdorf [1999], Reinsdorf [1998], and Reinsdorf and 
Triplett [2009].) 
We denote the yet-to-be-specifi ed price and quantity summary sta-
tistics for each product n in each period t by Stnp
,  and Stnq
, . The nominal 
value of the jth transaction is jtn
jt
n
jt
n qpR
,,,  . Thus the nominal value of 
all transactions for product n in period t is
(2.7)    tntn Jj jtnjtnJj jtntn qpRR 1 ,,1 , .
If any important auxiliary product unit attributes do not vary sys-
tematically across transactions, the following is a desirable condition 
for the price and quantity summary statistics to satisfy for each of the N 
products covered by the price index:
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This condition says that the growth in the per-period value of all 
transactions for product n from Period 0 to 1 can be expressed as the 
product of a pure price-change ratio times a pure quantity-change ratio. 
We call this condition the product-level product rule.13
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The product-level product rule will always hold if, for each period 
(t = 0,1), the product of the price and quantity summary statistics equals 
the nominal value fi gure:
(2.9) Stn
St
n
t
n qpR
,, .
Moreover, it is readily apparent that the condition in Equation (2.9) will 
always hold if the quantity and price summary statistics are defi ned for 
each period (t = 0,1) as
(2.10) tn
J
j
jt
n
St
n qqq
t
n  1 ,,  
and 
(2.11)  ,, / tntntnStn pqRp ,
where the dot ( ) replaces the index over which the summation is taken 
to compute the per-unit price average.14 The price summary statistic 
given in Equation (2.11) is the period t unit value for product n. The 
quantity summary statistic given in Equation (2.10) is the total quantity 
transacted of product n in the given period t.
Substituting the period t unit value, ,tnp , for the price variable tnp  
in the basic specifi cations for the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes given 
in Equations (2.2) and (2.3), and redefi ning the quantity variable as the 
summation over all transactions in the given period, we obtain, respec-
tively, the following expressions for what we call the hybrid Laspeyres 
index (the HLaspeyres index for short)15
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and for the hybrid Paasche index (the HPaasche index)
(2.13) 
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Thus, the hybrid Fisher index (the HFisher) is given by
(2.14) 2/11,01,01,0 )( APALHF PPP ? .
The value-share weights in Equations (2.12) and (2.13), 0nS  and 
1
nS , are 
given for all n by
(2.15) ttn
t
n RRS / ,
where tnR  is now given by Equation (2.7) and where   Nn tnt RR 1 .
The HLaspeyres, HPaasche, and HFisher indexes use unit val-
ues for the fi rst stage of aggregation, so these indexes can explicitly 
accommodate a product being transacted at multiple prices within a unit 
time period. They reduce to the basic formulas in situations in which 
there truly is just one price per period for each product. From Equa-
tions (2.12) to (2.14), we see too that the HLaspeyres, HPaasche, and 
HFisher indexes are summary metrics for relatives of average prices 
(i.e., what we will refer to as unit-value price relatives), defi ned as
(2.16) )/( ,0,1  nn pp .
These unit-value price relatives reduce to the usual price relatives given 
in Equation (2.6) when there is just one price per period for each prod-
uct. Thus the HLaspeyres, HPaasche, and HFisher formulas are gener-
alizations of the basic formulas. 
Analysts who have estimated price indexes using raw scanner or 
other transactions-level data16 from merchants or from fi nancial mar-
kets are, in fact, already accustomed to evaluating price indexes based 
on unit-value price relatives,17 but they have not always made this prac-
tice explicit by spelling out the data-processing specifi cs. By calling 
attention to how the formulas in Equations (2.12) through (2.16) depart 
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from the corresponding basic formulas, and by providing terminology 
for these practices, we hope to facilitate efforts aimed at fi nding practi-
cal solutions to the problems statistical agencies face in dealing with the 
reality of multiple prices per index basket product per period.
An Important Historical Clarifi cation
We chose to label as “hybrid” indexes the Laspeyres, Paasche, 
and Fisher formulas given in Equations (2.12) to (2.14) above. But, 
in fact, these are the “true” Laspeyres, Paasche, and Fisher indexes as 
introduced by the original authors. Only one of the multiple authors of 
this chapter (namely, Erwin Diewert) had the language skills needed 
to go back to the original German articles by Laspeyres (1871) and 
Paasche (1874). However, Walsh (1901, 1921) and Fisher (1922) wrote 
in English and are quite explicit that unit-value prices and total quanti-
ties transacted in a given time period and market place are the “right” 
p’s and q’s that should be used in a bilateral index-number formula at 
the fi rst stage of aggregation over transactions that take place at differ-
ent prices within the period. 
Of course, when authors put their creations into the public domain, 
they cannot control how others alter what they originally proposed. It is 
clear that large numbers of authors have defi ned and used the indexes 
as in Equations (2.2) through (2.4) above, which correspond to what 
we have labeled as the “basic” indexes. And offi cial statistics agencies 
have typically defi ned and used the indexes in the form we give subse-
quently (in Equations [2.31] through [2.33]), and which we refer to as 
the “conventional” indexes. It is in this context, and in the context of 
uses we make of the indexes subsequently in this chapter, that we refer 
to the formulas in Equations (2.12) through (2.14) as “hybrid” indexes.
Working with Grouped Transactions Data
Suppose we want to divide up the transactions for the N products 
covered by a price index according to one or more auxiliary attributes. 
For transaction j for product n in period t, the price and quantity are 
denoted here by jtnp
,  and jtnq
, . We can designate a total of C exhaus-
tive and mutually exclusive groups for the transactions: G1 ,, GC. For 
each group of transactions, the total quantity and the average price (i.e., 
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the group quantity and the group unit value) are given, respectively, by
(2.17) ?
?
?
Gcj
jt
n
Gct
n qq
,,   and  Gctn
Gcj
jt
n
jt
n
Gct
n qqpp
,,,, /)( ?
?
? ?.
Hence, for each product n, the overall quantity transacted in period t can 
be represented as
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The overall unit price for product n in period t can now be given as
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where for group Gc = Gc,…, GC, the following conditions hold for the 
quantity shares: Gctns
, , for groups Gc = 1,…, GC:
(2.20) tn
Gct
n
Gct
n qqs /
,, ?   and  1,1, ??? GCtn
Gt
n ss ?  .
Note that the quantity shares defi ned in Equation (2.20) can only 
be meaningfully computed when the product units being added are 
homogeneous with respect to their primary attributes. With this proviso, 
when the total quantity transacted in period t is computed as in Equation 
(2.18) and the period t unit value for each product n is computed as in 
Equation (2.19), then the HLaspeyres, HPaasche, and HFisher formu-
las given in Equations (2.12) through (2.14) can be evaluated. In other 
words, the only adjustment needed in this grouped-transactions case 
is to use Equations (2.18) and (2.19), rather than (2.10) and (2.11), to 
compute the quantity and price summary statistics.
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A Formula for the Bias in Conventional Laspeyres, Paasche, and 
Fisher Indexes 
As noted, with some exceptions, the conventional statistics agency 
practice is to collect just one price per index basket product at a selected 
establishment in a time period. Without loss of generality, we denote the 
one transaction used in the conventional index as Transaction 1 (i.e., 
as j = 1). The full set of transactions in a given period t for each prod-
uct n can then be divided into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
groups, G1 and G2, with G1 containing the single transaction used in 
compiling a conventional price index and G2 containing the rest of the 
transactions, which are transactions ignored in the conventional way of 
compiling the index. Hence, for G1, the quantity and price summary 
statistics can be denoted, respectively, as
(2.21) 1,1, tn
Gt
n qq   and 1,1, tnGtn pp  ,
and, from Equation (2.17), we see that for group G2 we have
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where 2,Gtnq  is the quantity total and 
2,Gt
np  is the unit value for the G2 
transactions.
The total quantity transacted for each product n in period t is the 
sum of the transaction quantities for the G1 and the G2 groups, so we 
have
(2.23) 2,1,
2
,
1
,
1
, Gt
n
Gt
n
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n
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.
And, from the last expression in Equation (2.19), the overall unit price 
for product n in period t is
(2.24) ,22,1,1, t,Gn
Gt
n
Gt
n
t,G
n
t
n spspp ???  
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where now for the quantity share statistics we have
(2.25) tn
Gt
n
Gt
n qqs /
1,1,    and  tnGtnGtn qqs /2,2,    with 12,1,  GtnGtn ss .
For our price index bias analyses in the next section, it will prove 
useful to defi ne a factor relating the average of the G2 transaction 
prices to the single G1 price. The product-specifi c discount factor, tnd ,
is defi ned so that 1 minus this discount factor is the factor of propor-
tionality relating the average for the ignored G2 prices to the G1 price:
(2.26) 1,2, )1( Gtn
t
n
Gt
n pdp  .
When the average price for the G2 transactions for product n in 
period t is less than the corresponding G1 price, then tnd  will be strictly 
between 0 and 1. When the average for the G2 prices is greater than the 
G1 price, then tnd  will be negative, making )1(
t
nd  greater than 1. 
The overall average price can now be represented as follows for product 
n in period t:
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  using (2.26)
 
  after factoring out .1,Gtnp
We see from the last line of Equation (2.27) that what we label as the 
price quote representativeness term, given by (1 2,Gtntn sd? ), relates 
the unit value for all the period t transactions for product n to the one 
price quote used when following conventional index-making practice.
Now we defi ne a product-specifi c price index representativeness 
factor 1,0n  as the ratio of the price quote representativeness terms for 
Period 1 versus Period 0:
1 herew 2,1, Gtn
Gt
n ss ??
−
−
−
−
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(2.28) .
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This price index representativeness factor equals 1 when the represen-
tativeness term has the same value in both Period 0 and Period 1. As 
long as this factor is approximately equal to 1, then the overall average 
price for product n is related in the same manner in both Periods 0 and 1
to the one price quote conventionally utilized each period. In contrast, 
values of 1,0n that are appreciably different from 1 indicate that there is 
a difference between Periods 0 and 1 in how the overall average price 
relates to the price quote utilized. (Note that 1,0n exists and is positive 
if there are at least two transactions per period; 2,Gtns  must be strictly 
less than 1 because G1 must contain a transaction for some positive 
quantity in both time periods, and tnd  must be strictly less than 1 since 
the average G2 price is positive in either time period.)
The last expression for the HLaspeyres price index given in Equa-
tion (2.12) can now be restated to incorporate the relative price index 
representativeness factor 1,0n : 
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using (2.28).
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Similarly, the HPaasche price index given in Equation (2.13) can be 
restated as
(2.30) 
1
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The HFisher counterpart of Equations (2.29) and (2.30) is still given by 
Equation (2.14), but with the HLaspeyres and HPaasche components 
now given by Equations (2.29) and (2.30).
We are now ready to defi ne the price index formulas we will refer 
to as conventional.18 To obtain the conventional Laspeyres price index 
(PCL0,1), we substitute the single price relative, given by (pn1,G1/ pn0,G1), for
the price relative of the average prices, given by )/( ,0,1  nn pp , in the 
fi rst expression for PHL0,1 in Equation (2.29). This yields what we refer to 
as the conventional Laspeyres index, based on the conventional prac-
tice of only using one price observation per product in each time period:
(2.31) ? ? ???
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???
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n
nCL p
p
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Similarly, to obtain the conventional Paasche price index (PCP
0,1), we 
substitute (pn1,G1/ pn0,G1) for )/( ,0,1  nn pp  in the expression for PHP0,1 given 
in Equation (2.30). This substitution yields what we refer to as the con-
ventional Paasche index, based also on the conventional practice of 
only using one price observation per product in each time period:
(2.32) 
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The conventional Fisher price index (PCF0,1) is given by
(2.33) 2/11,01,01,0 )( CPCLCF PPP ?  .
In the index-number literature, the term “bias” refers to a systematic 
difference between the result that would be obtained for some index in 
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use or considered for use versus a specifi ed target index. To this point, 
we have only demonstrated the price index representativeness factor 
as an outcome of sampling error: basing an index on one product item 
will generally yield a different answer from using the entire popula-
tion of product prices. In the next section, however, we present reasons 
why the price of the selected item could have a systematically differ-
ent expectation from the population unit value. If we use PHL, given in 
Equation (2.29) as the target index, then the bias of the conventional 
Laspeyres index given in Equation (2.31) is
(2.34) 
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 using (2.28).
 
Similarly, using Equations (2.30) and (2.32), the bias for the conven-
tional Paasche index is
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It is cumbersome to develop a bias formula for the conventional 
Fisher index given in Equation (2.33). However, as Diewert and 
Nakamura (2010, appendix) explain, it is straightforward to develop 
formulas for the differences between the arithmetic averages of the 
Laspeyres and Paasche components for the conventional and for the 
target Laspeyres and Paasche components, respectively, of the conven-
tional and the target Fisher indexes.19 Thus, the bias of the conventional 
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Fisher index can be approximated by
(2.36) ]2/)[(]2/)[( 1,01,01,01,01,01,01,0 HPHLCPCLHFCFCF PPPPPPB ?????? .
DIFFERENT SORTS OF PRICE INDEX SELECTION BIAS
In this section, we show how the expression in Equation (2.34) 
can be used to represent and provide a framework of analysis for price 
index bias stemming from various sorts of causes. We focus here on the 
Laspeyres bias formula because the BLS (and other statistical agen-
cies) mostly use the Laspeyres index in their infl ation measurement 
programs. However, comparable results for the Paasche and Fisher for-
mulas can be derived starting instead from Equation (2.35) or (2.36). 
Outlet Substitution Bias in the CPI
For the CPI, the BLS collects prices from selected retail outlets. 
In an effort to control for possible price-determining factors that can 
differ even for the same commercial product (i.e., to control for what 
we call auxiliary product item attributes), the BLS only forms price 
relatives for product items sold at the same retail outlet (see Greenlees 
and McClelland [2011]). Suppose, however, that households mostly 
care about what they must pay for products characterized by their pri-
mary attributes (including the brand and producer) and hence shift their 
expenditures among retail outlets in response to advertising about pric-
ing policies and temporary promotional sales. The benefi ts of this sort 
of price-informed shopping in terms of the prices actually paid for the 
products used by any one consumer will be missed by a practice of 
only pairing prices for product items purchased at the same retail outlet 
in forming price relatives. If the ratio of the average price paid to the 
price used in the index is falling because opportunities for paying lower 
prices are increasingly being taken up by consumers using new forms of 
Internet- and cell phone–based advertising, then the conventional index 
will be upwardly biased.
The potential for outlet-specifi c evaluation to cause CPI price index 
bias was noted decades ago. In a 1962 report, Edward Denison raised 
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   42 2/16/2015   8:32:07 AM
Sourcing Substitution and Related Price Index Biases   43
the concern that, in his words, “revolutionary changes in establishment 
type that have taken place in retail trade” may have caused “a substan-
tial upward bias” in the CPI (Denison 1962, p. 162).20 
Marshall Reinsdorf empirically investigated Denison’s CPI bias 
hypothesis. The BLS produces average price (AP) series for selected 
food groups. These are unit-value series for certain food categories, 
though not for strictly homogenous products, as we advocate. Reinsdorf 
(1993) compared selected AP series for food and gasoline with the corre-
sponding CPI component series. He discovered that from 1980 to 1990, 
the CPI and AP series for comparable products diverged by roughly 2 
percentage points a year, with the CPI series rising faster than the AP 
series, as would be expected if the CPI systematically fails to capture 
the benefi ts to consumers of price-motivated retail outlet switching. 
These empirical results captured the attention of Erwin Diewert, inspir-
ing him to derive a formula for what he called the outlet substitution 
bias problem (Diewert 1998). 
Reinsdorf (1998) later found that formula bias in the CPI caused 
part of the divergences between CPIs and corresponding AP series, 
so the outlet substitution effects turned out to be less than what was 
reported in his 1993 paper. However, a still substantial bias of 0.25 
percentage points per year was found for both food and gasoline. The 
combined efforts of Reinsdorf and Diewert then galvanized other econ-
omists and price statisticians to take the outlet substitution bias problem 
seriously.21
If a signifi cant number of consumers regularly switch where they 
shop among multiple retail outlets depending on the product prices each 
is currently offering, then we would expect tnd , defi ned in Equation 
(2.26), to be strictly between 0 and 1 in value for both Periods 0 and 
1. This alone, however, will not cause a bias problem. We see from 
Equation (2.34) that the key question is whether the term 2,Gtn
t
nsd  has 
been changing in value over time. If the value of this term happened to 
stabilize, there would then be no outlet substitution bias. We believe, 
however, that the G2 quantity share ( 2,Gtns ) has been growing over time 
for two sorts of complementary reasons. The fi rst is that there have 
been steady improvements in the access that consumers have to current 
information about retail prices at different outlets in consumers’ market 
areas, including now even “smart phone” geotargeted advertising. The 
second is that modern information technologies have made it cheaper 
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and easier for retailers to implement strategically designed tempo-
rary promotional sales, which tend to generate high demand given the 
expanded abilities of advertisers to inform consumers of promotional 
sales. Hence, we expect the Laspeyres index bias given by Equation 
(2.34) to be positive.  
CPI Promotional Sale Bias
Outlet substitution bias, discussed above, can result from a failure 
to capture a growing trend for consumers to take advantage of tem-
porary sale and other price differences among retail outlets. However, 
even at the same retail outlet, units of a product are often sold at both 
regular and promotional sale prices within a month, which is the unit 
time period for the CPI. The frequency of temporary sales is believed 
to be increasing in the United States. The information available to con-
sumers about sale pricing has been steadily expanding, too, presumably 
allowing consumers to take progressively greater advantage of tempo-
rary promotional sale prices.22 
The BLS collects and uses for the CPI whatever prices are in effect 
at the time the price quotes are collected from each selected retail out-
let, regardless of whether the prices are identifi ed as “sale” or “regular” 
prices.23 Temporary sales are believed to be in effect for any one prod-
uct at any one outlet for less than half of the days or hours of business. 
Hence, the value of tnd  is expected to be predominantly between 0 and 
1. Nevertheless, because the capture of regular or sale prices is random, 
the value of tnd  can be either positive or negative. 
The volumes sold at promotional sale prices tend to be large and, as 
already stated, the frequency of temporary sales is believed to be rising, 
in the United States at least. As is evident from Equation (2.28), the sign 
of the change in the term 2,Gtn
t
nsd  determines the sign of the promo-
tions bias.24 Because the U.S. CPI includes sales prices in proportion to 
the percentage of time in which they are offered, increased frequency 
of sales could result in either a rise or a fall in this term. A fall would 
occur if the increased frequency of sale-price offerings increased the 
relative frequency of sale prices being selected for the CPI by more than 
it increased the relative frequency of sale prices being paid by consum-
ers. On the other hand, if consumers’ costs of acquiring information 
fell, the term would likely rise, implying a positive promotions bias. 
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   44 2/16/2015   8:32:09 AM
Sourcing Substitution and Related Price Index Biases   45
Information costs have, indeed, fallen, so promotions bias is expected 
to be positive on average.25
Sourcing Substitution Biases in the PPI and MPI
Finding cheaper input sources and then making sourcing substitu-
tions is a prevalent strategy for lowering business costs. Empirical evi-
dence suggests that this sort of supplier switching behavior plays an 
economically important role in the survival and growth of new fi rms 
(e.g., Bergin, Feenstra, and Hanson 2009; Foster, Haltiwanger, and 
Syverson 2008).26 If both the old and the new suppliers are domestic, it 
is the uses of the Producer Price Index (PPI) as a defl ator for inputs that 
can be affected. If both the old and the new suppliers are foreign, it is 
the Import Price Index (MPI) that can be affected. 
For both the PPI and MPI cases, we would expect the values of tnd  
in Equation (2.26) to be strictly between 0 and 1. Moreover, we would 
expect the G2 quantity share ( 2,Gtns ) to have been growing over time 
because of expanding information availability about suppliers and their 
prices, enabling purchasers to take greater advantage of lower-priced 
offers. Hence, we would expect positive biases in the relevant price 
indexes from sourcing substitutions.27
We next provide a simple example illustrating the sourcing substitu-
tion bias problem for the MPI. We then go on to take up two other pos-
sible sorts of producer sourcing changes that may cause bias problems.
An Example of MPI Sourcing Substitution Bias Due to Import 
Sourcing Switches
Here we distinguish a supplier (k) from a buyer (k ). For our exam-
ple, Businesses 1 and 2 are foreign suppliers (hence, 2,1k ), and Busi-
nesses 3 and 4 are domestic buyers (hence, 4,3k ) for a single prod-
uct. The quantities and prices are denoted by qtk,k' and ptk,k'. With only one 
product, a Laspeyres (or Paasche or Fisher) price index reduces to a 
ratio of a single price or average price for the one product in each of the 
two time periods for the price index 
The value fl ows summarized in Table 2.1 refl ect the following 
specifi cs:
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• Business 1 is a developed-country supplier to Business 3, with 
this supply arrangement having been in place already for more 
than two periods as of the start of Period 0 for this example. 
• Business 2 is a cheaper, developing-country supplier that has a 
supply arrangement with Business 4 that was in place already for 
more than two periods as of the start of Period 0.
• Business 3 purchases from Business 1 in both Periods 0 and 1. 
In Period 1, Business 3 also enters into a new purchasing rela-
tionship with the low-cost supplier Business 2. Houseman et al. 
(2011) note the potential importance of the entry of lower-cost 
suppliers in the domestic economy (as well as competition from 
foreign producers, which is the case to which they devote more 
attention). What a new supplier charges has no effect on the 
“conventional” price index.
• Business 4 has had an ongoing purchasing relationship with 
Business 2 and continues to buy exclusively from Business 2 in 
Periods 0 and 1. 
• The following inequalities hold:
    
00 4,2
0
3,1  pp , 01 4,213,1  pp , 01 3,213,1  pp .
The price indexes for domestic businesses 3 and 4 can be regarded 
as the MPI index series. 
The conventional price index for Business 4, PCL(4) is the same as 
our hybrid Laspeyres target price index for that business, PHL(4), because 
Table 2.1  Value Flows for the Four Businesses
Output fl ows Input fl ows
Business 1  Business 2  Business 3 Business 4
Period 0 value fl ows
0
3,1
0
3,1 qp
0
4,2
0
4,2 qp
0
3,1
0
3,1 qp 0 4,20 4,2 qp
Period 1 value fl ows
1
3,1
1
3,1 qp
1
4,2
1
4,2
1
3,2
1
3,2 qpqp  1 3,21 3,213,113,1 qpqp  1 4,21 4,2 qp
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Business 4 uses just one supplier each period. That is, for this case, the 
conventional price index equals the target price index:
(2.37) )4(0 4,2
1
4,2
)4( / HLCL PppP ?? .
Thus there is no bias problem for PCL(4). 
In contrast, we can show that the conventional price index for Busi-
ness 3 is biased, and we can show what the bias depends on. For Busi-
ness 3, the conventional price index is 
(2.38) ippPCL ??? 1/ 03,113,1)3(  ,
where (1 + i) is the measured infl ation rate using this conventional price 
index. This conventional price index takes no account of the fact that 
in Period 1, Business 3 not only bought from Business 1 but also used 
a new supplier, Business 2. In contrast, and under our assumption that 
Business 3 views the products from the two suppliers as equivalent, the 
specifi ed target index for Business 3 uses the information for all the 
transactions in Period 1. This price information is summarized in Period 
1 by the unit value
1
3,p ; i.e., we have
(2.39) 1 3,2
1
3,2
1
3,1
1
3,11
3,2
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1
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where
(2.40) 
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Hence, the target output price index for Business 3 is given by
(2.41) 1 3,2
0
3,1
1
3,2
1
3,1
0
3,1
1
3,1
0
3,1
1
3
)3( )/()/(/ sppspppuPHL ???  .
It is the price charged by the lower-priced supplier, Business 2, that 
is ignored by the conventional price index for Business 3. The price 
charged by Business 2 is what constitutes the G2 group price for this 
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example, whereas p1 3,1  is the G1 price. Using Equation (2.26), we have
(2.42) 1 3,2
11
3,1 )1( pdp   ,         
where 0 < d1 < 1. In Period 0, there is only the one supplier for Business 
3. Hence, applying Equation (2.34) yields the following:28 
(2.43) 
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                 using Equation (2.38).
The last two lines of Equation (2.43) are convenient alternative expres-
sions for the sourcing substitution bias of PCL(3). 
We note that the last expression in Equation (2.43) is the same as 
Equation (2.12) in Diewert and Nakamura (2010).29 This bias is seen to 
depend on
• the rate of price infl ation as measured by the conventional index,
• the proportional cost advantage of any ignored supply source(s), 
and
• the quantity share for any ignored supply source(s). 
If estimates can be made for the above factors, then a rough approx-
imation to the bias given in Equation (2.43) can be made using this 
formula, which is a special case of our general bias formula found in 
Equation (2.34). 
Domestic to Foreign Supplier Switches and a Proposed True Input 
Price Index (IPI)
We next consider the case of a business that switches from using 
a domestic supplier to a foreign one, thereby benefi ting from an input 
cost decrease.30 Neither the PPI nor the MPI can capture the cost sav-
ings from this sort of a sourcing substitution. The PPI’s domain of defi -
nition does not include imports, and the MPI measures price changes 
beginning in the second month in which a newly selected imported 
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product is observed. The resulting price index coverage gap is wor-
risome, since most of the increase in the relative importance of trade 
in the U.S. economy is accounted for by the expansion of imports of 
intermediate products.31 
The pricing gap between the PPI and the MPI programs could be 
closed by creating a true Input Price Index (IPI) program that is defi ned 
to measure the infl ation experience of producers in buying their inputs 
from all sources: foreign as well as domestic. In this case, the price 
evolutions measured should include those associated with shifts in pur-
chase shares from more to less expensive domestic producers, and from 
more to less expensive foreign producers, as well as from domestic to 
cheaper foreign producers. 
The BLS has put forward a plan for a true IPI (Alterman 2008, 
2009; Chapter 10, this volume). With an IPI, a newly imported product 
that matches the primary attributes of a domestically supplied product 
could be brought into the IPI as a directly comparable substitute. Also, 
in principle, the purchaser of the inputs would be able to report the price 
per unit irrespective of the sources for inputs they treat as homogeneous 
in terms of what is done with the product purchases. 
However, current BLS practice is not to average over prices for 
items of different products, even when they were explicitly designed 
to meet the same product specifi cations and differ only in terms of the 
producer of the product items. If this practice is retained for the IPI 
program too, then the new IPI could also be subject to sourcing substi-
tution bias.32 This potential IPI bias can be represented using Equation 
(2.34) in the same manner as for the PPI and MPI cases, except that pur-
chases for domestic as well as imported inputs must now be covered. 
For the same sorts of reasons as discussed above for the PPI and MPI, 
we would expect this potential bias problem to be positive.33
Infl ation Measurement Problems Due to the Initial Switch 
to Outsourcing
When a business switches from in-house production to procurement 
of an intermediate input, this is usually done in hopes of realizing cost 
savings. The fact that this sort of cost savings will not be picked up by 
the PPI or MPI programs is sometimes treated as an aspect of the new-
goods price index bias problem, even if there is nothing new in terms of 
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the input product in question. We note, however, that there will usually 
be no way for a business to make this sort of a change without altera-
tions to the operating processes of the business. Perhaps, therefore, this 
sort of sourcing change should be viewed as a business technology 
change that should be counted as a contribution to productivity growth. 
Nevertheless, regardless of which of these perspectives is adopted, this 
sort of change is outside the scope of this chapter. 
FIVE SORTS OF BARRIERS TO ADOPTION OF UNIT 
VALUES FOR OFFICIAL STATISTICS PURPOSES 
The target indexes we recommend incorporate unit values. As we 
have noted, there are impediments to the adoption of indexes like this by 
statistics agencies in their offi cial published series. Here we deal with 
what we see as the main impediments, grouped under fi ve subheadings.
Impediment 1: Bad Reputation Due to Historical Misuse of 
Unit-Value Indexes 
More than a half-century ago, the Price Statistics Review Commit-
tee chaired by George Stigler, also known as the Stigler Committee, 
considered the relative merits of unit value versus what is referred to 
as specifi cation pricing. It recommended the latter. Under the heading 
of “Specifi cation vs. Unit Pricing,” the Stigler Committee report states 
the following:
In 1934, the Bureau of Labor Statistics adopted “specifi cation” 
pricing, and since then has sought to price narrowly defi ned com-
modities and services to obtain price relatives for price indexes…. 
The Committee believes that in principle the specifi cation method 
of pricing is the appropriate method for price indexes. The chang-
ing unit values of a broad class of goods (say shirts or automo-
biles) refl ect both the changes in prices of comparable items 
and the shifting composition of lower and higher quality items.
(Price Statistics Review Committee 1961, p. 32, italics added) 
Note, however, that the Stigler Committee’s opposition to unit val-
ues did not arise in the context of price collection for carefully and very 
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narrowly specifi ed products, as we are recommending; rather, it arose 
in the context of prices collected for what nowadays would be viewed 
as very broadly specifi ed products. 
The Stigler Committee report recommended that the BLS move to 
probability sampling methods for narrowly specifi ed products rather 
than using the customs administrative data, which were for unaccept-
ably broad product groups. For example, with the BLS practices based 
on customs data, the price of new cars was based on the average of what 
were referred to as the “low-priced three” makes of automobile (Chev-
rolet, Ford, and Plymouth), with no adjustment for quality as the mod-
els evolved over time. The committee report particularly was concerned 
that “in the case of the Farm Indexes the classes over which unit values 
are computed are still often too wide” (p. 33). An accompanying study 
by Rees (1961) argued that the Farm Index measure of rugs, which did 
not specify the fi ber content, failed to capture a substantial rise in the 
price of wool rugs as refl ected in the BLS data (and in Sears and Ward 
catalogs) because it increasingly captured the pricing of wool-rayon 
blend rugs (pp. 150–153).34 Similarly, the old U.S. Census Bureau unit-
value indexes for imports and exports were based on customs admin-
istrative data for very broad product categories. As a result, the Census 
Bureau unit-value average prices were clearly subject to mix shifts. 
As part of its response to the Stigler Report, in 1973 the BLS began 
producing rudimentary versions of an Import Price Index (MPI) and an 
Export Price Index (XPI) using price quotes and value-share weights 
produced by methods similar to those used for the PPI program. Full 
coverage of import and export goods categories was achieved by 1982 
for the MPI and XPI (Silver 2010). Nevertheless, the Census Bureau 
unit-value indexes were not discontinued until July 1989. Alterman 
(1991) takes advantage of data from the overlap years to conduct a com-
parative empirical study of the Census Bureau unit-value indexes ver-
sus the MPI and XPI produced by the BLS. That study notes that if unit 
values are computed for what, in fact, are different products, then those 
price indexes will refl ect not only the underlying price changes but also 
any changes in product mix as well. By way of example, he goes on to 
state that if there were a market shift, say, “from cheap economy cars 
to expensive luxury cars, the unit value of the commodity (autos) will 
increase, even if all prices for individual products remain constant.” 
This clarifying remark makes it clear that Alterman, in his 1991 paper, 
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is referring to the commodity categories the Census Bureau used in 
constructing its unit-value indexes rather than to precisely and very nar-
rowly defi ned products. Alterman’s remark was true for the customs 
data that the Census Bureau used in constructing its unit-value indexes 
but does not pertain to our proposals, as seen in the following quotation:
In comparing price trends of imported products, the BLS series, 
surprisingly, registered a consistently higher rate of increase 
between 1985 and 1989. Between March 1985 and June 1989 the 
BLS index rose 20.8 percent, while the equivalent unit-value index 
increased just 13.7 percent. . . .With the exception of motor vehi-
cles, the major import components—foods, feeds, and beverages, 
industrial supplies and materials, capital goods, and consumer 
goods—all show larger increases in the BLS series than in the 
unit-value series. The most dramatic difference between the two 
series is found in the comparison for imported consumer goods. 
Between March 1985 and June 1989 the BLS series recorded a 
30.7 percent increase, while the comparable unit-value series rose 
just 10.3 percent. (Alterman 1991, p. 116, italics added)
In the above quotation, Alterman (1991) also reports an interest-
ing anomaly along with his other fi ndings. As Alterman explains, his 
discovery that the Census Bureau unit-value series shows smaller price 
increases for imports than the MPI contradicts a common presumption 
about the nature of unit-value indexes. This is the presumption that 
quality levels tend to rise over time, so that the failure to adjust for 
product mix changes within the product categories for which prices are 
being averaged will typically cause unit-value indexes based on broad 
product categories to overstate the true price increases.35 
We, however, now suspect that what Alterman identifi ed as an 
“anomalous” result is a manifestation of sourcing substitution bias in 
the MPI: a problem that would not have affected the Census Bureau 
unit-value series in the same way. In particular, the MPI produced by 
the BLS could not capture direct cost savings that buyers achieved by 
switching to lower-cost suppliers. In contrast, the old Census Bureau 
unit-value series probably did capture at least some of those price-
motivated buying switches among products sharing the same, or almost 
the same, primary attributes.36 
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Impediment 2: Questions Regarding the Proper Treatment of 
Auxiliary Attributes
Producers of mass-marketed products try to ensure the homogene-
ity of items of what they label as being the same commercial product. 
Producers usually want it to be the case that items of what they label as 
“a product” can be advertised and sold interchangeably. For example, 
a 10.75-ounce can of Campbell’s tomato soup, as this is defi ned by the 
company that owns the brand, is intended by Campbell’s to be the same 
product no matter when, where, or how a can of the soup is purchased. 
Nevertheless, as has been noted, product items that all have the same 
primary attributes can acquire different auxiliary attributes such as hav-
ing been sold at regular price or during a temporary promotional sale, or 
at a neighborhood convenience store versus a superstore. 
We argue that in terms of the fi nal uses made of products, it is usu-
ally just the primary attributes that matter. For example, when it comes 
to using cans of soup in a kitchen cupboard that may have been pur-
chased from different outlets to take advantage of price promotions, 
typically no account is taken of the forgone effort or time of the family 
member who did the shopping. This is in line with current practices for 
compiling the gross domestic product (GDP). That aggregate is com-
piled for the United States by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
following the guidelines of the System of National Accounts (SNA). It 
is explicit in the SNA that no account is taken of unpaid time expen-
ditures of household members, whether for picking up groceries at a 
superstore as opposed to a nearby convenience store, or for any other 
activity (United Nations Statistics Division 2014). Moreover, the nomi-
nal value of the consumption aggregate includes all sales of consumer 
products at the prices for which they were, in fact, purchased. One main 
purpose of the CPI program is to provide components to be used for 
constructing defl ators for the consumption aggregate of the GDP.
We can, nevertheless, see reasons for wanting to hold a variety of 
auxiliary attributes constant in estimating the price relatives that are 
used in compiling a price index. After all, customers are willing to pay 
more per unit for the soup cans sold in a convenience store, and, in that 
sense, those cans of soup are defi nitely of “higher quality” than lower-
priced units of the product sold at a discount superstore. An important 
secondary consideration from our perspective is that whatever product 
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differentiation and index basket defi nitions are adopted for price-quote 
collection purposes, it is important that those same index basket product 
defi nitions are used as well in collecting the data for and in producing 
the product-specifi c value-share weights for the price index. The ques-
tion of if and when auxiliary product unit attributes should be used in 
forming index basket product defi nitions is deep, and largely beyond 
the scope of this chapter.
Impediment 3: Producer Goods with Different UPCs but the Same 
Primary Attributes
The mechanics of price measurement for producer goods are greatly 
simplifi ed when the products can be specifi ed as individual product 
UPCs or predefi ned groups of these. It is the primary product character-
istics that usually matter for how product units are utilized in a produc-
tion process, and differences in primary attributes are always refl ected 
in different UPCs. 
Nevertheless, UPCs for product units sometimes differ even though 
the product units are, for all practical purposes, identical. For example, 
as previously noted, many large manufacturers issue precise specifi ca-
tions for needed intermediate products, and then purposely select multi-
ple suppliers from among the businesses that bid on the supply contract 
opportunity. If intermediate product units are produced according to 
specifi cations that are identically the same but they nevertheless come 
from different producers, then the product units from each producer 
will have a different producer-specifi c UPC. For price index compila-
tion purposes, we recommend that items of products that are believed to 
be the same and are utilized in the same manner by the fi nal user should 
usually be treated as the same product for price index evaluation pur-
poses even when their UPCs may differ. In addition, if a producer indi-
cates that the product items from different suppliers are used or sold in 
the same way except for some allowance for a quality difference (e.g., 
through purchase order adjustments to allow for supplier-specifi c defect 
rates), then the producer could also be asked to report and evaluate the 
quality difference, and that information could be used in implementing 
quality adjustments so that the items from the different suppliers can all 
be treated as quality-adjusted items of the same index basket product. 
However, defi ning meaningful classifi cation systems of UPCs can 
be expected to be a laborious process. 
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Impediment 4: Consumer Products Sharing Primary Attributes 
but Not UPCs
Concerns have also been raised regarding the infl ation measurement 
implications of a growing proliferation of retail products with different 
UPCs even when the producer is the same and the primary product-
attribute differences are trivial. One reason for this proliferation may be 
that producers supplying retail products fear that their customers may 
switch to buying the products of competitors if they raise their prices. 
Hence, they instead may bring out new versions of a product that are 
minor variants: variants that are advertised as being improved and that 
are offered at increased prices that yield higher profi t margins. The cor-
responding old versions can then continue to be sold too, only to be 
discontinued if and when a new version has become a sales success (see 
Nakamura and Steinsson [2008, 2012]). 
Another reason for the introduction by a producer of a new product 
that intentionally has primary attributes that are highly similar to the 
attributes of an existing product may be a desire to take market share 
from competitors with successful products. In these cases, the producer 
wants the new product to differ enough from the old one marketed by 
the competitor to avoid successful trademark or patent infringement 
lawsuits but hopes that potential users will judge the new product to 
meet all the needs and uses of the old one they were purchasing. We 
view this as the spirit, for example, in which large grocery store chains 
often introduce their own “private label” variants of popular established 
brand-name products. Similarly, clothing makers often try to bring out 
styles like those of popular designers. And pharmaceutical companies 
often try to fi nd ways of producing drugs as effective as the successful 
drugs produced by competitors. These products have different UPCs 
but are deliberately similar to existing products in terms of the primary 
attributes. 
Conversely, but equivalently for measurement purposes, a producer 
may have the goal of maintaining a constant price by replacing a prod-
uct with another that is less costly to produce.
Although statistical agencies like the BLS do not average over 
changing sets of multiple-price quotes for individual products, for price 
change to be measured correctly, unit values are sometimes defi ned 
in BLS price index programs to encompass multiple UPCs that repre-
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sent the same index basket product. Adoption of our recommendations 
implies an extension of these practices. However, the task of determin-
ing when consumer products with different UPCs should be treated as 
the same index basket product for infl ation measurement purposes may 
be harder than the corresponding problem discussed above for producer 
products. There are three reasons for this: 
1) Consumers are far more numerous than producers, and they 
generally each buy much smaller amounts than producers pur-
chasing intermediate products. Hence the product-use views 
and experiences of much larger user groups would need to be 
considered to follow an approach for consumers like what we 
suggest above for producers.
2) Producers inevitably keep and analyze data about the perfor-
mance of units of an intermediate product that are obtained 
from different suppliers. Consumers, on the other hand, are not 
usually in a position to systematically note primary attribute 
quality differences for similar product items from different 
producers. 
3) Producer products that are similar enough that it might make 
sense to consider them as being the same index basket product 
were often requested by the purchaser. Thus, the product item 
sameness is an openly declared objective to satisfy specifi ca-
tions issued by the purchaser. In contrast, sameness in the con-
sumer case that results from an effort to expand or enter a mar-
ket by competing with the product of a competitor is usually 
illegal if the duplication is exact. Hence, for consumer prod-
ucts, design work is needed to produce a similar product that is 
nonetheless suffi ciently different so that allegations of patent or 
trademark infringement can be defended against. Foreign sup-
pliers trying to gain market share from domestic producers of 
consumer products often invest heavily in that sort of product 
design work. A great deal of effort can go into legally produc-
ing a product that is almost identical to one that already is being 
sold by some other producer. 
Even when a very similar new product is developed by a producer 
as an alternative for one of the producer’s own established products—
perhaps in the hopes of being able to use the new product as a means of 
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making a de facto price adjustment—design work is usually required. 
This is so no matter how small the differences may seem. From some 
perspectives, product development should be treated as part of produc-
tivity growth rather than as a price change mechanism. Hence, maybe 
these products truly should be treated as new products rather than as 
quality-adjusted old products. Kaplan and Menzio (2014) offer data 
on the distribution of prices across similar products as well as within 
UPCs; their analysis sheds some light on the relative importance of 
alternative product specifi cation methods. We do not attempt to provide 
answers here to these diffi cult questions. 
Nevertheless, the issue must be faced of when and how to average 
prices over units of consumer products with very similar primary attri-
butes, as is now sometimes done on the consumer side using hedonic 
and other quality-adjustment methods. This is so whether or not our 
recommendation to use unit-value price indexes is adopted. The BLS is 
already engaged on an ongoing basis in deciding when different com-
mercial products are similar enough to be treated as the same index 
basket product, but those efforts, however important, are outside the 
scope of this chapter and are not covered here.
Impediment 5: A Need to Change Current Data 
Collection Arrangements
The most straightforward impediment to conquer might be the most 
serious. The information requirements for a unit-value price approach 
based on narrowly defi ned index basket products are much larger than 
for the approaches used for conventional price indexes. Nevertheless, 
private businesses have paved the way. Businesses formerly carried out 
their decision making and forecasting using sample and other sorts of 
incomplete information for their own transactions. In contrast, mod-
ern big businesses strive to operate with full, real-time transactional 
visibility.
Thus the nature of the needed changes at the BLS and other national 
statistics agencies can be seen from the way in which large private-
sector businesses have remade their data systems over the recent 
decades and have then also remade their business processes to utilize 
their improved information capabilities. The needed hardware and soft-
ware have been developed. Nevertheless, moving a national statistics 
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agency into a position of roughly equivalent data storage and handling 
capabilities with what big companies now have will require budget allo-
cations and investments in training and hiring people with the needed 
capabilities. Private-sector data system experts do not have offi cial 
statistics expertise, and those already with the statistics agencies have 
had no opportunity to master data capture, warehousing, and utilization 
methods of the sort that have become common for big businesses, or the 
intricacies of the UPCs.37
It is instructive to briefl y examine the steps that the private sector 
had to take to attain its modern data-handling capabilities. The 1961 
Stigler Report was written before the business world had UPCs. Indeed, 
for most of the twentieth century, as stores got bigger and varieties mul-
tiplied, the only way for a grocer or other retailer to fi nd out what was in 
stock was by physically counting all the cans, boxes, bags, and cartons. 
The achievement of widespread use of UPCs was the result of sustained 
business-world efforts of many sorts. A machine-readable product-code 
design had to be devised and agreed on. Equipment for cost-effectively 
reading the product codes and for storing and processing the product-
code data had to be invented, produced, purchased, and put to use by 
businesses. A product-code numbering system had to be invented and 
widely accepted. And an organization had to be developed to oversee 
the assignment and use of product codes over time. Also, business pro-
cesses had to be redesigned to make use of the product-code data.
More than a decade before the Stigler Report was written, Bernard 
Silver and Norman Joseph Woodland developed (and in 1952 were 
granted a patent for) a bar-code design consisting of concentric circles 
that could be scanned from any direction. However, without a cheap, 
fast, and convenient way to read and record bar-code data, their inven-
tion could not be put to use. The development of cheap lasers and 
integrated circuits in the 1960s made bar-code scanners and bar-code 
data handling potentially affordable for retailers. However, the original 
Silver-Woodland “bull’s-eye” bar-code design performed poorly in an 
important fi eld test. Also, there was the challenge still to be met of get-
ting all needed participants to more forward together. 
In the early 1970s, IBM researcher George J. Laurer devised a new 
bar-code design for which the fi eld test results were acceptable. He then 
succeeded as well in getting the U.S. Supermarket Ad Hoc Committee 
interested in what was named the IBM Universal Product Code (UPC) 
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system.38 On April 3, 1973, the Ad Hoc Committee voted to accept the 
symbol proposed by IBM. 
Standardization made it worth the expense for manufacturers to put 
bar codes on their packages and for printers to develop the needed new 
ink types, plates, and other necessities for reproducing the code with 
the accuracy required for the UPC scanners, and the Ad Hoc Committee 
succeeded in bringing the grocery industry and other needed partici-
pants together to implement UPC scanning at the point of sale (POS). 
This included agreement on a standardized system for assigning and 
retiring bar-code product numbers. To facilitate this, the nonprofi t Uni-
form Code Council (UCC) was established. Businesses applied for reg-
istration with the UCC, which eventually changed its name to Global 
Standards One, or GS1.39 Each business that was accepted as a regis-
tered member began paying an annual fee and was then issued a manu-
facturer identifi cation number and given training on how to register its 
products and on how to assign and retire UPCs as needed.
Use of scanners grew slowly at fi rst. In 1978, less than 1 percent of 
grocery stores nationwide had scanners. By mid-1981, the fi gure was 
10 percent. Three years later it was 33 percent. And by 1999, it was 
already over 60 percent.40 
GS1 today manages what is collectively referred to as the Global 
Trade Item Number (GTIN) System, which includes the UPCs (GS1
.org 2014). The offi cial GS1 member organization for the United States 
is now called GS1 US. The modern logistics, inventory management, 
pricing, advertising, and supply chain coordination operations of busi-
nesses of many sorts, especially including grocers and general merchan-
dise retailers, would be inconceivable without the information derived 
from tracking items of product units identifi ed by UPCs. 
In 1999, the Supermarket Ad Hoc Committee commissioned Price-
waterhouseCoopers to make a report examining the extent to which the 
aims of the original Ad Hoc Committee business plan had material-
ized (Jones, Garg, and Sheedy 1999). The resulting report fi nds that 
the direct savings from bar-code adoption (i.e., savings at the checkout 
counter) proved greater than originally projected. The report also fi nds, 
however, that it was the general merchandise companies, rather than the 
supermarkets, that managed to most fully realize the projected indirect 
savings from bar-code scanning, and it argues that the supermarkets 
have been losing market share to superstores because of this reality. 
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(The indirect savings envisioned by the original Ad Hoc Committee 
pertain to business functions such as inventory management.) We see 
Walmart as a notable example of this last point. 
From 1973 on, as grocery and other retail chain stores grew, the 
chains almost all established semiautonomous regional data centers 
that collected and processed bar-code scanner data. The reason for the 
regional data centers that most chains created and many still have is 
that the volume of the bar-code data seemed too large for processing 
in a single data warehouse for even a midsized chain store. Neverthe-
less, in 1979 Walmart built an initial company-wide data warehouse 
(Metters and Walton 2007). Walmart was also the fi rst large retailer to 
give its suppliers access to Walmart’s point-of-sale and inventory data 
for the products of each of those suppliers, thereby helping the suppliers 
reduce costs due to under- or overproducing. Walmart recognized that 
by sharing this information with its supply-chain partners, the company 
and its suppliers could all gain from improved coordination.
To improve the reliability of access to its data warehouse, Walmart 
in 1987 also built the world’s largest private-sector satellite commu-
nications system. Then, in 1991, the company reportedly spent $4 bil-
lion more to create its new Retail Link company-wide data warehouse. 
Nowadays, Walmart suppliers are able to monitor in almost real time 
how their products are selling on Walmart store shelves everywhere that 
Walmart carries their products. The POS data is credited with enabling 
Walmart suppliers to reduce their inventories, shorten their lead times, 
and increase their profi tability. Also, with product items being electron-
ically identifi ed at the checkout counters and with fi nancial as well as 
physical inventory records being updated on an ongoing, almost real-
time basis, store managers in Walmart outlets everywhere as well as 
those in the company headquarters can plan better. 
Investments that bring the data capabilities of offi cial statistics 
agencies more into line with what big companies have could pay big 
dividends.41 This and our other reform suggestions are presented in 
the fi nal section. However, before proceeding to those suggestions, we 
briefl y note how price indexes affect some other key economic perfor-
mance metrics.
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INFLATION MEASUREMENT EFFECTS ON OTHER 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Price indexes are used to measure infl ation for nations and to trans-
form nominal into real values. Real values of national output are then 
used to measure economic growth, and for creating measures of pro-
ductivity growth and growth in material well-being over time. 
Previously we defi ned Rt in Equation (2.1) as the sum of either the 
nominal period t revenue for all products sold by some economic entity 
or the nominal period t remittance paid (i.e., the cost) for all products 
bought by a given economic entity. However, outputs need to be dis-
tinguished from inputs for productivity and economic well-being mea-
surement purposes. Productivity is a measure of the effi ciency of an 
economic entity in turning inputs into desired outputs (see, e.g., Diewert 
[2007] and Diewert and Nakamura [2007]), and economic well-being 
is usually gauged by restating in per-capita terms a measure of the total 
output for a nation (such as GDP). 
For some given economic entity, here we redefi ne tR , tnp , 
t
nq , and the 
index limits N and J as pertaining just to output products (rather than 
including inputs too, as in our previous defi nitions). Thus the total nom-
inal revenue in period t for a specifi ed economic entity is now given by
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Here, we redefi ne P 0,1 as an index measure of output price change from 
t = 0 to t = 1.
The most commonly used productivity performance metric for 
nations is labor productivity growth. Suppose Lt is defi ned as a pure 
quantity measure of labor services input such as aggregate hours of 
work. Labor productivity growth from Period 0 to 1, denoted here by 
LP0,1, can be measured as the ratio of real revenue growth to a growth 
ratio for aggregate hours of work:
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The interpretation people want to make of labor productivity values is 
that values greater than 1 (less than 1) mean that real GDP has grown 
faster (slower) over time than the quantity of labor required to produce 
the real output. 
We now consider how the price-index bias problems discussed in 
previous sections of this chapter could distort measures of real GDP 
growth. Nominal GDP for period t is defi ned as
(2.46) GDP = C + I + G = (X − M),
where C denotes aggregate consumption, I is investment, G is govern-
ment expenditure, X is exports, and M is imports. If infl ation is overes-
timated (underestimated) for the C component of GDP, this will cause 
the growth of real GDP to be underestimated (overestimated), since 
C enters with a positive sign into GDP. If infl ation is overestimated 
(underestimated) for the M component of GDP, this will cause the 
growth of real GDP to also be overestimated (underestimated), since M 
enters with a negative sign into GDP.
The outlet substitution bias problem explained in the subsection 
titled “Outlet Substitution Bias in the CPI” is believed to have contrib-
uted to the overestimation of infl ation for C, and hence to the under-
estimation of real GDP growth. The MPI sourcing substitution prob-
lem explained in the subsection “Sourcing Substitution Biases in the 
PPI and MPI” is also believed to have contributed to an overestimation 
of infl ation—for imports in this case—which would contribute to an 
overestimate, rather than an underestimate, for GDP growth because M 
enters the expression for GDP with a negative sign.42 
The extent to which these bias effects on real GDP cancel each other 
out is an empirical question. Although for the United States the C com-
ponent of nominal GDP is much larger than the M portion, there are fairly 
narrow limits on the proportion by which it makes sense for a retailer 
selling in any given market area to undercut the prices of competitors. 
This places bounds on the likely size of the CPI outlet substitution bias 
problem. In contrast, intermediate product-supply contracts can be very 
large, and suppliers sometimes have labor, raw-materials access, patent, 
government subsidy, or other cost advantages that make it possible for 
them to profi tably sell their products, if they wish, at prices far below 
what competitors are charging. Hence, it is plausible that positive MPI 
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bias problems have outweighed positive CPI bias problems, resulting in 
the systematic overestimation of real GDP growth. There is an urgent 
need for empirical research on this point.
Haskel et al. (2012) paint a vivid picture of real income declines for 
the large majority of Americans over the previous decade. They clas-
sify U.S. workers into fi ve groups by their levels of education—fi ve 
groups that all enjoyed substantial increases in average real income in 
the second half of the 1900s. However, since 2000, these same groups 
of workers have suffered real average-income declines. This is perplex-
ing, Haskel et al. note, since the U.S. economy enjoyed superior mea-
sured labor-productivity growth.43 They point out that the last 10 to 15 
years have also brought dramatic changes in economic globalization, 
but that connections between globalization and the observed economic 
trends are unclear based on available research. Our own results, consid-
ered along with other fi ndings cited in our chapter, raise the possibility 
in our minds that price-index bias problems that have been indirectly 
worsened by the growth of electronic information processing and com-
munications and associated business process changes (changes that 
enabled globalization) may, in part at least, be responsible for the per-
plexing picture of how the U.S. economy has been doing, as reported 
by Haskel et al. 
We conclude with suggested changes in offi cial statistics price 
measurement that we feel could improve our ability to understand the 
evolving economy. 
POSSIBLE PRICE MEASUREMENT PRACTICE REFORMS
We have shown that the bias formulas derived in this chapter can be 
used to represent the sourcing substitution bias problem in the Import 
Price Index (MPI) and the Producer Price Index (PPI), and the potential 
sourcing substitution bias problem in the proposed Input Price Index 
(IPI) (see Alterman 2008, 2009, and Chapter 10 of this volume), as well 
as the outlet substitution and promotions biases in the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). Our recommendations in this fi nal section are aimed at 
reducing the noted bias problems. 
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Our main recommendation is that when items of the same commer-
cial product unit are sold at multiple prices even by the same merchants 
during a time period such as a month, then the conventional practice of 
using a single price observation per period for the product from each 
establishment where the product is priced during the time period (with 
this single price then being used to represent the price distribution at 
each establishment) should be replaced by the use of establishment-
specifi c unit-value prices. Hence, we argue for greater adoption of unit-
value-based price indexes to handle cases of multiple prices for the 
same product in the same period. This fi rst recommendation implies a 
need for modifi cations of both data collection operations and compila-
tion procedures. In the text, the need for these modifi cations is part of 
what we allude to as the fi fth and most serious of the impediments to 
the adoption of unit-value-based price indexes. We propose a way here 
in which the BLS might proceed incrementally toward a capability for 
unit-value-based price-index compilation.
At present, the BLS price-quote-collection operation for each of 
the agency’s main price index programs (e.g., the CPI, the PPI, and 
the International Price Program) starts with selecting establishments on 
a probabilistic basis from comprehensive lists of various sorts. Next 
comes the selection of products on a probabilistic basis at each selected 
establishment. Then, the BLS collects a single price quote in each pric-
ing period (typically a month) for each selected product at each of the 
selected establishments.44 The way products are selected for pricing 
at different establishments does not usually result in the same product 
being chosen for price collection at more than one establishment in a 
given geographic market area. Moreover, even when the BLS price col-
lection approach does yield multiple price observations for the same 
product version, the BLS does not average over changing sets of the 
price observations.45 In addition, for producer products, an effort is 
made to only make price comparisons over time for the same buyer-
seller pairs. These are the main reasons why the BLS price-collection 
operations could not, at present, support a switch to compiling unit-
value-based price indexes.
Yet most businesses in a developed country like the United States 
have their full transactions data for at least the current month readily 
available in electronic form. Hence, with equal ease, a business could 
give the BLS information on the quantity of the selected product that 
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was bought or sold along with the price per unit that the BLS presently 
collects. Moreover, most modern businesses could provide their trans-
action value and quantity as well as price data for all transactions over 
some recent time period, such as a month, for a list of UPC-identifi ed 
products. Feenstra and Shiells (1997) made a similar recommendation 
almost 20 years ago. The respondent burden would barely vary depend-
ing on the length of the product list. Hence, the same basic probabilistic 
selection approach for products at each selected establishment could 
be retained if desired, but the products selected at each establishment 
could be added to a common product list for all establishments, and 
then a month’s worth of transactions data could be obtained from all 
selected establishments for all products on the common list.46 The BLS 
would then have the option of producing various sorts of unit-value 
price indexes. 
If averaging of prices for UPC-identifi ed products is done over time, 
month by month, for each establishment, it should be possible to pro-
duce unit-value-based price indexes that are largely free of promotions 
bias problems. However, the outlet substitution bias would remain as 
long as there is no averaging over establishments. Alternatively, if unit 
values are produced by averaging of prices for UPC-identifi ed products 
over the establishments in each designated market area, then it should 
be possible to produce unit-value-based price indexes that are largely 
free of outlet substitution as well as promotions bias problems.
Unfortunately, though, even averaging over establishments and 
time will not help with MPI and PPI sourcing substitution bias prob-
lems. The reason is that items of intermediate products that are the same 
from the perspective of how the purchasing fi rm plans to use the items 
are often bought from multiple suppliers, and product items from dif-
ferent producers have different UPCs even when all their attributes are 
identical. Thus the sourcing substitution bias problem would remain. 
Nor would this averaging of prices help with the product replacement 
bias phenomenon identifi ed by Nakamura and Steinsson—another 
important case in which the UPCs differ for product items that have 
essentially the same attributes and that should perhaps be treated as the 
same index basket product. 
At least for producer intermediate products, however, the user of 
the intermediate product units is in a position to specify the UPCs that 
are, from that user’s perspective, for the same product. Hence, we rec-
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   65 2/16/2015   8:32:25 AM
66   Nakamura et al.
ommend asking all producers from whom price quotes are collected 
whether they regard some of the UPC-identifi ed products they purchase 
as identical, in that they use the product items interchangeably and in 
identically the same manner. Moreover, if a producer indicates that the 
product items from different suppliers are used or sold in the same way 
except for some allowance for a quality difference (e.g., purchase order 
adjustments to allow for supplier-specifi c defect rates), then the pro-
ducer could also be asked to report and evaluate the quality difference, 
and that information could be used in implementing quality adjustments 
so that the product items from the different suppliers could be treated as 
items of the same constant-quality product. 
As we have noted, there are also four other sorts of impediments to 
the adoption of unit-value-based price indexes by an offi cial statistics 
agency like the BLS. One is an established and somewhat indiscrimi-
nate prejudice against unit values. We have argued that the reasons that 
led to this prejudice do not apply when the unit values are for UPC-
identifi ed or similarly very narrowly defi ned products, which is what 
we recommend.47 
We differentiate what we call primary product and auxiliary product 
attributes. We defi ne primary product attributes as characteristics that 
a product item has when fi rst sold by the original producer and that 
normally continue to be characteristics of the product item regardless 
of where and how it may be resold. We defi ne auxiliary product item 
attributes as attributes that a product item acquires as a consequence 
of where and how it is sold. A second impediment we then identify is 
that some of what a producer ships out as items of the same product 
can acquire additional auxiliary price-determining attributes, depend-
ing on where and how the product items are sold. We note that there are 
diffi cult conceptual and operational questions that arise regarding the 
treatment of auxiliary product attributes. 
We can, as already acknowledged, see reasons for wanting to hold a 
variety of auxiliary attributes constant in estimating the price relatives 
that are used in compiling a price index. However, if an auxiliary attri-
bute is used in product differentiation for price-quote collection pur-
poses, then it is important for that same auxiliary-product attribute to 
be taken into account too in collecting the data for and in producing the 
product-specifi c value-share weights for a price index. 
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A third impediment is that there are unresolved issues regarding 
the price measurement appropriateness and the operational diffi culty of 
recognizing the sameness of units of producer intermediate inputs from 
different suppliers that are viewed as identical (or almost so) by the 
businesses using these inputs. Related issues arise as well for consumer 
products, and we label those issues as the fourth impediment. So both 
Impediments 3 and 4 relate to situations where the UPC product defi ni-
tions may be narrower than ideal for infl ation measurement purposes. 
We view the task of determining when units of consumer products with 
different UPCs are, in fact, the same—or suffi ciently similar that they 
should be treated as the same for infl ation measurement purposes—as 
intrinsically harder than the corresponding problem discussed above for 
producer products. 
Clearly, we do not provide full solutions to all the problems noted,48 
and some of our proposed solutions may prove to be suboptimal. We 
offer these suggestions in the spirit of a search for better ways, which 
we believe are possible now, given product code and other modern 
information-technology developments. 
The incremental new transactions data collection approach outlined 
above would allow estimates to be made of the importance of the identi-
fi ed price-index bias problems, since this recommended approach nests 
the current BLS price-quote collection processes. The BLS could also 
draw on the growing experiences of other national statistics agencies 
that are now producing unit-value-based price indexes using electronic 
data from businesses (though, as we understand, without designating 
them as different from the conventional price indexes or explaining the 
relationship).49
We note too that the suggested incremental new data-collection 
approach would vastly enrich the BLS research databases, in addition 
to contributing to the price-index improvement agenda. Price indexes 
are ubiquitously used as measures of infl ation and as defl ators. In addi-
tion, however, the BLS research databases have been enabling a true 
empirical examination of the origins and transmissions of price sig-
nals in the U.S. economy.50 If the BLS is given the resources needed 
to harness the power of the new information technologies, including 
making fuller use of the product codes now ubiquitously used by busi-
nesses, and if our recommendations (or appropriate modifi cations of 
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these) are accepted, we believe the eventual result will be far superior 
price indexes.51 We also believe this will result in great improvements 
in the accuracy of a host of other economic measures that embed price 
indexes as component parts, as well as an even greater fl owering of 
insights into price signals, which are fundamental to the functioning of 
a free-market economy.
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1. Statistical agencies with practices more in line with our recommendation are noted 
in the seventh section, titled “Possible Price Measurement Practice Reforms.” In 
addition to those agencies, many countries rely on monthly unit values for some of 
the prices used to compile their PPIs.
2. If that is how the proxy price is arrived at, an implicit assumption is being made 
that consumers are indifferent between the 10.75-ounce and the 15.2-ounce formats 
for the Campbell’s tomato soup content. Other, more elaborate methods of quality 
adjustment might be utilized if that assumption were believed to be inappropriate.
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3. Reinsdorf (1993) and Diewert (1995, 1998) defi ned and brought attention to this 
price-index bias problem. For related materials, see Greenlees and McClelland 
(2011), Moulton (1993, 1996a,b), Reinsdorf (1994a,b,c, 1998, 1999), and Reinsdorf 
and Moulton (1997), as well as Hausman (2003), Nakamura (1999), and White 
(2000).
4. Diewert and Nakamura (2010) defi ne this bias problem and provide a measure-
ment formula for it, having been inspired to work on this problem by the argu-
ments and empirical evidence of Houseman (2007, 2009, 2011), Mandel (2007, 
2009), and Mandel and Houseman (2011). See also Fukao and Arai (Chapter 7, 
this volume), Houseman et al. (2011), and Inklaar (2012).
5. Reinsdorf and Triplett (2009) review the context and content of the Stigler Com-
mittee’s recommendations. 
6. The person who purchases a can of soup may have preferences regarding shopping 
at a convenience store or a superstore for various sorts of products, but others who 
end up eating the soup at home will likely not care where a particular can of the 
soup happened to have been purchased and often will not even be aware of that 
detail.
7. See Nakamura and Steinsson (2008, 2012) for more on this sort of “price fl exibil-
ity” and its signifi cance for understanding and for the management of infl ationary 
pressures in the macro economy.
8. Superlative indexes, defi ned by Diewert (1976, 1992), have many desirable prop-
erties when it comes to taking account of buyer substitution behavior, but they 
cannot properly account for the effects on the prices paid by buyers when that be-
havior changes because buyers progressively learn about cheaper sources of prod-
ucts rather than because of suppliers lowering their prices. See also Diewert (1987, 
2013a,b); Diewert and Nakamura (1993, 2007); Nakamura (2013); and Reinsdorf, 
Diewert, and Ehemann (2002) regarding aspects of the Fisher index of relevance 
for the use of price indexes in the making of productivity indexes for nations.
9. The Laspeyres formula is defi ned below. It can be calculated in multiple stages of 
aggregation or in a single step. The Paasche index, also defi ned below, shares this 
convenient property.    
10. Note that attributes of the product content will always be primary attributes of a 
product item. 
11. See, for example, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe et al. (2009), 
Chapter 10, p. 147, expression 10.1. There, the quantity weights are for a base pe-
riod other than the base period for the price observations because of the additional 
time often needed to obtain the data for estimating the index weights. We ignore 
this additional complication in this chapter.
12. There are many documented examples of narrowly defi ned products for both 
households and businesses being available from different producers for different 
prices. See, for example, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2009); Foster, Haltiwanger, 
and Syverson (2008); and Klier and Rubenstein (2009). 
13. While not defi ning the product-level product rule as we do here, von der Lippe 
and Diewert (2010) do make a similar sort of argument. They note that economic 
agents often purchase and sell the same commodity at different prices over a single 
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accounting period. They assert that a bilateral index-number formula requires that 
these multiple transactions in a single commodity be summarized in terms of a 
single price and quantity for the period. They explain, moreover, that if the quan-
tity is taken to be the total number of units purchased or sold during the period 
and it is desired to have the product of the price summary statistic and the total 
quantity transacted be equal to the value of the transactions during the period, then 
the single price must be the average value. They note that this point was also made 
by Walsh (1901, p. 96; 1921, p. 88) and Davies (1924, 1932) and more recently 
by Diewert (1995). See Diewert (1987) and Diewert and Nakamura (2007) on the 
conventional product test.
14. Note that if there truly is just one price for each unit time period as each product 
n is defi ned, then each individual price observation equals pn
t,• for the given n,t 
combination. Hence, the condition in Equation (2.11) will be satisfi ed when the 
conventional statistical agency practice of utilizing a single price observation for 
each product in each time period is followed.
15. The term “hybrid” was suggested to Marshall Reinsdorf by Harlan Lopez of the 
Central Bank of Nicaragua. 
16. By “raw” we mean transactions data not already aggregated over time. Providers 
of what is labeled “transactions data” often, in fact, deliver data sets consisting of 
the total quantities transacted and the unit values for some unit time period such as 
a week. See, for instance, Nakamura, Nakamura, and Nakamura (2011) for a study 
done using transactions data of this sort.
17. See, for example, Ivancic, Diewert, and Fox (2011) and Nakamura, Nakamura, 
and Nakamura (2011).
18. In defi ning these formulas, we ignore the important aspect of conventional practice 
that is the focus of the Lowe index literature: namely, that the data used in esti-
mating the value shares is collected separately from the price information used in 
index making, and is not usually even for the same time periods. See Balk (2008, 
Chapter 1) and Diewert (1993) for more on this issue.
19. For a formal proof of this result, see Diewert and Nakamura (2010, appendix), 
where this result was fi rst presented.
20. For more on the practical aspects of these “revolutionary changes” that Denison 
(1962) noted and foresaw, see Brown (1997); Freeman et al. (2011); Hausman and 
Leibtag (2007, 2009); Jones, Garg, and Sheedy (1999); and Senker (1990).
21. Important papers on this topic include Greenlees and McClelland (2011), Hausman 
(2003), Hausman and Leibtag (2007, 2009), and Moulton (1993, 1996a,b). Also, 
White (2000) presents related evidence for Canada. 
22. For more on the importance of temporary sales for explaining retail price dynam-
ics, see Nakamura and Steinsson (2008, 2012), Pashigian (1988), and Pesendorfer 
(2002). 
23. The same is true for Statistics Canada (1996, p. 5): “Since the Consumer Price 
Index is designed to measure price changes experienced by Canadian consumers, 
the prices used in the CPI are those that any consumer would have to pay on the 
day of the survey. This means that if an item is on sale, the sale price is collected.” 
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The BLS does, however, have other special procedures for handling sale prices of 
apparel at the end of the selling season.
24. The statistical agencies for some U.S. trading partners exclude temporary sale 
prices in compiling their Consumer Price Index (CPI). For example, price col-
lectors are instructed by the Statistics Bureau of Japan not to collect sale prices. 
More specifi cally, price collectors are instructed that “the following prices are ex-
cluded: Extra-low prices due to the bargain sales, clearance sales, discount sales, 
etc., which are held for less than seven days” (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2012, p. 
3, item 10). (See also Imai, Shimizu, and Watanabe [2012].) This methodology 
difference could defi nitely affect inter-nation comparisons of infl ation, economic 
growth, and well-being, and the formula in Equation (2.34) can be useful for un-
derstanding these effects.
25. We thank Brent Moulton for comments that greatly improved this section of the 
chapter.
26. Supply chain models like what Oberfi eld (2013) specifi es assume that much of 
what typically is measured as technical progress in fact refl ects the cost savings 
from supplier switches.
27. Houseman et al. (2011) provide a variety of relevant empirical evidence for the 
MPI case. 
28. Note that the terms in Equation (2.34) involving d 0n drop out of the fi nal expression 
in this case, and also that here we have S0 = 1 because, in period 0, there is only the 
one supplier for Business 3, charging a single price.
29. Equation (2) in Reinsdorf and Yuskavage (2014) modifi es this formula to use a 
value share weight instead of a quantity share by multiplying by a factor that is 
between 1 and 1/d1. Also, Houseman et al. (2010, p. 70) derive a formula for cal-
culating quantity shares from value shares and the discount d1. A related formula 
for outlet substitution bias is found in Diewert (1998, p. 51).  
30. Houseman et al. (2011) also provide relevant empirical evidence for the IPI bias 
case, including pointing out evidence in studies of others about the cost savings 
possible to a business from switching from domestic to foreign suppliers for inter-
mediate products. They note as well that “the foreign price defl ator for intermedi-
ate materials rose somewhat faster than the domestic defl ator” (p. 122). This result 
is the opposite of what, as they explain, would be the expected result and could 
be explained by price-index bias problems of the sort we consider here and in the 
previous section. They empirically implement a bias correction to an input price 
index under a range of alternative possible assumptions.
31. See Eldridge and Harper (2010); Kurz and Lengermann (2008); and Yuskavage, 
Strassner, and Medeiros (2008). 
32. This point was independently noted both by Diewert and Nakamura (2010) and by 
Reinsdorf and Yuskavage (2014).
33. An additional conceptual test is international aggregation, as in Maddison (2001). 
The sum of world GDP should be a consistent measure of world investment and 
consumption; this implies that exports and imports (with shipping costs) equate 
across nations in real terms. Eliminating sourcing biases moves us toward an abil-
ity to meet this test.  
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34. From 1948 to 1959, the relevant BLS price index services and Sears and Mont-
gomery Ward prices grew by 50 percent, whereas the Farm Index series grew by 
less than 10 percent.  
35. Alterman (1991) proposes and checks out other possible explanations as well for 
the results he observed, but he reports that those other hypotheses were rejected 
by the data.
36. Written comments by Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg on Nakamura and Steinsson 
(2012), shared with us by those authors, led us to see this point, and made us aware 
that similar issues may affect a variety of other studies and views on changes over 
time in price fl exibility and related issues for the U.S. economy and for interna-
tional comparisons.
37. There is an even larger knowledge gap opening up between the business world 
and the offi cial statistics agencies as the business world now begins to move from 
UPCs and bar code scanners to Electronic Product Code (EPC) and Radio Fre-
quency Identifi cation (RFID) usage. See Roberti (2005) for more on the nature of 
and reasons for this continuing evolution.
38. The Ad Hoc Committee consisted primarily of presidents, vice presidents, and 
CEOs who were selected from manufacturers, distributors, and retailers so as to 
ensure that the interests of all parts of the grocery supply chain were represented. 
In addition to being corporate executives, the individuals selected for the commit-
tee had signifi cant knowledge, respect, and infl uence within the entire industry. 
39. See http://www.upccode.net/upc-guide/uniform-code-council.html.
40. On how bar codes can be obtained in each nation, see http://www.gs1.org/barcodes/
need_a_bar_code. For more on this history, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Universal_Product_Code and also Kennedy (2013).
41. Walmart’s superior information systems have even enabled the company to re-
spond better to emergencies such as hurricanes than government agencies, as was 
widely reported during Hurricane Katrina (see, e.g., Barbaro and Gillis 2005).
42. We focus on just the bias problems for the CPI and MPI here because those bias 
problems affect the computation of real GDP. In contrast, whereas bias problems 
for the PPI or the proposed IPI are relevant for estimation of real input values for 
intermediate products, these problems do not affect in any direct way the computa-
tion of offi cial real GDP estimates, hence they do not directly affect the labor pro-
ductivity growth estimates of offi cial statistics agencies like the BLS. Houseman 
(2007, 2009, 2011) and Mandel (2007, 2009) have explored and helped raise inter-
est in these issues. See also Fukao and Arai (Chapter 7, this volume); Howells et 
al. (2013); Inklaar (2012); and Strassner, Yuskavage, and Lee (2009).
43. Haskel et al. (2012) refer to BLS data series #PRS85006092 at http://www.bls.gov. 
44. So if an establishment, in fact, charged or paid multiple per-unit prices for a chosen 
product in a given month, there would be no evidence of this in the BLS price-
quote data.
45. As noted above, the geometric mean indexes used in the CPI amount to averaging 
prices, but the sample of prices that are averaged is held constant between the two 
time periods being compared. In contrast, unit-value indexes allow the composi-
tion of the averages to change.  
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46. It is important for this sampling to include Internet and multichannel retailers 
(Metters and Walton 2007).
47. Indeed, the UPC-identifi ed products may be too narrowly defi ned in some cases, 
so sometimes it may be judged to be better for infl ation measurement purposes to 
treat a stated group of UPCs as being all for the same product.
48. For example, we have not even made a start on considering the problems of pro-
ducing unit values for products such as computers that are currently handled using 
hedonic methods (see, for example, Baldwin et al. [1996], Berndt and Rappaport 
[2001], Pakes [2003], and Pakes and Erickson [2011]), or pharmaceuticals and 
medical services (Berndt and Newhouse 2012).
49. The Australian Bureau of Statistics and the New Zealand Bureau of Statistics have 
reportedly been exploring ways of obtaining supermarket scanner data directly 
from the main supermarket chains in those nations and then of using weekly unit- 
value prices for grocery products that are computed by the statistical agencies 
directly from grocery-store scanner data. Also, as Guðmundsdóttir, Guðnason, and 
Jónsdóttir (2008) explain, Statistics Iceland collects electronic data from the infor-
mation systems of fi rms. Besides prices and quantities, the data Statistics Iceland 
harvests show customer identifi ers and business terms for each customer at the 
time of the trade. Statistics Iceland reports that electronic data collection has re-
sulted in lower collection costs and lighter response burdens for the participating 
fi rms. Statistics Iceland also reports that when the agency switched to electronic 
data collection from fi rms, it was also able to adopt a superlative approach for 
price-index compilation. Feenstra et al. (2013) analyze several sources of mismea-
surement in the U.S. terms of trade and fi nd that one important source of bias 
comes from the fact that the import and export price indexes published by the BLS 
are Laspeyres indexes, rather than being based on a superlative formula. 
50. The CPI Research Database is a confi dential data set that contains all the product-
level nonshelter price and characteristics data that were used to construct the CPI 
from 1988 to the present. The goods and services included in the CPI Research 
Database represent about 70 percent of consumer expenditures, the excluded cat-
egories being rent and owners’ equivalent rent. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008, 
2012) created analogous data sets from the production fi les underlying the PPI and 
also the MPI and XPI. Those data sets have become the new research databases 
for the PPI and International Price Program. These BLS research databases are 
enabling far-reaching and fundamental advances in economic understanding.
51. It is possible that more than fi nancial resources will be required. Participation in 
all BLS price surveys is voluntary, unlike the situation in many nations, and some 
businesses may consider the provision of electronic price and quantity data to be 
more burdensome than the current BLS data collection procedures.
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Appendix 2A
Putting the Picture Together with a Final Example
The BLS collects and uses prices for the CPI regardless of whether they 
are “regular” or “sale” prices. In contrast, as noted in the text, some U.S. trad-
ing partners, such as Japan and the EU countries, exclude sale prices in compil-
ing their CPI programs. A numerical example may help clarify why this choice 
matters. Consider the hypothetical data in Table 2A.1.
Table 2A.1  Regular and Temporary Sale Transaction Data for a Product
Price ($) Quantity
Transaction 
value ($)
Period (t = 0)
Regular price transactions for product n 2.00 2,000 4,000
Temporary sale discount price transactions 1.00 3,000 3,000
Total 5,000 7,000
Period (t = 1)
Regular price transactions for product n 2.20 1,000 2,200
Temporary sale discount price transactions 1.15 4,000 4,600
Total 5,000 6,800
Case 1. Suppose that only the regular price quotes are used for compiling 
a price index. As for the estimates of the value weights, following conventional 
practice, suppose these come from a household survey that does not distin-
guish between regular and sale transactions and will refl ect all transactions for 
a product. With the hypothetical data in rows 1 and 4 of Table 2A.1 for regular 
price transactions, the resulting Laspeyres, Paasche, and Fisher price indexes1 
all equal 1.1. 
Case 2. Next, suppose that both the regular and sale prices are used, treat-
ing the items of product n sold at regular price as a different product from the 
items sold during temporary sale periods. If we do that,2 we get 121.11,0 LP ,
333.11,0 PP , and 2/11,01,01,0 )( PLF PPP  =1.127.3 Note that only the quan-
tities of the product sold at the regular price are used now as weights for the 
observed regular-price quotes, and only the quantities of the product sold at a 
temporary sale price are used as weights for those price quotes, which is what 
one might expect to be the procedural implication of treating the two groups of 
units of the product as different products.
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Case 3. Finally, suppose we treat each unit of a product as being the same 
regardless of whether it is sold at regular price or at a discount during a tempo-
rary sale period. In this case, we fi rst compute the average price for the product 
n in each period:
 
4.1
000,3000,2
000,3$000,4$,0 
np  and
 
 000,4000,1
600,4$200,2$,1 
np
 
1.36.
Using the average prices for the price variable and the total transaction 
volumes for the quantity variable in each price index,4 now we get 
 
1,01,01,0  FPL PPP 0.9714. 
In Period 0 and also in Period 1, the quantity of 5,000 units of product n 
was transacted. These transactions had a nominal value of $4,000 in Period 0 
and $6,800 in Period 1. If we defl ate the Period 1 nominal value by 0.9714, 
we get a real value of $7,000, so we fi nd no change in the “real value” from 
Period 0 to 1: a result that is in agreement with the data on the physical quanti-
ties transacted. This result only pertains to the last of the above approaches for 
calculating a price index; the others do not yield this outcome. 
Appendix Notes
1. PL0,1 1.1)items000,3000,2(00.2$
)items000,3000,2(20.2$
?
??
??
? , PP0,1 1.1)items000,4000,1(00.2$
)items000,4000,1(20.2$
?
??
??
?
 ,
and PF0,1 = (PL0,1 PP0,1)1/2 .
2. We note again that the U.S. CPI actually would employ a geometric mean, rather 
than Laspeyres, formula.
3. PL0,1 1.1)items000,300.1($)items000,200.2($
)items000,315.1($)items000,220.2($
?
???
???
?  and 
PP0,1 3.1
)items000,400.1($)items000,100.2($
)items000,415.1($)items000,120.2($
?
???
???
?  .
PL0,1 )items000,3000,2(40.1$
)items000,3000,2(36.1$
?
??
??
? 0.971 and 
PL0,1 )items000,4000,1(40.1$
)items000,4000,1(36.1$
?
??
??
? 0.971.
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Appendix 2B
An Example Showing How 
Product Defi nitions Matter
 
The producer-side product substitution bias problems identifi ed by Naka-
mura and Steinsson (2008, 2012) and the sourcing substitution bias problems 
identifi ed by Diewert and Nakamura (2010) have in common the fact that the 
solutions to both necessarily involve some sort of averaging of per-unit prices 
for products with different UPCs. As already noted, these bias problems force 
a consideration of how products are defi ned. 
UPCs have the desirable attributes of being documented and electronically 
recognizable. Also, business data systems are built to keep track of product 
purchases and sales using UPC information, making it easy for businesses to 
provide information to statistical agencies for products identifi ed by UPCs.
Consider the case of an economy with just two commercially distinct out-
put products, A and B. We will briefl y examine the measurement consequences 
of treating the two products as distinct for both price and value-share data col-
lection purposes versus grouping them together as a single product. We will 
assume we have full price and quantity data for all transactions for the two 
products in both periods t = 0 and t = 1, and that there truly is just one price per 
product in each time period. 
In row 1 of Table 2B.1 we show the nominal output growth ratio. Below 
that on the left-hand side we show the Fisher price index, the real output 
growth ratio created by defl ating the nominal revenue ratio by the Fisher price 
index (which equals the Fisher quantity index), and the Fisher labor productiv-
ity index. (The results if a Laspeyres price index is used instead can be seen by 
ignoring the second term in the left-hand column and not taking the indicated 
square root in both row 2 and row 3 and also in the numerator in row 4.) 
The counterpart expressions that are obtained if we use the same full trans-
actions data but treat products A and B as the same product for measurement 
purposes are shown on the right-hand side of the table. The nominal revenue 
ratio is shown in the middle of row 1 because it is unchanged by whether we 
treat products A and B as distinct or as the same product for measurement 
purposes.
The consequences of choices made about product defi nitions are clear-
est perhaps from the quantity growth ratios in row 3. When we distinguish 
the products, the quantity growth measure involves price-weighted aggregates, 
whereas when we treat the items of A and B as all being items of the same 
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index basket product, then the numbers of items of each are simply added into 
the total for each period without the use of weights. 
Table 2B.1  The Consequences of Treating Two Products as Distinct 
versus the Same Index Basket Product
Using a Fisher price index for deflation with A and B 
treated as distinct index basket products
Using a Fisher price index for 
deflation with A and B treated as 
the same index basket product
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Assessing Price Indexes for 
Markets with Trading Frictions
A Quantitative Illustration 
Brian K. Kovak 
Carnegie Mellon University and 
National Bureau of Economic Research
Ryan Michaels 
University of Rochester
In the last half-century, reductions in transportation and commu-
nication costs have dramatically reshaped the spatial organization of 
manufacturing production. It is becoming common, for instance, for an 
input to be manufactured abroad and then shipped back to the fi rm that 
designed it (Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001). The physical manufactur-
ing of the good in this case is increasingly concentrated in developing 
economies such as China, which tend to offer lower prices than incum-
bent producers. 
What is the source of these lower prices? They may represent real 
discounts on the same physical good. But there is also a possibility the 
price differentials are spurious. They may refl ect, for instance, unob-
served differences in the composition of goods. Furthermore, even if 
the inputs are physically identical, the quality of the production service 
may vary—as judged, for instance, by the timeliness of delivery and 
the reliability of the fi nished product. As Carlton (1983) stresses, the 
service quality factors into the true price of the good to the buyer (and 
into the real resource cost of the transaction). 
The answer to our question is of considerable importance to price 
index measurement. If price differentials are mistakenly assumed to be 
spurious, price indexes will be constructed to ignore the true decline 
that occurs when lower-price suppliers enter an intermediate market. 
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However, it is equally perilous to neglect the scope for unobserved vari-
ation in product and service quality. The challenge to statistical agen-
cies is that, in practice, it is very diffi cult to isolate real price dispersion 
given data limitations.
In reaction to this, the present paper attempts to provide some guid-
ance for price measurement. We explore how well imperfect, but fea-
sible, price indexes approximate the true price change in markets where 
quality variation and real dispersion commingle. A price index is feasi-
ble if it can be computed from data only on observable outcomes, such 
as market prices. We apply these feasible indexes to markets character-
ized by two key features. First, even if physical products are identical, 
there is scope for variation in service quality that would be unobservable 
to the analyst. Second, the same product and service can still be priced 
differently because of a certain trading friction that impedes arbitrage. 
We carry out our experiment within a simple duopoly pricing model. 
The structure of the model is designed to mimic salient features of the 
market for semiconductor wafers, the subject of our empirical applica-
tion below. The latter market is an excellent example of the contract 
manufacturing sector, in which domestic fi rms design products and off-
shore all fabrication activities. This sector is expanding at a remarkable 
rate in the United States (Bayard, Byrne, and Smith 2013). 
In the model, two large suppliers—a leader (the founding fi rm in 
the market) and a follower (who enters the market last)—produce an 
input for overlapping generations of buyers. We assume that the physi-
cal (observable) dimensions of the input are the same across suppliers. 
This assumption is relatively safe in our context since, in our empirical 
application, we have exceptionally detailed data on physical attributes. 
However, the model allows for variation in the quality of the manufac-
turing service. We make this notion more precise below; the bottom line 
is that lower-quality service will raise the effective price of transacting 
with the follower. At the same time, we introduce a trading friction that 
takes the form of a setup cost that must be paid if a buyer switches sup-
pliers during the life of its product. The setup cost applies regardless of 
the identity of the supplier to whom the buyer is switching. This friction 
implies that, when the follower enters the market, the leader’s custom-
ers may pay its high price even if there is no difference in production 
service. 
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In the second section (“A Pricing Game with Costly Switching”), 
we fi rst solve the model numerically to illustrate its key implications 
for price dispersion and price dynamics. The presence of the setup cost 
implies that, when the follower enters, the extent of price dispersion 
exceeds that which could be attributed to quality variation. However, 
as the leader’s contracts with its original customers end, it will compete 
more aggressively for new generations of buyers. This causes price dis-
persion between fi rms to narrow. In fact, under certain circumstances, 
the effect of the setup cost on price dispersion will abate to the point 
that the price differential at the end of the product life will refl ect only 
variation in service quality. This is a key distinguishing property of the 
model—constant differences in service quality alone do not induce this 
pattern in the dynamics of price dispersion. 
Before we apply the model to price index measurement, we fi rst 
look for evidence consistent with these predictions. To that end, the 
third section (“An Application to the Semiconductor Industry”) pres-
ents results from Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) that are consistent 
with these dynamics. The authors have data on transaction-level prices 
of semiconductor wafers along with the key technological attributes of 
each wafer. They can therefore control for differences across suppliers 
in product composition. However, there may still be differences with 
respect to service quality. Indeed, it is often thought that the leader in 
this market, Taiwan, has software tools that enable it to provide higher-
quality service, for which it presumably charges a higher price than its 
main competitor, China.1 The theory in Section Two suggests a way of 
identifying quality-adjusted dispersion in this setting: Byrne, Kovak, 
and Michaels can test for whether the price difference between these 
suppliers narrows after China’s entry into a particular wafer market.2 
They fi nd that, on average, the price differential between Taiwan and 
China does close substantially over the life of a given semiconductor 
technology: It falls from 39 percent in the year of Chinese entry to 10 
percent after fi ve years. This narrowing is consistent with the presence 
of real dispersion, although the differential remaining even at the end of 
the product life is suggestive of quality dispersion.
In light of this evidence, Section Four (“Feasible Price Indexes”) 
returns to the model and uses it to study the performance of differ-
ent price indexes when the observed change in average market price 
refl ects both real dispersion and variation in quality. This section fi rst 
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calculates a benchmark index that assumes the analyst has perfect infor-
mation regarding quality and is able to directly adjust for the effective 
cost of transacting with the follower. It then compares the results of this 
benchmark with feasible price indexes that can be calculated even when 
the analyst has access only to data on market prices. We consider three 
examples.
The fi rst feasible index is based on the idea that price dispersion 
across suppliers derives exclusively from quality variation. In this case, 
the index can be computed by analogy to a standard superlative index, 
which treats a supplier’s service as a separate “good” and averages price 
changes across providers. The second feasible index takes the oppo-
site view: All of the observed differential represents a real discount. 
Accordingly, one can simply average price levels across suppliers and 
compute the change in the average price across periods. Not surpris-
ingly, this index yields the largest declines in the price level when the 
lower-priced supplier enters the market. The third index is our preferred 
index, since it tries to strike a compromise between these two. It relies 
on a simple implication of the theory, noted above: the effect of the 
setup cost on price dispersion abates over the course of the product life 
cycle, leaving a price differential that refl ects only variation in service 
quality. As a result, we can use the observed price differentials late in 
the product life cycle to proxy for unobserved quality variation. This 
enables a simple correction to market price data while not foreclosing a 
role for real price dispersion. 
Section Four confi rms that our preferred index performs best. Yet, 
as we detail later, the correction here is still somewhat conservative in 
that it continues to slightly understate the extent of the true price decline 
that occurs when the follower enters the market. We then illustrate how 
to adjust our preferred index so that it delivers an upper bound on the 
extent of the price decline. The true price change can then be bracketed. 
Section Five offers a conclusion.
A PRICING GAME WITH COSTLY SWITCHING
This section begins by describing an extension of the simple pricing 
game in Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013). Our modeling is guided 
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by a large literature that studies price setting in markets under costly 
switching.3 The model here deviates slightly from this preceding litera-
ture, which typically restricted attention to the analytics of games with 
symmetric players. Refl ecting our interest in the quantitative dynamics 
following the entry of a low-cost supplier, we analyze a calibrated game 
with asymmetric actors. The leader is the founding fi rm in the market 
and enjoys monopoly status for a time. The follower enters the market 
subsequently and has a lower unit cost of production but inferior pro-
duction technology. Each fi rm competes to supply an input to overlap-
ping generations of fi nal-goods producers—the consumers, or buyers, 
in this market. 
The Model
The basic environment
The model is perhaps the minimalist structure needed to consider 
some of the questions of interest. There are three periods, and there 
are two types of agents in the market—buyers and manufacturers of 
an intermediate good. A cohort of buyers enters in each of the three 
periods. The period-1 cohort is present in periods 1 and 2, the period-2 
cohort is present in periods 2 and 3, and the period-3 cohort is present in 
period 3. Each cohort is of mass 1. Buyers have unit demand, and they 
purchase from one of the suppliers as long as the price is less than the 
reservation value, a constraint that we discuss in detail below. 
Even though buyers purchase the same physical input from both 
suppliers, we assume there are details of the production process that 
have to be tailored to the buyer’s order. To preview the example in Sec-
tion Three, consider the market for semiconductor wafers, where buy-
ers are designers of integrated circuits. Suppliers are fi rms that fabricate 
silicon wafers on which the design is implanted. Each buyer purchases a 
wafer with the same size and density of transistors, but there are details 
of the design—the precise manner in which transistors are arrayed on 
the wafer—that require some specialization of the production process. 
Formally, we follow in the spirit of Klemperer (1995) and assume that 
design complexity, y, is distributed uniformly from 0 (lowest quality) 
to 1 (highest quality). This heterogeneity across buyers would be unob-
servable to an econometrician who has data only on the physical wafer 
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size and line width. In this sense, the model allows for price dispersion 
that refl ects unobserved heterogeneity.
Turning to the manufacturers, Firm A is the leader and is present in 
the market from period 1 onward. Firm B is the follower; it joins the 
market in period 2. We assume Firm A is at the technology frontier. To 
again borrow an example from the semiconductor wafer market, it is 
thought that Taiwan’s fabrication fi rms have intellectual property that 
enables them to more effi ciently produce a highly complex design. This 
means that, although Firm B (China, in the case of the wafer market) 
can fabricate any chip, the consumer must pay a cost to monitor and 
consult with this supplier. We assume that buyers who purchase from 
Firm B pay a per-period monitoring cost, τy (with τ > 0), that is increas-
ing in design complexity. What helps Firm B to compete in the face of 
this disadvantage is that it enjoys a lower unit cost of production, which 
we denote by cB. Specifi cally, we assume that both fi rms have constant 
unit costs, and that cA > cB.
When a buyer initiates production with a supplier, it must pay a 
startup cost, s. This cost has to be paid again if the buyer switches 
suppliers. Thus, if a buyer purchased from Firm A in period t − 1 but 
switches to Firm B in period t, it must pay s again (independent of its 
quality). Hence, this buyer would pay a price, pAt , to remain with Firm 
A in period t, and would pay pBt  + τy + s to switch to Firm B, where pBt 
is Firm B’s posted price in period t, τy is the monitoring cost, and the 
startup cost s acts as a cost of switching. 
There are very clear examples of switching costs in the wafer mar-
ket. To illustrate, certain equipment has to be supplied by the customer 
and calibrated to the processes and technologies of each supplier. For 
instance, the customer supplies the mask, through which its design of 
transistors is projected onto a wafer. The mask must be specifi ed to 
sync with the supplier’s proprietary technologies, which are generally 
incompatible across manufacturers. This makes it diffi cult to re-source 
a product once wafer production begins. In the case of a mask, the price 
of a new one is high, at over $1 million. As a result, notes one industry 
association, “The time and cost associated with [switching] tend to lock 
customers into a particular [supplier]” (Gabriel Consulting Group 2006, 
p. 1).4
Last, following much of the literature on costly switching, the 
model prohibits price discrimination. This restriction is roughly con-
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sistent with wafer supplier contracts, which limit a supplier’s freedom 
in charging appreciably different prices across its customers.5 Thus, we 
assume the price pAt   (pBt ) applies to all Firm A (B) buyers in period t.
The terminal period problem 
The problem is solved by backward induction. To analyze the 
period-3 problem, we fi rst conjecture that there is a threshold y2 so that 
Firm B attracts all period-2 entrants with designs y that satisfy y ≤ y2. 
In other words, we assume the least “advanced” producer attracts buy-
ers with the least complex designs. This conjecture will be confi rmed 
in equilibrium. In what follows, since y is uniformly distributed, we 
refer to the mass of buyers y2 as Firm B’s customer base at the start of 
period 3. The mass of higher-quality buyers 1 − y2 makes up Firm A’s 
customer base. 
There are three groups of buyers to whom Firm A may sell: mem-
bers of its own customer base, members of Firm B’s customer base, and 
buyers who enter in period 3 (period-3 entrants). The demand sched-
ules for each of these cohorts are given below. Throughout, we let σtj j 
represent the share of Firm j’s customer base that it retains in period t, 
σt
j 0 the share of period-t entrants that it attracts, and σtj i the share of Firm 
i’s customer base acquired by Firm j. Hence, for Firm A, we have
(3.1) ????????? ???? ??? ? ?????? ? ??? ? ?? ? ????? ? ??? 
 ??
??????? ???? ??? ? ?????? ? ? ? ??? ? ?????? ? ???
 
 
????????? ???? ??? ? ?????? ? ??? ? ??? 
where p j t denotes the price of Firm j in period t. 
Each of the components of Equation (3.1) is straightforward. Firm 
A retains a member y > y2 of its customer base if its price, p A3, is less than 
the quality-adjusted price of its rival, p B3  + τy, plus the cost of switching 
production to a new supplier, s. It poaches a buyer y ≤ y2 in Firm B’s 
customer base if its price, plus the cost of switching, is less than p B3  + 
τy. Last, Firm A attracts a new (period-3) entrant if its price is less than 
the quality-adjusted price of Firm B. Observe that s does not appear in 
the entrant’s decision, since it must pay the cost of setting up regardless 
of the supplier from which it sources. 
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Absent from Equation (3.1) is any mention of the buyer’s (gross) 
payoff from the sale of its fi nal good. This is because the gross payoff 
is independent of the identity of the supplier. Thus, conditional on par-
ticipation in the market, the buyer’s choice of supplier depends only on 
the relative (quality-adjusted) prices and setup costs. We only assume at 
this stage that the gross payoff exceeds the minimum cost to the fi nal-
goods maker. Later, we will specify the payoff and calibrate it so that 
the participation constraint does not in fact bind in periods 2 and 3. 
Firm A’s terminal-period problem may now be stated as follows. 
From Equation (3.1), we have that total sales by Firm A in period 3 are 
given by
(3.2)
       
??? ? ????????? ???? ????? ? ??? ? ????????? ???? ??? ? ????????? ???? ???????  
 
The leader then sets its price to maximize profi ts, (p A3 − c
A)YA3 , which 
yields an optimal price of the form p A3 (p
B
3 , y2). Firm B faces the analo-
gous problem, the solution of which is represented by p B3 (p
A
3 , y2). The 
intersection of the two best responses yields the terminal-period equi-
librium, conditional on y2. We denote the equilibrium prices by P
A
3(y2) 
and PB3 (y2).
The (pure-strategy) pricing policy of a fi rm can typically be parti-
tioned into three regions. Consider, for instance, the behavior of Firm 
A, whose optimal price is shown in Figure 3.1 as a function of Firm B’s 
price. Over a range of low Firm B prices, Firm A will concede all new 
entrants to its rival. The reason for doing so is that it can earn greater 
profi ts by setting a higher price and selling exclusively to its partially 
“locked-in” buyers. As Firm B raises its price, it becomes profi table 
for Firm A to compete for new entrants. Thus, there is an intermediate 
range of Firm B prices over which Firm A both retains its own customer 
base and captures a share of new entrants. Lastly, still higher Firm B 
prices enable Firm A to poach from Firm B’s customer base. 
Interestingly, the pricing rule in Figure 3.1 is not necessarily con-
tinuous across these regions. As a result, one fi rm’s best response can 
pass through the “gap” in the other’s, yielding no equilibrium (in pure 
strategies).6 The reason for these discontinuities can be traced to the fact 
that, given s > 0, no fi rm wishes to charge a price so as to acquire only 
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a marginal share of new entrants. If Firm A does this, for instance, it 
renders the y = 1 entrant (the most complex design) indifferent between 
suppliers. But in that case, A’s incumbents will be strictly inframarginal 
because they face s > 0. As a result, the fi rm can increase profi t by dis-
cretely raising its price: It makes a higher profi t from incumbents while 
sacrifi cing an infi nitesimal share of new entrants. Accordingly, Firm A 
delays reducing its price to compete for incoming buyers. Then, when 
pB is suffi ciently high, Firm A can increase profi ts by reducing its price 
discontinuously and capturing a discrete share of new entrants, even 
while still charging a reasonably high price level to its incumbents. 
Despite these discontinuities in the best responses, we identify a 
realistic calibration of the model under which there does in fact exist a 
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which both suppliers sell to new 
entrants in each period (a “no-sale” equilibrium, to borrow from Farrell 
and Klemperer’s [2007] language). We discuss this calibration in greater 
detail below.
Figure 3.1  Firm A Best Response
NOTE: This shows Firm A’s optimal price, given the Firm B price shown along the 
horizontal axis. The three regions of the graph are discussed in the main text. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of simulation results from the model in Section Two.
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The period-2 problem
We now turn to the period-2 problem. There are two types of buy-
ers: new entrants and members of Firm A’s customer base. We begin 
with the former. A period-2 entrant with design y will purchase from 
Firm A only if the presented discounted sum of period-2 and period-3 
prices is less than what the entrant would face if it purchased from Firm 
B. This implies that the buyer at the threshold y = y2 must be indifferent 
across suppliers. Accordingly, y2 solves
(3.3) ??? ? ????????????? ??????? ? ??? ? ?? 
 ? ??
? ? ??? ? ???????????? ? ?? ??????? ? ???? ,
where β < 1 is the discount factor. Equation (3.3) implicitly defi nes the 
threshold, y2 , as a function of period-2 prices, y2(pA2, pB2 ). Thus, Firm A’s 
demand schedule among period-2 entrants is 1 − y2(pA2, pB2 ) ≡ σ2A0 (pA2, pB2 ).7
      In addition, Firm A begins the period with a customer base. Let y1 
denote the threshold level of quality so that all entrants in period 1 (the 
initial period of the market) with y ≥ y1 participate and so purchase for 
Firm A. Thus, Firm A’s customer base is 1 − y1. These buyers remain in 
the market for period 2 and then exit. Hence, their problem is a static 
one: they remain with Firm A if pA2 ≤ pB2  + τy + s. Since y is uniformly 
distributed (conditional on y ≥ y1), Firm A retains a measure of its old 
customers equal to
????????? ???????? ? ?????? ? ??? ? ?? ? ????? ? ??? ?
? ? ??? ? ??? ? ?
?? ? ????
? 
Firm A now solves
???????? ??? ? ???
??
?
????? ? ??? ? ???????? ????????
 ? ? ???? ???????? ????? ? ??? ? ??? ???????? ??????
 
,
subject to period-2 sales 
???????? ???????? ? ????????? ???? ? ????????? ?????????? ? ??? 
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and period-3 sales YA3 (y2(p A2, pB2 )), given in Equation (3.2). Firm B solves 
the analogous problem. We denote the equilibrium prices in the period 
by PA2 (y1) and PB2  (y1). 
The initial period problem 
The period-1 problem is a monopoly problem, as Firm A is the only 
supplier. The period-1 cohort’s problem is to source its input from Firm 
A or not participate in the market at all. To solve this cohort’s prob-
lem, then, we must make more explicit the demand side of the market. 
Our goal here is modest: We wish to introduce a reduced-form demand 
schedule that enables us to pose a simple monopoly problem for Firm 
A in period 1 and is consistent with the full participation of all period-2 
and period-3 entrants. To this end, we assume that the payoff, F, to the 
buyer from its (unit) sale of the fi nal good has the form 
(3.4) F(y) = R + ry,
where R,r > 0. This assumes, reasonably in our view, that higher-quality 
fi nal goods “fetch” a higher price, so the payoff is increasing in y.
Given Equation (3.4), the buyer’s problem in period 1 can be made 
straightforward, if we make three assumptions. First, if the buyer 
chooses to leave the market altogether in period 2, exit is costless. This 
means that a suffi cient condition for participation in period 1 is F(y) > 
p A1. To see this, note that a buyer who enters in period 1 and remains 
in the market through period 2 has a present discounted payoff from 
participation equal to
F(y) − p A1 + β max{F(y) − p A2 ,  F(y) − pB2 − τy − s,  0}.
Since exit is costless, the buyer will leave the market if the maximum 
payoff across the two suppliers is negative. Furthermore, it pays no cost 
to leave. In this case, could a lower-y buyer ever be better off if it waited 
and signed up with the lower-price supplier, Firm B, in period 2? If it 
did, its discounted payoff would be β max{F(y) − pB2 − τy − s,  0}. Notice 
the presence of s, since the setup cost has to be paid upon entry. Com-
paring the two payoffs, it is clear that, as long as F(y) − p A1  > 0, the buyer 
is always better off participating in period 1 than waiting until period 2.
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However, the latter is not, in general, a necessary condition. Even 
if F(y) < p A1 , a buyer may stand to make a profi t in period 2. Thus, it 
may still enter in period 1 if that is the only opportunity for it to enter. 
There are a number of ways to make F(y) > p A1  a necessary condition. 
We choose to do this by assuming that the fi rm has no access to exter-
nal fi nance. This implies the fi rm cannot borrow to cover losses during 
period 1, which in turn implies a nonnegativity constraint on dividends: 
F(y) − p A1  > 0. Thus, F(y) > p A1  is a necessary and suffi cient condition 
for participation in period 1.
Last, what happens to a fi rm if it declines to participate on account 
of F(y) < p A1 ? We assume that ideas are not storable. This means that 
fi rms for which F(y) < p A1  do not retain the option to return to the mar-
ket in period 2.8 Therefore, we do not have to keep track of buyers that 
decline to enter in period 1.
These assumptions achieve a substantial simplifi cation. In particu-
lar, if F(y) > p A1  is necessary and suffi cient, then the choice of partici-
pation collapses to a static problem. From Equation (3.4), we see that 
the buyer, y, participates if y ≥ y (pA1 ) ≡ (p A1  − R)/r. It follows that the 
monopolist supplier faces a linear demand schedule 1 − y1 (p A1 ) = (R + 
r − p A1 )/r. The monopolist then selects its price p A1  to maximize present 
discounted profi ts,
???
??
?
????? ? ????? ? ???????? ? ???????????????,
where πA2 (y1) is the discounted present value of profi ts as of the start of 
period 2 conditional on the equilibrium plays in periods 2 and 3. 
Quantitative Analysis
Calibration
We now illustrate the model’s mechanics. To that end, we calibrate 
and solve it numerically. There are seven parameters (β,cA,cB,s,τ,R,r) 
that have to be chosen. Of these, only the discount factor β can be set 
without reference to a particular input market. We assume the period 
is one year and set β = 0.95, which implies an annual real interest rate 
slightly higher than 5 percent (Table 3.1). The remaining parameters 
will vary across markets. We calibrate the model to the offshore semi-
conductor wafer market.9 
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The costs of production and the quality premium, τ, are chosen to 
target the two suppliers’ long-run price levels and the leader’s (Firm 
A’s) market share. To be more precise, we seek to have the model’s 
terminal-period outcomes match observed outcomes “late” in a prod-
uct’s life cycle. As for how “late” ought to be measured, the model 
suggests that we would like to observe market outcomes after the ini-
tial cohort of Taiwan’s customers conclude their production runs. The 
evidence available from supplier agreements indicates that customers 
arrange for at least three-year production runs, but with an option to 
renew.10 To allow for some “slippage” around the three-year mark, we 
focus on market outcomes after the fi rst fi ve years of a product’s life. 
Next, we select s. We have no direct estimates of this, but the testi-
mony of industry experts (see footnote 4) suggests that switches are very 
rare. We also observe that customers remain in very long-term arrange-
ments with suppliers. Fabless fi rms’ annual reports to shareholders, for 
instance, show that fabless fi rms maintain relationships with Taiwan’s 
TSMC and China’s SMIC for at least four to fi ve years at a time. There-
fore, we choose s to imply a “low” switch rate, which we take to be on 
the order of 10–15 percent of Firm A’s period-2 customer base.
Last, we now calibrate Equation (3.4). For given R, the slope, r, in 
Equation (3.4) pins down the fi rm’s incentive to target high-y buyers: 
if r is high, the supplier charges a high price to take advantage of these 
buyers’ willingness to pay. But as a result, many low-y buyers elect not 
to participate. We therefore set r to target a size for the period-1 market 
NOTE: This presents the calibration of the pricing game. The parameters are chosen so 
that the model induces the moments on the far right side of the table. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of the values for the parameters used in the model 
simulation. 
Table 3.1  Calibration
Parameter Interpretation Value Target moment/reason
β Discount factor 0.95 Real interest rate
c A Unit cost, Firm A 400 Long-run Taiwan price
c B Unit cost, Firm B 334 Long-run China price
τ Monitoring cost 395 Long-run Taiwan mkt. share
s Switching cost 197.5 Probability of switching
r Buyer’s payoff 432 Period-1 mkt. size
R Buyer’s payoff 688 Firm A profi ts
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relative to the size of the period-2 market. The idea here is that, in many 
markets, there is a ramp-up in terms of the volume of business after the 
introduction of a new product. Our data from the wafer market suggest 
that the size of the market at the time of product introduction is around 
one-half of its size in the mature phase of the product’s life. Since there 
will be a measure 2 of period-2 buyers, we must then set r so that nearly 
a measure 1 of buyers elect to participate. This means that y1 is not far 
from zero. Since there is a measure 2 of buyers in period 2, this cor-
responds to about one-half of the size of the market in the mature phase 
of the product life cycle.
As for R, this is chosen to ensure that all period-2 and period-3 
entrants wish to participate. If R is suffi ciently high, then Equation (3.4) 
indicates that even the lowest-quality buyer (y = 0) will make a pur-
chase. In particular, one can easily show that, in order to guarantee full 
participation in periods 2 and 3, it is suffi cient that R > R̂  ≡ maxt = 2,3
{pAt , pBt  }.11 Of course, this provides only a lower bound; it does not 
point-identify R. To do the latter, we note that our model very likely 
understates the degree of competition in this market. Though Taiwan 
and China are the most signifi cant producers, there are others. There-
fore, we choose R in order to contain the rather outsized profi ts implied 
by the model. This means that R is set to roughly target R̂ . 
Results: Price dispersion
We focus here on the model’s predictions regarding the dynamics of 
price dispersion. We delay a discussion of aggregate price changes until 
later. Table 3.2 reports the results. There are two we wish to highlight. 
First, the model implies that the degree of price dispersion declines 
over the product life cycle. The model implies a gap of roughly $250 
in the period in which the lagging supplier enters, and a gap of around 
$150 in the next period. The source of these dynamics is very intuitive. 
In period 2, the leader charges a relatively high price to its customers, 
who are partially locked in because of the cost to switch. However, as 
the leader’s original customers exit the market, it has a stronger incen-
tive to compete aggressively for new entrants. The difference in prices 
between the leader and the follower therefore narrows. This result is a 
simple but important property of the model, and it is one that is absent 
if the only source of price dispersion is time-invariant unobserved het-
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erogeneity. Thus, it gives us a testable prediction to take to data, which 
we do in the next section.
We also note here that the magnitude of dispersion in period 2, and 
the extent of its decline in period 3, line up reasonably well with the 
estimates from the semiconductor wafer market discussed in Section 
3. For this reason, we believe that our calibrated model, although quite 
simple, provides some insight into price determination in this market. 
As such, it should serve as a useful laboratory in which to study the 
properties of various price indexes, a topic to which we return in Sec-
tion Four, “Feasible Price Indexes.” 
Second, the price differential not only narrows in period 3, but it 
very nearly approaches the differential in the frictionless model where 
s = 0. To see more clearly how this comes about, return to the period-3 
problem for a moment. We impose the restriction that each supplier 
retains its customer base from the period-2 cohort, as occurs in equi-
librium for our calibration (see the fi nal row in Table 3.2). Under these 
conditions, a little bit of algebra reveals that the difference, Δ3 ≡ p
A
3 − pB3 ,
in period-3 prices is given by the expression
(3.5) ?? ? ?? ? ???? ? ??? ? ??
?
? ,  
where Δ* represents the difference between Firm A and B prices in the 
frictionless (s = 0) equilibrium. 
NOTE: This presents the equilibrium of the pricing game discussed in the main text. 
The calibration underlying this solution is shown in Table 3.1.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of simulation results from the model in Section Two.
Table 3.2  Equilibrium Prices and Market Shares
Firm B period-2 price, pB2 456.37
Firm B period-3 price, pB3 686.80
Period-2 price differential, Δ2 252.00
Period-3 price differential, Δ3 150.38
Frictionless (s = 0) price differential 153.67
Measure of participants in period 1 0.99
Firm A period-2 market share 0.67
Firm A period-3 market share 0.55
Measure of switchers in period 2 0.13
Measure of switchers in period 3 0.00
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We unpack Equation (3.5) in two steps. First, it is straightforward to 
show that Δ* is the difference in market prices that makes the marginal 
buyer with design y* indifferent across suppliers. This means that Δ* 
compensates for the transaction cost, so that Δ* = y*τ. We therefore inter-
pret Δ* as the difference in market prices that could be accounted for by 
(unobserved) heterogeneity in quality. Second, the source of the wedge 
between Δ3 and Δ* is intuitive. To see this, note that the wedge vanishes 
if y2=1/2. Each supplier in this case charges a higher price level than in 
the frictionless model, but the two suppliers’ incentive to exploit their 
customer bases is the same. Hence, the price difference refl ects entirely 
the difference in the quality of the production service. If y2 < 1/2 , in 
contrast, then Firm A’s market share is relatively large. As a result, it 
charges a relatively high price to “milk” its customer base, and Δ3 > Δ*.
For our calibration, it is true that y2 ≈ 1/2, which implies Δ3 ≈ Δ*. This 
suggests that one might use the observed difference in market prices 
late in the product cycle to proxy for the contribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity to the price differentials. In particular, one can subtract 
Δ3 from price differentials earlier in the product life cycle, such as Δ2, 
and thereby adjust prices all along the product life cycle for unobserved 
heterogeneity. This yields an estimate of the share of the period-2 dif-
ferential that is due to frictional dispersion. More exactly, we have that
(3.6) 
?? ? ??
??
?
??? ? ???
???
? ???? ,  
which is the percentage of the observed differential that is “real.”12 As 
we discuss in greater detail below, this simple correction will signifi -
cantly aid our measurement strategy in Section Four. 
Before we turn to the model’s implications for aggregate price 
changes, we digress slightly in the next section to consider some recent 
evidence for the model’s key prediction regarding the dynamics of price 
dispersion. 
AN APPLICATION TO THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
We believe that the model presented in the previous section cap-
tures features common to many intermediate input markets. Indeed, it 
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is, in principle, relevant to any market with entry and clearly defi ned 
product turnover. But our empirical exploration of the model’s implica-
tions is, of course, limited by available data. In a prior work (Byrne, 
Kovak, and Michaels 2013) we focused on the contract semiconductor 
manufacturing industry, for which we have detailed, transaction-level 
data. In the remainder of this section, we briefl y review the structure of 
this market and the fi ndings reported in Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels.
Semiconductor production involves a number of discrete steps.13 
A chip is fi rst designed using computer-aided tools that convert the 
desired functionality into a network of transistors and interconnections. 
The chip is then fabricated by depositing and etching away conducting 
and insulating materials to create a three-dimensional pattern of transis-
tors and connections on the surface of a silicon wafer. Each step in the 
process is repeated for each of many chips, called “die,” resulting in 
a grid of identical, completed die on the surface of the wafer. The die 
are then tested, sliced up, and placed in protective packages with leads 
allowing the chips to be connected to circuit boards in a fi nal product. 
Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) focus on the second step in this 
production process—the fabrication of semiconductor chips based on 
a particular design. Semiconductor fabrication technology has evolved 
steadily over time and can be characterized by a few observable tech-
nological traits such as the size of the wafer and the size of the small-
est feature that can be produced on the surface of the wafer, called the 
“line width.” The number of physical layers needed to create the chips 
has also increased over time, refl ecting increased design complexity 
and leading to increased fabrication cost. Semiconductor technology 
evolves discretely over time, with only a few specifi c wafer sizes and 
line widths present in the market at any moment in time, making it 
possible to control for technological differences across products very 
fl exibly. 
Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels’ (2013) empirical results use data on 
arm’s-length transactions between fi rms specializing in chip design and 
marketing, called “fabless fi rms” since they have no fabrication facili-
ties, and fi rms called “foundries” that specialize in fabricating other 
fi rms’ chips. Most fabless fi rms are located in the United States and 
Europe, and they correspond to the buyers in the model just described. 
The largest foundries are located in Taiwan and China, which together 
account for 74 percent of foundry output. Taiwanese foundries enter a 
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product market, defi ned by a wafer-size and line-width combination, at 
least eight quarters ahead of Chinese foundries. The dominant Taiwan-
ese foundry, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), 
is the overall market leader—it is Firm A in the model. TSMC is widely 
considered as possessing the most advanced design integration tools 
and engineering support. 
The data come from a proprietary database collected by the Global 
Semiconductor Alliance (GSA), a nonprofi t industry organization. 
Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels’ (2013) extract spans 2004–2010 and cov-
ers a representative sample of about 20 percent of the wafers produced 
by the worldwide foundry sector. The GSA data are unique in provid-
ing details on transaction prices, along with all technological charac-
teristics of fi nished semiconductor wafers that are relevant for pricing, 
including wafer size, line width, and numbers of various types of lay-
ers. This detailed product-characteristic information makes it possible 
to compare average prices for physically identical inputs across suppli-
ers located in different countries.
Formally, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) implement such a 
comparison in a hedonic regression framework that relates wafer prices 
to observable technological characteristics, quarter indicators, and indi-
cators for supplier’s location.14 The controls for product characteristics 
enable them to estimate the effect of location on price, holding fi xed 
the composition of goods. The data reveal substantial price differences 
across suppliers. Comparing the two largest suppliers, a Chinese wafer 
sells at a 17 percent discount compared to an otherwise identical Tai-
wanese wafer.15 
This average difference masks, however, interesting dynamics in 
price dispersion. Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) go on to estimate 
how the price differential evolves following Chinese entry. The key 
result is replicated in Figure 3.2 (which is Figure 4 in Byrne, Kovak, 
and Michaels). The dashed gray line plots raw quarterly price differ-
ences for the process technology with the largest sales during our time 
period, 200mm wafers with 180nm line width. Despite the noise in the 
series, it is clear that the average price differential closes considerably 
over the life of this technology. It falls from around $600 to around $150 
more than fi ve years after Chinese entry. This pattern applies to other 
technologies with smaller sales as well. The black solid line in the fi g-
ure plots the difference in price averaged across all technologies in each 
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quarter following Chinese entry and exhibits quite consistent declines 
in the gap between Chinese and Taiwanese prices.16 Last, whereas the 
solid line pools across technologies, the dotted line in the fi gure esti-
mates the price differential based exclusively on the typical variation 
within the life of a technology. It reveals a very similar pattern.
As Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) stress, this dynamic pat-
tern is unlikely to be driven by unobserved differences in products or 
services across Chinese and Taiwanese suppliers. The price differences 
start out large and then converge for each new process technology, so 
constant differences across suppliers or differences that evolve over 
calendar time for all technologies are unlikely to explain the observed 
Figure 3.2  The Closing China-Taiwan Price Gap Following China’s 
Entry
NOTE: This presents the difference between China’s and Taiwan’s price for certain cat-
egories of wafers. The 200mm/180nm is one of the most popular wafers in the sam-
ple. The cross-technology average measures the mean of the price differentials across 
wafers. The within-technology fi t is derived from a regression model with wafer fi xed 
effects and thus uses only within-technology variation in the price differential. See 
Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) for more.
SOURCE: Based on regression results in Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013).
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pattern. In other words, steady improvements in the quality or reliabil-
ity of China's production service may explain price differentials across 
technologies, but they are unlikely to account for the sharp, within-
technology dynamics we observe. This also rules out explanations 
related to brand recognition, customer service, intellectual property-
rights protection, tax policy, and other factors that might make Chinese 
producers more attractive over time. 
Accordingly, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) argue that the 
dynamics refl ect the presence of real, frictional price dispersion. The 
pattern of narrowing differentials is clearly consistent with that predicted 
by the theory of switching costs sketched in Section Two, “A Pricing 
Game with Costly Switching.” This fi nding motivates our work in the 
next section, as we consider developing a price index that admits roles 
for both frictional dispersion and constant, unobserved heterogeneity.17 
FEASIBLE PRICE INDEXES
Our goal is to measure the change in price of a production service in 
an environment in which the quality of service varies across suppliers. 
The source of the difference in service quality is not especially critical, 
though, for the purpose of this exercise. In our model, the quality of 
service varies inversely with the complexity of the design, y. But this is 
merely one way to operationalize the idea; heterogeneity across designs 
is not, per se, signifi cant. 
It is worth taking a moment at the outset to elaborate on this point. 
The following discussion should help reveal the generality of the prob-
lem confronting price index construction. In so doing, it also points the 
way toward developing the “ideal” price index in this setting, which 
will serve as the benchmark against which all feasible alternatives are 
judged.
A Benchmark
There is a way to reinterpret the model that is particularly help-
ful. Imagine that suppliers produce and ship the input to customers. 
Assume, moreover, that Firm B has an inferior transport technology. In 
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this context, it is natural to reinterpret y as distance from Firm B. The 
cost, τy, is then read as a transport cost, so that a Firm B customer with 
unit demand who is y units away must purchase 1 + τy units because 
τy are “lost in transit.” In this interpretation, it is the customer who 
implants its own design on the chip after receipt of the product. 
This problem is formally identical to our own. But what design the 
retailer implants on the wafer after it is shipped by Firm B is clearly 
orthogonal to how we measure the price of the production (and trans-
portation) service. In other words, in this (re)interpretation, the mea-
surement of the input’s price is unrelated to, and unaffected by, the pres-
ence of heterogeneous designs. All that matters, in terms of the real 
resource cost to customers, is the transaction cost, τy. 
It follows that, in our preferred interpretation of the problem, design 
heterogeneity matters for price measurement only insofar as it implies a 
particular transaction cost. If we could just observe these costs (τy), we 
would fold them into a comprehensive, or quality-adjusted, measure-
ment of the price paid by Firm B buyers, p̂ B ≡ pB + τy, for the production 
service. After adjusting for τy, this is the same service provided by Firm 
A. Hence, at that point, we simply aggregate across the pA’s and p̂B’s 
in a particular period and compare the result with the average price in 
the prior period. This is, in fact, how we will build our benchmark price 
index, to which we now turn.
Our benchmark index requires the most information on the part of 
the analyst. In particular, the analyst is assumed to observe the trans-
action cost, τy, paid by a Firm B customer with design y. Hence, the 
analyst measures prices, pA and p̂B. 
Since each price in the model (inclusive of τy) pertains to the same 
service, it is not hard to aggregate across observed prices. In any period 
t, there is a set It of buyers with measure μt . The period-t (with t = 2 or 
3) price is then given simply by 
?
??
????????
??
? , 
where pt(i) is the price paid by buyer i ϵ It (and equal to either pAt or p̂ Bt ). 
This aggregates prices paid across the measure μt of buyers, weighting 
each equally, since all participants purchase one unit of the input.18 This 
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price is compared to the average price in the prior period to derive the 
price change.
To illustrate the calculations, consider the period-2 problem. It 
is helpful to fi rst take the case where Firm A retains the full measure 
1 − y1 of its period-1 customers but only sells to new entrants with 
y ≥ y2. It follows that a measure 2 − y1 − y2 pays p A2  for the input, whereas 
each new entrant y ϵ [0,y2] pays p B2 + τy. Therefore, the average period-2 
price, P*2 , is
??? ?
?
? ? ??
? ???????
????????????
?
? ? ?? ? ??
? ? ??
??? ?
?
? ? ??
? ???? ? ?????
??
?
? 
Since the only price in period 1 is pA1 , the price index in period 2 would 
be P*2  / pA1 .
The problem is slightly more cumbersome if Firm B poaches in 
period 2, as occurs in the model. In this case, Firm B poaches from Firm 
A for all qualities less than a threshold, y p2, where the threshold satisfi es 
y1 < y p2 < y2. Therefore, Firm A supplies a measure 1 − y2 of entrants 
and 1 − y p2 of incumbents. Firm B supplies, in turn, a measure of y2 of 
entrants and y p2  − y1 of incumbents. Given this distribution of buyers 
across designs, the average price becomes 
(3.7) ??? ?
? ? ?? ? ??
?
? ? ??
??? ?
?
? ? ??
?? ???? ? ?????
??
?
? ? ???? ? ?????
??
?
??
???
In what follows, it will be instructive to integrate the terms enclosed in 
braces on the right half of Equation (3.7) and rewrite this as a weighted 
average of the suppliers’ quality-adjusted prices,19 
(3.8) ??? ?
? ? ?? ? ??
?
? ? ??
??? ?
?? ? ??
? ? ??
? ? ??
???? ? ????,
where
(3.9) ? ?
??
?? ? ??
? ? ??
?
??
?
??
??
? ? ??
?? ? ??
? ? ??
?
??
? ? ??
?
?
is the average design supplied by Firm B. Hence, the average price 
(Equation [3.8]) is a weighted average of the market prices plus a mea-
sure of the average transaction cost paid by Firm B buyers. Again, the 
price index is simply P*2 /pA1.
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Feasible Alternatives
In practice, the BLS does not observe the level of detail—namely, 
τ—needed to calculate the benchmark index. We now consider several 
indexes with less demanding data requirements. We refer to these as 
feasible price indexes.
Within index
The fi rst of these is consistent with our understanding of BLS-IPP 
practice, which typically treats the identity of the seller as a price-
forming characteristic (Nakamura and Steinsson 2012). In this case, 
there are, in effect, two types of goods: those sold by Firm A and those 
sold by Firm B. Under these circumstances, standard practice is to com-
pute the price index by fi rst calculating price changes within each sup-
plier and then averaging these changes across suppliers. We refer to this 
as the within index. This contrasts with the benchmark index, which 
fi rst averages prices across suppliers and then takes the difference. 
Applied to the period-2 data, the within index is very simple. Since 
Firm B does not participate in period 1, the within index is computed 
just by taking the ratio of Firm A’s market, pA2 /pA1. 
Average index
The second measure takes the opposite approach to the problem of 
unobserved quality. The strategy here is to take the average period-2 
posted market price across suppliers for all qualities greater than y1 and 
compare it to the period-1 price. We refer to this as the average index.20 
This index is distinguished by the fact that it takes no account of 
the transaction costs—it makes no quality adjustment. Accordingly, the 
average index is calculated by simply excluding τy from the price paid 
by each of Firm B’s customers in the benchmark index (Equation [3.7]). 
The average period-2 price is then 
(3.10) ??? ?
? ? ?? ? ??
?
? ? ??
??? ?
?
? ? ??
?? ?????
??
?
? ? ?????
??
?
??
? 
? ???????
?
????
??? ?
?????
????
????
??? ,
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and the index is calculated according to Pα2 /pA1. This approach is more 
concerned that the new supplier is likely to sell the same qualities at 
lower prices, which does in fact happen if y1 < y2. In these instances, 
quality-adjusted price declines faced by buyers are not recorded by the 
within index.
Diff-in-diff index
Last, we present an index that attempts to strike a compromise 
between the within and average indexes. The index confronts the chal-
lenge of unobserved heterogeneity but does not abandon the idea that 
there may be quality-adjusted price dispersion in equilibrium. At the 
same time, it does not place the same data requirements on the analysts 
as the benchmark index does. 
The construction of what we will call the diff-in-diff index is guided 
by the model in Section Two (“A Pricing Game with Costly Switch-
ing”). One of the key points of the section was the idea that one can 
use the observed price differentials late in the product life cycle, Δ3 , to 
proxy for the contribution of unobserved heterogeneity, denoted by Δ*. 
This implies that the quality-adjusted period-2 differential, Δ2 , can be 
estimated by netting off Δ3 , which is the most that could be attributed to 
quality. This boils down to doing quality adjustment by simply infl ating 
Firm B’s price by Δ3. To see this, let p˘B2  denote our estimate of Firm B’s 
period-2 price adjusted for service quality. We defi ne p˘B2 according to 
the quality-adjusted period-2 differential, pA2 − p˘B2 = pA2  − pB2 − (pA3 − pB3  ). 
Canceling the pA2 ’s, we have that p˘B2  = pB2  + Δ3.
This corrected price differential is the key input into the diff-in-diff 
index. The index itself is now easy to construct. We add Δ3 to pB2  in 
the average index (Equation [3.10]), use the proxy Δ3 =Δ* = τy*, and 
integrate. (Recall that y* is Firm B’s market share in the frictionless 
equilibrium.) The result can then be written as 
(3.11) ??? ?
? ? ?? ? ??
?
? ? ??
??? ?
?? ? ??
? ? ??
? ? ??
???? ? ????.
Comparing Equation (3.11) to the benchmark (Equation [3.8]), we 
see our adjustment is exact only if y* = θ. In fact, a discrepancy between 
y* and θ will likely arise. To see why, recall from Section Two that what 
drives a wedge between market prices in the frictionless equilibrium 
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is the transaction cost faced by the marginal buyer (who is indifferent 
across the two suppliers). That is, the difference, Δ*, in market prices 
is given by y*τ. However, a quality-adjusted price index like those in 
Equations (3.7) and (3.8) requires calculation of the average price inclu-
sive of transaction costs among all Firm B buyers, as represented by θ. 
Since the transaction cost increases with y, the marginal cost exceeds 
the average. It is very likely, then, that θ < y*. In that case, P δ2 would 
overestimate P*2 .
The comparison between y* and θ becomes clearer if we consider 
a special, but informative, case. Suppose that y1 = 0 = y
p
2 . This is an 
instructive case because, in our calibrated model, most buyers do in 
fact participate in period 1 (so that y1 ≈ 0), and switching is minimal in 
period 2. It follows that Equation (3.9) collapses to θ = y2 /2, where y2 is 
Firm B’s share of period-2 entrants under s > 0. Hence, in this case, θ = 
y* only if y2 = 2y*: Firm B claims twice as many period-2 entrants under 
s > 0 as it does in the frictionless equilibrium. The intuition behind 
this is that the average transaction cost, θ, approaches y* only if Firm 
B supplies very complex designs when s > 0. This is unlikely, and our 
calibrated model doesn’t bear this out. It follows that the quality adjust-
ment is too large in Equation (3.11), so that P δ2 > P*2 . 
Reacting to this, we wish to make two observations. First, if we 
make no changes to Equation (3.11), it could still be used productively 
by agencies with the understanding that it provides an upper bound on 
the true quality-adjusted price. Second, we can complement this upper 
bound by considering a lower bound; a comparison of the two will help 
better identify the true change. To see this, suppose the switching cost 
did not distort the distribution of market shares, so that y* = y2. Accord-
ingly, in the special case where θ = y2 /2, one can align P δ2 with P*2  by 
just dividing Δ* = y* τ in Equation (3.11) by 2. This yields an alternative 
to Equation (3.11), 
???? ?
? ? ?? ? ??
?
? ? ??
??? ?
?? ? ??
? ? ??
? ? ??
???? ?
??
?
??? 
In all likelihood, the switching cost will affect the distribution of 
market shares—in particular, the entering fi rm will compete relatively 
aggressively to attract customers, since the buyers will be subsequently 
locked in. This suggests that y* < y2 = 2θ. As a result, y*  / 2 < θ, which 
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means that Pˆ δ2  < P*2 : we obtain an estimate of P*2  that is downwardly 
biased. Comparing P̂δ2 to the baseline diff-in-diff index (Equation 
[3.11]), one can better gauge the true price change. We implement this 
procedure below.
We complete this discussion by quickly mentioning how to apply 
these indexes to period 3. In correspondence with the calibrated model, 
we assume both fi rms retain all buyers in period 3. Hence, Firm A sells 
to a measure 1 − y2 + 1 − y3 , and Firm B sells to a measure y2 + y3 . 
The calculations of each index then follow by analogy to their period-2 
counterparts. For instance, the benchmark index is P*3 /P*2 , where P*3 is 
given by
??? ?
? ? ?? ? ??
?
??? ?
?? ? ??
?
???? ? ??? ,
and ? ?
??
?? ? ??
??
?
?
??
?? ? ??
??
?
?
 
is the average design supplied by Firm B in period 3. Next, the within 
index is obtained by fi rst computing the change in each supplier’s mar-
ket price and then aggregating these price changes across suppliers. We 
use Tornqvist weights in the latter step, which yields
?
???
???
?? ?? ? ??
???
???
? ,
where 
? ?
?
?
?
? ? ?? ? ??
?
?
? ? ??
? ? ??
? ? ??
??
is the average Firm A market share across periods 2 and 3. Finally, 
using the appropriate period-3 market shares, the average and diff-in-
diff indexes can be computed according to the expressions contained in 
Equation (3.10) and Equation (3.11). 
Results
Table 3.3 uses our calibrated model to assess the accuracy of the fea-
sible indexes. Each column corresponds to a period. Each row reports 
the gross price change implied by the index relative to the gross price 
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change implied by the benchmark. For instance, with respect to period 
2, the row that reports the average index presents 
???????
???????
? .
Thus, if the estimate in the row is less than 1, the feasible index under-
states the true change. Equivalently, the feasible index overstates the 
decline in the price level between periods 1 and 2. 
The within and average indexes yield estimates in line with our 
expectations. As we showed in Section Two, roughly 40 percent of the 
period-2 price differential cannot be attributed to quality dispersion; 
Firm B does provide a real discount. As a result, the within index fails to 
capture the full extent of the decline in the average price level driven by 
the entry of Firm B. The table reveals that it overstates the price change 
(understates the price decline) by 8 percentage points. At the same time, 
as our discussion in Section Two noted, there is a quantitatively sig-
nifi cant component of price dispersion owing to difference in service 
quality. The average index fails to account for this and so understates 
the true price change. Equivalently, it overstates the price decline—in 
this case by about 4 percentage points. 
We now turn to the performance of the diff-in-diff index. The table 
reports results for both the baseline index derived from Pδ2 and the alter-
native based on P̂δ2 . As we anticipated, the baseline index (Equation 
[3.11]) outperforms the within index, since it treats a portion of Firm 
B’s price as a real, quality-adjusted discount relative to Firm A’s price. 
Accordingly, it better captures the decline in the average price level 
Table 3.3  Feasible Indexes Relative to Benchmark
NOTE: This table uses the solution to the calibrated model to calculate the gross price 
changes implied by a variety of price indexes. The results are expressed here relative 
to the true gross price change. See main text for a discussion of the indexes and Table 
3.1 for the calibration. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of simulation results from the model in Section Two.
Period 2 Period 3
Within 1.082 1.047
Average 0.958 0.990
Diff-in-diff, baseline 1.032 1.001
Diff-in-diff, alternative 0.995 0.997
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when Firm B enters. Yet it still understates the extent of the price decline 
by 3 percentage points. Interestingly, the alternative index, based on P̂δ2,
performs noticeably better. As we noted earlier, it should be the case 
that P̂δ2   > P*2 , but this discrepancy depends on the distance between y2 
and y*. This distance turns out to be rather limited in this calibration, but 
we stress that it is hard to judge the robustness of this result.
As for period 3, the diff-in-diff indexes perform very well. Mechan-
ically, the reason is that Pδ2  and Pδ3 both overstate the corresponding 
true prices. These errors appear to cancel each other out, so the gross 
change, Pδ3 /Pδ2 , turns out to very nearly equal P*3 /P*2 . The same idea 
applies to the average index. However, with respect to the within index, 
errors do not cancel each other out so fortuitously; this continues to 
overstate the true price. Again, it is diffi cult to know if these results hint 
at a more general lesson. We hope continued work in this area will help 
elucidate this. 
CONCLUSION
This paper has studied the problem of price index construction for 
intermediate inputs when observed price differentials are combinations 
of unobserved heterogeneity and real, or frictional, price dispersion. 
In particular, it assesses several price indexes that can be feasibly con-
structed. Our results provide some guidance for how to adjust price 
indexes when a new low-price supplier, such as China, joins a market. 
In our application to the semiconductor market, we fi nd that if frictional 
dispersion is ignored, the price index overstates the true price decline 
due to entry by fi ve to eight percentage points. Ignoring unobserved het-
erogeneity, in contrast, means that lower-quality service by the entrant 
is not accounted for, and thus the price decline is overstated. We then 
try to provide a pathway between these extrema. Our diff-in-diff index 
exploits a simple insight: the cost of switching to a new supplier in this 
market sustains frictional dispersion during the early life of a product, 
but this infl uence abates as the market matures and the market leader’s 
original customers exit. Thus, late in the product life cycle, the price 
difference largely refl ects time-invariant quality differences. Accord-
ingly, one can use these observed late-in-life price differences to correct 
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for unobserved heterogeneity and thereby isolate the extent of real price 
dispersion. For this reason, our diff-in-diff index performs quite well as 
an approximation to the true price change.
Our assessment, of course, is confi ned to a particular market in the 
semiconductor sector. Yet we believe our approach provides a fruitful 
way forward in this literature. That approach, in sum, consists of a few 
components: gather detailed data for a particular industry; develop a 
quantitative model of industry dynamics that can be fi tted to these data; 
and assess alternative, feasible price indexes within the context of the 
parameterized model. If applied to several industries, we believe this 
approach has the promise of revealing more general lessons for price 
index measurement. 
Notes
 1.  By “Taiwan,” we mean Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, or 
TSMC, the largest wafer fabrication fi rm in Asia. Most of its properties are in Tai-
wan, though it has one plant in Shanghai. However, the vast majority of produc-
tion in China is due to Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, 
or SMIC. When we refer to “China,” then, we mean SMIC. 
 2.  China typically enters two years after Taiwan initiates production.
 3.  See Farrell and Klemperer (2007) and Klemperer (1995) for surveys.
 4.  This quote is from a report describing the Common Platform technology alliance. 
This is an industry group consisting of a few large chip manufacturers—IBM, 
Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing, and Samsung. The group advocates for 
a “common platform” that would standardize aspects of semiconductor produc-
tion technology. However, this alliance has not yet had a material impact on stan-
dardizing mask sets (McGregor 2007).
 5.  We have obtained a handful of these contracts. A representative agreement in terms 
of how price discrimination is handled is one between Altera Corp. and TSMC. It 
states that “TSMC shall calculate an average price for such Process in use at all of 
TSMC’s . . . plants,” and if the buyer’s price “deviates, up or down, by more than 
three percent (3%) from the [average price],” the buyer’s price will be adjusted 
in the direction of the average price. Note that this agreement does not commit 
TSMC to a particular price path over time. The contract merely restricts price 
discrimination in a given period, consistent with the model’s assumptions. This 
agreement is found at http://corporate.fi ndlaw.com/contracts/operations/purchase
-agreement-taiwan-semiconductor-manufacturing-co-ltd.html (accessed April 22, 
2014). 
 6.  See Nishimura and Friedman (1981) for an analysis of this class of games. They 
provide suffi cient conditions to ensure a pure-strategy equilibrium, but these con-
ditions can only be confi rmed ex post. This is, in effect, what we aim to do. 
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 7.  It is not immediate that there is a unique solution for y2 , but we have always 
located one in practice. The intuition for this is as follows. The discounted sum of 
Firm B prices is relatively low when y2 is low (i.e., when Firm B’s customer base 
is small, it sets lower prices in period 3 to attract new entrants). But the discounted 
sum of Firm B prices is also increasing at a relatively fast rate as y2 rises. This 
refl ects the quality premium, as captured by τy2. Together, these features imply 
a single crossing, with the right side of Equation (3.3) cutting the left side from 
below.
 8.  Interestingly, another way to make F(y) > pA1 a necessary condition is to drop the 
nonnegativity constraint and to assume that ideas are instead perfectly storable. 
This would imply that a fi rm would never produce in period 1 if its instantaneous 
profi ts were negative; it would just store the idea and join the market in period 2. 
Note that, since production runs for two periods, these late entrants would presum-
ably live through period 3. This points to the downside of this approach: delayed 
entry reverberates through the model’s periods 2 and 3 and creates a more com-
plicated dynamic problem. Moreover, the payoff from this added complication is 
rather small. As we discuss, the model will be calibrated in such a way that the 
measure of fi rms that delay entry is very small, so its quantitative implications 
cannot be too great. For this reason, we choose the simpler approach in the main 
text.
 9.  The subsequent two paragraphs are taken from Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels 
(2013) (see Appendix 6D).
 10.  For example, a contract between Quicklogic and TSMC states, “The term of this 
Agreement shall . . . continue for a period of three (3) years, renewable annually 
as a rolling three (3) year Agreement.”
 11.  Since the lowest-quality buyer in Firm A’s cohort has payoff R + ryt in period 
t = {2,3}, it follows that Firm A buyers will in fact participate if R exceeds 
maxt{pAt }. Furthermore, if r > τ (as it does, in our calibration), then the highest-
quality customer of Firm B will participate if R is greater than maxt{pBt }. 
 12.  We also stress that, although y2 ≈ 1/2 in our model, the approach suggested by 
Equation (3.4) can be applied robustly to real-world data even if there are certain 
deviations from this. For instance, if y2 is smaller than ½, then Δ3 overestimates its 
frictionless counterpart. As a result, if we used Δ3 as a proxy for the contribution of 
unobserved heterogeneity to the price differential, we would obtain a lower bound 
on the degree of pure (frictional) price dispersion. This property can be desirable 
in certain circumstances. For instance, though we assume the suppliers provide the 
same physical input here, data limitations may make it impossible for a statistical 
agency to do any direct hedonic-style quality adjustments for product composi-
tion. In that case, it may want to err on the side of unobserved heterogeneity. 
 13.  Turley (2003) provides an accessible overview of semiconductor technology, 
manufacturing, and business. 
 14.  The GSA data do not provide fi rm identifi ers, only the country in which the sup-
plier is located.
 15.  See Table 3 in Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) for the full list of regression 
coeffi cients from the hedonic model. 
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 16.  To be more precise, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) regress the price differ-
ential on, among other controls, a quadratic time trend and product fi xed effects; 
the latter control for changes in the composition of technologies. The dotted line, 
referred to in Figure 3.2 as the “within-technology fi t,” is the estimated time trend. 
 17.  Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels make the correction embodied in Equation (3.6) to 
the raw wafer price differentials in order to isolate the component that is due to 
real dispersion. In their application, they interpret “late in the product life cycle” 
to be roughly fi ve years after Chinese entry, based on the length of typical semi-
conductor fabrication contracts (see the subsection titled “Quantitative Analysis,” 
beginning on p. 100). Then, drawing from Figure 3.2, the authors interpret Δ3 = Δ* 
≈ $150. Netting this off of the observed period-2 differential, Δ2 , yields the quality-
adjusted component. For instance, the average differential 10 quarters after Chi-
nese entry is about $375, so the authors estimate that 60 percent ???? ? ???
???
?? refl ects 
real price dispersion. Hence, the wafer data indicate more frictional dispersion 
than implied by the model.
 18.  Simple averaging across buyers is appropriate within our theoretical model 
because the production service, modulo τy, is in fact identical. The BLS does not 
follow this approach when aggregating across outlets’ prices at the most detailed 
level (the item-area stratum) of the CPI. This is because BLS staff worry that dif-
ferent outlets’ items are not in fact the same. See Hausman and Leibtag (2009) for 
more on this practice. See Shapiro and Wilcox (1996) for a general discussion of 
aggregation within the CPI.
 19.  The weights are formed from the quantity of units sold by each supplier. Through-
out, we do assume that the statistical agency has access to price and revenue data 
from the supplier, so that quantities may be inferred. The BLS International Price 
Program does request data on the dollar value of trade for each good when a fi rm 
is initiated into the survey. 
 20.  The average index does embody a slight recognition of quality differences, in 
that it excludes never-before-priced designs in period 2. In this sense, the index 
acknowledges that some period-2 goods are “too different” from the basket of 
goods in period 1 to be included in the index. We take this approach to try to 
capture the fact that the statistical agency does observe repeated sales of the same 
product, even if it does not observe quality precisely. Still, this inclusion only of 
designs y > y1, as opposed to all designs, makes little quantitative difference to our 
results, since y1 is so close to zero.
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Specifi c Trade Costs, 
Quality, and Import Prices
Benjamin Bridgman
Bureau of Economic Analysis
Recently, quality differences among internationally traded goods 
have received significant attention. Differing import quality across mar-
kets, characterized by lower-income countries producing lower-quality 
products, is a robust empirical finding.1 Johnson (2011) shows that qual-
ity differences account for most firm heterogeneity in trade. Baldwin 
and Harrigan (2011) argue that, in order to match the data, trade models 
must account for such differences. However, international price indices 
frequently cannot make quality adjustments. Correctly accounting for 
quality differences is important to the measurement of real trade, since 
mismeasurement of trade filters into other indicators such as real GDP 
and productivity. (See Feenstra et al. [2013], Houseman [2007], and 
Houseman et al. [2011].)
While quality measurement is an issue for all price indices, it is a 
particular challenge for international prices. There has been a significant 
increase in the number of goods that are traded. A large number of 
goods that are traded are only traded intermittently. The “new goods 
problem”—determining the quality of new goods relative to previ-
ously traded ones—is a frequent issue in international prices. A lack of 
quantifiable characteristics or agency resources often prevents explicit 
adjustments for quality, such as hedonics.
Statistical agencies have developed techniques to deal with environ-
ments with shifting sets of goods. A common way of accounting for the 
quality of newly measured goods is matched modeling. If an explicit 
adjustment for quality cannot be done, a good may be matched to a 
similar good. The price difference is attributed to quality differences.
To avoid having frequent replacement of goods in the sample, sam-
pling techniques intentionally focus on consistently traded goods. Price 
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changes of consistently traded goods within a category stand in for 
price changes of all goods in that category.
I examine these techniques in light of recent advances in trade 
theory. I use a version of the model in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) 
to show theoretically that both methods are vulnerable to mismeasure-
ment for goods with quality differences that pay specific (per-unit) trade 
costs. I then analyze the quantitative impact of these forces using U.S. 
import data.
I show theoretically that matched modeling will tend to overstate 
quality differences between goods. Specific trade costs weaken the link 
between price and quality. Prices are set as markup over production and 
trade costs. Lower-quality goods cost less to produce, and all goods pay 
the same specific cost regardless of quality. Therefore, a bigger share 
of a low-quality good’s price is due to trade costs. The price difference 
between goods will be smaller than their quality differences. Using 
matched modeling will tend to overstate real imports of new goods. 
Since matched modeling overstates the quality of new goods, it under-
estimates the (quality-adjusted) price.
Dropping intermittently traded goods will tend to underestimate 
price changes. Specific trade costs systematically make goods that 
enter and exit different from continuing goods. Lower-quality goods 
are the least profitable, so they are the most sensitive to cost changes. 
Relatively small cost changes can make a previously profitable market 
unprofitable, and vice versa. Low-quality goods are more likely to be 
traded intermittently, and the prices of these intermittently traded low-
quality goods are likewise more sensitive to cost shocks.
I show that the quantitative impact of this mismeasurement can 
be significant: in some cases, applying matched modeling leads to 
significant overstatement of the quality of new goods. For leather foot-
wear, a major import category, matched modeling understates the quality 
gap between the highest- and lowest-quality goods by over 30 percent. 
However, the average impact has fallen over the period of 1974–2004, 
since transportation costs, which tend to be specific, have fallen.
The impact of dropping intermittently traded goods from the sam-
ple has likely increased. The size of the effect is proportional to the 
price gap between continuing and newly traded goods, a gap that has 
widened. By 2004, the model predicts that newly traded goods’ prices 
were twice as sensitive to cost shocks as previously traded ones.
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This chapter is part of a literature that examines mismeasurement of 
international prices. Feenstra and Romalis (2012) also examine interna-
tional prices with specific trade costs. However, their focus is on macro-
level data, while I analyze the micro-level data and the techniques used 
by statistical agencies. A number of papers have examined diffi culties 
in matched modeling. Reinsdorf and Yuskavage (2011) examine coun-
try substitution bias, which arises when imports are sourced from new 
countries with different price levels. Gagnon, Mandel, and Vigfusson 
(2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) look at whether the ten-
dency to introduce price changes at product introduction biases import 
price indices. This chapter is complementary to those papers, as it looks 
at a different mechanism. Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) exam-
ine whether entry and exit in response to exchange rates dampen the 
pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations. The mechanism is similar, 
though they do not examine its impact on statistical agency methods.
A theoretical literature examines how to accommodate new goods 
in international price measurement. Feenstra (1994) derives a method of 
calculating the ideal price index with new goods. This chapter focuses 
on statistical agency practice and does not deal with welfare.
MODEL
The model is adapted fr om that found in Bridgman (2013). This 
model is based on the Quality Heterogeneous Firm Trade (QHFT) 
model developed by Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and is similar to that 
of Gervais (2008).
Households
There are J number of countries.  The preferences of the representa-
tive household in each country is given by the following equation:
(4.1)     
1
11 11
j
j
i
U c i q i 


       ,
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whe re cj (i) is units consumed of variety i in country j, and Ωj is the set 
of available varieties. The preference parameters q(i) are the quality of 
the variety and σ > 1. The household is endowed with L units of labor.
Productio n
Consumption goods are produced using labor. The wage in country 
j is wj. There is a constant set of firms, each endowed with a technology 
to produce a variety. Output of a variety is
    
L i
y i
a i
  . 
Higher-cost firms produce higher-quality goods. A firm with unit cost a 
produces a good of quality q according to the following equation:
(4.2)     1q i a i   ,
where θ > 0. The assumption that θ > 0 implies that the consumer’s valu-
ation of quality increases faster than marginal cost, so profit increases in 
marginal cost. Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) argue that the data support 
this assumption. Following Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo (2012), profits 
are spent outside the economy.
Trade
There are three costs to export a variety. There is a market-entry 
fixed cost of  fodF i  units of labor to export variety i from origin country o to destination country d. There is a specific (per-unit) cost with unit 
labor requirement  sodF i . Finally, there is an ad valorem charge τod(i). 
Given a mill price pod(i), consumers pay delivered price 
        1 .sd od od o odp i p i i w F i  
Sol ution
This section characterizes the solution but does not fully solve it. 
A full solution to the model would require specifying a distribution of 
unit costs. Since the results do not require a distribution, I do not fully 
close the model.
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Each representative household chooses cj (i) for ji  to maximize Equation (4.1) subject to
   
j
j j ji
p i c i Lw  .
 
For varieties that are available in a market, expenditure in destination 
country d is given by 
(4.3)       
1
d d d
d
q i
p i c i B
p i
     
 ,
where 1
d d
d
d
w LB
P 

 
and
(4.4) 
 
 
1
1 1
d
d
i
p i
P
q i
           
  
is the quality-adjusted price index of destination country d. The demand 
function in terms of the mill price pod(i) in origin country o for a good 
exported to destination country d is 
           1 1 sd od od od o od dc p i q i p i i w F i B            .
Firms are monopolistic competitors that set prices to maximize 
profits. They can set different prices for each market. As a simplifying 
assumption, the firm takes the price index P as given.2 The optimal mill 
price pod(i) is the solution to
(4.5)              maxod fod d od o d od od op i p i c p i w a i c p i F i w   .
The mill price solution is
      1 1
s
odo
od
od
F iwp i a i
i
 
     
 ,
which generates the delivered price   
        1
1
so
d od od
wp i a i i F i        . 
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The firm will only export if profits are nonnegative. The goods that are 
available are determined by whether it is profitable to sell to the market. 
A variety i will be exported from origin country o to destination country 
d if
(4.6)          
1 11
1
1
fd
od os
od o od
a i B F i w
a i F i w i
 


 
            
 .
SAMPLING
In this chapter, I attempt to match the model to how international 
prices are actually collected. Statistical agencies cannot collect price 
data for all goods that are traded. They must use a sample to stand in for 
nonsampled goods. In this section, I describe the sampling process the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) uses for its International Price Pro-
gram (IPP).3 The BLS’s sampling process is the most germane, since 
the empirical work examines U.S. trade. The sampling techniques and 
constraints faced are similar at other statistical agencies, s o much of the 
description applies to other countries.
Selecting Quotes
Based on trade data, the BLS sets a sample to determine the num-
ber of price quotes needed for each item. The BLS then selects a set of 
companies to ask for quotes and determines which quotes to ask of each 
company. A field economist then approaches the company to determine 
the particular products that will be priced.
The BLS sets a number of goals for its price program and faces a 
number of constraints when setting its sample. Therefore, the sampling 
is not a pure proportional probability sample, but a compromise that 
attempts to achieve its goals within the constraints.
The sample is designed to get prices covering total trade as well as 
a number of subaggregate price indices. Therefore, it will oversample 
some products to maintain suffi cient coverage of those subindices.
The survey is voluntary and requires the ongoing cooperation of 
importers or exporters. Resource constraints restrict the number of 
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new prices that can be gathered and how often the sample is reset. It is 
more diffi cult to obtain prices from intermittently traded products, since 
items that trade too infrequently do not yield usable price changes, so 
field economists focus on items that are regularly traded. Firms that are 
involved in trade intermittently tend to cooperate with data collection 
less frequently; therefore, the survey design intentionally downweights 
such products and companies.
Not all intermittent trade is due to the effects identified in this chap-
ter. For import prices, the BLS does not have jurisdiction to ask overseas 
exporters for price data. A foreign company’s goods may be imported 
consistently, just not by the same importer. Since the BLS can only 
track the importer’s side of the relationship, the goods from that foreign 
company will be intermittently traded in the sample. Some goods, like 
machinery installed in a new factory, are only demanded irregularly.
Quote Replacement
Quotes will drop out and need to be replaced periodically. There is 
both planned and forced substitution.
Planned substitution is replacement built into the sampling design. 
The sample is reset periodically to reflect changes in the set of products 
that are traded. Old items are cycled out and replaced by items in the 
new sample. Forced substitution is due to a product being discontin-
ued or a firm ceasing business. In such cases, the field economist will 
attempt to get a replacement quote from the trading firm if possible.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) report that about half of the quotes 
that drop out do so because of forced substitution and that a quarter 
drop out because of planned substitution. The remaining quarter are 
cases where the firm ceases to provide quotes and gives no reason for 
stopping. Depending on factors such as how much longer the item was 
to be included in the sample, the item may either be replaced by a new 
quote from a different firm or discontinued.
If there is a forced substitution and the new item is substantially 
different, the reporter is asked for the value of change so it can be sub-
tracted from the new item’s price, a process called “linking.” Gagnon, 
Mandel, and Vigfusson (2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) 
argue that this method is used relatively infrequently. If a new item is 
added (as in a planned substitution), there is no item with which to link. 
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When the import prices are put together by the BEA to deflate trade, 
quality adjustments are made to a few items, largely durable goods, 
where established hedonic methods are available (BEA 2011).
Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) argue that since explicit quality 
adjustment is done infrequently, import/export prices are approximately 
matched-model indices. That is, level differences between items within 
an index are attributed to quality differences and omitted. Of course, 
the data collection does not explicitly use matched modeling. However, 
quotes are often added to a cell without quality adjustment, and level 
differences between items do not get included. From the standpoint of 
the theory, this method is equivalent to matched modeling.
RESULTS
This section examines the theoretical diffi culties in adjusting for 
quality. Specifically, I examine matched modeling and the problems 
posed by sampling intermittently traded goods less frequently. I show 
that specific trade costs interfere with the assumptions that support the 
use of these methods.
In the subsections that follow, I will focus on how statistical agen-
cies measure international price change. The BLS uses a Laspeyres 
index for its import price indices (BLS 1997). The expression for the 
index measuring a price change from period 0 to period t is
(4.7)    
 
 
,0
,00
od t
t
i odi
p iw i
P
w i p i
  
,
where ω0      ,0 ,0od di p i c i .
This measure is distinct from the theoretical price index that mea-
sures the welfare effects of price change. The BLS (1997) states explic-
itly that the purpose of the international price indices is not to measure 
welfare.
To isolate the differential impact of costs on price across goods of 
different qualities, I assume throughout this section that trade costs are 
the same for all varieties.
ω
ω0
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Matched Modeling
Matched modeling works off the assumption that if two simi-
lar goods are available in the market at different prices, the price gap 
reflects differences in quality. We can recover the quality gap between 
an existing and a new good by examining the price gap. In this section, 
I show that specific costs weaken the link between price and quality.
Without specific costs (Fs = 0), prices closely reflect quality. The 
relationship between unit cost a(i) and quality q(i) can be written as
    11a i q i  . 
The relative price of two goods i and i′ that only differ in quality is
(4.8)    
 
 
 
 
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
o
od
od
o
q i w
p i q i
p i q iq i w










      

 .
In this case, matched modeling works well. As long as wages paid by 
the producers of the two products are the same, the price difference 
reflects only quality differences. If a comparison good from a producer 
with similar input costs can be found (for example, from the same coun-
try), matched modeling is a practical method for dealing with the new-
goods problem.4
This clear relationship between price and quality breaks down with 
specific costs. The relative price is now
(4.9)    
 
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
s
od
od od
s
odod
od
Fq i
p i
Fp i q i


 
 


      
.
As the specific cost term increases, prices are determined more by 
trade costs than by quality. Breaking the relationship between price and 
quality makes matched modeling more diffi cult. In matched modeling, 
the price gap between an old and a new good is attributed to quality. As 
Proposition 1 shows, this method underestimates the quality gap. 
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Proposition 1: Suppose .L Ha a  Then   oo
p L qL
p H qH
 .
Proof: From the solution to the model,   oo
p L qL
p H qH

 
if
(4.10)  
 
 
 
 
1
1 1
1 1
s
o od
od
s
o od
od
w Fa L
a L
a Hw Fa H
 
 

               
 .
This condition holds if
    
 
 1 1 01
s
od
od
a H a HFa H
a L a L
 
 
                           
. 
This condition is always true, since    1
a H
a L

 
and θ > 0 by assumption.
The specific cost sodF  has more influence on the price of low-quality goods. Therefore, the price difference will be smaller than qual-
ity differences. New goods are of lower quality than prices indicate. 
This force will tend to overstate the real value of new goods imports.
Sampling
As long as the nonsampled prices move in the same way as the 
sampled goods, this method gives accurate price measures. However, 
specific trade costs can introduce differences. Newly and intermittently 
traded goods are likely to have systematically lower quality than con-
tinuing goods. These lower-quality goods react to trade cost changes 
differently, so deflating these goods by prices of high-quality goods can 
lead to mismeasurement. 
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Quality of new goods 
Newly traded goods tend to be of lower quality than continuing 
goods. Since lower-quality goods are the least profitable, they are the 
most sensitive to cost changes. High-quality-goods exporters will serve 
even high-trade-cost markets, since they have high margins. Low-
margin exporters of low-quality goods are much closer to the zero-profit 
cutoff. Relatively small cost increases can make a market unprofitable, 
so these exporters are the most likely to exit.
In the paragraphs that follow, I will vary a cost and hold all other 
quantities constant. That is, if an exercise changes a specific trade cost 
so that
, 1 ,
s s
od t od tF F  , 
all other trade costs and wages are held constant: 
,
f
odF  1 ,
,ft od tF   τod, t +1 = τod,t , and , 1 ,o t o tw w   .
I define cutoff quality odq  as the quality level that sets Equation (4.6) at equality; however, changes in trade costs or input prices will change 
this cutoff. Lemma 1 shows that falling wages and trade costs (holding 
the other quantities constant) will lead to entry of low- quality goods.
Lemma 1: Holding all other quantities constant, if any of the fol-
lowing four conditions hold:
1) , 1 ,
s s
od t od tF F  ,
2) , 1 ,
f f
od t od tF F  ,
3) , 1 ,od t od t   , or
4) , 1 ,o t o tw w  ,
then , 1 ,od t od tq q   .
Proof: For proofs of the first three conditions, see Lemmas 2, 3, and 
4 in Bridgman (2013). For the proof of the final condition, rearranging 
the cutoff condition (Equation [4.6]) gives us
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(4.11)  
   
        
11 1
1
fd
od os
od od
a i B F i w
a i F i i




 
      
 .
If , 1 ,o t o tw w  , the right-hand side of the condition falls. This decline is equivalent to the fixed cost ,fod tF  falling. Following the proof of Lemma 
3 in Bridgman (2013), this implies that , 1 ,od t od tq q  .
Qua lity and price changes 
The fact that new and intermittently traded goods are of lower qual-
ity would not be a problem for sampling if the price changes of low- and 
high-quality goods were the same. However, low-quality goods react 
more to cost changes than do high-quality goods. Since more of the 
price of low-quality goods reflects trade costs, these goods are more 
sensitive to changes in these costs. The prices of low-quality goods fall 
(rise) more when specific trade costs fall  (rise) than do the prices of 
higher-quality goods. I show this formally in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: If a(H) > a(L) and either
1)  , 1 ,
s s
od t od tF F   or
2)  , 1 ,od t od t    ,
then 
   
 
   
 1 1t t t tt t
p L p L p H p H
p L p H
   .
Proof: Define Δp(i) by pt +1(i) = pt(i) + Δp(i). For the condition
   
 
   
 1 1t t t tt t
p L p L p H p H
p L p H
    to hold, we have
 
 
 
 t t
p L p H
p L p H
  .
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If either trade cost  , ,orsod t od tF  changes,    p L p H   . Formally, if
, 1 ,
s s
od t od tF F   , then
    , 1 ,
1
s s
od t od tF Fp L p H 
       , and if , 1 ,od t od t   , then
   
, 1 ,1 1
s s
od od
od t od t
F Fp L p H       
. The condition holds if
   
1 1
t tp L p H
 . Since     ,a H a L    p H p L  and the 
condition holds.
Since they show more price volatility, dropping low-quality goods 
will tend to underestimate price changes. To see this more concretely, 
consider the case where both a high- and a low-quality good—c(H)
and c(L), respectively—are traded in a category, but only the high-
quality good is included in the sample. Suppose the specific cost falls  1s st tF F  . The measured price change for the category is 
   
 
 
 1
t t tM
t
t ti
w H w L p H
P
w i p H
    . The price change should be 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 1
t t t t
t
t t t ti i
w H p H w L p L
P
w i p H w i p L 
   .
By Proposition 2,   
 
 1 1t tt t
p L p H
p L p H
   . That implies that
(4.12)    
 
 
 
 
 
 1 1
t t t t
t t t ti i
w H p H w L p H
w i p H w i p H 
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 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 1
t t t t
t t t ti i
w H p H w L p L
w i p H w i p L 
   
.
Therefore, Mt tP P , so the measured price change underestimates the 
price fall.
ωt ωt
ωt
ωt ωt
ωt ωt
ω ω
ω
ωt ωt
ωt
ωt
ωt
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The previous section showed theoretically that specific trade costs 
can lead to mismeasurement. In this section, I examine how important 
this mismeasurement is empirically.
This section only performs an initial assessment of the empirical 
scope of the theoretical mechanisms. It does not “fix” the import price 
index. While I find that these mechanisms appear to have a quantitative 
impact in some cases, doing a full adjustment of the data will require 
additional work.
Data
The basic data I use in the data analysis are U.S. goods import data 
from the Census Bureau, as collected by Hummels (2007). These data 
give trade value on a customs value (FOB, or free on board), tariffs, 
freight charges, and weight of shipments from 1974 to 2004. A “good” 
is defi ned as an SITC Revision 2 item-and-country-of-origin pairing. 
There are a couple of caveats to using these data. First, they are 
not the data that are used by the BLS to calculate import price indices. 
The price concept I use is unit value (value per weight) rather than 
price per product.5 A product is much more aggregated compared to the 
prices used by statistical agencies, so it will likely underestimate the 
real impact of specific costs. Furthermore, the analysis does not cover 
all trade. Weight data only cover shipments brought in by water or air. 
Therefore, the portion of trade with Mexico and Canada shipped by rail 
or truck is excluded. Additionally, not all goods report a weight.
Despite the limitations of the data, they do have advantages that 
lead me to use them. Most importantly, they are publicly available, 
unlike the microdata. Quality variation across exporters and locations 
is a robust finding. (For example, see Bastos and Silva [2010]; Choi, 
Hummels, and Xiang [2009]; and Hummels and Klenow [2005].) There-
fore, country-level variation generates suffi cient quality differences to 
get a first-pass impact of quality difference on price measurement.
In the subsection that follows, I assume that tariffs are all ad valorem 
charges and that freight rates are all specific costs. That is, τod(i) is the 
tariff rate and  so odw F i  is freight charge per kilogram. Price pod(i) is unit value. Hummels and Skiba (2004), among many others, find that freight 
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rates are charged on a specific basis. Tariffs in the post–World War II 
era are typically charge d on an ad valorem basis.
Matched Modeling
As documented in Proposition 1, specific trade costs change the 
relationship between quality and price compared to the case without 
such costs. To get an empirical measure of this impact, I compare the 
model’s estimates of the cost parameter a(i) with and without specific 
costs. Since we know that specific costs are present, I will assume that 
the specific trade-cost model is the “true” model. I will use the ratio 
of the “true” a(i) and the estimate without these costs, as is usually 
assumed, as my indicator of quality mismeasurement.
The mill price is given by       1 1
s
odo
od
od
F iwp i a i
i
 
     
.
We can rewrite this equation as follows:
(4.13)        
1 1
1
s
o od
o od
od
w F i
a i w p i
i
 
     
 .
Neglecting the impact of specific costs (setting Fs = 0) will give an 
estimate of â(i):
(4.14)     ˆ odp ia i w  .
Taking the ratio gives us a measure of the overstatement of quality dif-
ferences from assuming only ad valorem costs:6
(4.15)   
 
     1ˆ 1 1
s
o od
od od
a i w F i
a i p i i      
.
Specific trade costs are more likely to be an issue when one or more of 
the following characteristics are present:
1) High specific-cost goods (high Fs)
2) Low-quality goods (low a(i))
3)  Inelastically demanded goods (low σ)
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Microanalysis 
I begin the empirical analysis by examining one good, leather foot-
wear, in detail. I selected this good for a number of reasons. It is one of 
the 10 largest import categories in the period examined. A wide variety 
of countries export this good to the United States, with the potential 
for significant quality differences. In addition, there are few observable 
attributes that can be used for hedonic quality adjustment. Therefore, 
there ma y be room for alternative methods such as the one proposed in 
this chapter.
I need a value of σ to estimate the mismeasurement. I use a value 
of 2.02, taken from Broda and Weinstein (2006).7 Table 4.1 reports the 
estimated a(i) ratio for Switzerland and Sri Lanka at the beginning and 
end of the sample period. I use these two countries since they represent 
the high and low ends of unit value, with Swiss exporters charging more 
than fi ve times the price of their Sri Lankan counterparts in 1974. This 
spread reflects the fact that the richer countries tend to export higher-
quality goods (Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman 2011).
In 1974, the impact of specific costs on mismeasurement is much 
stronger for Sri Lanka than it is for Switzerland. Price overstates qual-
ity by nearly 40 percent for Sri Lanka, whereas it overstates quality by 
only 4 percent for Switzerland. FOB prices are selected as a markup 
over production cost, which is correlated with quality, and over specific 
cost, which is not. For Switzerland, trade costs are low relative to price. 
Therefore, most of the price reflects production cost, which reflects 
quality. Specific costs relative to unit value are much higher for Sri 
Lanka, so more of the charged price is a markup over trade costs. In 
2004, Sri Lanka’s mismeasurement falls significantly. Specific costs 
Table 4.1  Leather Footwear a(i) Ratios
Switzerland 
1974
Sri Lanka 
1974
Switzerland 
2004
Sri Lanka 
2004
Po 15.41 2.97 30.97 13.01
F swo 0.70 0.93 1.49 0.80
τ 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.11
aˆ(i)
a(i) 1.04 1.37 1.05 1.06 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, using data from Hummels (2007).
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relative to unit value are much lower. Switzerland and Sri Lanka are 
much more similar in cost structure, so prices are more reflective of 
quality.
If each good was mismeasured by the same amount, there would be 
no impact on matched modeling. As shown above, specific costs affect 
low-quality goods more, so we would not expect the impact to be the 
same. To measure the impact on measurement, we need to compare 
goods across producers. An issue with the trade data is that the produc-
ers are different countries, so input costs are unlikely to be the same. 
The price levels of wealthier countries tend to be higher, as a result of 
the “Penn effect.” (See Marquez, Thomas, and Land [2012] for a recent 
empirical confirmation of this effect.) Certainly, wages in Switzerland 
and Sri Lanka are different.
We can use the model to eliminate the wages from our estimates. If 
good k is produced by countries i and j, the price ratio without specific 
costs is
 
 
 
 
ˆ
ˆ
i i i
j j j
p k w a k
p k w a k
 .
 
The equivalent ratio with the true a(i) ratio is
(4.16)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ
ji i i i i
j j j j i j
a kw a k w a k a k
w a k w a k a k a k
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.
The degree to which matched modeling underestimates quality gaps is
(4.17)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
ˆ ˆ
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ˆ ˆ
j j ji i i
j j i i i j
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.
In 1974, the unadjusted price ratio overstates the quality difference 
by 32 percent. The unadjusted price ratio
 
 
ˆ
ˆ
i i
j j
w a k
w a k
  is 5.19, while the adjusted ratio   i ij j
w a k
w a k
    
 is 6.83.
In 2004, the overstatement falls to 1 percent. Since Swiss and Sri 
Lankan costs are more similar, so is the degree of mismeasurement. 
Therefore, the data better reflect the assumptions of matched modeling.
× ×
× ×
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Overstating the quality of new goods will overstate imports. The 
effect is strongest for low-quality goods. Therefore, this effect will tend 
to overstate the U.S. trade deficit. American producers tend to produce 
higher-quality goods, since the United States is a high-income country. 
U.S. imports have begun to shift to lower-income countries, for whom 
the effect is stronger. Therefore, imports are more likely to be over-
stated than exports.
The size of the mismeasurement is sensitive to the elasticity used. 
For example, the a(i) ratio for Sri Lanka in 1974 drops from 1.37 to 1.10 
if σ is increased from 2.02 to 4.00. On the other hand, the ratio jumps up 
to 2.24 if σ falls to 1.50. The elasticity governs the degree to which price 
is marked up over cost. For low values of σ (inelastic goods),  there are 
high markups that magnify the impact of specific costs.
Aggregate analysis 
I now turn to the aggregate effect on quality measurement. I use 
σ = 4 for all goods. This is the value Simonovska and Waugh (2011) 
settle on as a consensus value using U.S. data; the value is within the 
usual range used in the literature. This will tend to underestimate the 
impact, since more differentiated goods tend to have a lower value of σ.
The impact of specific costs is heterogeneous. The range is large, 
from a ratio of 1 (no distortion) to 3 (200 percent overstatement). 
The average   
aˆ i
a i
 ratio over the sample is 1.039, with a standard devia-
tion of 0.067. The goods with the largest ratios are those shipped by air. 
The mismeasurement is larger for goods with high specific-trade costs. 
Since air charges are much larger than charges for goods shipped by 
water, goods shipped mostly or exclusively by air are more subject to 
this distortion.
So far, I have treated each good equally. To get a sense of the overall 
impact, Figure 4.1 plots the a(i) ratio against its share in total imports 
within the sample for 2004.8 The most distorted goods tend to be a 
smaller share of imports. However, there are a nu mber of goods that are 
relatively important that show significant distortion.
As a measure of the aggregate impact, I calculate a trade-weighted 
ratio of all goods:
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(4.18) 
 
 
ˆi
i
i i
w a i
s
w a i  ,
where
 
   
   oi oi
p i c i
s
p i c i
   .
Figure 4.2 shows the weighted ratio, which declines from 1.029 
to 1.015. This decline follows the fall in freight rates documented in 
Hummels (2007). Of course, what matters for matched modeling is the 
relative mismeasurement within a category. As shown above with Sri 
Lankan shoes, the decline in specific costs will reduce the scope of this 
source of mismeasurement. Since the typical good’s price reflects its 
quality more over time, the typical r elative mismeasurement will likely 
decline as well.
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Figure 4.1  Estimated Mismeasurement vs. Log Share of Total Imports 
for 2004 (σ = 4.00)
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, using data from Hummels (2007).
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The matched modeling issue may be important for at least some 
goods. There is reason to believe that this calculation underestimates 
the degree of mismeasurement. The data may understate actual specific 
costs. They do not include any other specific costs that accrue because 
of internal transportation and wholesale and retail trade. Rousslang and 
To (1993) find that internal trade barriers are significant. Internal trans-
portation costs are 37 percent of international rates. If any of these costs 
are specific, these estimates will be too low. Using Norwegian data, 
Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2011) estimate that the median 
specific trade cost is 34 percent of a good’s value.
Using the same σ for all goods understates the impact on some dif-
ferentiated goods whose demands are less elastic than σ = 4. If we set 
σ at 2, the magnitude of the average mismeasurement increases to 9.9 
percent in 1974 and 5.4 percent in 2004.
Even if the impact for the average good is small, there are some 
goods for which it is likely to matter. Lower-income countries, which 
Figure 4.2  U.S. Trade–Weighted Estimated Mismeasurement (σ = 4.00)
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tend to produce lower-quality goods, have become more important in 
U.S. imports. The shift to air transportation, which has much high er 
freight rates, has increased the specific cost for some goods.
Sampling
The sampling method is less likely to collect quotes for intermit-
tently traded goods, whereas the model predicts that new and intermit-
tently traded goods are of lower quality than continuing goods. I begin 
the analysis by examining whether these goods are of lower quality in 
the data. Though quality cannot be observed directly, there is evidence 
that such goods are of lower quality than continuing goods.
Goods that were not traded in the previous year have lower unit 
values. This set of goods includes both completely new goods and inter-
mittently traded goods that are imported again. Bridgman (2013) shows 
that newly traded goods enter at a lower unit value, while trade costs are 
similar across the two sets of goods.
Beginning with Besedes and Prusa (2006a,b), a growing literature 
has examined the duration of trading relationships. (See Besedes and 
Prusa [2010] for a survey.) This literature finds that most trade relation-
ships are very short, with the median product being traded for only a 
year. Lower exporter income, as measured by GDP per capita, is asso-
ciated with shorter trading relationships. As discussed above, lower-
income countries tend to export lower-quality goods.
There is direct evidence that entering and exiting items are of lower 
quality than continuing goods. Mandel (2010) finds that U.S. goods that 
cease to be exported are of lower quality. In a later work, Mandel (2013) 
finds that Chinese exporters to the United States entered at low quality.
I mpact of sampling 
These data do not allow us to assess the quantitative impact of 
sampling, since we cannot identify which goods are excluded from 
the sample. However, we can do a back-of-the-envelope calculation to 
get a sense of quantitative impact. I examine the impact of trade cost 
changes for low- and high-quality goods. Specifically, I compare what 
the theory predicts the new prices would be if F s changed to ,sF . To 
parameterize the exercise, I use new and old goods in 2004 as reported 
in Bridgman (2013). I identify old and new goods as high- and low-
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quality goods, respectively. Their prices are po(H) and po(L). (H and L 
stand for high and low.)
Equation (4.19) gives us a(i)wo. Using the price equation, we can 
calculate  op i  for  ,i H L , the predicted price when Fs changes to Fs,′ and all other quantities are held constant.
If trade costs Fs and τ are the same for high- and low-quality goods, 
which is the case for new and old goods in 2004, the relative growth 
rate of prices is
(4.19)   
 
 
 
 1 / 1o o oo o o
p H p L p L
p H p L p H
               
 .
In 2004, we have   
0.59 0.49
1.20
o
o
p L
p H
  .
 
Therefore, high-quality goods are half as responsive to a change in 
specific trade costs.
While this example is quite stylized, it indicates that there can be 
significant differences in price responsiveness among goods of different 
quality. Using only high-quality goods will tend to underestimate price 
changes.
There are forces mitigating this effect. Most trade value results 
from trade relationships that are long lasting. If a trade relationship sur-
vives the first few years, the chances that it will end fall significantly 
(Besedes and Prusa 2010).
Trade relationships in differentiated goods tend to be longer. Besedes 
and Prusa (2006b) compare trade duration for goods in organized mar-
kets with differentiated goods using the classification reported in Rauch 
(1999). Trade relationships for commodities traded in organized mar-
kets tend to be shorter, since such markets lower the cost of switching. 
These are the goods for which the measurement issues resulting from 
quality differences are less important.
The impact on aggregate trade measurement is probably small. 
Most trade value is not impacted by this effect. However, it may have 
an impact on subindices. The price gap between new and old goods 
has been increasing, suggesting that the scope for mismeasurement is 
increasing.
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This increasing scope of mismeasurement could have an impact on 
some of the other uses of trade prices, aside from deflating trade. For 
instance, it may have a role in explaining the low responsiveness of 
trade prices to exchange rates. Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) note 
that trade quotes change very little over time. The items that tend to be 
included in the price sample are those that are the least affected by cost 
shocks.
CONCLUSIO N
This chapter shows theoretically that two frequently used tech-
niques in international price measurement, matched modeling and 
dropping intermittently traded goods from the sample, will mismeasure 
prices when there are quality-differentiated goods and specific trade 
costs. Specific costs weaken the link between a good’s quality and its 
price. This effect causes matched modeling to overstate the quality of 
low-quality goods. Intermittently traded goods are typically low-quality 
goods, those whose prices are the most sensitive to shocks. Removing 
them from the sample will understate price movements. These effects 
may lead us to overstate the amount of trade from new, low-income 
exporters, since they tend to produce lower-quality goods. Determining 
the extent of this overstatement will require additional work using more 
granular data. However, initial data work indicates that these effects 
may be quantitatively important for some types of goods.
Notes
I thank Jeffrey Blaha, John Greenlees, Larry Lang, and Dave Mead for comments. The 
views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author and not necessarily those 
of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis or the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 
 1. For example, see Hallak (2006); Hallak and Schott (2011); Henn, Papageorgiou, 
and Spatafora (2013); Hummels and Skiba (2004); Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and 
Opromolla (2011); Manova and Zhang (2012); Martin (2012); and Spearot (2011).
 2. This assumption provides closed-form solutions for prices. As shown in Bridgman 
(2013), the impact of this assumption is small as long as there are a large number 
of varieties sold.
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 3. I thank the BLS’s Jeffery Blaha, Larry Lang, and Dave Mead for extensive assis-
tance in explaining the sampling process.
 4. There are other issues with match modeling. If there are menu costs, firms may use 
the introduction of new models as an opportunity to change prices (Nakamura and 
Steinsson 2012). That concern does not arise in this model, since prices are fully 
flexible and there are no strategic or informational reasons for not adjusting prices. 
Therefore, that literature is complementary to this paper.
 5. Amiti and Davis (2009) use unit values and argue that they are a reasonable proxy 
for broad price movements.
 6. Quality is actually a function of this cost q(i) = a(i)1 + θ. By only examining the 
ratio of the a(i), we do not have to assign a value for θ. This ratio shows the impact 
of specific trade costs on quality measurement, but we would need a value of θ to 
assess the impact on welfare measurement.
 7. This value is the 1974–1988 value for SITC Revision 2 Code 85102, taken from 
the working-paper version (Broda and Weinstein 2004). The published version 
reports elasticities for the more aggregated three-digit SITC level, while the work-
ing paper reports at the five-digit level.
 8. I log both variables to make the figure easier to see. I use 2004, the final year of 
the sample, since it has the most observations.
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Industries Affect the Numbers and Perceptions
Susan N. Houseman
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W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Timothy Sturgeon
Industrial Performance Center, MIT
Since 2000, the U.S. manufacturing sector has lost more than fi ve 
million jobs, or over 30 percent of its employment base. Large-scale 
employment losses in manufacturing are not confi ned to a few Rust Belt 
states. Manufacturing employment over the period has fallen in all but 
one state (Alaska), and the drop has exceeded 20 percent in 40 states. In 
response to these employment losses, as well as to a large trade defi cit 
in manufactured goods and concerns that U.S. manufacturing is losing 
its international competitiveness, President Obama created a cabinet-
level Offi ce of Manufacturing Policy, and Congress has considered a 
number of measures to help U.S. manufacturers.1
The development of special policies to promote U.S. manufactur-
ing has many detractors, however. At the heart of the debate is a basic 
disagreement over the state of U.S. manufacturing. Those who oppose 
government intervention typically argue that there is little need, point-
ing to robust output growth in the sector. Over the past decade the aver-
age annual growth of real value-added in manufacturing has outpaced 
that in the aggregate economy, except during recessions, and in quantity 
terms, the output of U.S. manufacturers relative to the rest of the econ-
omy has remained steady (Figure 5.1).2 These statistics, by themselves, 
provide compelling evidence that manufacturing remains highly com-
petitive. Citing such fi gures, Robert Lawrence and Lawrence Edwards 
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recently asserted, “The concerns about U.S. manufacturing are not 
about output or growth but relate to employment” (Lawrence and 
Edwards 2013). High growth in real value-added coupled with large 
employment losses implies high labor productivity growth: many infl u-
ential researchers and analysts promote the narrative that employment 
losses in manufacturing, as in agriculture, are largely a consequence of 
automation, not import competition.3 As U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Offi cer David Chavern 
put it, “Where did those [manufacturing] jobs go? Mostly to a country 
called ‘productivity’” (Chavern 2013).
Statistics, and their interpretation, play a crucial role in shaping our 
understanding of the economy and informing policy. Yet, the debate 
over the state of U.S. manufacturing, with its dueling narratives, bol-
stered by apparently contradictory sets of statistics, illustrates how the 
rapid pace of globalization and technological change greatly compli-
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cates the collection and interpretation of economic data. Building on 
Houseman et al. (2011), we raise concerns about the widely cited output 
growth statistics in Figure 5.1, which have served as a basic indicator of 
the health of American manufacturing. That article focuses on biases to 
manufacturing statistics resulting from the rapid shift toward imported 
intermediates from low-wage countries and estimates that real GDP 
growth in manufacturing was overstated by up to 20 percent between 
1997 and 2007. In this chapter, we argue that, even in the absence of 
such biases, the manufacturing output statistics in Figure 5.1 are mis-
leading and commonly misinterpreted.
First, it is generally unknown that the robust growth in real GDP in 
the manufacturing sector is largely driven by one industry: computers 
and electronic products. For most of manufacturing, real output growth 
has been relatively weak or negative.4 When the computer and elec-
tronic products industry is excluded, real GDP growth in manufacturing 
falls by two-thirds between 1997 and 2007, the decade leading up to 
the Great Recession. In 2011, without computer-related industries, real 
GDP in the manufacturing sector was actually lower than in  2000. The 
computer and electronic products industry similarly drives real manu-
facturing output growth in most U.S. states. Real manufacturing GDP 
growth between 1997 and 2007 falls by more than half in a majority of 
states and by at least 25 percent in all but 10 states.
Furthermore, the extraordinary growth in real value-added in 
manufacturing and the accompanying productivity growth in the com-
puter and electronic products industry results largely from two sets of 
products, computers and semiconductors, that, when adjusted for qual-
ity improvements, have prices that are falling rapidly. These quality 
improvements, in turn, largely refl ect better design and increases in the 
density of electronic circuitry. While changes in manufacturing pro-
cesses are necessary to produce these improved designs, the produc-
tion processes in computers and semiconductors have been automated 
for many decades. Thus, the high growth in real value-added and pro-
ductivity in the computer and semiconductor product segments, and by 
extension the manufacturing sector, refl ects, to a large degree, product 
improvements from research and development rather than automation 
of the production process. Unlike productivity resulting from automa-
tion, which involves the substitution of capital for labor, productivity 
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arising from improvements to product design and already-automated 
production processes does not, in and of itself, cause job losses.
Ironically, the extraordinary growth in real value-added and pro-
ductivity in the computer and semiconductor industries does not signal 
the competitiveness of the United States as a manufacturing location for 
these products. Drawing on new market research data, we provide evi-
dence of the shift in the location of computer and semiconductor manu-
facturing to Asia. Few personal computers and servers are assembled 
in the United States today, and, consequently, the United States runs a 
large trade defi cit for these products. The United States retains a sig-
nifi cant presence in semiconductor wafer fabrication, but over the past 
decade manufacturing capacity has expanded much more rapidly in 
Asia, and, as a result, U.S. market share has declined rapidly. Although 
many of the computers and semiconductors produced overseas are still 
designed in the United States, the shift in the location of production has 
a direct bearing on the number and types of U.S. jobs.
The effect that computer-related industries have on measured 
growth in manufacturing real GDP has important implications not only 
for the interpretation of published statistics but also for research based 
on them. We illustrate with an empirical analysis of the relationship 
between employment and real output growth using state manufactur-
ing data. The computer and electronic products industry is an outlier 
in manufacturing, characterized both by extraordinary real value-added 
growth and by above-average employment declines. An increase in 
a state’s manufacturing output resulting from higher demand for its 
products should lead to an increase in employment, but we fi nd no 
such employment effect in instrumental variables regression analy-
ses. Although a naïve interpretation of this fi nding would suggest that 
policies to promote U.S. manufacturing will fail to generate jobs, the 
fi nding makes no sense, and such an interpretation would be incorrect. 
When the computer and electronics product industry is dropped from 
the manufacturing measures, the expected relationship between output 
and employment holds: higher demand generates roughly equal per-
centage increases in real manufacturing shipments and employment.
Misleading statistics have helped shape an important policy discus-
sion concerning U.S. manufacturing. To address the problem, statistical 
agencies fi rst and foremost should take steps to assure that the outsized 
effect that computer-related industries have on manufacturing-sector 
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statistics is transparent to data users. This could easily be accomplished 
by publishing real output and productivity statistics for the manufactur-
ing sector less computer-related industries.
In the remainder of the paper, we do three things. First, we detail 
the infl uence that computer and electronic products manufacturing has 
on real manufacturing GDP growth nationally and in states. We also 
estimate the bias to real GDP growth in state manufacturing sectors 
from offshoring in the appendix to this chapter. Second, we examine 
the global competitiveness of the U.S. computer and semiconductor 
industry segments and the sources and interpretation of the rapid real 
value-added and productivity growth in them. And third, we illustrate 
the distorting effect computer-related industries may have on research 
fi ndings through an empirical examination of the relationship between 
output and employment growth using state manufacturing data. We 
conclude with recommendations for statistical agencies.
THE EFFECT OF THE COMPUTER AND ELECTRONIC 
PRODUCTS INDUSTRY ON REAL GDP GROWTH
IN MANUFACTURING
Manufacturing output statistics mask divergent trends within the 
sector. Figure 5.2 displays annual average growth rates for each three-
digit NAICS manufacturing industry. Real value-added in the computer 
and electronic products industry, which includes computers, semicon-
ductors, telecommunications equipment, and other electronic products 
manufacturing, grew at a staggering rate of 22 percent per year from 
1997 to 2007.5 In contrast, real value-added in petroleum and coal prod-
ucts manufacturing, the second-fastest growing industry, expanded less 
than 5 percent per year. Real value-added declined in seven industries 
over the decade. As shown formally below, without the computer and 
electronic products industry, which accounted for just 10 to 13 percent 
of value-added throughout the decade, manufacturing output growth in 
the United States was relatively weak.
The rapid growth of real value-added in the computer and elec-
tronic products industry, NAICS 334, can be attributed to two subin-
dustries: computer manufacturing, NAICS 334111, and semiconductor 
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and related device manufacturing, NAICS 334413.6 The extraordinary 
real GDP growth in these subindustries, in turn, is a result of the adjust-
ment of price indexes used to defl ate computers and semiconductors for 
improvements in quality. From 1997 to 2011, for example, the BLS pro-
ducer price indexes have fallen at a compound annual rate of 52 percent 
for microprocessors, 36 percent for portable computers, and 28 percent 
for desktop personal computers and workstations.
Contribution of the Computer and Electronic Products Industry 
to Aggregate Manufacturing Growth
Growth rates for industry subsets may be approximated from pub-
lished data using a Törnqvist formula. Specifi cally, the growth rate of 
real value-added for a subset of industries, expressed as a logarithmic 
change, is approximately equal to the weighted average of the growth 
rates of the component industries:
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Figure 5.2  Real Value-Added Average Annual Growth Rate, 1997–2007
SOURCE: Authors’ tabulations using BEA industry accounts data.
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(5.1)    ln(Qt / Qt 1) wi,t ln(qi,t / qi,t 1) ,
              i
where qi,t is the published real dollar value-added or (equivalently) 
quantity index for industry i in year t and wit is the average of industry 
i’s share of nominal manufacturing value-added in adjacent time peri-
ods (t, t − 1);7 
 wi,t  1.
          i
 Figure 5.3 shows average annual growth in real GDP for U.S. man-
ufacturing as published and for manufacturing excluding the computer 
and electronic products industry (NAICS 334) along with aggregate 
real GDP growth rates from 1997 to 2007 and from 2000 to 2010.8 
Although the computer and electronic products industry only accounted 
for between 10 and 13 percent of value-added in the U.S. manufactur-
ing sector throughout the period, it has an outsized effect on manufac-
turing statistics. Without NAICS 334, U.S. manufacturing’s real GDP 
growth was only 1.2 percent per year from 1997 to 2007, a third of the 
published aggregate manufacturing growth rate, and was much weaker 
than overall growth in the economy. The manufacturing sector is dis-
proportionately affected by recessions, and so when computed over a 
more recent period, real GDP growth was somewhat lower in manu-
facturing than in the aggregate economy. From 2000 (a business cycle 
peak) to 2011, real GDP grew at an annual rate of 1.3 percent in manu-
facturing compared to 1.7 percent for the economy overall. Without the 
computer and electronic products industry, however, real value-added 
in manufacturing was about 5 percent lower in 2011 than in 2000. The 
computer and electronic products industry has a similarly large impact 
on manufacturing productivity statistics. For example, manufacturing’s 
multifactor productivity growth rates between 1997 and 2007 fall by 
almost half when NAICS 334 is excluded (Houseman et al. 2011).
Contribution of the Computer and Electronic Products Industry 
to State-Level Manufacturing Growth
The nationwide pattern of strong manufacturing output growth in 
combination with a large employment decline is also apparent in most 
states. In the decade leading up to the Grea t Recession, real manufactur-
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ing value-added declined in only four states (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
Kentucky, and West Virginia), while the growth rate of real manufactur-
ing value-added exceeded 20 percent in 33 states and real value-added 
more than doubled in seven (Oregon, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, Califor-
nia, South Dakota, and Texas). In spite of strong manufacturing output 
growth, the large majority of states experienced signifi cant employment 
declines in the sector. Manufacturing employment declined by more 
than 10 percent in 37 states and the District of Columbia and expanded 
in just four states over the decade.
Paralleling our analysis of national manufacturing data, we exam-
ine the extent to which state-level manufacturing’s real GDP growth 
is attributable to the computer and electronic products manufacturing 
industry (NAICS 334). Figure 5.4 displays state-level average annual 
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growth rates of real GDP for all manufacturing and for manufactur-
ing excluding NAICS 334 from 1997 to 2007. The infl uence of this 
industry on the manufacturing sector’s real value-added growth natu-
rally is greatest in states with relatively high or signifi cantly growing 
concentrations of computer and electronic products manufacturing.9 For 
example, when NAICS 334 is omitted, manufacturing’s average annual 
real GDP growth rate between 1997 and 2007 falls from 8.7 percent to 
2.4 percent in Arizona, from 7.9 percent to 2.5 percent in California, 
from 5.9 percent to 1.0 percent in Colorado, from 12.8 percent to 1.5 
percent in Idaho, from 6.3 percent to −0.3 percent in Massachusetts, 
from 5.4 percent to −1.4 percent in New Mexico, and from 15.1 percent 
to 1.1 percent in Oregon.
The infl uence on manufacturing output growth rates is substan-
tial, however, even in states in which computer and electronic products 
manufacturing has a modest presence. That growth rate falls by more 
than half in 28 states and the District of Columbia when NAICS 334 
is excluded and by at least 25 percent in all but 10 states. And without 
NAICS 334, real GDP for the rest o f manufacturing experienced an 
absolute decline in 10 states and the District of Columbia in the decade 
before the Great Recession.
A state’s manufacturing output growth often is used to assess the 
sector’s overall health and competitiveness vis-à-vis manufacturing in 
other states. Although computer and electronic products manufacturing 
is an important component of manufacturing in some states, we argue 
below that the extraordinary growth in real value-added and productiv-
ity in this industry segment largely refl ects product innovations result-
ing from research and development (R&D), and such innovations may 
not have occurred in the state, potentially giving a distorted picture of 
the relative competitiveness of states’ manufacturing sectors.
Table 5.1 shows, for selected states, rankings according to manufac-
turing’s real value-added growth from 1997 to 2007, as published, and 
new rankings based on real value-added growth rates of manufactur-
ing excluding NAICS 334. For 22 states and the District of Columbia, 
rankings change by at least 10 when growth rates exclude NAICS 334; 
rankings for fi ve states fell by more than 20. As expected, states with 
large or growing shares of computer and electronic products manufac-
turing tend to have the highest manufacturing GDP growth rates and 
experience the largest decline in ranking when the growth is calculated 
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without NAICS 334. Still, the changes are dramatic. Most notable are 
the drops in the rankings for New Mexico (from 11 to 49) and Massa-
chusetts (from 9 to 43). Oregon, the state with the highest manufactur-
ing GDP growth rate over the period in offi cial statistics, falls to 25 in 
the new rankings. Correspondingly, 12 states with a relatively small 
presence of computer manufacturing experience signifi cant improve-
ments under the new ranking. In sum, states with apparently rapidly 
Table 5.1  Rankings by Growth Rate in Manufacturing Real Value-
Added and Real Value-Added Excluding NAICS 334, 1997–
2007, Selected States  
Rank, all mfg.
Rank, mfg. less 
NAICS 334 Change in rank
New Mexico 11 49 −38
Massachusetts 9 43 −34
Oregon 1 25 −24
New Hampshire 22 45 −23
Vermont 13 35 −22
Idaho 2 20 −18
Colorado 10 27 −17
Maryland 25 41 −16
District of Columbia 35 46 −11
Arizona 4 14 −10
Connecticut 27 17 10
Georgia 39 28 11
Indiana 18 7 11
Iowa 29 18 11
Louisiana 17 6 11
Alabama 24 12 12
Montana 21 9 12
Wyoming 14 2 12
Oklahoma 28 15 13
South Carolina 42 29 13
Michigan 40 26 14
Mississippi 33 19 14
Alaska 41 23 18
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using BEA regional data.
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expanding manufacturing sectors are for the most part simply states 
with sizable computer and semiconductor industries.
INTERPRETING THE EXTRAORDINARY REAL OUTPUT 
AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE COMPUTER AND
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRIES
So far, we have argued that U.S. manufacturing-sector statistics 
are often misinterpreted because it is not understood that computer and 
related industries largely drive the apparent robust growth in real manu-
facturing GDP and have a large effect on the manufacturing productiv-
ity measures. One might suppose, at least for this industry segment, 
that the strong real output growth indicates the competitiveness of the 
United States as a location of production and that the sharp drop in 
employment is a consequence of productivity growth. Both, however, 
would be a misinterpretation of the numbers.
The Competitiveness of the United States as a Location for 
Production of Computers and Semiconductors
As noted, the infl uence of computer and electronic products manu-
facturing (NAICS 334) on aggregate manufacturing’s real GDP growth 
largely derives from electronic computer manufacturing (NAICS 
334111), whose key product segments are personal computers and serv-
ers, and from the semiconductor industry (NAICS 334413), which in 
the United States largely comprises the production of integrated circuits. 
To put their infl uence into perspective, we plot data on the (nominal) 
value of shipments published by the Census Bureau in these two sub-
industries for the 2002–2011 period in Figure 5.5.10 Semiconductor ship-
ments were relatively fl at until the 2008 recession, declined during the 
recession, and have expanded signifi cantly since 2009.11 In contrast, the 
value of shipments in electronic computer manufacturing was relatively 
fl at until the recession in 2008 and has declined precipitously since. 
Although these two subindustries accounted for most of the growth in 
manufacturing real GDP over the period, because of rapidly declining 
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price defl ators the ir share of the manufacturing sector’s output did not 
increase; together, they accounted for only 2 to 3 percent of all manu-
facturing shipments throughout the period. Real output and productiv-
ity statistics are commonly used as indicators of the competitiveness of 
U.S. industries, but the extraordinary growth of these measures for the 
computer and semiconductor industries may be a poor indicator of the 
overall competitiveness of the United States as a location for manufac-
turing these products. 
How competitive is the United States in computer and semicon-
ductor manufacturing? To address this question, we present market 
research data and analysis on trends in the global location of production 
of personal computers, computer servers, and semiconductors. We sup-
plement these data with import and export data in these product groups 
from the UN Comtrade database.
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Figure 5.5  Computer (NAICS 334111) and Semiconductor (NAICS 
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Personal computers and servers
Personal computers (termed “single-user computers” in U.S. sta-
tistics) include desktop and portable computer devices, while servers 
(termed “multiuser computers”) provide shared data services. Figure 
5.6 displays estimates by the market research fi rm International Data 
Corporation (IDC) of the share (in units) of worldwide production of 
personal computers (PCs) and servers assembled in the United States 
since the early 2000s. In both product segments, the share assembled 
in the United States is small and has fallen dramatically over the last 
decade. In 2001, an estimated 12 percent of personal computers were 
manufactured in the United States; by 2012 that share had fallen by 
more than half, to about 5 percent. U.S. assembly is most common with 
desktop computers; portable computers are almost exclusively manu-
factured in Asia. The shift in demand away from desktops in favor of 
portable computers partly explains the decline in U.S. market share. 
As with PCs, a growing share of servers are manufactured in Asia and 
Mexico and a declining share in the United States. Large Internet con-
tent providers (e.g., Google), retailers (e.g., Amazon), and social media 
companies (e.g., Facebook) did some assembly in the United States for 
their own server farms in the early 2000s—explaining the increase in 
U.S. market share around 2003 in Figure 5.6—but have since discontin-
ued that practice, according to the IDC.
What PC product segments are still assembled in the United 
States? According to IDC analysts, U.S. assembly is primarily done for 
government- and education-sector orders that require domestic content. 
In addition, for PCs, last-minute customized confi guration is sometimes 
carried out domestically for desktop PC units, though several such 
plants have recently closed (Ladendorf 2012). PC confi guration gener-
ally entails inserting specifi c processors, memory, and hard disk drives 
into mostly built-up machines to meet the requirements of specifi c 
orders. Because the manufacturing process requirements are minimal, 
PC confi guration facilities are sometimes referred to as “screwdriver 
plants” in the industry.
The shift of PC production away from the United States is refl ected 
in trade statistics. The nominal value of U.S. PC exports rose only 3.6 
percent on an average annual basis from 2002 to 2012 (from $1.8 to 
$2.6 billion), while world exports rose 18.4 percent annually (from 
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$28.3 to $153.1 billion), causing the U.S. share of world PC exports to 
fall from 6.5 percent in 2002 to 1.7 percent in 2012. Most of this growth 
in world exports has come from China. China’s exports rose 42 percent 
on an average annual basis from 2002 to 2012 (from $3.5 to $117.4 bil-
lion), and its share of world exports soared from 12.4 to 76.6 percent. 
During the same period, PC imports to the United States rose at an 
average annual rate of 14.7 percent, and as a result, by 2012 the United 
States ran a trade defi cit of $38.3 billion in PCs.
The center of PC production clearly has shifted to China, where 
PCs (increasingly in notebook format, since that format is cost-
effective to ship by air) are assembled in huge numbers, largely by 
Taiwan-headquartered contract manufacturers such as Quanta and Fox-
conn for major global brands such as Lenovo, Hewlett-Packard, and 
Apple. Although U.S.-based PC companies remain important as brand 
leaders and orchestrators of the global PC value chain, little production 
occurs within the borders of the United States.12
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Figure 5.6  U.S. Share of Personal Computers and Computer Servers 
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World trade in computer servers displays a similar pattern. In 2005, 
China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest exporter of 
computer servers. The nominal value of U.S. server exports rose only 
4.4 percent on an average annual basis from 2002 to 2012 (from $2.8 to 
$4.2 billion), while world exports have risen 5.8 percent annually (from 
$18.3 to $32.1 billion). During the same period, China’s exports rose 
25 percent per year (from $1.1 to $10.2 billion), and the number-two 
server exporter, Mexico, increased exports at a rate of 12.4 percent per 
year (from $1.3 to $4.3 billion). At the same time, huge server farms 
were being erected in the United States to support the expansion of the 
Internet, driving import growth at an annual average rate of 16.3 percent 
per year, from $2.9 billion in 2002 to $13.1 billion in 2012. By 2012, 
server imports to the United States accounted for 34.9 percent of the 
world total, far higher than server imports to Japan, the second largest 
importer, which accounted for only 7.8 percent of total world imports. 
These fi gures refl ect the continued dominance of the United States as a 
hub of the global Internet, with imports to the United States rising much 
faster than worldwide imports (16.3 percent per year for the United 
States compared to 5.8 percent worldwide). As with PCs, the shift of 
server manufacturing to outside the United States does not mean that
American-branded server companies are losing global market share, 
only that the United States is losing ground as a location for server 
manufacturing. As a result, the U.S. trade balance has declined dramati-
cally in the past 10 years in both PCs and servers (see Figure 5.7).
Semiconductors
To gauge the relative position of the United States as a location for 
semiconductor manufacturing, we acquired annual data on all major 
semiconductor fabrication plants (called “fabs”) worldwide from the 
market research fi rm IHS Global Inc. for the period 2000 to 2013. 
Semiconductor fabs fall into two general categories: 1) integrated 
device manufacturing (IDM) plants (e.g., Intel and Samsung), which 
mainly produce semiconductors that are designed and sold by the fab’s 
owner, and 2) “foundries,” which produce semiconductors designed by 
others on a contract basis (the largest are Taiwan Semiconductor Manu-
facturing Company and United Manufacturing Corporation, both based 
in Taiwan). Foundries are analogous to the PC contract manufacturers 
(e.g., Foxconn) mentioned earlier.
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For IDMs, the data include, among other things, information on 
plant capacity (normalized to eight-inch wafer size), product type 
(logic, memory, analog, microcontroller, and discrete), plant location, 
and the average cost of producing wafers (also normalized to eight-inch 
equivalence) by product type and level of technology. For foundries, 
which almost exclusively produce logic chips (programmable, often 
application-specifi c [ASIC] microprocessors), the data include the 
same information, except product type.
Figure 5.8 shows the growth of total semiconductor production 
capacity by country or region between 2000 and 2013. Strikingly, total 
capacity has grown at a considerably slower pace in the United States 
and Europe than in key semiconductor-producing countries in East Asia. 
Specifi cally, the compound annual growth rate of total capacity was 4.2 
percent in the United States and 2.3 percent in Europe, compared to 8.0 
percent in South Korea, 8.7 percent in Singapore and Malaysia, 11.3 
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Figure 5.7  U.S. Trade Defi cit in PCs and Servers, 2002–2012
SOURCE: UN Comtrade data.
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percent in Taiwan, and 23.8 percent in China. (Table 5.2 translates Fig-
ure 5.8 into numerical values and gives the rankings of the countries.) 
While China’s growth is measured from a low base, its global share of 
semiconductor capacity nonetheless grew by 7 percentage points, from 
less than 1 percent in 2000 to 8 percent in 2013. At the same time, the 
U.S. share of global semiconductor capacity shrank from 19 percent to 
13 percent, and Europe’s share fell from 14 percent to 7 percent. Most 
strikingly, Taiwan’s share of world semiconductor fabrication capacity 
increased from 12 percent to 20 percent over the same period, driven 
mainly by the popularity of the fabless/foundry model, as we will dis-
cuss below.
The trends displayed in Figure 5.8 may be misleading because 
capacity is aggregated across all types of semiconductors, combining 
products with quite different design parameters, prices, and manu-
facturing requirements. As Table 5.3 shows, the most expensive and 
design-intensive semiconductors are digitally programmable devices 
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Table 5.2  World Semiconductor Wafer Production Capacity by Country 
or Region, 2000 and 2013
2000                  2013 Annual 
growth 
for latter 
country (%)Country ranking Wafer units Wafer units   Country ranking
1 Japan 1,590,549 1 South Korea 3,570,447 8.0
2 South Korea 1,262,014 2 Japan 3,265,501 5.5
3 United States 1,178,370 3 Taiwan 3,136,841 11.3
4 Europe 889,309 4 United States 2,042,534 4.2
5 Taiwan 722,255 5 China 1,274,393 23.8
6 Other Asia 360,645 6 Europe 1,194,959 2.3
7 China 57,687 7 Other Asia 1,124,601 8.7
NOTE: Units normalized to eight-inch wafer equivalents. 
SOURCE: IHS Global Inc.
Table 5.3  Semiconductor Manufacturing Requirements, Design 
Requirements, and Typical Selling Prices, by Product Type
Product type
Manufacturing
requirements
Design
requirements
Typical 
selling
prices Typical use
Logic High High High Digital processing
(programmable de-
vices, such as CPUs 
and ASICs)
Memory Very high Low Medium 
to low
Information storage 
and retrieval
Analog Low High Medium Analog signal
processing (e.g., 
radio and other “real 
world” signals)
Micro-
controllers
Low Medium
to low
Low Single-function 
systems (nonpro-
grammable, such as 
engine controls)
Discrete Very low Very low Very low Single function 
(transistors, resistors, 
capacitors, etc.)
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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called “logic semiconductors.” They include central processing units 
(CPUs) such as Intel processors, but also a wide variety of application-
specifi c devices that provide functionality for nearly all electronic-
based products that can be programmed by users (from mobile-phone 
handsets to automated factory equipment). While design requirements 
for logic semiconductors are extremely high because they include mil-
lions of microcomponents and multiple technologies in a single chip of 
silicon, manufacturing requirements, while also high, are not extreme. 
Computer memory chips, by contrast, contain even greater numbers of 
microcomponents per area of silicon and are thus extremely demand-
ing to produce, but the circuitry is relatively simple, with information 
storage grids dominating the design. Other major semiconductors vary 
in regard to design intensity, but they are generally less demanding to 
produce and are produced in lower volumes.
Figure 5.9 displays global capacity by product type from 2000 to 
2013, along with the U.S. market share by product type in the begin-
ning and at the end of the period. The greatest increase in capacity has 
occurred in memory chips, which are predominantly produced by IDMs 
such as Samsung (from Korea). Only one company, Micron Semicon-
ductor, produces memory in the United States. While U.S. memory 
capacity expanded at a compound annual growth rate of 6 percent, the 
share fabricated in the United States has declined as production has 
shifted to Asian countries, notably Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and 
China. A large share of analog, microcomponent, and discrete semi-
conductor products are fabricated in the United States, but these are 
relatively small segments of the semiconductor market.
Changing patterns in the location of production of logic semicon-
ductors is linked to the rise of the foundry model. So-called fabless 
semiconductor design companies design and sell logic semiconductors, 
which are associated with high manufacturing and design requirements 
as well as high profi t margins, and contract out production to found-
ries. Many dominant fabless design companies, such as Qualcom and 
Broadcom, are located in the United States, while foundries are concen-
trated in Taiwan and Singapore. In 2000, 41 percent of the capacity to 
produce logic semiconductors was in foundries, but by 2013 foundries 
accounted for 65 percent of logic capacity.
The United States accounted for only 3.1 percent of world foundry
capacity in 2013, down from 4.6 percent in 2000 (Table 5.4). Manufac-
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turing of logic semiconductors in the United States is concentrated in 
the domestic plants of highly successful IDMs, such as Intel and Texas 
Instruments.13 While the share of IDM logic semiconductor capacity in 
the United States has expanded since 2000, the U.S. share of total world 
logic semiconductor capacity has fallen, from 12.8 percent in 2000 to 
9.9 percent in 2013—again, mainly because of the rise of the fabless/
foundry model. In sum, a more detailed analysis does not alter the gen-
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Table 5.4  U.S. Global Capacity Share by Product Type, 2000 and 2013 
(%)
U.S. global capacity share by product type and 
business model 2000 2013
IDM logic 18.4 22.5
IDM memory 15.5 8.9
IDM other (analog, microcomponent, and discrete) 29.3 33.2
Foundry (mostly logic) 4.6 3.1
IDM logic and foundry, combined 12.8 9.9
SOURCE: IHS Global Inc.
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eral picture of decline in the importance of the United States as a loca-
tion for semiconductor manufacturing, depicted in Figure 5.8.
As with computers, this decline is refl ected in trade statistics. Semi-
conductor exports, in nominal dollars, from the United States (of all 
types) fell at an average rate of 2.5 percent per year from 2002 to 2012 
(from $26.3 billion to $20.5 billion), while worldwide exports increased 
at a rate of 8.7 percent per year (from $161.9 billion to $371.1 billion). 
As a result, the U.S. share of world semiconductor exports fell from 
16.3 percent in 2002 to just 5.5 percent in 2012. This pattern is similar 
to export trends in PCs and computer servers.
However, changes in world semiconductor imports show a differ-
ent pattern. Instead of rising imports, as shown for the United States 
in PCs and servers, semiconductor imports were stagnant, increasing 
at an average annual rate of less than 1 percent from 2002 to 2012. 
Since semiconductors are only of use as components in larger systems, 
imports have mainly risen for the major producers of PCs, servers, and 
other electronics-based products. China’s semiconductor imports, not 
surprisingly, grew the most rapidly from 2002 to 2012, at an average 
annual rate of 21.3 percent, and China’s share of total world imports 
grew from 15.3 percent to 41.6 percent. During this same period, the 
U.S. share of world semiconductor imports shrank from 8.4 percent to 
3.6 percent, refl ecting the general decline of the United States as a loca-
tion for fi nal goods manufacturing in electronics.
The location of production of computer and semiconductor manu-
facturing has clearly shifted away from the United States toward Asian 
countries, both overall and within the most important and technologi-
cally demanding product types (from a manufacturing perspective). 
Again, this does not necessarily imply that the U.S.-based computer 
and semiconductor industries, broadly defi ned to include research and 
design functions, have lost global competitiveness. U.S. companies 
continue to drive innovation and growth in the ITC industry, pioneer-
ing and dominating new industry segments such as Internet search and 
retailing, social media, and cloud computing. However, these software-
based systems now run, in large part, on hardware manufactured outside 
the United States. In semiconductors, the addition of new and acquired 
U.S. IDM fabs outside the country and the rise of the foundry/fabless 
design business model have enabled U.S. semiconductor companies to 
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continue to design chips in the United States while shifting production 
overseas (Brown and Linden 2011). The shift of manufacturing to Asia, 
however, has important implications for the number and types of jobs 
located in the United States.
In sum, despite the extraordinary real output growth in the U.S. 
computer and semiconductor manufacturing industries, as measured in 
offi cial statistics, the competitiveness of the United States as a manu-
facturing location for these products has substantially eroded. Exactly 
how, over the longer term, the shift in the locus of production to Asia 
will affect research and development activities in the United States 
remains to be seen.
Interpreting Productivity Growth
The rapid growth in real output, coupled with a sharp drop in 
employment—39 percent since 1997 compared to 30 percent for all 
manufacturing—has led to surging labor productivity in the computer 
and electronic products industry. Analysts often interpret productivity 
growth to mean that workers are working faster or that automation (the 
substitution of capital for labor) is driving the growth, as illustrated in 
a recent White House report on manufacturing, which stated, “Manu-
facturing workers have paradoxically often been the victims of their 
sector’s own success, as rapid productivity growth has meant that goods 
can be produced with fewer workers” (Executive Offi ce of the Presi-
dent 2009).
Productivity growth in computer-related industries, however, is 
largely attributable to rapidly falling price defl ators that aim to cap-
ture consumer valuation of improvements in product quality. These 
improvements, we argue, primarily refl ect innovations from research 
and development and innovations in the production processes. While, 
for example, the typical computer produced in the United States today 
may in some statistical sense be the equivalent of several computers 
produced a decade ago, that does not, in and of itself, mean that fewer 
workers are needed to manufacture a computer today than in the past. 
For an industry where full automation has reigned for many decades, 
the notion of capital substituting for labor appears quaint. Indeed, a 
recent report by the McKinsey Global Institute concluded that all of 
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the large-scale net job losses in U.S. computer and electronic prod-
ucts manufacturing are attributable to the offshoring of production 
(Roxburgh et al. 2012).
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
The outsized effect that the computer and electronic products 
industry has on real output and productivity measures holds important 
implications for empirical research. While computer-related indus-
tries show extraordinary real GDP growth owing to price defl ators that 
account for improvements in product quality, they registered above-
average employment declines and import penetration. Such an outlier 
may distort relationships between economic variables, result in anom-
alous fi ndings, and lead researchers to draw incorrect inferences—
for example, about the causes of the sharp decline in manufacturing 
employment or the effects of imports on domestic industry.
In addition to the large effect that computer-related industries have 
on measured aggregate and state-level manufacturing’s real value-
added growth, the sizable growth of imported intermediates used in 
manufacturing has likely imparted a signifi cant bias to real value-added 
in the published statistics for all manufacturing industries. The BEA 
estimates that the import share of materials intermediates used in manu-
facturing rose from 18 percent in 1997 to 25 percent in 2007. Moreover, 
most of the growth in imported intermediates came from developing 
countries, most notably China, whose market share increased largely 
because suppliers from these countries offered lower (quality-adjusted) 
prices for these intermediate inputs. So-called offshoring bias arises 
because the price declines associated with the shift in sourcing to low-
cost countries are unlikely to be captured in the import and producer 
price indexes constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and used 
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis to defl ate intermediate inputs in 
the industry accounts data. As a result, offi cial statistics may substan-
tially understate the quantity of inputs used by U.S. manufacturers and 
overstate the growth in manufacturing’s real valued-added (Houseman 
et al. 2011).
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Although growth in a state’s real manufacturing GDP should be a 
good predictor of a state’s manufacturing employment growth, com-
puter-related industries and offshoring bias may substantially weaken 
the relationship between measured output and employment in manufac-
turing.14 Consequently, we expect that a state’s real value-added growth 
in manufacturing, adjusted for the contribution from computer-related 
industries and for offshoring bias, will be a better predictor of the state’s 
employment growth than published real value-added growth measures.
Here we test that proposition by regressing a state’s manufacturing 
employment growth over the 1997–2007 period on real value-added 
growth over the same period, measured three ways: fi rst as the pub-
lished aggregate manufacturing measure, next as the published mea-
sure excluding NAICS 334, and fi nally as a measure that both excludes 
NAICS 334 and adjusts for offshoring bias.15
(5.2) ln(Es,07 / Es,97) = α + β ln(Qs,07 / Qs,97) + εs
Ordinary least squares estimates of Equation (5.2) may be subject 
to simultaneity bias because employment and output growth in a state’s 
manufacturing industry are determined by both demand- and supply-
side forces: while overall national demand conditions for an industry’s 
product affect state-level industry demand for labor, a state’s supply of 
workers may affect industry growth in that particular state. For exam-
ple, industries may expand relatively more in states with higher popu-
lation growth and hence growth in their supply of labor. In addition, 
state-level labor productivity shocks may expand output while reducing 
employment to output ratios. In other words, the ordinary least squares 
estimates of Equation (5.2) do not correspond to any well-defi ned struc-
tural relationship.
To address possible simultaneity bias and to focus on how demand 
forces at the national level affect state labor markets, we instrument 
state-level manufacturing’s real GDP growth rates using national
industry-level growth rates: the instrument is a weighted average of 
the national industry-level growth rates, where the weights are the 
state’s nominal shares of value-added in the component industries.16 
This instrument proxies for what would happen to state-level demand 
for manufacturing output if each of a state’s manufacturing industries 
were to maintain its current competitiveness and hence its market share 
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of national demand. With this instrument, Equation (5.2) estimates a 
structural relationship showing the effects of national demand shocks 
to products produced in a state’s manufacturing sector on that state’s 
manufacturing employment.
Table 5.5 presents ordinary least squares and two-stage least 
squares estimates of Equation (5.2). The fi rst two columns of Table 5.5 
are based on observations from all 50 states and the District of Colum-
bia. Strikingly, the coeffi cient estimate on the output growth term more 
than doubles, from 0.23 to 0.56, in the OLS model when NAICS 334 
is omitted from the growth measure. State-level employment growth is 
much more strongly related to output growth when we omit the infor-
mation from this industry.
Table 5.5  The Effect of Manufacturing Output Growth on Employment 
Growth, 1997–2007  
(1) 
OLS
(2) 
2SLS
(3) 
OLS
(4) 
2SLS
Growth in mfg. 
real value-added
0.227
(0.066)
0.057
(0.106)
0.228
(0.050)
0.084
(0.080)
Constant −28.041 −21.907 −27.588 −22.146
(3.231) (4.473) (2.478) (3.512)
Growth in mfg. 
real value-added 
w/o computers
0.560
(0.095)
1.067
(0.741)
0.504
(0.069)
0.692
(0.338)
Constant −26.493 −33.353 −25.196 −27.900
(2.271) (10.312) (1.692) (5.061)
Growth in mfg. 
real value-added 
w/o computers, 
adjusting for 
offshoring bias
0.559
(0.095)
0.990
(0.621)
0.502
(0.068)
0.700
(0.299)
Constant −24.518 −28.839 −23.372 −25.499
(2.093) (6.619) (1.548) (3.534)
N 51 51 48 48
NOTE: Each panel represents the regression of state employment growth on output 
growth for the period 1997−2007. Standard errors of the coeffi cient estimates are 
reported in parentheses. A weighted average of national-level industry real value-
added growth is used as an instrument for state growth measures in the two-stage least 
squares models. See text for further discussion.
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In the 2SLS models reported in column 2, the coeffi cient on the 
aggregate manufacturing growth term is 0.06, whereas the coeffi cient 
on the manufacturing growth measure that excludes computer-related 
industries is 1.07. A coeffi cient estimate of approximately 1 implies that 
a 1 percent increase in a state’s output results in a 1 percent increase in 
employment, which is a reasonable estimate of the effect of a demand 
shock. In contrast, the coeffi cient close to zero on aggregate manufac-
turing growth implies that demand shocks to a state’s industries have 
little effect on state employment growth, a fi nding that makes little 
sense and suggests problems in using the aggregate manufacturing data.
The output measure in the bottom panel of Table 5.5 excludes
NAICS 334 and adjusts for offshoring bias. This last output measure is 
subject to important caveats. As discussed  in the appendix, estimates 
of offshoring bias in real GDP measures of state manufacturing likely 
signifi cantly understate true variation across states in offshoring bias. 
Given this fact, it is perhaps not surprising that also adjusting for off-
shoring bias has little effect on the point estimates. Nevertheless, it 
does substantially reduce the standard error of the estimate in the 2SLS 
model: the coeffi cient estimate of 0.99 in the third panel of column 2 
has a p-value of 0.12.
In the models reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.5, we omit 
observations from the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Alaska, which 
have the smallest manufacturing sectors and which differ from other 
states in geographic proximity or size. The patterns of the coeffi cient 
estimates are similar to those reported in columns 1 and 2, but exclud-
ing these very small states substantially improves the precision of the 
estimates, particularly in the 2SLS models. In the models that instru-
ment for state output growth, the coeffi cient on manufacturing real 
value-added growth is 0.08 and insignifi cant. The coeffi cients on the 
growth measures that either exclude NAICS 334 or exclude NAICS 
334 and correct for offshoring bias are 0.69 and 0.70, respectively, and 
both are signifi cant at conventional levels (p-values 0.05 and 0.02).17
Although, using state-level data, the results from these regres-
sions show that the computer and electronic products industry breaks 
the empirical link between real output and employment growth in the 
manufacturing sector, this analysis does not provide insights into the 
reasons underlying the sharp trend of decline in U.S. manufacturing 
employment since 2000. It does, however, underscore the point that the 
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strong output and productivity growth  in the aggregate manufacturing 
statistics is not evidence, in and of itself, that automation caused the 
decline, as many researchers and analysts have concluded.18
The dominance of the computer-related industries in measured real 
output growth in manufacturing may lead to other perverse research 
fi ndings, as illustrated in Acemoglu et al. (2014, Appendix Table 2). In 
an analysis of the effect of import penetration on domestic shipments 
in manufacturing industries, the study’s authors fi nd that an increase in 
import penetration signifi cantly lowers nominal shipments but has no 
effect on real shipments in the affected industry. The naïve researcher 
would conclude, therefore, that imports have had no adverse impact on 
the quantity of goods manufactured in the United States. This fi nding, 
however, is driven by computer-related industries, which are outliers—
simultaneously experiencing extraordinary real output growth and high 
growth in import penetration. Acemoglu et al. show that the coeffi cient on 
the import penetration term is negative and signifi cant when computer-
related industries are excluded from the regression.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATISTICAL AGENCIES
Statistics play a critical role in informing policymakers and shaping 
their responses to economic issues. The recent debate over manufactur-
ing policy in the United States, however, illustrates how the numbers 
can obfuscate as much as enlighten. More transparency in the publi-
cation of the data—in particular, making clear to data users the infl u-
ence the computer and semiconductor industries have on the aggregate 
manufacturing numbers—could have avoided much of the confusion. 
The extraordinary growth of real value-added and productivity in the 
computer and semiconductor industries also naturally raises the ques-
tion: Are these numbers right? The outsized effect that this small indus-
try has on aggregate statistics is reason for further scrutiny of the data. 
In addition, the growth of globalization, accompanied by rapid shifts in 
the location of production, underscores the inadequacy of current price 
indexes to capture price changes associated with changes in sourcing. 
In this closing section, we recommend steps the statistical agencies can 
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   178 2/16/2015   8:34:02 AM
Measuring Manufacturing   179
take to improve communication with data users and highlight several 
areas for further research.
Improve Transparency and Communication with Data Users
Many infl uential economists and policy analysts have cited the 
robust growth in U.S. manufacturing’s real value-added and produc-
tivity as evidence of the sector’s strength (Atkinson et al. 2012). It 
is unlikely that most citing those statistics understand that one small 
industry segment largely accounts for the sector’s growth, that the out-
put and productivity growth in the computer industry primarily derives 
from product innovation, or that the manufacturing presence of these 
industries in the United States appears to be declining. Making these 
facts more transparent to data users is important. The statistical agen-
cies could easily highlight the infl uence of computer-related industries 
by publishing separate tabulations for real value-added in manufac-
turing excluding these industries. The statistical agencies also should 
disseminate information to users clarifying how price defl ators affect 
the industry’s measured output growth and what the output growth 
measures mean. Ideally, the statistical agencies would develop better 
measures of the global competitiveness of domestic industries by gen-
erating and publishing systematic comparisons of U.S. manufacturing 
industries with industries elsewhere in the world.
State policymakers are among the many users who would benefi t 
from more transparent manufacturing data. In seeking to understand 
how national manufacturing trends might be affecting their state labor 
markets, state policymakers will not learn much from a naïve use of 
the offi cial statistics. Adjusting statistics to exclude computer-related 
industries and to correct for import price biases will result in data that 
are more sensible and useful for understanding trends in state labor 
markets.
A proposed change to the industry classifi cation system would 
put so-called factoryless goods producers (FGPs)—organizations that 
design and sell products but contract out their production—in the 
manufacturing sector.19 Currently, such organizations usually are clas-
sifi ed in wholesale trade or research. The proposed change—originally 
intended to take effect in 2017 but indefi nitely postponed—is expected 
to signifi cantly increase measured manufacturing output in a number of 
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industries, including computers and semiconductors. While their clas-
sifi cation in manufacturing has merit, the activities in FGPs (such as 
fabless semiconductor design fi rms and computer fi rms that use con-
tract manufacturers in China) are a far cry from the factories of old. At 
the very least, extensive education of data users about any change and 
the publication of separate tabulations on FGPs within manufacturing 
would be critical to avoid even further misinterpretation of the manu-
facturing statistics.
Research on Price Defl ators
The price defl ators for a small number of products within the com-
puter and electronic products industry fundamentally drive growth in 
the manufacturing sector and have a large infl uence on aggregate GDP 
growth as well. Those price defl ators, however, are potentially sensi-
tive to methods used to adjust for quality improvements. Existing price 
indexes for computers and related electronic products, for example, 
implicitly assume that consumers and businesses derive value solely 
from the hardware embedded in these products. In practice, however, 
consumers benefi t from the interaction of the hardware with software 
and from networking with other computer users via the Internet. In the 
presence of network externalities, the welfare implications for an indi-
vidual consumer of some change in computer-related hardware charac-
teristics and prices depend upon the hardware and software used by oth-
ers. When some users upgrade their computers, it may force others to 
upgrade theirs in order to maintain the same level of interaction. These 
negative externalities must be taken into account in order to capture real 
output measures that correspond to changes in consumer well-being. 
However, current price index procedures do not take these externali-
ties into account. A version of this problem was explored in Ellison 
and Fudenberg’s (2000) article on excessive upgrades in the software 
industry.20
Future research should address this and other critiques that current 
methodology may signifi cantly overstate the true benefi ts to consumers 
and businesses from technological advances in computer and related 
hardware.
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Crediting Gains from R&D
Rapid advances in research and product development in the com-
puter and electronic products industry have resulted in rapid declines 
in measured quality-adjusted product prices, which in turn have driven 
rapid measured output and productivity growth in manufacturing. 
Conversely, recent plant closures and associated downward revisions 
to shipments in the computer industry have contributed to a substan-
tial downward revision in real GDP growth in manufacturing.21 And 
if offshoring of computer and semiconductor production continues, it 
likely will signifi cantly dampen measured value-added and productiv-
ity growth in manufacturing in the future.
But one might ask whether the true economic impact of increased or 
decreased production in this industry is commensurate with its impact 
on the manufacturing statistics? Should, for example, the effect on real 
output and productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing from the closure 
of a computer assembly plant be an order of magnitude greater than the 
closure of a similarly sized auto assembly plant, particularly if research 
and development for the former still takes place in the United States?
Crediting the output and productivity growth from product improve-
ments to production would matter little if fi rms were vertically inte-
grated—performing tasks from product design to the manufacturing of 
the products—and if these tasks were all performed in one fi rm in one 
country. As the computer and electronic products industry illustrates, 
however, the United States increasingly is moving away from making 
things and instead specializing in services and product design (Corrado 
and Hulten 2010). Research should address distortions to statistics aris-
ing from the fact that gains from technical advances are being credited 
solely to the manufacture of physical products.
Research on Price Index Construction
Finally, research indicates that the rapid shift in sourcing of prod-
ucts to low-cost foreign suppliers is imparting a signifi cant bias to real 
value-added and productivity statistics in the computer and electronic 
products industry and in manufacturing overall. The bias is part of a 
more general problem in the construction of price indexes: the way they 
are constructed implicitly assumes that the “law of one price” holds, and 
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thus that observed price differences across suppliers refl ect differences 
in the quality of their goods. The entry and market expansion of low-
cost suppliers, however, is an important part of the ongoing dynamics in 
prices facing consumers and businesses. The input price index proposed 
by Alterman (this volume), which would be based on a survey of input 
purchasers, represents a fi rst step toward addressing this important gap 
in price measurement. Research is needed to pilot the index and deter-
mine its feasibility.
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1. McCormack (2013) reports on the status of congressional action on manufactur-
ing policies.
2. Throughout this chapter, we use the terms “real value-added” and “real GDP” 
interchangeably. Although nominal value-added in manufacturing has declined as 
a share of GDP in the United States, this decline may be attributed to the fact that 
prices have risen less quickly for manufactured products than for services.
3. See, for example, Becker (2012), Hassett (2010), and Perry (2012). Atkinson et al. 
(2012, pp. 24–25) includes citations to many other prominent analysts and policy-
makers promoting this view.
4. Houseman et al. (2011) originally made this point. Atkinson et al. (2012) also 
emphasized this fact.
5. NAICS 334 also includes the manufacture of audio and video equipment; navi-
gational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments; and magnetic and 
optical media.
6. This information was provided to us by Erich Strassner at the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis. Detailed industry value-added data are not published by the BEA, 
and consequently the analysis presented below is based on data aggregated to the 
three-digit NAICS level.
7. Atkinson et al. (2012, Figure 30) present similar calculations. In the late 1990s, 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis along with the other U.S. statistical agencies 
introduced the use of chained aggregates. Although the BEA publishes value-
added in “real chained dollars” for all individual manufacturing industries, these 
industry-level real chained dollars cannot be summed to create a real series for 
subsets of industries. The BEA publishes annual fi gures on industry contributions 
to aggregate real GDP growth.
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8. Because of revisions to the data, the compound annual growth rates for the 1997–
2007 period reported in Figure 5.3 differ somewhat from those reported in House-
man et al. (2011). The BEA issued additional revisions to the national industry 
accounts data in January 2014 but had not updated state data at the time of this 
writing. The analyses in this chapter are based on national and state manufacturing 
data available as of December 2013. Recent updates to the national manufacturing 
statistics do not affect the substantive fi ndings of this chapter.
9. The share of manufacturing value-added in NAICS 334 exceeded 20 percent 
in 1997 in 10 states: Arizona (50%), California (30%), Colorado (28%), Idaho 
(29%), Massachusetts (28%), New Hampshire (43%), New Mexico (81%), Ore-
gon (44%), South Dakota (22%), and Vermont (27%).
10. At the time of this writing, 2011 is the last year for which shipments data are avail-
able. Data on industry value-added are not published at the six-digit NAICS level.
11. It is possible that the semiconductor industry includes some fabless (that is, with-
out fabrication plants) entities, which design integrated circuits but contract out 
production, typically to overseas foundries.
12. According to Gartner, U.S. PC brands Hewlett-Packard and Dell ranked num-
ber two and number three in unit sales worldwide in the third quarter of 2013, 
with market shares of 17.1 percent and 11.6 percent, behind China’s Lenovo, 
which held a 17.6 percent market share. See http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/
id/2604616. Although little computer assembly takes place in the United States, 
the United States remains an important location for PC design. Even Lenovo, the 
Chinese company that purchased IBM’s PC division in 2005, maintains a large 
design center in North Carolina.
13. According to IHS Global Inc., fi ve of Intel’s nine logic fabs are located in the 
United States, along with two in Ireland, one in Israel, and one in China. Four of 
Texas Instruments’ fi ve logic fabs are in the United States, with the additional fab 
in Japan. Besides these logic fabs, Intel has seven fabs producing microcompo-
nents, all in the United States, and Texas Instruments has 14 smaller fabs produc-
ing analog semiconductors, half of which are in the United States.
14. This is particularly true if a state’s real output growth results from increased 
demand for a state’s products, rather than from state-level productivity shocks, as 
we would expect demand would have only modest effects on productivity.
15. In the second and third measures, we exclude employment in NAICS 334 from 
the manufacturing employment measure, but doing so has little effect on our esti-
mates. The appendix to this chapter provides details on our adjustment of state 
manufacturing’s real GDP growth for offshoring bias, which is based on estimates 
in Houseman et al. (2011).
16. Specifi cally, we generate a new annual quantity index series for each state so that 
the rate of real value-added change between years for the state s is ln(qs,t / qs,t − 1) = 
∑
t   
wi,s,t ln(qi,US,t / qi,US,t − 1) , where the weight for industry i is the average of industry 
i’s nominal share of value-added in years t and t − 1. See Bartik (1991) for further 
discussion of the instrument.
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17. These coeffi cient estimates of about 0.7—though not signifi cantly different from 
1—imply that long-run demand shocks to a state’s industries may boost labor 
productivity somewhat. Such a boost to labor productivity could occur if healthy 
demand conditions allow greater investment and hence increased use of newer 
technologies and vintage capital. Healthy demand conditions also may permit 
greater exploitation of scale economies. However, because technology innovations 
can be shared nationwide, these productivity effects should be limited, and indeed, 
point estimates of 0.7 indicate that output demand shocks do considerably boost 
state labor demand. In contrast, the point estimate of 0.08 on the aggregate manu-
facturing growth term reported in column 4, panel 1, implies that almost all of a 
demand shock to state output growth is manifested in productivity growth rather 
than in employment growth, which is hard to believe.
18. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2014) provide the most 
rigorous analysis to date of the causes of the recent decline in manufacturing 
employment and its associated impacts on regional employment and labor force 
participation. They fi nd strong evidence that the growth of imports from China 
caused a substantial share—potentially most—of the large decline in manufactur-
ing employment in the years leading up to the Great Recession.
19. Three chapters in the second conference volume—those by Doherty; Kamal, 
Moulton, and Ribarsky; and Bayard, Byrne, and Smith—provide extensive analy-
ses of the proposed change in classifi cation of factoryless goods producers.
20. Feenstra and Knittel (2004) consider a related problem: that individuals purchase 
computer hardware beyond its current usefulness because they anticipate future 
changes in software that will make it necessary to have better computer hardware. 
As a result, short-run changes in consumer well-being are overstated by the mea-
sured decline in computer hardware prices for constant-quality models.
21. For a discussion of the revision, see Mandel (2012).
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Appendix 5A
Biases to Real Growth from Offshoring 
Background on Offshoring Bias
The potential bias from the shift in sourcing to a low-cost foreign supplier 
occurs because of the methodologies the BLS uses in constructing its price 
indexes. The BLS samples the prices paid by importers for the import price 
index and the prices received by producers for the producer price index. Each 
observation used in the construction of a particular price index represents the 
period-to-period price change of an item as defi ned by very specifi c attributes 
and reported by a specifi c importer or domestic producer. These price changes 
will not necessarily capture price changes purchasers experience when they 
shift from one supplier to another.
Consider the case where a low-cost foreign supplier enters the U.S. mar-
ket and captures market share from high-cost domestic suppliers of interme-
diates used by U.S. manufacturers. Hypothetically, the price drops that U.S. 
manufacturers realize when they shift to the foreign supplier could be fully 
captured in the import and input price indexes if three conditions hold: 1) the 
foreign supplier initially offers the same (quality-adjusted) price as the domes-
tic suppliers; 2) markets instantaneously clear, and thus any expansion of 
the foreign supplier’s market share refl ects contemporaneous price declines 
relative to the domestic supplier that occur after entry; and 3) the new for-
eign supplier is picked up in the import price sample prior to any decline in 
its relative price. In practice, however, these conditions are likely to be vio-
lated: The lag between the time when a new supplier enters the market and 
its products are integrated into the BLS price sample can be considerable; 
new suppliers often enter the market with a lower price than incumbent sup-
pliers, and because of information and other adjustment costs that decline 
over time, businesses may not immediately switch to the low-cost supplier, 
and thus price differentials between low- and high-cost suppliers may persist 
(see, for example, Griliches and Cockburn [1994]; Foster, Haltiwanger, and
Syverson [2008]; Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels [2013]; and Kovak and
Michaels [Chapter 3, this volume]). Diewert and Nakamura (2009) formally 
show that the bias to the input price index from shifts in sourcing, which is 
analogous to outlet substitution bias in the Consumer Price Index, is propor-
tional to the growth in the low-cost supplier’s market share and to the percent-
age discount offered by the low-cost supplier.1
In the case of shifts in sourcing from high-cost domestic to low-cost foreign 
suppliers, import and intermediate input price defl ators—which are weighted 
185
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averages of the domestic and import price indexes—are upwardly biased. This, 
in turn, results in an underestimation of the real growth in imports and an over-
estimation of the growth in real value-added produced domestically (Diewert 
and Nakamura 2009; Houseman et al. 2010, 2011; Mandel 2007; Nakamura et 
al., this volume; Reinsdorf and Yuskavage 2009).
Biases to the input price index may occur whenever a producer shifts from 
a high-cost to a low-cost supplier, irrespective of whether the low-cost supplier 
is domestic or foreign. However, the rapid growth of imported intermediates 
from emerging economies raises concerns that biases in the data from offshor-
ing have been empirically important. Houseman et al. (2010, 2011) estimate 
the size of the potential bias to the growth of real value-added and multifac-
tor productivity in U.S. manufacturing from the growth in imported materials 
intermediates over the 1997–2007 time period. Because the size of the price 
decline associated with the offshoring of an intermediate good to a low-cost 
foreign supplier is not observed, it is necessary to make some assumptions 
about the size of the discount. Houseman et al. compute offshoring bias at the 
three-digit NAICS level under a variety of assumptions about the size of the 
price differentials, drawing on information from case studies and micro import 
price data collected by the BLS.
In addition, U.S. statistical agencies do not track the destination of imports 
and consequently do not know which industries use imported intermediates. 
In generating the industry-level data used in Houseman et al. (2010, 2011), 
the BEA assumes that all industries use imported inputs in proportion to their 
overall use of the input in the economy. For example, if an industry accounts 
for 20 percent of the use of an intermediate product economy-wide, then, under 
the so-called import proportionality assumption, it is assumed the industry uses 
20 percent of the imports of this intermediate product. While certain inputs are 
specifi c to an industry, often products are inputs to a wide variety of industries. 
If manufacturers more intensively (less intensively) engage in offshoring than 
businesses in other sectors, the estimates in Houseman et al. will understate 
(overstate) the degree of offshoring bias in manufacturing. Similarly, within 
manufacturing there may be considerable variation in the intensity with which 
industries offshore specifi c intermediate inputs; the import comparability 
assumption will dampen any differences in estimates of offshoring bias among 
manufacturing industries.
Houseman et al. (2010, 2011) estimate that the substitution of imported 
for domestic material inputs used by U.S. manufacturers resulted in an over-
statement of the annual growth in real value-added by between 0.2 and 0.5 
percentage points per year from 1997 to 2007. Estimates of the bias to real 
value-added growth from the offshoring of material intermediates were the 
largest in the computer and electronic products industry—ranging from 0.5 to 
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   186 2/16/2015   8:34:07 AM
Measuring Manufacturing   187
1.4 percentage points per year—although because the average annual growth 
rate in NAICS 334 exceeded 20 percent, adjusting for the bias lowers that 
growth by only 4 to 7 percent. For manufacturing excluding NAICS 334, 
Houseman et al. estimate that the growth in real value-added was upwardly 
biased by 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points per year, implying that real value-added 
growth was upwardly biased by as much as 50 percent over the period in the 
rest of manufacturing.
Estimates of the bias from materials offshoring to multifactor productivity 
ranged from about 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points per year for all manufacturing 
and from about 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points per year for the computer and 
electronic products industry.
Offshoring Bias in State Manufacturing Real GDP
The adjustments to state manufacturing real GDP growth for offshoring 
bias, which are used in the regressions reported in Table 5.5, are based on 
estimates generated in Houseman et al. (2010). A couple of caveats should be 
made about these state-level adjustments. First, and perhaps most importantly, 
as noted above, imports are imputed to industries using the import propor-
tionality assumption, and thus differences across states in their industry mix 
generate cross-state differences in our estimates of biases to real value-added 
growth from offshoring. Because the import proportionality assumption mini-
mizes measured variation in import use across industries, it also minimizes 
measured cross-state variation in offshoring bias.
In addition, the BEA has revised the manufacturing GDP numbers since 
the estimates in Houseman et al. (2010) were generated. We use the revised 
manufacturing real GDP fi gures and assume that the bias from offshoring 
affects measured growth rate in the same proportion as estimated in that paper:
(5A.1) 
?????????
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 .
The left-hand expression is the ratio of adjusted to unadjusted manufactur-
ing real value-added in industry i, state s, and year t; rai is the growth rate in 
industry i adjusted for offshoring bias; rmi is the measured or baseline growth 
rate of real value-added in industry i as estimated in Houseman et al. (2010); 
and t is an index for year, 1997 = 0.2
We estimate the effect of offshoring bias on state manufacturing growth 
rates under two assumptions about the quality-adjusted price differences of 
products between developing countries (e.g., China) and the United States and 
the quality-adjusted price differences between countries with an intermediate 
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   187 2/16/2015   8:34:08 AM
188   Houseman, Bartik, and Sturgeon
level of development (e.g., Mexico) and the United States: 1) the developing 
country discount is 30 percent, and the intermediate country discount is 15 
percent; and 2) the developing country discount is 50 percent, and the interme-
diate country discount is 30 percent. These two assumptions yield estimates of 
offshoring bias on the low and high end of those presented in Houseman et al. 
(2010) (see Table 5A.1).
Compared to real value-added growth measures that exclude NAICS 334, 
measures that also adjust for biases to the input price index from the growth 
of imported material intermediates result in an additional downward adjust-
ment of 0.1–0.7 percentage points. The largest adjustments occur in Michi-
gan (a 0.3–0.7 percentage-point reduction), followed by Kentucky (a 0.3–0.5 
percentage-point reduction) and Ohio and Indiana (a 0.2–0.5 percentage-point 
reduction). Our estimates of the bias for another 20 states fall in the 0.2–0.4 
percentage-point range. As previously noted, however, the import comparabil-
ity assumption used to allocate imports to user industries tends to minimize 
cross-state differences in offshoring bias and consequently may introduce con-
siderable error into these estimates. 
The state manufacturing real GDP fi gures utilized in the regressions 
reported in Table 5.5 assume a price discount of 50 percent with developing 
countries and 30 percent with intermediate countries. Corrections based on 
these assumptions performed somewhat better in regressions than those based 
on smaller discount assumptions.
Appendix Notes
1. Outlet substitution bias is an example of a shift in sourcing from high- to low-cost 
domestic suppliers. Diewert and Nakamura (2009) show that the characterization 
of the bias to the input price index that results when producers shift sourcing of 
intermediates is identical to the characterization of the bias to the CPI from outlet 
substitution.
2. We do not have access to the detailed data on imported and domestic intermediate 
inputs needed to generate entirely new estimates. The growth rate rm for industry 
i corresponds to column 2, and the rate ra for industry i corresponds to those in 
columns 10 or 11 of Table 9 of Houseman et al. (2010). Houseman et al. detail the 
classifi cation of countries as developing, intermediate, or advanced, as well as the 
evidence on price discounts.
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Table 5A.1  Average Annual Growth of Real Value-Added in 
Manufacturing, Adjusted for Computer and Electronic 
Products Manufacturing and Offshoring Bias, by State, 
1997–2007 (%)
All 
manufac-
turing
Mfg. less
NAICS 334
Mfg. less NAICS 
334, adj. for
offshoring bias, 
15/30a
Mfg. less NAICS 
334, adj. for 
offshoring bias, 
30/50a
Alabama 3.4 2.5 2.3 2.1
Alaska 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0
Arizona 8.7 2.4 2.2 2.0
Arkansas 0.5 0.1 −0.1 −0.3
California 7.9 2.5 2.3 2.1
Colorado 5.9 1.0 0.8 0.7
Connecticut 2.9 1.9 1.8 1.6
Delaware 2.2 0.7 0.6 0.4
District of 
Columbia
1.9 −0.9 −1.0 −1.2
Florida 4.6 1.4 1.2 1.1
Georgia 1.5 0.9 0.7 0.5
Hawaii 0.1 0.0 −0.1 −0.2
Idaho 12.8 1.5 1.3 1.2
Illinois 1.1 0.0 −0.2 −0.3
Indiana 3.9 3.4 3.2 2.9
Iowa 2.7 1.8 1.6 1.4
Kansas 3.8 2.9 2.7 2.5
Kentucky −0.4 −0.9 −1.2 −1.5
Louisiana 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.5
Maine 1.8 0.6 0.4 0.2
Maryland 3.3 −0.1 −0.3 −0.4
Massachusetts 6.3 −0.3 −0.4 −0.6
Michigan 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.3
Minnesota 4.1 1.2 1.0 0.8
Mississippi 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.3
Missouri 0.2 −0.1 −0.3 −0.6
Montana 3.5 3.1 3.0 2.8
Nebraska 3.7 2.6 2.5 2.3
Nevada 9.7 8.7 8.5 8.4
New Hampshire 3.4 −0.4 −0.6 −0.7
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All 
manufac-
turing
Mfg. less
NAICS 334
Mfg. less NAICS 
334, adj. for
offshoring bias, 
15/30a
Mfg. less NAICS
334, adj. for 
offshoring bias, 
30/50a
New Jersey −0.2 −1.6 −1.8 −1.9
New Mexico 5.4 −1.4 −1.6 −1.7
New York 2.4 0.2 0.0 −0.2
North Carolina 3.2 1.4 1.3 1.1
North Dakota 6.8 4.6 4.4 4.2
Ohio 0.4 −0.3 −0.5 −0.8
Oklahoma 2.9 2.3 2.1 1.9
Oregon 15.1 1.1 0.9 0.7
Pennsylvania −0.1 −1.0 −1.2 −1.3
Rhode Island 1.6 0.2 0.0 −0.2
South Carolina 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.3
South Dakota 7.5 4.9 4.7 4.5
Tennessee 2.1 0.6 0.4 0.2
Texas 7.1 4.1 4.0 3.8
Utah 5.4 3.4 3.2 3.0
Vermont 5.4 0.4 0.2 0.0
Virginia 1.6 0.4 0.3 0.1
Washington 3.4 2.0 1.8 1.6
West Virginia −2.1 −2.3 −2.5 −2.7
Wisconsin 2.0 0.5 0.4 0.2
Wyoming 5.1 5.0 4.8 4.7
a Adjustments for offshoring bias use estimates from columns 10 and 11 of Table 9 in 
Houseman et al. (2010). Offshoring bias adjustments labeled “15/30” assume that the 
intermediate country discount is 15 percent and the developing country discount is 30 
percent, while offshoring bias adjustments labeled “30/50” assume that the intermedi-
ate country discount is 30 percent and the developing country discount is 50 percent. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using BEA data. 
Table 5A.1  (continued)
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Import Sourcing Bias in 
Manufacturing Productivity Growth
 
Evidence across Advanced and Emerging Economies
Robert Inklaar
University of Groningen
One of the main features of the current wave of globalization is 
the rise in outsourcing to emerging economies. Manufacturing indus-
tries, especially, are at the forefront of this development, sourcing ever 
more of their materials from emerging economies.1 The motive for 
this development is straightforward enough: from the perspective of 
advanced economies, materials sourced from emerging economies are 
often considerably cheaper than those from domestic producers or other 
advanced economies. The consequences for U.S. productivity of the 
shift from high-cost domestic producers to cheaper imports is the topic 
of two separate works by Houseman et al. (2010, 2011). 2 As the authors 
show, many of the cost savings associated with this offshoring of pro-
duction are not captured in offi cial statistics, leading to what they label 
“offshoring bias.” This bias results because lower prices for imports 
from an emerging economy are often fully attributed to differences in 
quality; such assumptions overlook the possibility of real cost savings.3 
Correcting for this, Houseman et al. conclude that U.S. manufactur-
ing value-added and multifactor productivity growth are considerably 
biased upwards because input growth is biased downwards.
This chapter provides an international comparative perspective on 
this topic. In order to achieve such a perspective, I limit the scope of the 
analysis to the effect on productivity growth of changing the source of 
imports; thus, I do not take into account shifts from domestic to foreign 
sources. I will refer to this effect as “import sourcing bias” rather than 
use Houseman et al.’s (2010, 2011) term of “offshoring bias.” While 
this is a narrower concept than that of Houseman et al., it can be more 
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widely applied, since it relies on unit values of imported products from 
UN Comtrade. This is in contrast to Houseman et al.’s combination 
of confi dential transaction-level prices used by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) to compile the U.S. import price indexes and U.S. case 
study evidence. My analysis of import sourcing bias thus allows for a 
comparison of the import sourcing bias in manufacturing productivity 
growth across countries.
The import sourcing bias measure is based on comparing two polar 
alternatives for treating the same product imported from different coun-
tries. A product imported from Country A could be treated as being dif-
ferent from the same product imported from Country B, or it could be 
considered a perfect substitute. In the fi rst case, any observed price dif-
ferences would be considered quality differences, while in the second 
case, observed price differences would be considered actual price dif-
ferences. These two alternatives were also outlined in Diewert (1995, 
1998), in the context of dealing with consumer prices from different 
outlets. I will assume that offi cial statistics treat imports from A and 
B as different products. Because of this fl awed approach, cost savings 
from switching to cheaper source countries will be missed, and the 
import price index will be biased.
Whether this bias estimate is correct depends, fi rst, on whether it 
accurately refl ects price (rather than quality) differences across source 
countries and, second, on whether the “different products” price index is 
an accurate refl ection of the approach in the offi cial import price statis-
tics. Caution is in order on both grounds. First, the trade unit values are 
available at the four-digit Standard International Trade Classifi cation 
(SITC) level, so there is still ample scope for quality differences within 
these product categories, as shown in Feenstra and Romalis (2012). 
When some of the price differences are actually quality differences, the 
true import sourcing bias is likely closer to zero than the bias estimated 
here. Second, it almost goes without saying that if statistical agencies 
already accurately distinguish between price and quality differences in 
estimating their import price indexes, then there is no import sourcing 
bias.4 However, there is reason to believe that statistical agencies would 
sooner err on the side of ascribing too much of price differences to 
quality differences, although reliable information on statistics method-
ologies is hard to come by.5 These considerations suggest that import 
sourcing bias is certainly possible in offi cial statistics, but also that the 
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current analysis is likely to overstate any true bias. From that point of 
view, this analysis is more exploratory regarding the potential scope of 
this problem, rather than a defi nitive estimate of its precise magnitude.
The impact of import sourcing bias on productivity growth in 
manufacturing is computed based on input-output tables. I calculate 
the bias in manufacturing multifactor productivity (MFP) growth for 
the period from 1995 to 2008 for 38 economies included in the World 
Input-Output Database (WIOD).6 Results show that MFP growth in 
manufacturing, on average, is overstated by between 0.18 and 0.34 
percentage points in advanced economies. Bias estimates for emerg-
ing economies are more mixed and include many negative bias esti-
mates as well, which imply shifts toward higher-priced imports. As it 
would be highly unlikely that manufacturers would willingly switch to 
higher-cost sources of materials, this suggests that these are actually 
shifts toward higher-quality products. In the case of the United States, 
the import sourcing bias found here is between 14 and 33 percent of 
the offshoring bias of Houseman et al. (2010, 2011). The fact that it is 
lower comes as no surprise, as import sourcing bias ignores the shifts of 
sourcing from domestic to foreign suppliers. Even so, it still represents 
a notable fraction. Howells et al. (2013) have taken a similar approach 
for the United States as the one I discuss here. Theirs is based on more 
detailed unit value data, and they fi nd import sourcing bias estimates 
that are similar to those presented here.
My estimates indicate that import sourcing bias is larger in Western 
Europe than in the United States. This may be due to the integration 
of many central and eastern European countries into European supply 
chains, following their accession to the European Union (EU). Sinn 
(2006) questioned the apparent solidity of Germany’s growth in light 
of increased offshoring. My fi ndings of lower bias-corrected produc-
tivity growth in Germany would seem in line with his argument. But 
while productivity growth is quite noticeably affected by import sourc-
ing bias, the impact is also not so large that it materially affects cross-
country growth patterns. So productivity growth in Germany, after cor-
recting for import sourcing bias, is still quite healthy.
From the perspective of the quality of statistics, my results indi-
cate that import sourcing bias should also be of concern in advanced 
economies outside the United States. This is certainly not to argue that 
my unit-value approach would be a superior alternative to import price 
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surveys. Instead, surveying prices of inputs directly from fi rms, as sug-
gested by Alterman (2009 and Chapter 10 of this volume), would be an 
approach that would solve import sourcing bias as well as the broader 
offshoring bias.
METHODOLOGY
Import Sourcing Bias 
The bias this chapter aims to quantify can best be illustrated using 
a stylized example, adapted from Houseman et al. (2010, 2011) to the 
case of switching between importers. Table 6.1 compares the price of a 
television in two periods from two foreign suppliers. Both suppliers—
Sri Lanka and Switzerland—export televisions, and we assume the 
product is identical. Given the lower price and identical nature of the 
product, the number of televisions that is imported from Switzerland 
drops from 75 to 50 units, while Sri Lanka supplies 25 units in the fi rst 
period and 50 in the second period. For simplicity’s sake, we assume 
that the price of both suppliers remains unchanged between the two 
periods, so the price change, shown in the fi nal column, is equal to zero.
We distinguish between two cases: Case 1, where the two suppli-
ers are treated as supplying a different product from each other, and 
Case 2, where they are treated as supplying the same product. Case 1 
is assumed to correspond to current statistical practice (more on that 
Table 6.1  Hypothetical Import Switching Example—Sri Lankan and 
Swiss Televisions
t t + 1 Change (t + 1/t − 1) (%)
Swiss price 10 10 0
Sri Lankan price 5 5 0
Swiss quantity 75 50 −33
Sri Lankan quantity 25 50 +50
Import price
Case 1: measured 0
Case 2: true 8.75 7.5 −14
SOURCE: Author’s construction.
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below), while Case 2 is the true input price, given that we are dealing 
with identical products. Using a Törnqvist price index, the import price 
change in Case 1 is calculated as
(6.1) 
log Pt
M Pt?1
M? ? ? 12 slt ? slt?1? ? log PtSL Pt?1SL? ? ? 12 swt ? swt?1? ? log PtSW Pt?1SW? ?
? 12 slt ? slt?1? ? log 5 5? ? ? 12 swt ? swt?1? ? log 10 10? ?
? 0
   
,
where superscript SL refers to the price of televisions from Sri Lanka, 
sl is the share of Sri Lankan televisions in the total value of imports, 
and SW and sw refer to the price and import value share for Switzerland. 
Since the price of both suppliers is constant over time, the weighted 
average price change is zero.
In Case 2, the input price in period t is a weighted average of the 
price of the two suppliers, so (25 × 5 + 75 × 10) / 100 = 8.75. Here the 
(correct) assumption is made that these products are substitutes, and 
the true import price change is thus a 14 percent drop. This drop will be 
missed by standard statistical methods, even if all the relevant informa-
tion is available, simply because the products from the two suppliers are 
assumed to be different even though they are the same. So if the statisti-
cal agency decides (mistakenly here) that the price difference refl ects a 
difference in quality, there will be an import sourcing bias.
In this example, it is assumed that the two suppliers sell an identical 
product. If this is not the case—because, for instance, the quality of the 
domestic supplier’s product is higher—then the quality-adjusted price 
difference is smaller. Adjusting trade-unit values for quality differences 
is not straightforward, but it is feasible, as shown by Hallak and Schott 
(2011) and Feenstra and Romalis (2012). However, such adjustments 
rely on a specifi c underlying theoretical model. Furthermore, even 
when adjusting for quality differences, Mandel (2010); Byrne, Kovak, 
and Michaels (2013); and Feenstra and Romalis (2012) still fi nd sub-
stantial deviations from the law of one price. This implies that there is 
certainly scope for import sourcing bias.
The main analysis compares import prices for individual products 
according to the two cases outlined in Table 6.1. The main difference 
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is that many different foreign suppliers are compared, rather than the 
simple two-supplier case. For Case 1, the price change for product i 
from t − 1 to t can be written as
(6.2) dPit
1 ? log Pit Pit?1? ?1 ? vijt log Pijt Pijt?1? ?
j
?  ,   
where v vijt ? 12 Vijt Vijt ?Vijt?1 Vijt?1
j
?
j
?
?
??
?
??
 is the two-period average share
of imports from country j in the total value of imports of product i. The 
subscript for the importing country is omitted to avoid notational clut-
ter. The price of each product is computed using import quantities and 
values as Pijt Vijt Qijt ; see also the next section for more details about 
the data and implementation. The price change for Case 2 is defi ned as
(6.3) dPit
2 ? log Pit Pit?1? ?2 ? log
Vijt
j
? Qijt
j
?
Vijt?1
j
? Qijt?1
j
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
,
 
 
so the weighted average unit value of imports is calculated by summing 
import values and quantities across all source countries.
If the example from Table 6.1 is the typical case, we would expect 
to see that Pijt , used in Case 1, would be lower for emerging econo-
mies compared with advanced economies and that the share of imports 
from those countries, vijt , would increase over time. As a result, the 
import price dPit
2  (Equation 6.3) would typically increase by less than 
dPit
1 (Equation 6.2). The difference between the two price changes, 
?it ? dPit
1 ? dPit
2 , is used to determine the import sourcing bias in manu-
facturing value-added growth.
What is specifi cally included in this difference, ∆it , is not imme-
diately obvious when comparing Equations (6.2) and (6.3). However, 
Diewert and Nakamura (2010) have shown that it is possible to write the 
true index, dPit
2  here, as a function of the typically observed index dPit
1 
and a bias term. In their simplest case, with a new, lower-priced product 
entering in the second of a two-period example, the bias is equal to the 
price discount of the lower-priced entrant times the quantity share that 
this entrant captures in the second period. In the more general case, 
with many products and arbitrary quantity shares, the expression for the 
bias becomes more complicated, but it still only depends on the shifts 
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in imports and the price difference between different source countries.7 
This implies that the difference, ∆it , captures only import sourcing bias 
and would not be affected by other measurement problems.
There will be a bias if ∆it is different from zero, since in that case 
the import price measure used by the statistical offi ce, which I assume 
is well-proxied by dPit
1, is not the same as the true import price measure, 
which I assume is well-proxied by dPit
2 . In general, I would expect ∆it to 
be positive, which implies that the price index used to defl ate imports 
is increasing too fast, and thus the quantity of imports increases too 
slowly. 
The “true” import sourcing bias is likely to be smaller (closer to 
zero) than the bias I estimate here. This is because all true quality dif-
ferences are considered to be price differences, and it seems likely that 
sellers of a high-quality product would not charge a lower (true) price 
than sellers of a low-quality product. To see this, consider a modifi ca-
tion of the example in Table 6.1. The assumption in that example is that 
the Swiss television and the Sri Lankan television are identical, but say 
that the Sri Lankan product is of lower quality. For instance, assume 
that 20 percent of the Sri Lankan product is defective, compared with 
no defects for the Swiss product. The quality-adjusted price of the Sri 
Lankan product is then 6 rather than 5 because you have to buy 20 per-
cent more of the product to get the same amount of nondefective units. 
The true price change would then be −11 rather than −14 percent.8 
The same logic holds for a shift of imports toward higher-quality 
imports. Bias estimate ∆it would then be negative because quality dif-
ferences are assumed away. Accounting for quality differences would 
reduce the observed price differences and thus bring ∆it closer to zero. 
The estimated ∆it could also be understated if the high-quality product 
has a lower price than the low-quality product. While this cannot be 
ruled out, it seems less likely a priori. For instance, the results of Feenstra 
and Romalis (2012) indicate that estimates of quality and prices based 
on their model are positively correlated.
The Impact on Value-Added and Productivity Growth
Value-added growth is calculated as a residual, in a process called 
“double defl ation”: the growth in output that is not accounted for by 
growth in intermediate inputs. Imports make up part of intermediate 
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inputs, so if growth in the quantity of imports is too low, then growth 
in value-added is too high. To be more precise, the price of imported 
materials used in manufacturing will be biased to the following degree:
(6.4) , ? t
MM ? wit
m? it
i
?
where wit
MM  is the two-period average share of product i in the total 
value of imported materials used in manufacturing. Imported materials 
are, in turn, part of total materials used, which together with energy and 
services make up total intermediate inputs. Nominal gross output, PYY, 
can thus be written as the following accounting identity:
(6.5) Pt
YYt ? Pt
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where VA is value-added, I stands for total intermediate inputs, MM sig-
nifi es imported materials, DM stands for domestically sourced materials 
and OI for other intermediate inputs, and PX is the price of X. In national 
accounts, prices are available for gross output and the different interme-
diate inputs, and the price of value-added is solved for implicitly. The 
Törnqvist index for the change in the value-added price is defi ned as
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where an upper bar denotes a two-period average and a lowercase vari-
able is the share of that variable in gross output—thus, for example,
. vat ? 12 Pt
VAVAt Pt
YYt ? Pt?1
VAVAt?1 Pt?1
Y Yt?1? ?
Based on the argument above, the price of imported materials, PMM, is 
biased by ∆mm , so using Equation (6.6), the bias in the price of value-
added is 
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Since the bias in prices has no bearing on the growth of nominal 
value-added, the bias in the growth of the quantity of value-added is 
equal to the negative of the bias in the growth of the price of value-added, 
∆t
VA = −∆t
PVA. As the bias in the growth of imported materials has no 
effect on the growth of labor or capital, the growth bias of value-added 
translates one-for-one into a bias in MFP growth, ∆t
MFP = ∆t
VA.
DATA SOURCES AND IMPLEMENTATION
To implement the bias calculation in Equation (6.7), two data 
sources are used, one with data on import prices and the other with 
data on the economies’ input-output structure. The import prices are 
based on the UN Comtrade database, which provides information on 
the quantity and value of imports by product, importing country, and 
source countries for each year in the period 1995–2008. There are data 
for up to 804 products, classifi ed according to the four-digit level of the 
SITC Revision 2 (SITC Rev. 2) system. The valuation concept for the 
import value is CIF (cost, insurance, and freight), so it refl ects the full 
price the importer has to pay to get the product into the country. 
I undertake two processing steps before implementing Equations 
(6.2) and (6.3). First, I only keep observations for which the quantity 
unit is kilograms. This is done to ensure that the unit values are compa-
rable across source countries.9 Second, I compute the median unit value 
of a product across all 38 importers and 139 source countries and drop 
observations for which the unit value is either smaller than 1 percent 
or larger than 100 times the median unit value, as these are more likely 
to refl ect data errors. (The sensitivity of the results to these trimming 
criteria is discussed below.) Also included in the data error category 
are observations for which the quantity is equal to zero while the value 
is positive. Around 1 percent of observations are dropped as a result. 
Based on the resulting price and value data, Equations (6.2) and (6.3) 
are implemented and the price change difference, ∆it , is computed.
The price change difference for each imported product then needs 
to be weighted by the share of that product in imported materials used 
in manufacturing, as discussed in Equation (6.4). From the World 
Input-Output Database (WIOD), I have annual data on the composition 
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of imported intermediates for the 38 countries that are analyzed. How-
ever, this composition is only available at a higher level of aggregation, 
namely, for 14 manufacturing industries that deliver materials to manu-
facturing.10 So I fi rst use a concordance of SITC Rev. 2 to the Interna-
tional Standard Industrial Classifi cation Revision 3 (ISIC Rev. 3) indus-
trial classifi cation to aggregate product-level price-change differences 
to the level of these 14 manufacturing industries, using the share of each 
product in total imports by each country. Then Equation (6.4) is applied 
as described, and the outcome is used in Equation (6.7) to arrive at the 
estimate of the bias in manufacturing productivity growth. 
I use the Socio-Economic Accounts (SEAs) that are part of WIOD 
to compute the growth of manufacturing MFP:11
(6.8) 
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Based on the SEAs, there is information for manufacturing on value-
added at constant prices (VA), employment by skill type (Hit), the total 
capital stock (Kt), and the share of labor compensation going to each 
skill type in value-added (αit). Ideally, there should be data on capital 
stocks by asset type, but this is not available for all countries. As a result, 
the contribution to growth from changes in the composition of the capi-
tal stock is included in this measure of MFP growth.
For my analysis, I assume that statistical agencies treat imports of 
the same product from different countries as different products. Estab-
lishing whether this is actually the case is a much harder challenge. As 
a general principle, the main concern in offi cial statistics is to avoid 
ignoring quality differences, and statistical agencies would thus be 
likely to treat products from different countries as having a different 
quality, rather than a different price—see, e.g., Eurostat (2001) and IMF 
(2009). How U.S. statisticians deal with this issue is discussed in detail 
in Houseman et al. (2010, 2011).12 Put briefl y, unless it is clear that 
a “new” product imported from a different country is identical to the 
“old” product, price differences are assumed to be due to quality dif-
ferences. European countries would have to follow a similar approach 
as the United States to be in line with Eurostat requirements. Since 
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separate import price indices are published for imports from euro-area 
countries and for imports from non-euro-area countries, this suggests 
that products from different countries are not treated as close substi-
tutes. For other countries, information on import prices and the estima-
tion methodology is even harder to establish. For instance, the Reserve 
Bank of India (2012) shows import prices for India based on unit val-
ues, but it is unclear what level of detail these are constructed from. If 
they distinguish import unit values by source country, then there would 
be scope for import sourcing bias, but otherwise, their measure may 
be similar to my dP 2it . This paucity of methodological documentation 
presents a challenge in gauging the possible scope for import sourcing 
bias for most countries outside the United States.13
This might not be a major problem if dP 1it from Equation (6.2) were 
close to offi cial import prices. Using data provided by Eurostat, a com-
parison can be made for nine European countries, and the results actu-
ally show substantial differences. Indeed, dP 1it is much more similar to 
dP 2it (a correlation of 0.93) than to the offi cial import prices (0.18). The 
standard deviation of dP 1it  and dP
2
it is also about three times larger than 
that of the offi cial indices. To some extent, this is unsurprising, as dP 1it 
will capture many changes that offi cial import prices are designed to 
ignore. While both capture the changes in price of individual products 
by a specifi c producer in a particular country, dP 1it will also capture 
shifts between producers of the same product in the same country, shifts 
between products within the SITC four-digit category, and changes in 
the importance of individual products in the broader category.
However, as discussed above, Diewert and Nakamura (2010) show 
that it is possible to express the true price index, dP 2it , as a function of 
the typically observed price index dP 1it and a bias term. This bias term, 
∆it
 
, the difference between dP 1it and dP
2
it , depends only on the price dif-
ference and shifts in imports across source countries. In other words, 
even when dP 1it is a poor approximation of offi cial import prices, the 
import sourcing bias estimate ∆it is not “contaminated” by factors unre-
lated to import price differences and sourcing patterns. 
This discussion implies that caution is in order in interpreting the 
results on two counts. First, if statistical agencies adequately account 
for price and quality differences across source countries, the method 
employed here would incorrectly ascribe a bias to the import price 
index of that country. A bias would only occur if the statistical agen-
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cies ascribe too much of the price differences across source countries to 
quality differences. Second, our trade unit values are available at a level 
of detail at which quality differences will still be a notable factor. As 
long as the correlation between (true) prices and quality is not negative, 
the bias estimates are likely to be too large. Given these caveats, the 
results should be regarded more as indicative of the likely scope of this 
problem than as the fi nal word on the precise magnitude.
RESULTS
The increased sourcing of materials from lower-cost countries is 
shown in Figure 6.1 for the three largest European countries and the 
United States. Between 1995 and 2008, each of these countries consid-
erably increased the share of imported materials from emerging econo-
mies. I defi ne two groups of emerging economies. The fi rst group con-
sists of the (mostly) central and eastern European countries that have 
joined the European Union since 2004, the EU12.14 The second group, 
“Other emerging,” includes Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Russia, and Turkey. The advanced economies are the EU1515 and the 
group labeled “Other advanced,” which includes Australia, Canada, 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the United States.16 This grouping is infor-
mative, as the share of imports from advanced economies went down 
considerably over this period, while both groups of emerging econo-
mies gained considerably in import market share.17
This shift in import market share toward emerging economies is an 
indication that imports from these economies are cheaper. To illustrate 
this, we can compare the import price for the same product across coun-
tries. To make this more straightforward to visualize, I fi rst compute 
the median unit value by source country group (advanced/emerging, 
EU/other), importer, product, and year. These median unit values are 
then compared with the median unit value of imports from the EU15. 
Figure 6.2 plots the median price difference relative to the EU15 for 
each country group over time. The median price for imports from other 
advanced economies18 was about 20 percent higher than the price for 
imports from the EU15 throughout the period. To give an indication of 
the distribution around the median price difference, the percentage of 
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products that had a lower price than imports from EU15 countries is 
also indicated. For imports from other advanced economies, only about 
40 percent of products are cheaper than imports from EU15 countries. 
The generally higher prices of imports from other advanced economies 
could be a “Washington apples” effect (Alchian and Allen 1964). Since 
most countries in the analysis are EU countries (27 out of 38 countries), 
imports from other advanced economies tend to come from farther 
away and would thus need to be of higher quality to overcome higher 
trade costs.
Throughout the period, and for most countries, importing from 
emerging economies was much cheaper than importing from EU15 
countries. The median difference in 1995 was around 30–35 percent 
for imports from the EU12 and other emerging economies. The price 
advantage shrank over this period to about 20 percent for other emerg-
ing economies and to about 10 percent for EU12 countries. Most prod-
Figure 6.1  Share of Source Country Groups in Imported Materials Used 
in Manufacturing, Selected Countries for 1995 and 2008
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SOURCE: Computations based on WIOD, see www.wiod.org.
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ucts from both groups of countries had lower prices than when imported 
from EU15 countries. This fi gure, though, treats all products identically 
even if they represent only a small part of imports.
We therefore turn to the results from estimating import sourcing 
bias, where products are weighted by their share in the value of imports. 
In these results, we focus on how the difference in price levels translates 
to a different rate of import price change, rather than on the price-level 
differences in themselves. Table 6.2 illustrates the products and country 
groups for which the import sourcing bias is most relevant. For each 
traded product, I calculate the difference between a price index under 
the assumption products are different when imported from a different 
country (Equation [6.2]) and a price index under the assumption prod-
Figure 6.2  Median Price Difference Relative to EU15 Imports and 
Percentage of Products That Have Lower Prices than EU15 
Imports, by Country Grouping, 1995–2008
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NOTE: The lines show the median price difference of imports from a specifi c country 
grouping relative to imports from EU15 countries. The percentages indicate the 
percentage of products with lower prices.
SOURCE: Author’s computations.
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ucts imported from different countries are perfect substitutes (Equation 
[6.3]). This difference is then weighted by the share of each product in 
the total imports of each country and summed across three groups of 
products. 
This product grouping, introduced by Rauch (1999), distinguishes 
between homogenous and differentiated products. Some products, typi-
cally commodities such as oil or lead, are traded on exchanges and are 
thus considered homogenous. For a second category of products, it is 
possible to fi nd so-called reference prices in trade journals, such as for 
chemicals. The remainder of products—i.e., those for which no “stan-
dard” prices are available—are considered to be differentiated. This 
determination is made at the fi ve-digit SITC level, and in translating 
this to the four-digit SITC level (which is used here), Rauch formulates 
two alternative classifi cations, a “conservative” and a “liberal” one. 
In the conservative classifi cation, products are labeled as “differenti-
ated” when the four-digit category also consists (in part) of “reference-
priced” or “exchange-traded” products. In the liberal classifi cation, the 
alternate choice is made, thus allocating a product to the “reference-
Table 6.2  Offshoring Bias across Product Groups and Country Groups, 
1995–2008
Type of product Differentiated Reference-priced Exchange-traded
 Conservative Liberal Conservative Liberal Conservative Liberal
Overall 0.33 0.29 −0.01 0.03 −0.06 −0.06
EU15 0.51 0.44 0.02 0.08 −0.04 −0.04
Other advanced 0.53 0.51 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.03
EU12 0.26 0.15 −0.06 0.05 −0.06 −0.06
Other emerging −0.08 0.04 −0.04 −0.15 −0.18 −0.18
NOTE: The table shows the weighted average difference between the price change for 
a “different products” price index versus a “perfect substitutes” price index over the 
period from 1995 to 2008. The “different products” price index is defi ned in Equa-
tion (3.2), and the “perfect substitutes” index is defi ned in Equation (3.3). The price 
changes for each product are multiplied by the two-period average share of that prod-
uct in country imports and summed across product groups. The product groups are 
defi ned by Rauch (1999) and are used to indicate the extent to which products are 
homogenous (exchange-trade) or differentiated; both Rauch’s conservative and lib-
eral groupings of products are shown. The differences in price changes for each group 
are then averaged across countries.
SOURCE: Author’s computations.
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   209 2/16/2015   8:34:24 AM
210   Inklaar
priced” or “exchange-traded” categories, rather than the “differenti-
ated” category. The fi nal step is to compute an (unweighted) average of 
the price-change differences across countries.
The top row of Table 6.2 shows that, across all countries, there is 
only evidence of a (positive) import sourcing bias for differentiated 
products.19 For reference-priced and exchange-traded products—i.e., 
the more homogenous products—there is little indication that a shift 
toward low-cost sources is biasing import price indexes, especially in 
Rauch’s (1999) conservative product grouping (which uses a stricter 
rule for classifying products as homogenous). Indeed, the negative 
import sourcing bias numbers for some product and country groups 
imply shifts toward higher-cost sources. Across country groups, only 
advanced economies show notable positive import sourcing bias num-
bers, and then only for differentiated products. This group of products is 
where one would expect products of different prices—but also of differ-
ent quality levels—to be able to coexist. The positive import sourcing 
bias numbers in Table 6.2 could then imply that advanced economies 
are shifting toward lower-quality imports or toward lower-cost imports 
(at a given quality level). In that regard, the import sourcing bias esti-
mates in Table 6.2 and those that follow are likely to be an overestimate 
of the true bias.
Figure 6.3 moves to the country level and shows the import sourc-
ing bias in combination with average annual growth in manufacturing 
MFP for the 20 advanced economies between 1995 and 2008 (ordered 
by measured MFP growth). The total bar equals manufacturing MFP 
growth as computed from the SEA (Equation [6.8]), which is divided 
into the bias calculated from Equation (6.7) and the corrected MFP 
growth. This illustrates how the bias is substantial in most countries and 
positive in all but Luxembourg and Greece. For this set of countries, 
the average bias is 0.34 percentage points, which is 25 percent of the 
(corrected) average annual MFP growth of 1.38 percent. In other words, 
measured MFP growth in advanced economies could very well sub-
stantially overstate actual growth. At the same time, the cross-country 
pattern of MFP growth is not much distorted: Though the growth rates 
are lower, the measured MFP growth and corrected MFP growth rates 
are very highly correlated across countries (0.98).
The import sourcing bias found for the United States of 0.07 per-
centage points is smaller than the offshoring bias found by Houseman 
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et al. (2010, 2011), whose estimates range from 0.21 to 0.51 percent-
age points over mostly the same period.20 Since any bias from shifting 
from domestic to foreign suppliers is not included in my import sourc-
ing bias, this is as expected. It does suggest that import sourcing bias 
captures a notable share (14–33 percent) of the overall offshoring bias. 
In countries with smaller, more open economies than that of the United 
States, my import sourcing bias is likely to be an even larger part of the 
overall offshoring bias.
To gauge the robustness of these bias estimates, I repeated the anal-
ysis with more restrictive criteria for removing outliers in the unit value 
data. Rather than removing unit values that were 100 times larger or 
0.01 times as large, I used parameters of 20 times larger or 0.05 times as 
large, as well as 10 times larger or 0.1 times as large. The resulting bias 
estimates are noticeably smaller, indicating that mostly small unit val-
ues are dropped from the data set. For advanced economies, the average 
Figure 6.3  Average Annual Manufacturing MFP Growth in Advanced 
Economies, Bias and Bias-Corrected Measures, 1995–2008
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bias drops from 0.34 in the 100–0.01 case to 0.28 in the 20–0.05 case 
and 0.18 in the 10–0.1 case.21 The cross-country pattern is very similar, 
though, confi rming the fi nding that the cross-country pattern of MFP 
growth is not affected by import sourcing bias.
Figure 6.4 shows the bias estimates for the 18 emerging economies. 
As already shown in Table 6.2, there is no clear positive import sourc-
ing bias: the average bias is −0.06 and varies between −1.89 (Estonia) 
and +1.37 (Hungary). Taken at face value, the negative bias estimates 
suggest that measured productivity growth is understated because man-
ufacturers are shifting toward imports of higher-cost materials. This is 
hard to fathom unless these materials are also of higher quality. These 
negative biases could refl ect an increasing integration of emerging 
economies into advanced economies’ supply chains, with, for instance, 
(high-quality) car parts arriving from western European manufacturers 
for assembly in countries such as Slovakia. From the perspective of 
productivity measurement, import sourcing bias seems to be less of a 
problem in these emerging economies.
CONCLUSION 
While manufacturers increasingly buy their materials from lower-
cost countries, offi cial statistics lag behind this trend. Methods to mea-
sure the price change of imported materials miss out on cost-savings 
that manufacturers achieve by sourcing from lower-cost countries. By 
overestimating price changes of imports, statisticians underestimate the 
growth in the quantity of imports, leading to an upward bias in growth 
of productivity. In this chapter, I quantify this import sourcing bias 
for 38 advanced and emerging economies and estimate bias-adjusted 
growth of manufacturing value-added for the period 1995–2008. This 
relies on data for import unit values across importing countries, so that 
price changes of import products can be calculated under the assump-
tion that imports from different countries are either different products or 
perfect substitutes. Treating imports from different countries as substi-
tutes allows for cost savings to be registered in the statistics.
The analysis for advanced economies shows that there is a shift 
toward imports with lower unit values for the group of differentiated 
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products. As a result, manufacturing MFP growth in advanced econo-
mies is biased upwards by, on average, 0.18 to 0.34 percentage points, 
or 10 to 20 percent of measured growth. In emerging economies, there 
is no clear bias in either direction. The true import sourcing bias is 
likely to be closer to zero than these estimates, as the method used here 
ascribes none of the price differences to differences in quality. Further-
more, if statistical agencies already deal well with price and quality 
differences across source countries, then there is no bias to begin with. 
From that perspective, it is reassuring to discover that even with the 
larger estimate of import sourcing bias, the cross-country pattern of 
productivity growth is not affected. On the other hand, this analysis is 
limited to analyzing import sourcing bias, and any bias stemming from 
shifts between domestic and foreign suppliers is not accounted for.
Yet even the current estimates have implications for the reliabil-
ity of output and productivity statistics. These questions cannot easily 
Figure 6.4  Average Annual Manufacturing MFP Growth in Emerging 
Economies, Bias and Bias-Corrected Measures, 1995–2008
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be resolved in the standard statistical framework, where price changes 
are measured separately for inputs from domestic and different for-
eign sources. Instead, surveying an input price index, as discussed by 
Alterman (2009 and Chapter 10 of this volume), may hold greater 
promise, since for such an index fi rms would provide the overall input 
price, regardless of source. The earlier experiences of the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics in surveying margin prices (i.e., the sales price minus 
the purchase price of the product) in wholesale and retail trade suggest 
that this would be feasible. Those new prices led to much lower pro-
ductivity growth, particularly in retail trade (Harchaoui 2012), which 
points to the importance of accurately measuring not only output but 
also input prices. From a policy perspective, these fi ndings suggest that 
some of the offshoring of activities, in particular from western Europe 
to central and eastern European countries, has led to an overestimation 
of productivity growth. However, import sourcing bias by itself is not a 
large enough factor that the cross-country productivity growth patterns 
are materially affected.
Notes
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particular Susan Houseman and Ana Aizcorbe, for helpful comments and discussions.
 1. See, e.g., OECD (2010).
 2. There has also been earlier work on this; see, e.g., Schott (2004) and Reinsdorf 
and Yuskavage (2009).
 3.  In the literature on bias in consumer prices, this is known as outlet substitution 
bias; see, e.g., Reinsdorf (1993), Diewert (1998), and Hausman (2003).
 4.  There would still be offshoring bias until prices of domestic and foreign sources 
of inputs were compared and any price differences accounted for.
 5.  See IMF (2009) for international measurement guidelines, but also Inklaar, 
Timmer, and van Ark (2008) on the topic of the measurement of industry output 
prices across Europe in relation to measurement guidelines.
 6.  See http://www.wiod.org. Taiwan is excluded because of missing trade data, and 
Malta because of highly erratic unit values.
 7.  Diewert and Nakamura (2010) show this for a Fisher index, whereas here a 
Törnqvist index is used. Given the similarity in the structure of these two indexes, 
there is likely a similar decomposition for the Törnqvist as for the Fisher. Further-
more, import sourcing bias estimates based on the Fisher index are similar in size 
to the Törnqvist estimates shown in the chapter.
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 8.  The fi rst-period price is now 25% × 6 + (1 − 25%) × 10 = 9, and the second-period 
price is 8, so the price decline between the two periods is 11 percent.
 9.  More than 90 percent of the unit values are based on quantities in kilograms. Fur-
thermore, the same product could be reported in kilograms by some countries and 
in another unit (e.g., number of items) by other countries. To avoid mixing prices 
per kilogram and prices per unit for the same product, only prices per kilogram are 
used.
 10. WIOD distinguishes inputs from 35 industries, but these also include nonmanu-
facturing inputs.
 11.  See, e.g., Timmer et al. (2010) for more detail on (industry-level) growth accounts 
and MFP growth estimates.
 12.  See also Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) and BLS (1997).
 13.  See, for instance, Inklaar, Timmer, and van Ark (2008) on price measurement of 
industry output across Europe.
 14.  These are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
 15.  The EU15 consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom.
 16.  We could not include Taiwan in our full analysis because of missing trade price data.
 17.  Note that the share of imported materials in total material use also increased, so 
imports from advanced economies did not decline in the absolute sense.
 18.  The import price data cover more countries than the input-output data, so there 
are more advanced economies. All non-EU countries with a 2008 GDP per capita 
level exceeding 55 percent of the U.S. level are labeled “advanced.” This thresh-
old was chosen because it is the dividing line between the EU15 and the EU12.
 19.  Results based on unweighted average price changes are very similar.
 20.  The bias in value-added-based MFP growth is identical to the bias in value-added 
growth, as was noted in the discussion of Equation (6.7), so I use Houseman et 
al.’s (2010, 2011) estimate of the bias in value-added growth here. 
 21.  In the 10–0.1 case, the import sourcing bias for the United States drops almost to 
zero, which would imply that all of the offshoring bias is due to switching from 
domestic to foreign suppliers.
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Biases to Manufacturing
Statistics from Offshoring
Evidence from Japan
Kyoji Fukao
Sonoe Arai
Hitotsubashi University and RIETI
As manufacturing sectors of developed economies outsource more 
and more to developing economies, this may give rise to a serious mea-
surement problem. If a manufacturing industry (or fi rm) procures a lot 
of parts and components from developing economies at exceptionally 
low prices and we do not correctly take account of these low prices, we 
will overestimate the productivity of this industry (or fi rm). 
In this chapter, we investigate two types of biases to manufacturing 
statistics from the growth in manufacturers’ use of imported intermedi-
ates—commonly known as offshoring. 
The fi rst type of bias concerns measuring the use of imported prod-
ucts in the economy. Most countries, including the United States, do 
not track whether imports are destined for fi nal demand or intermedi-
ate uses but instead assume that industries use imports in proportion to 
their overall use of these products in the economy—this is the so-called 
import proportionality assumption. Measures using the import propor-
tionality assumption will differ from measures based on actual input 
use if two conditions occur: 1) industries’ use of imports differs sig-
nifi cantly from that assumed under the import proportionality assump-
tion, and 2) the price movements of imported and domestic intermedi-
ates within commodity classes differ signifi cantly.1 In this study, we 
call these types of biases the bias caused by the import proportionality 
assumption.
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The second type of bias concerns the price gap between domesti-
cally produced inputs and imported inputs. If manufacturers shift sourc-
ing from a high-cost domestic supplier to a low-cost foreign supplier 
and statisticians do not take account of this price gap, statisticians’ esti-
mates of the inputs of these manufacturers will be downwardly biased, 
and estimates of the total factor productivity (TFP) will be upwardly 
biased. This has been referred to as “offshoring bias” in the literature 
(Diewert and Nakamura 2011; Houseman et al. 2011).
Japan presents an ideal case study to examine both the bias caused 
by the import proportionality assumption and the bias caused by off-
shoring. The reason is that every fi ve years, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications publishes the Input-Output Tables for 
Japan (I-O tables), in which domestically produced intermediate inputs 
and imported intermediate inputs are treated separately. The Japanese 
government estimates the input structure by conducting a special sur-
vey, implemented by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(METI), on the sources of each industry’s procurements. Moreover, 
because of Japan’s location, imports of intermediate inputs from China 
and other developing economies in East Asia have increased rapidly 
in recent decades. Against this background, using Japan’s I-O tables 
and price indices for imported and domestic products, one of the major 
aims of this study is to estimate the bias from the import proportional-
ity assumption by examining differences in estimates of import use in 
the I-O tables based on actual data and estimates based on the import 
proportionality assumption. 
In order to estimate offshoring bias, we need—in addition to data on 
import use in the economy and price indices for imported and domestic 
products—data on the price gap between domestically produced inputs 
and imported inputs. In Japan, such data are available from the Sur-
vey on Foreign and Domestic Price Differentials for Industrial Inter-
mediate Input, conducted by METI every year. This survey provides 
information on differentials in customer delivery prices among Japan, 
China, the United States, Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong for about 180 commodities and 40 services. Using these data, 
we estimate the price gap between domestically produced inputs and 
imported inputs by country of origin.
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section Two, “Approach 
to Measuring the Two Types of Biases,” we explain our methodology to 
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estimate the two types of biases using data on Japan. We then explain 
our data in Section Three, “Data Used.” We also detail what data METI 
collects and how it collects these data. In Section Four, “Estimation 
of Bias Caused by the Import Proportionality Assumption,” we report 
our results on bias created by the import proportionality assumption. In 
Section Five, “Estimation of Offshoring Bias,” we report our results on 
the second type of bias. Section Six concludes.
APPROACH TO MEASURING THE TWO TYPES OF BIASES
This section presents the approach we use to measure the two types 
of bias: 1) bias caused by the import proportionality assumption and 2) 
offshoring bias.
We start by explaining our approach to measuring the bias caused 
by the import proportionality assumption. 
In Japan, input-output tables, in which domestically produced inter-
mediate inputs and imported intermediate inputs are treated separately, 
are constructed every fi ve years. Therefore, data on the nominal value 
of imported intermediate inputs from sector i to sector j, Xi,j
M(t), and 
data on the nominal value of domestically produced intermediate inputs 
from sector i to sector j, Xi,j
H(t), are available separately. Here, super-
script M stands for imported intermediate inputs and superscript H stands 
for domestically produced intermediate inputs. In the United States, 
only data on the total value of intermediate inputs from sector i to sec-
tor j, Xi,j
M(t)+Xi,j
H(t), are available to construct input-output tables; the 
extent to which the intermediate inputs used in sector j are imported or 
domestically produced is unknown. 
Let us theoretically examine biases caused by this shortcoming 
of U.S.-type input-output tables based on the import comparability 
assumption. 
Assume that imported intermediate inputs from sector i to sector j 
and domestically produced intermediate inputs from sector i to sector 
j are different products and the cost share of each product reveals its 
marginal contribution to production in sector j. 
In Japan, as in the United States, data on the absolute price levels 
of imported products and domestic products are not available. In both 
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countries, only the price indexes of imported products and domestic 
products are available. Let Pi
M(t) / Pi
M(0) denote the price change of 
imported product i from year 0 to year t and Pi
H(t) / Pi
H(0) denote the 
price change of domestically produced product i from year 0 to year t.2 
For our estimation of the bias, which would be caused  by a lack 
of information on imports, we fi rst prepared nominal and real import 
input-output tables for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008 in Japan using 
data on import use in the economy. As we will explain in detail in the 
next section, the main sources of our I-O tables are the 1995-2000-
2005 Linked Input-Output Tables, published by the Statistics Bureau of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC), and the 
2008 Updated Input-Output Tables, published by METI. Both of the 
statistics set 2005 as their benchmark year. 
The key variables we would like to estimate are the real input 
indexes for each sector. For the calculation of these quantity indexes, 
we use 2005 as the base year. That is, we weight input quantity changes 
by the nominal input values of 2005. Using Japan’s I-O tables, which 
incorporate information on the use of imports in the economy, we derive 
the real input index for sector j for year t (t = 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008), 
xj
J(t), as follows:
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where the superscript J means that this index is based on noncompeti-
tive import-type I-O tables like Japan’s. T denotes the base year, 2005.3 
In most countries, data on the destination of imports in the econ-
omy are not regularly available, and the ordinary approach is to assume 
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that a sector’s imports of each input, relative to its total demand, are 
the same as the economy-wide imports relative to total demand (as is 
assumed in the I-O tables for the United States)—the so-called import 
proportionality assumption.
That is, an industry’s imports are calculated as follows: let mi(t) 
denote the economy-wide imports of product i relative to total demand 
for product i:
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where Fi,k
M(t) and Fi,k
H(t) denote the value of imports of product i used 
to satisfy fi nal demand k and the value of domestic output of product i 
used to satisfy fi nal demand k. 
In this shortcut approach, growth of real inputs from sector i to sec-
tor j is estimated by
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Moreover, the real input index for sector j for year t, xj
U(t), is defi ned by
(7.3)
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where the superscript U means that this index is drawn from U.S.-type 
input-output tables based on the import proportionality assumption.
Equation (7.3) shows that when the price of imports relative to that 
of domestic output declines (Pi
M(T) / Pi
H(T) > Pi
M(t) / Pi
H(t)) from T to 
t for most inputs i, we will underestimate the increase in intermediate 
inputs in sectors where imports of product i relative to the sector’s total 
demand is higher than the economy-wide imports/domestic output ratio 
((Xi,j
M(t) / ( Xi,j
M(t)+ Xi,j
H(t)) > mi(t)) for these inputs. As a result, we will 
overestimate the TFP growth of such sectors. 
This type of bias is caused by the assumption that an industry’s 
imports of each input, relative to its total demand, are the same as the 
economy-wide imports relative to total demand. This bias will be large 
if imports of each input, relative to the total demand for that input, are 
quite different across sectors, and if changes in the relative prices of 
imports and domestic products are large. 
Biases caused by the import proportionality assumption have zero-
sum characteristics. In some sectors, the imports-total demand ratio 
is higher than the economy-wide average, while in others, the ratio is 
lower. Therefore, these biases will tend to cancel each other out when 
we calculate macro-level TFP growth. However, if imports tend to be 
used more as intermediate inputs and domestic output tends to be used 
more for satisfying fi nal demand, we will overestimate TFP growth 
of the macroeconomy when the prices of imports relative to those of 
domestic output decline.
Using Japan’s I-O data from 1995 to 2008, we will analyze how 
the intermediate input index based on Equation (7.1) moves differently 
from the intermediate input index based on Equation (7.3).
Next, let us explain our methodology for measuring offshoring 
bias. The offshoring bias concerns an important caveat regarding our 
real input index xj
J(t), which is defi ned by Equation (7.1) and is based 
on import I-O tables like Japan’s. If quality-adjusted prices of imports i 
and that of domestic output i are different, then our intermediate input 
index defi ned by Equation (7.1) is not appropriate for measuring true 
intermediate input growth. This issue was fi rst pointed out by Diewert 
and Nakamura (2011) and empirically examined by Houseman et al. 
(2011).
If we express the (quality-adjusted) absolute price level of imported 
products by Pi
M(t) and the (quality-adjusted) absolute price level of 
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domestically produced products by Pi
H(t), then the appropriate input 
index of sector j for year t is defi ned by
(7.4) 
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where the superscript O means that this index is based on information on 
price gaps between domestically produced inputs and imported inputs 
and is free from offshoring bias.
Assume that imports are cheaper than domestically produced 
inputs and that both prices, Pi
M(t) and Pi
H(t), are constant over time. 
Also assume that fi rms in sector j substitute imports for domestically 
produced inputs by the same amount, and that imports and domesti-
cally produced inputs make the same marginal contribution to produc-
tion. Then the true intermediate input index must remain constant. Input 
index xj
O(t), which is defi ned by Equation (7.4), satisfi es this condi-
tion. But both the input index xj
J(t), which is defi ned by Equation (7.1), 
and the input index xj
U(t), which is defi ned by Equation (7.3), decline. 
When we use xj
J(t) or xj
U(t), we will judge incorrectly that the intermedi-
ate input in sector i has decreased. Thus, we will overestimate the TFP 
growth of sector i.
Using METI’s Survey on Foreign and Domestic Price Differentials 
for Industrial Intermediate Input (METI 1999) and Japan’s I-O data, we 
will evaluate offshoring bias by comparing the intermediate input index 
xj
U(t) defi ned by Equation (7.3) and the intermediate input index xj
O(t) 
defi ned by Equation (7.4).
DATA USED
In this section we explain the data we use for our analysis. For 
information on the nominal use of imports in the Japanese economy 
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in 1995, 2000, and 2005, we use the Input-Output Tables for Japan for 
each of these years, published by the Statistics Bureau of the Minis-
try of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC). For these years, 
tables of imports reporting the nominal value of imports used as inputs 
in sector j, Xi,j
M(t), and the nominal value of imports used to satisfy fi nal 
demand k, Fi,k
M(t), for each product i are available. 
In order to construct these tables on imports, METI, which collabo-
rates with MIAC to compile the I-O tables, conducts its survey on the 
use of major imports at the HS nine-digit level.4 Online Appendix Table 
7A.1 provides an outline of the questionnaire form, which has been 
partially fi lled out by the authors with made-up industry names to illus-
trate the conceptual framework of the METI survey.5 About 200 trading 
companies and producer associations are interviewed; the latter, such 
as the association of electronics parts producers and the association 
of automobile parts producers, make up the majority. This means that 
METI mainly asks the Japanese producers of each commodity about the 
destination industries for imports of these commodities, most of which 
are produced by their rivals abroad. (Of course, some Japanese produc-
ers are now multinationals and import from their own affi liates abroad.) 
To extend our analysis to more recent years, we estimate import 
input-output tables for 2008 using the 2008 Updated Input-Output 
Tables and the 2005 Input-Output Tables for Japan. The updated I-O 
Tables do not contain tables on imports, so we therefore estimate tables 
on imports by extrapolating data in import tables for 2005 using import 
data for 2008.
We obtain defl ators for imports and domestic output separately for 
each sector i from the 1995-2000-2005 Linked Input-Output Tables, 
published by the Statistics Bureau of MIAC, and the 2008 Updated
Input-Output Tables. In these I-O tables, the major original sources 
of defl ators for commodities are the Domestic Corporate Goods Price 
Index (DCGPI) and the Import Price Index (IPI), taken from the Corpo-
rate Goods Price Index, published by the Bank of Japan.
Using these various sources, we prepared nominal and real import 
input-output tables for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008. The endogenous 
sector table for each year has 514 rows and 401 columns. In our analy-
sis, we set 2005 as our benchmark year for our calculation of the quan-
tity and the price index before and after 2005.
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Moreover, for data on price gaps necessary for our analysis we use 
the Survey on Foreign and Domestic Price Differentials for Industrial 
Intermediate Input (METI 1999). This survey has been conducted every 
year since 1993 and reports differences in the customer delivery price 
for about 150 intermediate goods and 30 services between Japan on the 
one hand and the United States, China, Germany, and the newly indus-
trializing economies (NIEs, consisting of South Korea, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Singapore) on the other. The survey specifi es each com-
modity and service in great detail. In the case of commodities, the sur-
vey in principle follows the commodity specifi cation of the Corporate 
Goods Price Index.
As we will report in detail in Section Five, “Estimation of Offshor-
ing Bias,” unit prices in the developing economies included in the survey 
(i.e., China and the NIEs) for many products tend to be much lower than 
unit prices in the developed economies (i.e., Japan, the United States, 
and Germany). This implies that it would be inappropriate to assume, 
as is done in Equation (7.4), that the unit prices of Japanese imports are 
identical regardless of the country of origin. We therefore distinguish 
between imports from developed and from developing economies.
The number of goods and services covered by the survey differs 
across countries and across years. Data are relatively abundant for U.S.-
Japan and China-Japan price differences from 2000, and we therefore 
use data for the two pairs for 2000 and 2008.6  
We grouped Japan’s trade partners into two groups: 1) developed 
economies, consisting of the United States and countries that were 
members of the European Union in 2000, and 2) developing economies, 
consisting of China and the rest of the world. We assume that price dif-
ferentials between Japan and the developed economies are the same as 
the U.S.-Japan price differentials, and that price differentials between 
Japan and the developing economies are the same as the China-Japan 
price differentials.
A potential problem is that customer delivery prices in the United 
States and China reported in METI’s survey may include prices of 
goods imported into the United States and China, but what we would 
like to know is the price gaps between domestically produced goods 
and imported goods from China and the United States in Japan. How-
ever, because we have no way of knowing whether the customer deliv-
ery prices in the United States and China reported in the METI survey 
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include imported goods, we assume that the price gaps reported in the 
survey are good indicators of the price gaps between domestically pro-
duced goods and imported goods in Japan.
Another, related issue is that in Japan’s I-O tables, the value of 
domestic products is given on a producer price basis, while the value 
of imported products is on a CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) basis. 
On the other hand, METI’s survey reports price gaps between customer 
delivery prices in Japan and customer delivery prices in other countries. 
Because of trade costs, it is likely that the ratio of the price of imported 
products on a CIF basis over the price of domestic products will tend to 
be higher than the ratio of customer delivery prices in other countries 
over customer delivery prices in Japan. In order to adjust for this factor, 
we assume for each commodity that the ratio of the price of imported 
products on a CIF basis over the price of domestic products is 10 per-
cent higher than the ratio of customer delivery prices in other countries 
over customer delivery prices in Japan.
In our analysis of offshoring bias, we use 2000 as the base year and 
set the producer prices of domestic product i in year 2000, Pi
H(2000), 
equal to one for all i. We derive the CIF price of product i in year 2000 
imported from developed economies, Pi
D(2000), and the CIF price of 
product i in year 2000 imported from developing economies, Pi
L(2000), 
for each i using the following equations:
(7.5) ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?20002000
20001.12000 HiH
i
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iD
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?? ?
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where Πi
H(2000), Πi
D(2000), and Πi
L(2000) respectively denote the 
customer delivery price of product i in year 2000 in Japan, the United 
States, and China, which we take from the Survey on Foreign and 
Domestic Price Differentials for Industrial Intermediate Input (METI 
1999).
As for the CIF prices of product i in Year 2008 imported from devel-
oped and developing economies (both developed and developing mea-
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   228 2/16/2015   8:34:37 AM
Biases to Manufacturing Statistics from Offshoring   229
sured in terms of the producer price of domestic product i in Year 2000 
in Japan), one way to estimate this is to use the customer delivery price 
in Year 2008 in Japan, the United States, and China and sectoral defl a-
tors in the I-O tables. That is, we can derive the CIF price of product i in 
Year 2008 imported from developed economies, Pi
D(2008), and the CIF 
price of product i in Year 2008 imported from developing economies, 
Pi
L(2008), for each i, as well as the producer price of domestic product i 
in year 2008, Pi
H(2008), for each i, using the following equations:
(7.7) ? ? ? ?? ?
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i PP
PP ? ?,
where Πi
H(2008), Πi
D(2008), and Πi
L(2008) denote the customer deliv-
ery price of product i in Year 2008 in Japan, the United States, and 
China, respectively. We obtain Pi
H(2008) / Pi
H(2000) from the sectoral 
defl ators in the 1995-2000-2005 Linked Input-Output Tables and the 
2008 Updated Input-Output Tables.
We should note that there is another important source of import 
price change in addition to the combined data of the Survey on For-
eign and Domestic Price Differentials for Industrial Intermediate Input 
(METI 1999) and the sectoral defl ators in the 1995-2000-2005 Linked 
Input-Output Tables and the 2008 Updated Input-Output Tables—
namely, the import defl ators in the I-O tables. The import defl ators in 
the I-O tables are mainly based on the Bank of Japan–published Cor-
porate Goods Price Index, which covers many more commodities and 
countries of origin than METI’s survey. The import defl ators in the I-O 
tables therefore likely are more reliable than our estimates using Equa-
tions (7.7), (7.8), and (7.9), but the I-O tables do not contain data on 
import prices by country of origin or on absolute price gaps. Taking 
these advantages and disadvantages of the import defl ator in the I-O 
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tables into account, we use these defl ators as a kind of a control total, as 
we shall explain below. 
The CIF price of product i in year 2008 imported from developed 
economies, Pi
D(2008), and the CIF price of product i in year 2008 
imported from developing economies, Pi
L(2008), are expected to satisfy 
the following equation:           
,(7.10) 
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
? ?2000
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20082008
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2008
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iD
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i
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P ??? ?
where Pi
M(t) denotes Japan’s import price of product i from the rest of 
the world in year t, and mi
D(t) denotes the percentage of Japan’s imports 
of product i from developed economies in Japan’s total imports in 2008. 
We obtain these data from the Trade Statistics of Japan, published by 
the Ministry of Finance.
Because of the differences in data sources and other factors (such 
as the fact that we use price difference data only for the U.S.-Japan 
and China-Japan pairs, whereas the import defl ators in the I-O tables 
cover all of Japan’s imports from the world), Pi
D(2008) and Pi
L(2008), 
derived from Equations (7.8) and (7.9), do not necessarily satisfy Equa-
tion (7.10). To make Pi
D(2008) and Pi
L(2008) consistent with Equation 
(7.10), we add an adjustment term γ on the right-hand side of Equations 
(7.8) and (7.9) and redefi ne Pi
D(2008) and Pi
L(2008) as follows:
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where γ is defi ned by 
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It can be easily confi rmed that Pi
D(2008) and Pi
L(2008), defi ned by 
Equations (7.11) and (7.12), satisfy Equation (7.10).
Our input index for sector j for year t, which is based on informa-
tion on price gaps between domestically produced inputs and imported 
inputs and is free from offshoring bias, is defi ned by the following 
equation:
(7.13) 
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for t = 2000, 2008, and T = 2000. This is a modifi ed version of Equation 
(7.4). 
Two additional caveats with regard to our data should be pointed 
out. First, METI’s survey on price differentials does not cover food 
processing and agricultural, fi shery, and forestry output, while the cov-
erage of service output is very limited. Therefore, we calculate price 
gaps only for the output of the mining and manufacturing sectors other 
than processed food, and we assume that there are no price differentials 
in the case of agricultural, forestry, and fi shery products; food process-
ing; and services. Moreover, because of this limitation in the data, we 
excluded the food processing sector from our analysis of the offshoring 
bias. 
Second, even in the case of nonfood commodities, the number of 
commodities reported in the survey (about 180) is not suffi cient for 
the estimation of price gaps for our disaggregated three-digit-level 
I-O tables in which we have 285 rows, consisting of the mining sec-
tor and of manufacturing sectors other than processed food. Therefore, 
for industries in the I-O tables that we could not match at the three-
digit level, we assumed that the price gap was the same as at the more 
aggregated two-digit industry level. Moreover, when the METI survey 
provides price gap data on multiple commodities that correspond to one 
of the 285 industry rows, we calculate the industry average price gap 
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for that industry by employing the weights used in the METI survey. 
The original source of the weights is the Corporate Goods Price Index.
ESTIMATION OF BIAS CAUSED BY THE IMPORT
PROPORTIONALITY ASSUMPTION
Using our data, we analyze how the prices of imported inputs rela-
tive to domestically produced inputs changed between 1995 and 2005, 
as well as how much the share of imported inputs in total inputs differs 
across sectors and how this share changed between 1995 and 2005. In 
addition, we estimate the bias from the import proportionality assump-
tion by comparing the intermediate input index based on information 
from the tables on imports. We estimate the index based on the assump-
tion that an industry’s imports of each input, relative to its total demand, 
are the same as the economy-wide imports relative to total demand (as 
is assumed in the I-O tables for the United States).
As we explained in Section Two, “Approach to Measuring the Two 
Types of Biases,” the bias caused by the assumption that an industry’s 
imports of each input, relative to its total demand, are the same as the 
economy-wide imports, relative to total demand, will be large if changes 
in the relative prices of imports and domestic products are large and if 
imports of each input, relative to the total demand for that input, are 
quite different across sectors. 
Figure 7.1 shows how the ratio of the average price index of 
imported inputs over the average price index of domestically produced 
inputs has changed over time. As can be seen, the ratio declined by 40 
percent in the period 1995–2008. This decline was not caused by yen 
appreciation, since, as Figure 7.1 also shows, the value of the yen as 
measured by the real effective exchange rate fell by more than 50 per-
cent during the same period. Rather, a likely reason for the decline in 
relative import prices is the increase in Japan’s imports of low-priced 
products from Asian countries and the decline of output price in coun-
tries of origin.7 
Figure 7.2 shows the regional composition of Japan’s imports of 
manufactured products for 2000, 2005, and 2008. Similarly, Figure 7.3 
shows the regional composition of Japan’s imports of machinery for 
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2000, 2005, and 2008. The fi gures show that the share of imports from 
China and other Asian countries in Japan’s total manufacturing and 
machinery imports increased rapidly in the 2000s.
Next, Online Appendix Table 7A.2 provides a list of commodities 
for which the ratio of the price of imports over the price of domestic 
Figure 7.1  Average Price of Imported Inputs over Average Price of 
Domestically Produced Inputs (1995 = 1) and Japan’s Real 
Effective Exchange Rate (yen/foreign currency): 1995–2008
NOTE: “BIS” stands for Bank for International Settlements.
SOURCE: 1995-2000-2005 Linked Input-Output Tables, published by the Statistics 
Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC); 2008 
Updated Input-Output Tables, published by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry (METI); and effective exchange rate, Bank of Japan.
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Figure 7.2  Regional Composition of Japan’s Imports of Manufactured 
Products: 2000, 2005, and 2008
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SOURCE: Trade Statistics of Japan, published by the Ministry of Finance.
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Figure 7.3  Regional Composition of Japan’s Imports of Machinery: 
2000, 2005, and 2008
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SOURCE: Trade Statistics of Japan, published by the Ministry of Finance.
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products declined by more than 25 percent from 1995 to 2008. The 
table confi rms that the import price–domestic price ratio of many com-
modities, including important parts and components, sharply declined 
during the period. For instance, in the case of integrated circuits and 
semiconductor devices, the relative price declined by 33 percent and 28 
percent, respectively.
The next issue we examine is how much the share of imported 
inputs in total inputs differs across sectors, and how this share has 
changed over time. We do so by two illustrations, Figures 7.4 and 7.5, 
that use the examples of integrated circuits and semiconductor devices, 
which are important inputs in manufactured products. 
Starting with integrated circuits, the nominal value of total interme-
diate inputs increased from 3.0 trillion yen in 1995 to 3.6 trillion yen in 
2005.8 While this increase in the nominal value is not particularly large, 
intermediate input in real terms in fact increased threefold. The share of 
the total nominal input of imports in total nominal input increased from 
34 percent to 58 percent. The increase in the share of the total nominal 
input of imports was even more pronounced in the case of semiconduc-
tor devices, where it jumped from 18 percent to 61 percent. 
However, as can be seen in Figures 7.4 and 7.5, the share of imports 
in total demand differs considerably across sectors. In the case of both 
fi gures, the import ratio tends to be high in electrical machinery sectors 
but relatively low in other sectors such as automobiles and precision 
machinery. This means that we will underestimate the growth of these 
electronics parts inputs in electrical machinery sectors and overestimate 
it in other machinery sectors if we assume that an industry’s imports of 
each input, relative to its total demand, are the same as the economy-
wide imports relative to total demand.
We calculate the extent of underestimation, ln(xj
U(2008) / xj
I(2008)) 
− ln(xj
U(1995) / xj
I(1995)), for all of the 202 manufacturing sectors, 
other than processing food, and all of the six mining sectors, using our 
data. Table 7.1 shows the 25 sectors in which the underestimation of 
intermediate input growth is largest among these 208 mining and man-
ufacturing sectors.9 By multiplying this value with two values—that 
is, with −1 and with the average of the nominal intermediate input–
nominal gross output ratio of a particular sector for 1995 and 2008, we 
also calculate the extent of the overestimation of TFP growth for the 
period 1995–2008. 
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Figure 7.4  Share of Imported Inputs in Total Inputs: Integrated 
Circuits, 1995–2005
SOURCE: 1995 and 2005 Input-Output Tables, published by the Statistics Bureau of 
MIAC.
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Figure 7.5  Share of Imported Inputs in Total Inputs: Semiconductor 
Devices, 1995–2005
SOURCE: 1995 and 2005 Input-Output Tables, published by the Statistics Bureau of 
MIAC.
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Table 7.1  Underestimation of Intermediate Input Growth as a Result 
of the Import Proportionality Assumption: Top 25 Sectors, 
1995–2008
Underesti-
mation of 
intermediate 
input growth, 
ln(xU/xJ) (%, 
1995–2008)
Intermediate 
input/gross 
output (aver-
age value 
of 1995 and 
2008)
Overestima-
tion of TFP 
growth on a 
gross output 
basis (%, 
1995–2008)
Sector A B A × B
Animal oils and fats −14.04 0.715 10.04
Ordnance −12.62 0.619 7.81
Aircrafts −9.85 0.538 5.29
Liquid crystal elements −8.13 0.727 5.91
Methane derivatives −6.90 0.742 5.12
Organic fertilizers, n.e.c. −4.49 0.657 2.95
Video recording and playback 
equipment
−4.25 0.722 3.07
Thermo-setting resins −4.13 0.733 3.03
Salt −4.13 0.546 2.25
Bicycles −3.73 0.720 2.68
Turbines −3.38 0.643 2.17
Glass fi ber and glass fi ber 
products, n.e.c.
−3.20 0.604 1.93
Integrated circuits −2.62 0.650 1.70
Processed meat products −2.62 0.710 1.86
“Tatami” (straw matting) and 
straw products
−2.47 0.703 1.74
Wooden chips −2.39 0.733 1.75
Other resins −2.34 0.749 1.75
Other glass products −1.94 0.537 1.04
Nonferrous metal castings and 
forgings
−1.85 0.703 1.30
Dextrose, syrup, and isomerized 
sugar
−1.72 0.820 1.41
High function resins −1.49 0.778 1.16
Electronic computing equipment 
(except personal computers)
−1.45 0.716 1.04
Optical fi ber cables −1.28 0.740 0.95
Applied electronic equipment −1.22 0.716 0.88
Watches and clocks −1.21 0.630 0.76
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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In the top 14 sectors in which the underestimation of intermediate 
input growth caused by the import proportionality assumption is larg-
est (namely, animal oils and fats, ordnance, aircraft, liquid crystal ele-
ments, methane derivatives, organic fertilizers not elsewhere classifi ed, 
video recording and playback equipment, thermo-setting resins, salt, 
bicycles, turbines, glass fi ber and glass fi ber products not elsewhere 
classifi ed, integrated circuits, and processed meat products), the nega-
tive bias of intermediate input growth caused by the import proportion-
ality assumption is more than 2.6 percent, and the positive bias of TFP 
growth is more than 1.7 percent. These sectors include important high-
tech machinery sectors, such as aircraft and integrated circuits. 
Next, Table 7.2 shows the 27 sectors in which the overestimation of 
intermediate input growth is largest among all the manufacturing sec-
tors. These include six sectors—cellular phones, radio and television 
sets, coal products, other nonferrous metal products, repair of aircraft, 
and other photographic and optical instruments—where the positive 
bias of intermediate input growth is at least 3.25 percent, and the nega-
tive bias of TFP growth is more than 1.9 percent. 
ESTIMATION OF OFFSHORING BIAS
Using our data, we estimate offshoring bias by comparing the real 
input index based on information on the price gaps between domesti-
cally produced and imported intermediate inputs. That is, we estimate 
Equation (7.13) in Section Three (“Data Used”), which is a modifi ed 
version of Equation (7.4) in Section Two (“Approach to Measuring the 
Two Types of Biases”). We also estimate the real input index, based on 
the assumption that an industry’s imports of each input, relative to the 
total demand for that input, are the same as the economy-wide imports 
relative to total demand (as is assumed in the I-O tables for the United 
States)—i.e., Equation (7.3) in Section Two. For the estimation, we use 
the year 2000 as our base year and calculate how the two types of inter-
mediate input indexes for each sector changed from 2000 to 2008. In 
addition, we analyze how much of a price gap there exists between 
domestically produced intermediate inputs, inputs imported from devel-
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Overestimation 
of intermediate 
input growth, 
ln(xU/xJ) (%, 
1995–2008)
Intermediate 
input/gross 
output (aver-
age value 
of 1995 and 
2008)
Underestima-
tion of TFP 
growth on a 
gross output 
basis (%, 
1995–2008)
Sector A B A × B
Cellular phones 5.49 0.782 −4.30
Radio and television sets 5.47 0.780 −4.27
Coal products 4.04 0.825 −3.33
Other nonferrous metal products 3.70 0.715 −2.64
Repair of aircraft 3.49 0.656 −2.29
Other photographic and optical 
instruments
3.25 0.592 −1.92
Confectionery 3.04 0.580 −1.76
Electric audio equipment 2.96 0.742 −2.20
Leather and fur skins 2.87 0.692 −1.98
Bottled or canned vegetables and fruits 2.69 0.770 −2.07
Chemical fertilizer 2.54 0.685 −1.74
Other electrical devices and parts 2.41 0.630 −1.52
Retort foods 2.40 0.704 −1.69
Dishes, sushi, and lunch boxes 2.16 0.697 −1.50
Synthetic dyes 2.12 0.649 −1.38
Other metal products 1.88 0.463 −0.87
Batteries 1.80 0.733 −1.32
Other electronic components 1.78 0.690 −1.23
Medicaments 1.67 0.608 −1.01
Dairy farm products 1.49 0.779 −1.16
Steel pipes and tubes 1.42 0.759 −1.08
Other industrial organic chemicals 1.26 0.672 −0.84
Soap, synthetic detergents, and surface 
active agents
1.21 0.715 −0.86
Synthetic fi bers 1.21 0.633 −0.77
Preserved agricultural foodstuffs (other 
than bottled or canned)
1.21 0.631 −0.76
Nuclear fuels 1.21 0.541 −0.65
Inorganic pigment 1.18 0.687 −0.81
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 7.2  Overestimation of Intermediate Input Growth as a Result 
of the Import Proportionality Assumption: Top 27 Sectors, 
1995–2008
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oped economies, and inputs imported from developing economies, as 
well as how these price gaps changed from 2000 to 2008. 
As Diewert and Nakamura (2011) and Houseman et al. (2011) 
explain, offshoring bias tends to be greater when there are large price 
gaps between domestically produced intermediate inputs and imported 
inputs and when fi rms substitute imports for domestically produced 
inputs to a substantial extent. 
Online Appendix Figures 7A.1 and 7A.2 show our results for esti-
mating the price gaps between domestically produced intermediate 
inputs, inputs imported from developed economies, and inputs imported 
from developing economies for 2000 and 2008, respectively. For the 
calculation, we use Equations (7.5), (7.6), (7.9), (7.11), and (7.12). In 
the two fi gures, the price levels of domestically produced products are 
set to 1 for both 2000 and 2008. Moreover, for the fi gures, we aggregate 
the estimated price gaps for the 285 sectors into 53 sectors. As explained 
in Section Three, titled “Data Used,” our estimation of the price gaps 
between developed economies and Japan is based on U.S.-Japan price 
differentials, and our estimation of the price gaps between developing 
economies and Japan is based on China-Japan price differentials.
The two fi gures show that in the case of price gaps between domes-
tically produced inputs and inputs imported from developed econo-
mies, domestically produced inputs are not always more expensive than 
imported inputs. On the contrary, in many sectors, including most of the 
machinery sectors, the price level of domestically produced inputs was 
lower than the price level of inputs imported from developed econo-
mies, both in 2000 and in 2008.
In the case of price gaps between domestically produced inputs 
and inputs imported from developing economies, imported inputs are 
cheaper than domestically produced inputs in most of the sectors. More-
over, in both 2000 and 2008, the price gap is considerable, not only in 
the case of most of the light-industry products (such as apparel and 
other textile products, timber and wooden products, and fur skins and 
miscellaneous leather products), but also in the case of most machinery 
products. 
In comparing the price gaps between domestically produced inputs 
and inputs imported from developing economies in 2000 and 2008, the 
gaps do not seem to have widened in most sectors, although there are 
some exceptions such as electronic computing equipment and acces-
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sories as well as semiconductor devices and integrated circuits. In fact, 
price gaps narrowed slightly in some sectors, probably because of rapid 
increases in wages in China (as well as appreciation of the Chinese 
exchange rates). 
These results suggest that during this period there was no large off-
shoring bias caused by a sharp decline in the prices of inputs imported 
from developing economies, except in the case of the electrical machin-
ery industry. However, even though prices of imported inputs generally 
may not have fallen, it is still possible that there was substantial offshor-
ing bias as a result of the rapid increase of imported inputs at prevailing 
price gaps. As seen in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, the share of imports of man-
ufactured products from China, Hong Kong, and other Asian econo-
mies in Japan’s total imports increased considerably between 2000 and 
2008. Moreover, Figure 7.6 shows that Japan’s imports of machinery 
increased not only in the case of fi nal goods but also in the case of many 
types of parts and components.
To examine whether the rapid rise in imported inputs from devel-
oping countries gave rise to offshoring bias, we calculate the extent of 
underestimation of intermediate input growth, ln(xj
U(2008) / xj
O(2008)) 
− ln(xj
U(2000) / xj
O(2000)), using our data. By multiplying this value 
with −1 and with the average value of the nominal intermediate input–
nominal gross output ratio of a particular sector for 2000 and 2008, we 
also calculate the extent of the overestimation of TFP growth for the 
period 2000–2008.
Table 7.3 shows the 27 sectors in which the underestimation of 
intermediate input growth is largest among all of the 208 mining and 
manufacturing sectors other than food processing. Probably refl ecting 
the fact that Japan’s imports of cheap electrical parts and components 
from developing economies have increased substantially, the 27 sec-
tors include many electrical machinery sectors such as liquid crystal 
elements, personal computers, electronic computing equipment (except 
personal computers), and electric measuring instruments. Among the 
27 sectors, about half produce machinery.
In many sectors, especially in machinery sectors, offshoring bias 
is of a substantial size that cannot be ignored. For example, Table 7.3 
shows that the TFP growth rate in liquid crystal elements and in per-
sonal computers is overestimated by 5.92 percent and 5.34 percent, 
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Table 7.3  Underestimation of Intermediate Input Growth and Total 
Factor Productivity Growth from Offshoring Bias: Top 27 
Sectors, 2000–2008
Underestimation 
of intermediate 
input growth, 
ln(xU/xO) (%, 
2000–2008)
Intermediate 
input/gross 
output (average 
value of 2000 
and 2008)
Overestimation 
of TFP growth 
on a gross 
output basis (%, 
2000–2008)
Sector A B A×B
Tatami (straw matting) and straw 
products
−15.47 0.738 11.41
Nuclear fuels −13.14 0.551 7.24
Toys and games −9.92 0.700 6.95
Pumps and compressors −8.90 0.644 5.73
Rayon and acetate −8.84 0.678 6.00
Other nonmetallic ores −8.55 0.578 4.94
Liquid crystal element −8.21 0.721 5.92
Metallic ores −7.78 0.465 3.62
Salt −7.10 0.535 3.80
Repair of aircraft −6.87 0.674 4.63
Pulp −6.87 0.858 5.90
Food processing machinery and 
equipment
−6.85 0.582 3.98
Sheet glass and safety glass −6.72 0.582 3.91
Personal computers −6.56 0.814 5.34
Paperboard −6.36 0.722 4.59
Other nonferrous metal products −6.29 0.706 4.44
Electronic computing equipment 
(except personal computers)
−6.25 0.748 4.68
Electric measuring instruments −6.24 0.660 4.12
Other offi ce machines −6.13 0.737 4.52
Coal mining, crude petroleum, 
and natural gas
−5.84 0.428 2.50
Boilers −5.66 0.575 3.25
Textile machinery −5.46 0.594 3.24
Machinists’ precision tools −5.44 0.540 2.93
Bearings −5.40 0.596 3.22
Other structural clay products −4.87 0.537 2.62
Chemical machinery −4.77 0.574 2.74
Other wooden products −4.75 0.547 2.60
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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respectively (the annual rate in log value is 0.74 percent and 0.67 per-
cent, respectively). 
We should note that the biases shown in Table 7.3 contain both 
biases caused by the import proportionality assumption and biases 
caused by gaps in the absolute price levels between imported prod-
ucts and domestically produced products. It is probably for this reason 
that many electrical machinery sectors such as liquid crystal elements, 
personal computers, electronic computing equipment (except personal 
computers), and electric measuring instruments appear in both Tables 
7.1 and 7.3. 
Comparing Tables 7.1 and 7.3, we also fi nd that the biases in Table 
7.3 tend to be much larger than those in Table 7.1, although the period 
covered by Table 7.3 is fi ve years shorter than the period covered by 
Table 7.1. The minimum value of the bias in TFP growth in Table 7.3 is 
3.04 percent (for leather and fur skins), which is much larger than the 
Figure 7.6  Japan’s Imports of Machinery from Developing Economies: 
2000 and 2008 (billions of yen)
SOURCE: Trade Statistics of Japan, published by the Ministry of Finance.
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minimum value of the bias in TFP growth in Table 7.1, 0.70 percent 
(for cameras). It seems that biases caused by gaps in the absolute price 
levels between imported products and domestically produced products 
are a more serious problem than biases caused by the import propor-
tionality assumptions.
In the case of the overestimation of intermediate input growth, such 
overestimation occurred in only 29 out of the 208 mining and manufac-
turing sectors other than food processing. In other words, in 179 sectors, 
intermediate inputs were underestimated. Among the 29 overestimated 
sectors, only fi ve sectors produce machinery. We also fi nd that in many 
sectors the magnitude (absolute value) of the underestimation of TFP 
growth caused by offshoring bias is smaller than the magnitude (abso-
lute value) of the overestimation of TFP growth caused by offshoring 
bias, which is reported in Online Appendix Table 7A.3. 
As pointed out in Section Two, biases caused by the import propor-
tionality assumption have zero-sum characteristics. In some sectors, the 
imports–total demand ratio is higher than the economy-wide average, 
while in others, the ratio is lower. Therefore, these biases will tend to 
cancel each other out when we calculate macro-level TFP growth. 
However, offshoring biases do not have such zero-sum characteris-
tics. If a majority of sectors shift their sourcing from high-cost domes-
tic suppliers to low-cost foreign suppliers, then the TFP growth of all 
these sectors will be overestimated, and the TFP growth of the economy 
as a whole will also be overestimated. Table 7.3 and Online Appendix 
Table 7A.3 show that TFP growth was overestimated in 179 out of the 
208 mining and manufacturing sectors during the period 2000–2008. 
It therefore seems likely that the TFP growth of Japan’s economy as a 
whole during this period may also have been overestimated. 
CONCLUSION
Using import tables and other data from Japan’s input-output tables 
for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008, we estimated how much and in what 
direction the intermediate input index and TFP growth will be biased 
if we assume that an industry’s imports of each input, relative to the 
total demand for the input, are the same as the economy-wide imports 
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relative to total demand. We also examined offshoring bias, which con-
cerns the price gap between domestically produced inputs and imported 
inputs. For this analysis, we used the Survey on Foreign and Domestic 
Price Differentials for Industrial Intermediate Input (METI 1999) in 
addition to I-O tables.
Our main fi ndings are listed in the following 10 points:
1) Our theoretical analysis shows that the bias caused by the 
import proportionality assumption will be large if imports of 
each input, relative to the total demand for it, are quite different 
across sectors and changes in the relative prices of imports and 
domestic products are large.
2) Japan experienced a 40 percent decline in the ratio of the aver-
age price of imported inputs over the average price of domesti-
cally produced inputs in the period 1995–2008. This decline 
was not caused by yen appreciation, since the value of the yen 
as measured by the real effective exchange rate in fact fell by 
more than 50 percent during the same period. Rather, a likely 
reason for the decline in relative import prices is the increase in 
Japan’s imports of low-priced products from Asian countries.
3) The import price–domestic price ratio of many commodities, 
including important parts and components, declined sharply 
during the period 1995–2008. 
4) We examined how the share of imported inputs in total inputs 
differs across sectors, focusing on the cases of integrated cir-
cuits and semiconductor devices. We found that for both types 
of input, the import ratio tends to be high in the electrical 
machinery sectors. Moreover, the ratio is relatively low in other 
sectors such as automobiles and precision machinery. 
5) We found that the bias caused by the import proportionality 
assumption is quite large in some sectors. For example, in ani-
mal oils and fats, ordnance, aircraft, liquid crystal elements, 
methane derivatives, organic fertilizers not elsewhere classi-
fi ed, video recording and playback equipment, thermo-setting 
resins, salt, bicycles, turbines, glass fi ber and glass fi ber prod-
ucts not elsewhere classifi ed, integrated circuits, and processed 
meat products, the negative bias of intermediate input growth 
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caused by the import proportionality assumption is more than 
2.6 percent, and the positive offshoring bias of TFP growth is 
more than 1.7 percent. 
6) On the other hand, in cellular phones, radio and television sets, 
coal products, other nonferrous metal products, repair of air-
craft, and photographic and optical instruments, the positive 
offshoring bias of intermediate input growth is more than 3.2 
percent, and the negative offshoring bias of TFP growth is more 
than 1.9 percent.
7) Next, we estimated offshoring biases caused by the price gap 
between domestically produced inputs and imported inputs and 
the substitution of intermediate inputs from expensive domes-
tic products to cheap foreign products. In the case of price gaps 
between domestically produced inputs and inputs imported 
from developing economies, imported inputs are cheaper than 
domestically produced inputs in most sectors. Moreover, in 
both 2000 and 2008, the price gap was relatively large not only 
in the case of most light industry products, such as apparel and 
other textile products, timber and wooden products, and fur 
skins and miscellaneous leather products, but also in the case 
of most machinery products.
8) In the 2000s, Japan’s imports of machinery from developing 
economies increased not only in the case of fi nal goods but also 
in the case of many types of parts and components. As a result 
of the rapid increase of imported inputs at prevailing price gaps, 
in many sectors, especially in machinery sectors, a substantial 
offshoring bias arose that cannot be ignored. For example, the 
TFP growth rates for the liquid crystal elements and personal 
computers sectors are overestimated by 5.92 percent and 5.34 
percent, respectively. (The annual rates in log value were 0.74 
percent and 0.67 percent.)
9) Refl ecting the fact that Japan’s imports of cheap electrical parts 
and components from developing economies increased sub-
stantially, the 50 sectors in which the underestimation of inter-
mediate input growth is largest include many electrical machin-
ery sectors such as liquid crystal elements, personal computers, 
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electronic computing equipment (except personal computers), 
and electric measuring instruments.
10) Biases caused by the import proportionality assumption have 
zero-sum characteristics. In some sectors, the imports-total 
demand ratio is higher than the economy-wide average, while 
in others, the ratio is lower. Therefore, these biases will tend 
to cancel each other out when we calculate macro-level TFP 
growth. In contrast, offshoring biases do not have such zero-
sum characteristics. If most sectors shifted their sourcing from 
high-cost domestic suppliers to low-cost foreign suppliers, then 
the TFP growth of these sectors would be overestimated. In this 
case, the TFP growth of the economy as a whole would also 
be overestimated. We found that during the period 2000–2008 
TFP growth was overestimated as a result of offshoring bias in 
179 out of the 208 mining and manufacturing sectors we exam-
ined. Consequently, Japan’s TFP growth at macro-level during 
this period may also be overestimated.
One of the key fi ndings is that there are relatively large biases due to 
offshoring in a substantial number of manufacturing sectors, including 
important machinery sectors. This means that the issue of biases from 
offshoring should be taken into account in future productivity analy-
ses at the sectoral and fi rm levels. Moreover, since offshoring activities 
are likely to continue increasing, data collection by statistical offi ces 
to grapple with such offshoring biases will be of growing importance.
Notes
This research was conducted as part of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry’s (RIETI’s) East Asian Industrial Productivity Project. We would also like to 
express our thanks for fi nancial support from the Global Centers of Excellence program 
Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences (G-COE Hi-
Stat), Hitotsubashi University. 
1. A good discussion of these types of biases is provided in the next chapter, Chapter 8.
2. For ease of presentation, it is assumed here that each sector produces one product, 
so subscript i is used to refer to both sectors and products.
3. Our quantity indexes are based on the Laspeyres formula for years after the base 
year T and on the Paasche formula for years before T.
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4. In 2013, this survey became one of Japan’s General Statistics and is now called the 
Survey on Input-Output Structure (Survey on Sale Destination of Import Goods). 
5. The online appendix, containing Appendix Tables 7A.1, 7A.2, and 7A.3 
and Appendix Figures 7A.1 and 7A.2, can be found at http://www.upjohn
.org/MEG/Ch7appendix.pdf. 
6. In the case of the 2000 survey, the survey investigates absolute price levels in each 
country’s currency during the period September–November 2000 and converts 
these prices into prices in Japanese yen using average market exchange rates dur-
ing the survey period. The exchange rates were 108.00 yen to the U.S. dollar and 
13.05 yen to the Chinese yuan. In the case of the 2008 survey, the survey period 
was July–September 2008, and the exchange rates were 107.60 yen to the U.S. 
dollar and 15.74 yen to the Chinese yuan.
7. As already explained, we obtain defl ators for imports and domestic output sepa-
rately for each sector i from the 1995-2000-2005 Linked Input-Output Tables pub-
lished by the Statistics Bureau, MIAC, and the 2008 Updated Input-Output Tables. 
In these I-O tables, the major original sources for defl ators for commodities are the 
Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index (DCGPI) and the Import Price Index (IPI), 
both taken from the Corporate Goods Price Index, published by the Bank of Japan. 
When the Bank of Japan compiles the IPI, it specifi es each commodity in great 
detail and tracks price changes of the same commodity from the same country of 
origin. Therefore, a shift of imports from high-price countries to low-price coun-
tries will not affect the IPI and the defl ators of the I-O tables. However, in the case 
of some imported raw materials and manufactured products, for which IPI data are 
not available, the I-O tables use the unit price of imports as defl ators. In the case of 
these products, a shift of imports from high-price countries to low-price countries 
will reduce the defl ators in the I-O tables. Therefore, the decline in relative import 
prices in Figure 7.1 refl ects not only the decline of output prices in countries of 
origin but also the increase in Japan’s imports of low-priced products from Asian 
countries. We should also note that in the case of these products, for which unit 
prices from the trade statistics are used as import defl ators, Equation (7.10) does 
not strictly hold. When the unit prices of imports decline because of a shift from 
high-cost exporters to low-cost exporters, there is a risk that Equations (7.11) and 
(7.12) will overestimate the price decline in exporting countries.
8. The reason that we focus on the period up to 2005 and not up to 2008 here is that 
we had to estimate the table on imports for 2008; we therefore think that the table 
on imports for 2005 is more reliable.
9. The reason that we are focusing only on 208 and not 285 industries is as follows: 
As explained in Section Three, titled “Data Used,” the endogenous table we use 
is not symmetric. The table for each year has 514 rows and 401 columns. Out of 
the 514 rows, 285 are for mining and manufacturing sectors other than food pro-
cessing. We prepared our special data on prices and imported intermediate inputs 
by country of origin and other categories for these 285 row sectors. Out of the 
401 columns, 208 are for mining and the manufacturing sectors other than food 
processing. We calculated biases of intermediate inputs and TFP growth for these 
208 column sectors.
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The increased role of international trade in U.S. economic activ-
ity is evident in the headline gross domestic product (GDP) statistics. 
Between 1948 and 1965, the value of imports of goods and services 
relative to gross domestic product held steady at about 4 percent. By 
the end of the 1970s this ratio had grown to close to 10 percent, and it 
remained at about 10 percent through the end of the 1980s. Between 
1990 and 2000, imports relative to GDP increased to nearly 15 percent, 
and they peaked at 17.9 percent of GDP in 2008. During the events 
surrounding the fi nancial crisis in 2009 and 2010, imports fell relative 
to GDP, but the value of imported goods and services relative to GDP 
bounced back to 17.6 percent of GDP in 2011. 
While the trend of increased reliance on imports within the U.S. 
economy is clear, the uses of these imports within the economy are 
subsumed in the aggregate data. Given the published level of detail in 
the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs), which measure 
GDP from the expenditure side, it is diffi cult to analyze major ques-
tions about the economic impact of increased imports on the economy. 
More importantly, it is not possible to quantify how imports are used 
by industries in their production processes, and how these substitu-
tions affect the economy as a whole. The most-often-studied economic 
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impacts are the effects of increased globalization on U.S. labor markets 
and industry competitiveness.
The economic impact of imports depends on how the imports are 
used. For example, a particular import could be made for any of three 
purposes: 1) for direct consumption by households, 2) for a select group 
of industries as an intermediate input, or 3) for a broad set of industries 
as a substitute for goods that are already produced domestically. While 
each of these scenarios has ramifi cations for the production and labor-
market decisions of U.S. producers, as well as for U.S. industry com-
petitiveness, the implications across the economy may be signifi cantly 
different. In one case, an import may be a close substitute for a good that 
is used by only one industry. In this case, not only are the U.S.-based 
suppliers of the competitive good affected, but the suppliers to the orig-
inal domestic producers are affected as well, through reduced demand 
for their production of intermediate goods. In another case, an import 
may be a substitute for a good that is produced by only one industry. In 
this case, the production of the industry itself is affected, as are all of 
the suppliers that sell to the producing industry, and all of the industries 
that produce similar products and face new competition. Thus, analyz-
ing the overall impact of imports on the U.S. economy requires a set of 
transaction data that accounts for interindustry linkages. 
Empirical research on the effects of increasing imports on the U.S. 
economy has focused both on the broad economic impact of increased 
trade and on the industry-specifi c effects. A large body of research has 
examined the impact of increased trade on wages in the United States. 
For example, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) argue that, depending on 
the specifi cation, outsourcing accounted for between 15 and 40 per-
cent of the increase in the nonproduction-to-production relative wage 
rate between 1979 and 1990. Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) argue that 
international trade did not play a major role in the slow growth of real 
hourly compensation in the United States between 1973 and 1991, but 
Haskel et al. (2012) conclude that the effects of globalization on the 
labor market became more important in the early 1990s. Eldridge and 
Harper (2012) econometrically estimate the impact of imports on pro-
duction processes in the manufacturing sector, while Kurz and Lenger-
mann (2008) and Yuskavage, Strassner, and Medeiros (2008) analyze 
the contribution of offshoring to economic growth in the United States. 
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Analyzing the effects of imports across industries on the econ-
omy requires data on the use of imports by industry and by type of 
import. Houseman et al. (2011) argue that measurement issues related 
to imports result in an overstatement of growth in the offi cial statistics 
on value-added and productivity growth in the manufacturing sector, a 
conclusion that may also have implications for economic research that 
relies on this type of data.
Two major issues related to assembling the data necessary to ana-
lyze the effects of increasing imports on the U.S. economy are that 
1) imports used by industry and categorized by detailed type of import 
are not available at the necessary level of detail in the source data, and 
2) shifts to lower-cost suppliers of imports are not captured in the price 
data, according to Houseman et al. (2011). 
These two data issues are directly related to a primary objective of 
the Industry Directorate at the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
Two major functions of the directorate are the production of estimates 
of 1) value-added growth by industry and 2) industry value-added con-
tributions to aggregate growth; the directorate also estimates price and 
quantity inputs used by industry. When an import, at the level of detail 
in which the accounts are constructed, cannot be treated as a perfect 
substitute for the domestically produced good, either because of a lower 
price for the same good or because of quality or compositional differ-
ences, the estimation of real value-added at the industry level requires 
estimates of the value of imports used by industry by type of import, as 
well as estimates of each import’s respective price.
As the body of research on the economic impact of globalization 
grows, these measurement issues have come to the forefront. Feenstra 
and Romalis (2012) construct a trade model that incorporates product 
quality and produces a quality-adjusted set of import and export prices 
to be used in the new generation of the Penn World Table. In Chapter 4 
of this volume, Bridgman analyzes how to adjust import prices for qual-
ity differences in the presence of fi xed market entry costs. Motivated by 
Houseman et al. (2011), Inklaar, in Chapter 6 of this volume, estimates 
the impact of import sourcing bias on 38 major economies over the 
1995–2008 period.
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the role of imports in 
current measurement practices at the BEA in constructing estimates of 
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value-added growth by industry. We compare these baseline accounts to 
alternative estimates that differ in their approach to estimating imported 
goods purchased as intermediate inputs. In particular, using broad eco-
nomic categories (BEC), we employ a two-step approach to produce an 
alternative industry import-use matrix that underlies the estimates of the 
quantity index of intermediate inputs used across industries in the U.S. 
economy between 1998 and 2011. We also examine the import price 
data and, based on Inklaar (see Chapter 6), analyze an alternative price 
covering 2002–2011 that treats switches in sourcing between export-
ing countries as switches to goods with different prices, as opposed to 
switches to a heterogeneous good. In contrast to Inklaar, we present 
results at the industry level.
Overall, we frame the analysis in the context of an industry-level 
production account that provides the sources of U.S. economic growth 
across industries, factors of production, and multifactor productivity. 
Our approach focuses on the measurement of imported goods, but it 
also analyzes the impact on all industries within the economy that pur-
chase these goods. We use the industry production account and growth 
accounting techniques to compare the baseline case of current practice 
to three alternatives: 1) an alternative import-use matrix for 1998–2011, 
2) an alternative set of import prices for 2002–2011, and 3) both the 
alternative import-use matrix and the alternative set of import prices for 
2002–2011.
Our major fi ndings are as follows:
• Compared to the standard import proportionality assump-
tion, the use of broad economic categories to allocate imports 
to intermediate inputs produces noticeably different distribu-
tions for many commodities, but this does not translate to sig-
nifi cantly different import shares of intermediate inputs across 
most industries. 
• The alternative assumptions we consider on import use and 
import prices have only a small impact on measures of aggre-
gate real value-added and multifactor productivity growth. 
Over the 1998–2011 period, value-added grew by 1.87 percent 
a year in the baseline and by 1.87 percent a year based on the 
alternative import allocation. For the 2002–2011 period, aggre-
gate value-added increased by 1.38 percent a year in the base-
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line compared with a range of between 1.34 and 1.37 percent 
under the alternatives. Over the same period, multifactor pro-
ductivity (MFP) increased by 0.42 percent a year in the base-
line compared with a range of between 0.38 and 0.41 percent a 
year under the alternatives.
• The impact on real value-added and MFP for the manufactur-
ing sector is also small: over the 2002–2011 period, manufac-
turing contributed 0.22 percentage points a year to aggregate 
value-added growth in the baseline, compared with a range 
of between 0.20 and 0.21 percentage points a year under the 
alternatives.
• For manufacturing excluding “Computer and electronic prod-
ucts,” value-added growth was −0.13 percent a year between 
2002 and 2011 in the baseline and ranged from −0.21 to −0.16 
percent a year under the alternatives.
The chapter proceeds along the following outline: In Section Two, 
“The BEA Industry Accounts and the Role of Imports,” we provide 
an overview of the current measurement practices in the BEA indus-
try accounts, including the approach to accounting for imports across 
industries and their prices. In Section Three, “Alternative Import Allo-
cation Using Broad Economic Catagories,” we discuss our alternative 
import-use matrix, while in Section Four, “Import Prices and Country-
Pooled Import Prices,” we discuss the alternative set of import prices. 
Section Five, “Value-Added and Productivity under Alternative Import 
Assumptions,” gives our results for the sources of U.S. economic 
growth under the baseline and alternative assumptions, and Section Six 
presents the conclusion.
 THE BEA INDUSTRY ACCOUNTS AND THE ROLE
OF IMPORTS
A major objective of the Industry Directorate at the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis is the production both of estimates of gross domestic 
product by industry and of estimates of contributions of industry GDP 
to aggregate GDP growth.1 These measures of value-added by indus-
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try, which are published at the 65-sector level, require nominal values, 
prices, and quantities of industry output and intermediate input over 
time that are consistent with GDP measured from the expenditure side 
as part of the NIPAs. Real value-added is calculated using the dou-
ble defl ation method, so that real value-added growth is the difference 
between the growth rate of industry output, defl ated by the appropri-
ate output defl ator, and the growth rate of industry input, defl ated by 
an industry input defl ator that refl ects the heterogeneity of the input 
use of the industry. Mayerhauser and Strassner (2010) provide a com-
plete description of the methodology used to construct the time series 
of industry accounts.
The starting point for the published time series of industry accounts 
is the benchmark input-output account produced approximately every 
fi ve years. The most recent published version covers the year 2002 and 
is described by Stewart, Stone, and Streitwieser (2007). This account, 
while published at about the 550-industry level, is constructed at about 
the 900-industry level and the 5,000 “item,” or product, level, and relies 
heavily on data tabulated by the Census Bureau from the quinquennial 
Economic Census. 
As imports to the U.S. economy continue to grow, the treatment 
of import measurement in the GDP by industry accounts has garnered 
attention. For example, Houseman et al. (2011) argue that the current 
treatment of import prices may lead to an offshoring bias in estimates 
of industry value-added, especially for industries concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector. 
Conceptually, imports are treated as heterogeneous items and dis-
tinct from domestically produced items in order to allow for price dif-
ferences between foreign and domestically produced goods that are pur-
chased as intermediate inputs. That is, at the item level, the import and 
the domestic commodity are treated as differentiated goods, whether 
because of the cost of the item, the quality of the item, or the composi-
tion of goods within the item category; thus, imports are allowed to have 
prices that differ from the domestically produced item. An important 
measurement diffi culty is that the value of imports by item by industry 
is not measured directly.
The BEA uses the import proportionality, or comparability, assump-
tion to allocate the value of imports by item by industry. This approach 
is discussed in Mayerhauser and Strassner (2010); Moyer, Reinsdorf, 
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   256 2/16/2015   8:35:01 AM
Import Allocation across Industries   257
and Yuskavage (2006); Strassner, Yuskavage, and Lee (2010); and 
Yuskavage, Strassner, and Medeiros (2008, 2009). The proportionality 
method assumes that each industry that purchases an item for inter-
mediate use purchases an amount from a foreign supplier that is in the 
same proportion as the ratio of imports to domestic supply for that item. 
In other words, the imported portion of intermediate inputs by industry 
is homogenous at the item level for each industry that purchases that 
particular item. This homogeneity is imposed only at the 900-industry-
by-5,000-item level, not at higher levels of aggregation.
It is worth noting a couple of aspects of the treatment of imports in 
calculating GDP by industry. First, the import proportionality assump-
tion does not affect the estimates of nominal value-added by industry. 
This is because the import proportionality assumption does not deter-
mine the level of use of an item by an industry; it only determines the 
share of an item used by an industry that belongs to imported intermedi-
ate use, for the purpose of defl ating intermediate use by the appropriate 
price index in constructing real value-added. Second, if at the item level 
domestically produced and imported goods are assumed to be homoge-
neous, or perfect substitutes, import and domestic prices change at the 
same rate, and there is no need for a separate treatment of imports in 
calculating real value-added growth.
The allocation of intermediate inputs to domestic versus foreign 
sources allows the BEA to incorporate the full suite of price statistics 
available within the U.S. economic statistical system. The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics’ (BLS) producer price indexes are the primary source 
used to defl ate the domestic portion of intermediate inputs. These prices
are the same as those used to defl ate the commodity composition of 
gross output by industry. In other words, each industry that purchases a 
domestic item pays the same price for that item. Table F in Washington 
et al. (2012) provides the principal sources of data used to defl ate gross 
output by industry and the domestic portion of intermediate inputs by 
item. BLS import price indexes (MPI) are used to defl ate the imported 
portion of intermediate inputs by item, also with the assumption that 
each industry that purchases imported inputs pays the same price for the 
imported intermediate input. Both the Producer Price Indexes (PPIs) 
and the MPIs are used at their most detailed levels available: PPIs range 
mostly from four- to seven-digit detail; NAICS MPIs are more aggre-
gated—typically these indexes are available only for two- to four-digit 
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detail. To defl ate a small subset of items, the BEA uses prices from the 
National Income and Wealth Division at the BEA. 
 ALTERNATIVE IMPORT ALLOCATION USING BROAD 
ECONOMIC CATEGORIES
Our alternative approach to allocating commodity imports across 
industries is motivated by the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) 
method of Timmer (2012). The WIOD approach deviates from the 
import proportionality assumption by fi rst assigning imports to one of 
three BECs: 1) intermediates, 2) fi nal consumption, or 3) investment. 
The second step is to proportionally allocate imported intermediate 
inputs across industries after this initial split has been applied. It is 
worth noting that this approach is purely an alternative allocation, and 
no new data are used to give additional detail on actual use of different 
types of imports by industry.2
For the fi rst step in this exercise, our objective is to construct a 
share for each imported item in the BEA industry accounts that refl ects 
its broad economic classifi cation. Specifi cally, for each imported item 
in the BEA industry accounts and each year, we estimate the share of the 
item that is sold to intermediates, consumption, and investment based 
on a concordance between harmonization codes and BEC categories. 
Our objective is not to construct new estimates of trade fl ows but to 
reallocate current estimates of trade fl ows. This preserves consistency 
with the NIPA trade data. Once we have item-level BEC shares, we 
apply these shares to estimate the value of each item sold to interme-
diate input. The second step is to allocate this total value of imported 
intermediate input across industries.
We use the concordance between the harmonized trade data and 
broad economic categories that is published by the United Nations 
to do the initial allocation of imports to the three broad groups.3 The 
harmonized trade data are at the 10-digit level, while the harmoniza-
tion code for BEC concordance is at the six-digit level. Because of the 
different levels of detail, we fi rst assume that for each of the six-digit 
commodities in the harmonization code to BEC mapping, the 10-digit 
components have the same broad economic category.4 This gives us 
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the value of imported goods by broad economic classifi cation at the 
10-digit level for all of the components of the harmonized trade data.5 
To go from the 10-digit harmonized data by broad economic classifi ca-
tion to the BEA’s item-level detail, we apply the Industry Directorate’s 
mapping between harmonization codes and items to get the value of 
items by broad economic classifi cation, based on the harmonized trade 
data.6 We use these import values by item and broad economic cat-
egory to construct the share, by BEA item, that was sold to intermedi-
ate input. We apply this value share to the current estimates of imports 
by item in the BEA industry accounts to derive an alternative value of 
imports that were sold to intermediate use. Finally, we allocate this total 
imported intermediate proportionally by item across industries to yield 
the import-use matrix. Because the harmonized trade data cover mostly 
goods, we exclude any adjustments to nongoods items. We apply the 
above methodology for years 1998–2011 so that the results are consis-
tent with the GDP-by-industry estimates published in November 2012. 
For the sake of clarity, the following nine steps enumerate how we con-
struct our alternative import-use table:
1) Compile concordances between the six-digit harmonization 
code trade data and the United Nations–based broad economic 
categories covering 1998–2011.
2) Construct a map from 10-digit harmonization data to six-digit 
harmonization codes.
3) Aggregate the 10-digit harmonization trade data on imports to 
the six-digit level.
4) Apply the six-digit harmonization code to the BEC concor-
dance to get estimates at the six-digit level of the values sold 
in the intermediate, fi nal consumption, investment, or undeter-
mined categories.7
5) Assume that the allocation for the 10-digit components of the 
harmonization code data is the same as for the 6-digit alloca-
tion to obtain values sold in the intermediate, fi nal consump-
tion, investment, or undetermined categories at the 10-digit 
harmonization level.
6) Allocate the 10-digit values to BEA item codes using the exist-
ing internal BEA mapping. Note that a 10-digit code may apply 
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to multiple items, and a single item may be made up of multiple 
10-digit coded values.
7) Based on the results from Step 6, construct the share of each 
BEA item that was sold to intermediate input.
8) Use the baseline item-level import data as a control and dis-
tribute the value that was sold to intermediate input using the 
shares of values calculated in Step 7.
9) Allocate imports across industries.
• For items that have a portion that goes to intermediate input 
according to UN Comtrade, allocate items across industries 
using the proportionality assumption. This is the two-step 
approach of Timmer (2012).
• For items that have an undetermined allocation, revert to 
the standard proportionality assumption.
• For items that have a BEC coding of “capital good,” revert 
to the standard proportionality assumption.8
The impact of the BEC allocation of imports on estimates of GDP 
by industry depends on three basic elements. The fi rst is that the value 
of trade by item that belongs to intermediate input based on the BEC 
allocation must be different from that based on the baseline import pro-
portionality assumption. A different allocation of imports translates to a 
different nominal value of imported goods used by industries that buy 
a particular item. Second, the price of imported items must differ from 
prices paid for domestic goods. And third, the value share of imports 
used in production within an industry must be signifi cantly different 
under the BEC allocation. The third condition is important, because 
while the BEC allocation may produce a different allocation of inputs 
for a particular item, if the value share of total imports in a particular 
industry’s production is relatively unchanged as a result of the new allo-
cation across all commodities used by the industry, the BEC-based allo-
cation will have very little impact on estimates of value-added growth 
by industry.
Table 8.1 compares the share of imports allocated to intermediate 
input by commodity based on the alternative import allocation to the 
baseline approach of applying the import proportionality assumption. 
The level of aggregation corresponds to that published in the annual 
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input-output accounts, although, as described above, the import alloca-
tions are estimated at the item level. Differences in estimated alloca-
tions have the potential to affect estimates of value-added growth for 
any industry that purchases that particular commodity. The difference 
in allocations between the baseline and BEC-based allocation refl ects 
the binary assignment of an import to either an intermediate or fi nal 
demand in the BEC mapping; it also refl ects the item-level component 
allocations from the import proportionality assumption. For example, 
Table 8.1  Share of Imports Allocated to Intermediate Inputs by 
Commodity, 2007
 Baseline
BEC-based 
allocation
Difference 
(absolute 
value)
Forestry, fi shing, and related activities 0.85 0.24 0.61
Utilities 0.45 1.00 0.55
Food and beverage and tobacco products 0.48 0.13 0.35
Textile mills and textile product mills 0.53 0.37 0.16
Publishing industries (includes software) 0.15 0.02 0.14
Chemical products 0.51 0.64 0.14
Miscellaneous manufacturing 0.16 0.28 0.12
Plastics and rubber products 0.72 0.83 0.11
Printing and related support activities 0.82 0.72 0.11
Farms 0.56 0.48 0.08
Apparel and leather and allied products 0.10 0.02 0.08
Electrical equipment, appliances, and 
components
0.55 0.61 0.06
Machinery 0.42 0.48 0.06
Furniture and related products 0.15 0.10 0.04
Computer and electronic products 0.36 0.39 0.03
Fabricated metal products 0.82 0.84 0.03
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, 
and parts
0.31 0.33 0.02
Other transportation equipment 0.51 0.52 0.01
Paper products 0.93 0.92 0.01
Mining, except oil and gas 0.99 1.00 0.01
Wood products 0.92 0.93 0.01
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and authors’ calculations.
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within the “Forestry, fi shing, and related activities” commodity, the 
BEC-based approach allocated 98 percent of commercial fi shing to 
fi nal demand, while the baseline allocated 20 percent. 
The largest differences in import allocation are for the “Forestry, 
fi shing, and related activities” commodity and the “Utilities” com-
modity, for each of which the share of imports allocated to intermedi-
ate inputs differs by more than 50 percentage points. The next largest 
difference is for “Food and beverage products,” where the item-level 
import proportionality assumption allocated 48 percent to intermedi-
ate purchases, while the BEC approach allocated only 13 percent, a 
difference of 35 percentage points. Next, there are differences in allo-
cations of between 10 and 16 percentage points for the following cat-
egories: “Textile mills and textile product mills,” “Publishing industries 
(includes software),” “Chemical products,” “Petroleum and coal prod-
ucts,” “Miscellaneous manufacturing,” “Plastics and rubber products,” 
and “Printing and related support activities.” Allocation differences of 
between 5 and 10 percentage points exist for “Farms,” “Apparel and 
leather and allied products,” “Electrical equipment appliances and com-
ponents,” and “Machinery.” The remainder of the commodities show 
minor differences or none at all in import allocation. Recall that we 
restrict our alternative import data to only goods.
While there are some large differences in import allocations across 
intermediate and fi nal use, the impact of the alternative allocations 
depends on the particular imports by an industry and on the value of 
imported goods relative to the use of goods produced domestically. For 
example, if an industry relies heavily on chemical products relative to 
all other inputs, a change in the estimated share of imported goods used 
in production has the potential to have a signifi cant impact on estimates 
of the growth of that industry’s intermediate input, and thus on that 
industry’s value-added growth. Table 8.2 gives the share of imported 
intermediate inputs relative to total intermediate inputs based on the 
baseline and the BEC allocations. Based on the baseline allocation, 15 
percent of the inputs in “Miscellaneous manufacturing” are imported, 
while according to the BEC mapping, 26 percent are imported. The 
“Food services and drinking places” category differs by 5 percent-
age points across allocations, and “Ambulatory health care services,” 
“Food and beverage and tobacco products,” and “Nonmetallic mineral 
products” all differ by 4 percentage points. The alternative allocation 
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made very little or no difference for the remainder of the industries at 
the published level.
As mentioned above, for the allocation of imports based on BECs 
to produce different estimates of value-added growth by industry, 
the price of imported goods must be different from the price used to 
defl ate purchases from U.S suppliers. Figure 8.1 plots the item-level 
price growth of imported versus domestically produced goods, exclud-
ing “Mining except oil and gas” and “Petroleum and coal products,” 
Table 8.2  Share of Imports in Total Industry Intermediate Use, 2007
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and authors’ calculations.
 Baseline
BEC-based 
allocation
Difference 
(absolute 
value)
Miscellaneous manufacturing 0.15 0.26 0.11
Food services and drinking places 0.09 0.04 0.05
Ambulatory health care services 0.08 0.12 0.04
Food and beverage and tobacco products 0.10 0.06 0.04
Nonmetallic mineral products 0.10 0.14 0.04
Computer and electronic products 0.23 0.26 0.03
Furniture and related products 0.19 0.17 0.03
Social assistance 0.06 0.04 0.02
Printing and related support activities 0.12 0.10 0.02
Other transportation equipment 0.19 0.21 0.02
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts 0.23 0.25 0.02
Mining, except oil and gas 0.09 0.11 0.02
Federal general government 0.14 0.15 0.01
Amusements, gambling, and recreation industries 0.06 0.05 0.01
Wholesale trade 0.08 0.09 0.01
Accommodation 0.06 0.05 0.01
Textile mills and textile product mills 0.17 0.16 0.01
Machinery 0.19 0.19 0.01
State and local general government 0.08 0.08 0.01
Educational services 0.05 0.04 0.01
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 0.20 0.21 0.01
Forestry, fi shing, and related activities 0.12 0.13 0.01
State and local government enterprises 0.07 0.08 0.01
Chemical products 0.15 0.16 0.01
Hospitals and nursing and residential care facilities 0.06 0.07 0.01
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weighted by the import values of the individual items relative to other 
items in the same aggregated commodity. The fi gure indicates that, in 
general, there are item-level price differences between imported and 
domestic goods. Thus, the allocation of intermediate input between 
domestic and foreign is a potentially important element in estimating 
value-added growth by industry.
Comparing import and domestic prices at the detailed level limits 
compositional effects at higher levels of aggregation. For example, the 
price indexes for total imported intermediate materials and total domes-
tic intermediate materials refl ect the compositional differences in types 
of materials that are imported versus purchased from domestic sources. 
At the item level, skewness above the 45-degree line would indicate a 
disproportionate number of cases where import prices increased rela-
NOTE: This fi gure plots import price growth by item between 1998 and 2011 versus 
domestic price growth for prices used in the industry accounts. Area of marker deter-
mined by value of imports in 2007. 
SOURCE: BEA GDP by Industry accounts.
Figure 8.1  Item-Level Price Growth (%), 1998–2011
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tive to domestic prices. The data indicate that, at the item level, about 
62 percent of the items are assigned import prices that fell relative to 
their domestic counterparts over the 1998–2011 period. 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 indicate that the allocation of imports between 
fi nal demand and intermediate input is noticeably different based on the 
BEC coding, but that the import share of inputs is not signifi cantly dif-
ferent for most industries under the BEC coding. To estimate the effect 
of the BEC allocation on measured value-added growth at the industry 
level requires taking into account these effects, in addition to the price 
differences between domestic and foreign goods. We do this analysis 
below in the context of an industry-level production account covering 
1998–2011.
IMPORT PRICES AND COUNTRY-POOLED IMPORT PRICES
Recent literature has argued that the prices used in estimating GDP 
by industry may be biased. Specifi cally, Houseman et al. (2011) contend 
that switches to low-cost providers are excluded from the index number 
estimate of the intermediate input price at the time of the switch, lead-
ing to an overstatement of the growth in value-added quantity indexes 
in manufacturing industries. Inklaar, in Chapter 6 of this volume, argues 
that a portion of the bias can be analyzed by assuming that imports 
across countries are perfect substitutes. It is worth noting that in our 
exercise below, we do not consider the index number problems that 
occur when product sourcing is switched between domestic and for-
eign sources, which is a major focus of Houseman et al. We focus on 
switches between foreign suppliers.
We follow the basic approach used in Inklaar (see Chapter 6) to 
construct alternative import prices that we refer to as country-pooled 
import prices. The rationale for this adjustment is that import source 
switches between high-priced and low-priced exporting countries may 
not be captured in the offi cial import price data because the same good 
from different countries has the potential to be treated as a different 
good. Thus, the import price index for an item needs to “link in” the 
switch to the new provider, instead of treating the new lower price paid 
in the initial year of the switch as a lower price paid for the same good. 
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   265 2/16/2015   8:35:08 AM
266   Samuels, Howells, Russell, and Strassner
For example, if a low-cost Chinese semiconductor producer enters the 
market and an importer switches from Japan to China, treating the semi-
conductors as homogenous would result in a price index that declines 
to refl ect the price discount. On the other hand, if the semiconductor 
from China was treated as heterogeneous, there would be no period 
t – 1 price to use to calculate the price decline in the semiconductor 
from China, so this observation would, effectively, be dropped from the 
estimation of the import price.
We use data from UN Comtrade that include the value ( icV ) and 
quantity ( icQ ) of imports of type by six-digit harmonization codes 
from 2002 to 2011 into the United States from Country c.9 Unfortu-
nately, while data exist for earlier years, the relationship between the
Comtrade-based and offi cial prices deteriorates in years prior to 2002.10 
We map imports by country by year to the level of detail for which 
the BEA has import price information from the BLS and construct two 
alternative price indexes for item i.11 The fi rst is
ln lni ic
c
icpf w pf    ,
where ipf  is the item-specifi c import price, c  indexes country, and icw  
is the average value share of imports of type i from Country c in periods 
t and t − 1, so that ipf  is a Törnqvist price index. Assuming that items 
are perfect substitutes across countries yields an alternative price for 
item i :
,ln ln
ic
c
alt i
ic
c
V
pf
Q
        

  .
The annual adjustment, which we refer to as country-pool adjust-
ment, is defi ned as ,ln ln lni i alt iB pf pf    for each imported 
item and captures the difference in item-level prices under the two alter-
native assumptions. We apply this bias adjustment to the baseline import 
prices used in the construction of GDP by industry at the item level. The 
approach of adding the bias to the baseline prices used in the construc-
tion of GDP by industry allows the import prices to maintain the exist-
ing adjustments to hold quality fi xed. This is particularly important for 
information technology goods, which exhibit rapidly changing prod-
uct characteristics. The relationship between the UN Comtrade–based 
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prices and the import prices used in the industry accounts is given in 
Figure 8.2.
VALUE-ADDED AND PRODUCTIVITY UNDER
ALTERNATIVE IMPORT ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we analyze how the alternative approaches to imports 
affect measured value-added and productivity growth at the industry 
and aggregate level. We use an industry-level production account that 
includes nominal values, along with prices and quantities for industry 
output and inputs. The account used here covers 1998–2011 and is an 
updated version of Fleck et al. (2012), which covers the 63 industries 
Figure 8.2  Item-Level Price Comparison: Price Growth (%), 2002–2011
NOTE: This fi gure plots growth of the Törnqvist index of UN Comtrade–based prices 
by item versus import prices used in the industry accounts. Area of marker determined 
by value of imports between 2002 and 2011.  
SOURCE: Author calculations, based on BLS import prices and Comtrade data, as 
described in text.
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that are published in the BEA’s GDP-by-industry data.12 This section 
discusses the pertinent accounting details, but we refer the reader to 
Fleck et al. (2012) for detail on the data sources and methods.
Industry-Level Production Account
The fundamental equation for analyzing the industry sources of 
growth is the equation defi ning multifactor productivity (MFP) as the 
residual after subtracting from industry output growth ( ln jQ ) the 
weighted growth rates of industry capital ( ln KjQ ), labor ( ln LjQ ), 
and intermediate inputs ( ln XjQ ):
   
(8.1)    ln ln ln ln lnj j Kj Kj Lj Lj Xj XjMFP Q w Q w Q w Q          
 
where the w eights are the average of period t and t − 1 value shares of 
each of the inputs in the value of output, which is the typically used 
Törnqvist index of MFP.
To analyze the industry contributions to aggregate value-added 
growth, we appeal to the translog production possibility frontier ana-
lyzed in Jorgenson et al. (2007):
(8.2)  ln lnj j
j
V w V    , 
so that aggregate  value-added growth lnV is a translog index over 
industry value-added growth rates ln jV . Because the quantity index 
of industry value-added ln jV is not directly observable, we appeal 
to the nominal accounting identity that says the value of gross output 
equals nominal value-added plus nominal intermediate input. Differ-
entiating this accounting identity with respect to time and taking a dis-
crete time approximation yields a Törnqvist index for the growth rate 
of industry gross output:
(8.3) ln ln lnj Vj j Xj XjQ w V w Q      , 
which, solving for ln jV ,  yields an estimate of industry value-added 
growth. This approach to estimating value-added growth is typically 
referred to as the double defl ation method because it allows for separate 
price defl ators for output and intermediate input.
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To analyze the industry sources of growth at the aggregate level, we 
combine Equations (8.1), (8.2), and (8.3) to yield a decomposition of 
aggregate value-added growth:
(8.4)
 
, ,
, , ,
1ln ln ln lnK j L jj Kj j Lj j j
j V j V j V j
w w
V w Q w Q w MFP
w w w
        
which gives aggregate ec onomy value-added growth as the weighted 
industry contributions of capital, labor, and MFP to industry output 
growth. We defi ne
(8.5) 
,
1ln lnj j
j V
Agg
j
MFP w MFP
w
    
and refer to this as aggr egate MFP growth.13 We call 
,
1 lnj j
V j
w MFP
w
  
the industry contribution to aggregate MFP, or Domar-weighted MFP 
growth.14 The industry production account framework allows us to ana-
lyze contributions of industries and sectors to aggregate growth and 
productivity. The aggregate sector classifi cation scheme that we use is 
based on the classifi cation scheme in Jorgenson and Schreyer (2013).
Import Measurement and Growth Accounting
Our analysis of the treatment of imports in the industry accounts 
reduces to alternative estimates of XjQ , which is the quantity index of 
intermediate inputs used by industry. Intuitively, the three reasons why 
XjQ  differs under the alternatives are as follows: 
1) With an alternative allocation of imports by broad economic 
category, the share of intermediate use by industry by item 
that is imported now refl ects the information available in the 
BEC mapping; this division of use by industry by item across 
domestically produced and imported items then is defl ated by 
either the domestic or the import price. In other words, under 
the alternative, the share of imports is different, and this new 
share is defl ated by the import price index. 
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2) The value of imports is defl ated by an alternative price index, 
thus yielding a different quantity. 
3) Both an alternative estimate of the value of imports by item by 
industry (Reason 1) and an alternative price index (Reason 2) 
contribute to yielding a different quantity. 
The three treatments of imports lead us to defi ne alternative esti-
mates of XjQ  that feed through our exercise by means of Equation (8.1); 
the fi rst uses the BEC-based allocation, the second uses the country-
pooled import prices, and the third uses both the BEC allocation and 
the country-pooled price. Based on Equations (8.1) through (8.5), we 
defi ne the alternative estimates of value-added growth and its sources. 
Equation (8.3) yields three alternative estimates of value-added growth 
by industry: , 1 , 3ln lnj Alt j AltV V  . Equation (8.1) gives alternative 
estimates of MFP growth by industry: , 1 , 3ln lnj Alt j AltMFP MFP  . 
Based on Equation (8.2), there are three alternative estimates of aggre-
gate value-added growth: 1 3ln lnAlt AltV V  , while based on Equa-
tion (8.5) each alternative estimate of aggregate MFP is due to alterna-
tive estimates at the industry level.
Import Treatment and Value-Added Growth Estimates
In this section, we compare the baseline estimates of industry 
value-added growth in the United States to estimates based on the alter-
native treatments of imports.15 Figure 8.3 shows that the BEC alloca-
tion of imports produces minor differences in the estimates of value-
added growth by industry over the 1998–2011 period. The effects are 
detailed across industries in Table 8.3. As discussed above, the differ-
ences between the baseline estimate of value-added growth and the 
alternatives are due to alternative estimates of the growth of intermedi-
ate inputs by industry. This difference takes into account the alternative 
value of imported commodities within an industry and the price differ-
ence between domestic and foreign purchases. Between 1998 and 2011, 
value-added in “Miscellaneous manufacturing” would have grown 0.3 
percentage points a year faster (3.22 percent a year versus 2.89 percent a 
year) if estimated with the BEC allocation, while “Food and beverages” 
would have grown about 0.2 percentage points a year slower (0.85 per-
cent a year versus 1.06 percent). “Nonmetallic minerals” would be esti-
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   270 2/16/2015   8:35:13 AM
Import Allocation across Industries   271
Figure 8.3  Measured Value-Added Growth, 1998–2011: Alt1 Less Baseline
NOTE: Difference in value-added growth under Alt1. See text. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on BEA and BLS data.
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272Table 8.3  Growth in Industry Value-Added and MFP under Alternatives (%)
Value-added growth MFP Growth
1998−2011 2002–2011 1998–2011 2002–2011
 Baseline Alt1  Baseline Alt1 Alt2 Alt3 Baseline Alt1  Baseline Alt1 Alt2 Alt3
Farms 2.12 2.12 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34 0.95 0.95 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57
Forestry, fi shing, and related 
activities
3.34 3.33 2.84 2.81 2.83 2.83 2.05 2.03 1.43 1.40 1.42 1.42
Oil and gas extraction −3.74 −3.75 −2.45 −2.45 −2.46 −2.46 −2.84 −2.84 −3.02 −3.02 −3.03 −3.03
Mining, except oil and gas −2.92 −2.93 −4.29 −4.30 −4.36 −4.38 −1.38 −1.38 −2.85 −2.85 −2.88 −2.89
Support activities for mining 6.31 6.30 4.75 4.74 4.67 4.65 1.81 1.81 −0.15 −0.16 −0.19 −0.19
Utilities 1.36 1.36 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.56 0.28 0.28 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14
Construction −2.24 −2.24 −3.54 −3.54 −3.58 −3.58 −1.15 −1.15 −1.28 −1.28 −1.30 −1.30
Wood products 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.26 1.21 1.20 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.36
Nonmetallic mineral products −3.15 −3.04 −4.11 −3.97 −4.09 −4.01 −0.73 −0.69 −0.76 −0.71 −0.74 −0.72
Primary metals −3.13 −3.13 −4.53 −4.52 −4.65 −4.64 −0.12 −0.12 −0.80 −0.79 −0.82 −0.82
Fabricated metal products −1.18 −1.18 −0.49 −0.49 −0.50 −0.51 −0.06 −0.06 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10
Machinery 0.22 0.21 2.84 2.82 2.53 2.51 0.64 0.64 1.30 1.30 1.19 1.18
Computer and electronic products 17.51 17.47 15.41 15.36 15.08 15.02 8.15 8.13 8.07 8.04 7.92 7.88
Electrical equipment appliances and 
components
0.80 0.79 −0.13 −0.14 −0.20 −0.23 0.96 0.95 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.39
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, 
and parts
0.28 0.17 −1.02 −1.15 −1.55 −1.70 0.70 0.68 0.64 0.62 0.55 0.52
Other transportation equipment 0.95 0.92 1.55 1.53 0.93 0.95 0.57 0.56 0.35 0.34 0.12 0.13
Furniture and related products −2.76 −2.74 −3.37 −3.37 −3.38 −3.38 0.08 0.09 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36
Miscellaneous manufacturing 2.89 3.22 2.48 3.00 2.48 2.91 1.46 1.63 1.22 1.47 1.21 1.43
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Food and beverage and tobacco 
products
1.06 0.85 1.26 0.90 1.33 0.98 0.19 0.14 0.29 0.20 0.33 0.23
Textile mills and textile product 
mills
−4.26 −4.26 −4.40 −4.41 −4.62 −4.63 1.33 1.33 1.78 1.78 1.70 1.70
Apparel and leather and allied 
products
−4.83 −4.77 −4.30 −4.29 −4.39 −4.37 3.37 3.39 4.35 4.35 4.30 4.31
Paper products −2.87 −2.87 −2.58 −2.58 −2.58 −2.58 −0.09 −0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Printing and related support 
activities
−0.96 -0.98 −1.35 −1.39 −1.39 −1.45 1.11 1.11 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.95
Petroleum and coal products 1.44 1.44 2.24 2.24 2.35 2.34 0.20 0.20 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38
Chemical products 1.03 1.00 0.36 0.33 0.51 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.28 0.27 0.33 0.31
Plastics and rubber products −0.68 −0.69 −1.00 −1.01 −0.84 −0.84 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.32
Wholesale trade 2.19 2.20 1.21 1.23 1.20 1.21 0.67 0.68 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13
Retail trade 1.41 1.42 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Air transportation 3.03 3.03 3.42 3.42 3.42 3.42 2.18 2.18 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.58
Rail transportation 0.10 0.10 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.54 0.54 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05
Water transportation 9.00 9.00 17.17 17.17 17.17 17.17 2.73 2.73 5.21 5.21 5.21 5.21
Truck transportation 1.74 1.74 2.20 2.20 2.18 2.18 0.68 0.68 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.01
Transit and ground passenger 
transportation
1.25 1.25 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.62 −0.71 −0.71 −0.89 −0.89 −0.90 −0.90
Pipeline transportation 6.62 6.63 5.03 5.03 5.05 5.05 2.20 2.20 1.68 1.68 1.69 1.69
Other transportation and support 
activities
1.77 1.77 1.92 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.39 1.39 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.67
Warehousing and storage 3.69 3.69 4.95 4.95 4.94 4.94 0.76 0.76 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64
Publishing industries (includes 
software)
2.62 2.62 2.30 2.30 2.29 2.29 0.28 0.28 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90
(continued)
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Value-added growth MFP Growth
1998−2011 2002–2011 1998–2011 2002–2011
 Baseline Alt1  Baseline Alt1 Alt2 Alt3 Baseline Alt1  Baseline Alt1 Alt2 Alt3
Motion picture and sound recording 
industries
1.18 1.18 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.59 0.59 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
Broadcasting and 
telecommunications
5.79 5.79 5.04 5.04 5.01 5.00 1.85 1.85 2.73 2.72 2.70 2.70
Information and data processing 
services
7.16 7.16 4.69 4.69 4.67 4.67 −0.17 −0.17 −0.40 −0.40 −0.41 −0.41
Federal Reserve banks, credit 
intermediation, and related 
activities
2.99 2.99 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.45 0.45 −0.23 −0.23 −0.24 −0.24
Securities, commodity contracts, 
and investments
5.59 5.59 −0.83 −0.83 −0.83 −0.83 1.02 1.02 −1.47 −1.47 −1.47 −1.47
Insurance carriers and related 
activities
1.41 1.41 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57 −0.51 −0.51 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.51
Funds, trusts, and other fi nancial 
vehicles
4.48 4.48 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 0.04 0.04 −0.29 −0.29 −0.29 −0.29
Real estate 2.28 2.28 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Rental and leasing services and 
lessors of intangible assets
1.89 1.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 −1.08 −1.08 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
Legal services −0.35 −0.35 −1.51 −1.51 −1.51 −1.51 −2.28 −2.28 −2.69 −2.69 −2.70 −2.70
Computer systems design and 
related services
6.91 6.91 8.08 8.08 8.05 8.05 2.02 2.02 3.09 3.09 3.07 3.07
Miscellaneous professional 
scientifi c and technical services
3.11 3.11 2.96 2.96 2.95 2.95 0.13 0.13 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21
Table 8.3  (continued)
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Management of companies and 
enterprises
0.27 0.26 −0.75 −0.77 −0.78 −0.79 −2.28 −2.29 −3.58 −3.59 −3.60 −3.61
Administrative and support services 3.06 3.06 3.23 3.23 3.23 3.23 1.23 1.23 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83
Waste management and remediation 
services
2.56 2.56 2.34 2.33 2.32 2.32 0.90 0.90 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.79
Educational services 1.15 1.15 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.80 −1.26 −1.25 −1.11 −1.11 −1.12 −1.12
Ambulatory health care services 3.52 3.47 3.35 3.28 3.30 3.14 0.36 0.32 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.11
Hospitals, nursing and residential 
care facilities
1.89 1.85 2.00 1.94 1.96 1.85 −0.17 −0.19 0.00 −0.04 −0.02 −0.09
Social assistance 2.99 2.99 2.58 2.57 2.58 2.57 0.62 0.61 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.89
Performing arts, spectator sports, 
museums, and related activities
2.28 2.28 1.53 1.52 1.53 1.53 0.27 0.27 −0.24 −0.24 −0.24 −0.24
Amusements, gambling, and 
recreation industries
1.25 1.26 2.16 2.17 2.14 2.17 0.10 0.11 1.39 1.40 1.38 1.40
Accommodations 1.77 1.76 1.53 1.52 1.53 1.52 0.19 0.19 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05
Food services and drinking places 2.04 2.02 1.57 1.52 1.56 1.51 0.64 0.63 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50
Other services, except government −1.00 −0.99 −0.82 −0.82 −0.82 −0.82 −1.15 −1.14 −0.73 −0.73 −0.73 −0.73
Federal government 1.03 1.03 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
State and local government 0.85 0.85  0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35  −0.38 −0.38  −0.35 −0.35 −0.35 −0.35
NOTE: Alt.1 uses the alternative import allocation based on the BEC. Alt. 2 uses the alternative set of import prices. Alt. 3 uses both the 
alternative allocation and the alternative import prices.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on BEA and BLS data.
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276   Samuels, Howells, Russell, and Strassner
mated to decline by 3.04 percent a year instead of 3.15 percent a year, 
while “Motor vehicles” would have grown at 0.17 percent a year versus 
0.28 percent. The other of the 63 industries all exhibited percentage-
point differences of less than 0.1 percentage points a year.
To understand the impact of the BEC allocations (summarized in 
Table 8.1) on the value-added growth estimates, we trace the effect of 
the BEC-based distribution of “Forestry, fi shing, and related activities.” 
Table 8.1 indicates that a signifi cantly smaller share of imported “For-
estry, fi shing, and related activities” was purchased as an intermediate 
input under the BEC mapping. The implication of this alternative allo-
cation for value-added growth depends on which industries purchase 
“Forestry, fi shing, and related activities” items, and the value of the 
imported items relative to the value of other intermediate inputs used 
by the industries. Furthermore, the impact depends on the item-level 
allocations within each commodity. For example, as discussed above, 
the major difference between the BEC-based and the baseline treatment 
of “Forestry, fi shing, and related activities” is the treatment of com-
mercial fi shing. Because the commercial fi shing item is sold mainly to 
a subset of the industries that purchases forestry and fi shing items, the 
BEC-based allocation affects only this set of industries. In particular, 
the largest purchaser of “Forestry, fi shing, and related activities” is the 
“Wood products” industry, yet the BEC-based and baseline estimates of 
imports of “Forestry, fi shing, and related activities” purchased by the 
“Wood products” industry are equivalent because the wood industry 
does not purchase commercial fi shing.16 
On the other hand, the treatment of commercial fi shing has a large 
impact on the estimates of imports purchased by the “Food services and 
drinking places” industry. In this “Food services and drinking places” 
industry, however, purchases of forestry and fi shing items were about 
2 percent of total intermediate purchases, while the difference in price 
growth between domestic and imported items was about 8 percentage 
points. This implies a value-added growth rate for the “Food services 
and drinking places” industry that differs by about 0.1 percentage 
points in 2007, and no difference in value-added growth in the “Wood 
products” industry. Over the 1998–2011 period, value-added estimates 
for the “Food services and drinking places” industry differed by 0.02 
percentage points when the baseline was compared to the BEC-based 
import allocation. This difference refl ects the treatment of commercial 
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   276 2/16/2015   8:35:17 AM
Import Allocation across Industries   277
fi shing, other items in the “Forestry, fi shing, and related activities” 
commodity, and the effects on value-added growth for the other years 
in the sample.
The differences in value-added by industry estimates that incor-
porate the country-pooled adjusted import prices are given in Figure 
8.4. In 49 out of the 63 industries, estimated value-added growth was 
slower during the 2002–2011 period (the details are given in Table 8.3). 
The largest difference (in absolute value) was for “Other transporta-
tion equipment”; it is estimated that that category would have grown 
about 0.6 percentage points a year more slowly using the country-pool-
adjusted import price. “Motor vehicle bodies and trailers and parts,” 
“Computer and electronic products,” “Machinery,” “Textile mills and 
textile product mills,” “Primary metals,” “Plastics and rubber prod-
ucts,” and “Chemical products” were the industries where estimated 
value-added growth differed by more than 0.1 percentage points a year, 
with the differences for plastics and chemicals being of opposite sign. 
Table 8.3 and Figure 8.5 show the combined effects for the 2002–
2011 period of the BEC-based allocation and alternative import prices. 
“Motor vehicle bodies and trailers and parts” would have been esti-
mated to grow more slowly, by about 0.7 percentage points a year; 
“Other transportation equipment” also more slowly, by 0.6 percentage 
points a year; “Computer and electronic products” more slowly by 0.4 
percentage points a year; and “Machinery” and “Food and beverage 
and tobacco products” more slowly by about 0.3 percentage points a 
year. “Miscellaneous manufacturing” would have been estimated to 
grow about 0.4 percentage points a year faster. Table 8.3 indicates that, 
in general, differences in growth estimates due to the alternative treat-
ments were small in comparison to the baseline estimates of value-
added growth.
Import Treatment and MFP Growth Estimates by Industry
Because MFP growth accounts for about 30 percent of growth in 
aggregate value-added between 1998 and 2010, according to Fleck et 
al. (2012), small changes in estimates of MFP growth at the industry 
level may have important ramifi cations for the sources of aggregate 
MFP growth. 
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Figure 8.4  Measured Value-Added Growth, 2002–2011: Alt2 Less Baseline
NOTE: Difference in value-added growth under Alt2. See text. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on BEA and BLS data.
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Figure 8.5  Measured Value-Added Growth, 2002–2011: Alt3 Less Baseline
NOTE: Difference in value-added growth under Alt3. See text. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on BEA and BLS data.
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Table 8.3 compares MFP growth rates across the baseline and 
alternative treatments for imports. The table shows that the BEC-based 
import allocation produces both marginally faster and slower MFP 
growth rates across industries. The largest difference was for “Miscel-
laneous manufacturing,” where MFP would have grown about 0.17 
percentage points a year faster under the BEC mapping (1.63 percent 
versus 1.46 percent). “Food and beverages and tobacco products” MFP 
grew 0.05 percentage points a year slower based on the BEC, while all 
of the other industries’ MFP growth differed by less than 0.05 percent-
age points a year.
Table 8.3 shows the effect of the alternative import prices (Alt2) 
and the combination of the alternative import prices and BEC allocation 
(Alt3) on MFP estimates. With the alternative import prices, measured 
MFP growth in “Other transportation equipment” would have been 0.22 
percentage points a year slower compared to the baseline, while that for 
“Computer and electronic products” would have been about 0.1 per-
centage points a year slower. Both “Machinery” and “Motor vehicle 
bodies and trailers and parts” would have exhibited slower MFP growth 
by about 0.1 percentage points a year. “Plastics and rubber products” 
would have been estimated to have higher MFP growth for the period 
by about 0.05 percentage points a year. Table 8.3 shows that the dif-
ferences in MFP under the alternatives are, in general, small compared 
to the baseline estimates. Finally, Table 8.3 indicates that combining 
the alternative import allocation and alternative import prices leads to 
relatively minor differences in MFP estimates across industries. The 
industries with the largest differences are “Other transportation equip-
ment,” “Computer and electronic products,” “Ambulatory health care 
services,” and “Miscellaneous manufacturing.” 
Houseman et al. (2011) argue that the measurement bias from 
offshoring as a percentage of growth in real value-added and MFP is 
particularly high for manufacturing excluding computers. Table 8.4 
presents the effects of the alternative import assumptions on estimated 
value-added and MFP in this sector of the economy. For the 1998–2011 
period, under the BEC allocation of imports, value-added would have 
decreased by 0.15 percent a year compared to 0.13 percent a year, while 
MFP growth would have been unchanged under the alternative. In com-
parison, under the alternative import prices between 2002 and 2011, 
valued-added fell by 0.16 percent a year compared to a decrease of 
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 Table 8.4  Value-Added and MFP: Manufacturing Excluding Computers and Electronic Products (%)
1998–2011 2002–2011
 Baseline Alt1  Baseline Alt1 Alt2 Alt3
Value-added growth −0.13 −0.15 −0.13 −0.16 −0.16 −0.21
Contribution to aggregate VA growth 0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01
MFP growth 0.37 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.31
Contribution to aggregate MFP growth 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09
NOTE: All fi gures are average annual percentages. Sector aggregation is discussed in the text. Alt. 1 uses the alternative import allocation 
based on the BEC. Alt. 2 uses the alternative set of import prices. Alt. 3 uses both the alternative allocation and the alternative import 
prices. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on BEA and BLS data.
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0.13 percent a year in the baseline. Again, MFP growth was basically 
unchanged. Combining the alternative import allocation and prices 
yields a value-added decline of 0.21 percent a year compared to a 0.13 
percent decline in the baseline, and MFP growth of 0.09 percent a year 
compared to 0.10 percent a year without the adjustments.
The Sources of Growth under the Alternatives
In this section, we compare the sources of aggregate value-added 
and MFP growth by industry across the alternative treatments. Table 
8.5, which presents the sector contributions to aggregate value-added 
growth, indicates that there are very few signifi cant differences based 
on the alternative import measurement approaches. For the BEC-based 
allocation over the 1998–2011 period, the contributions by major sec-
tor were observationally equivalent at 1.87 percent a year. Over the 
2002–2011 period, for which we consider both the BEC-based import 
allocation and the alternative import prices, there were some minor dif-
ferences in sector contributions to growth. Specifi cally, in the baseline 
aggregate, value-added grew by 1.38 percent a year, while it grew by 
1.34 percent a year under the alternative using the BEC allocation and 
alternative import price. This difference was due to minor differences in 
“Construction,” “Manufacturing,” “Information,” and “Other services.”
Across each of the cases that we consider, MFP growth accounts 
for between 25 and 30 percent of aggregate value-added growth. Table 
8.6 shows that for the broad economic sectors, the sources of aggregate 
MFP growth exhibit a similar pattern across the treatments of imports 
that we analyze. For the 1998–2011 period, the BEC-based allocation 
produces a sectoral decomposition of aggregate MFP that is almost iden-
tical to the baseline. For the 2002–2011 period, there are minor differ-
ences in “Transportation, warehousing, and utilities,” “Durable goods,” 
and “Other services.” Overall, the fundamental sources of aggregate 
MFP are very similar across the different treatments of imports for this 
sector classifi cation.
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 Table 8.5  Sector Contributions to Aggregate Value-Added Growth (%)
1998–2011 2002–2011
 Baseline Alt1  Baseline Alt1 Alt2 Alt3
Value-added 1.87 1.87 1.38 1.37 1.36 1.34
Agriculture, forestry, fi shing, hunting, and mining 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Transportation, warehousing, utilities 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Construction −0.10 −0.10 −0.15 −0.15 −0.16 −0.16
Manufacturing 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.20
Durable goods 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21
Nondurable goods 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.00
Trade 0.23 0.23 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Information 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing 0.51 0.51 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Other services 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.50
Government 0.11 0.11  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
NOTE: All fi gures are average annual percentages. Sector aggregation is discussed in the text. Alt. 1 uses the alternative import allocation 
based on the BEC. Alt. 2 uses the alternative set of import prices. Alt. 3 uses both the alternative allocation and the alternative import 
prices. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on BEA and BLS data.
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284Table 8.6  Sector Contributions to Aggregate MFP Growth (%)
1998–2011 2002–2011
 Baseline Alt1  Baseline Alt1 Alt2 Alt3
Aggregate MFP 0.49 0.48 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.38
Agriculture, forestry, fi shing, hunting, and mining −0.01 −0.01 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
Transportation, warehousing, utilities 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
Construction −0.11 −0.11 −0.13 −0.13 −0.13 −0.13
Manufacturing 0.39 0.39 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.31
Durable goods 0.35 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.28
Nondurable goods 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
Trade 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Information 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Other services −0.03 −0.04 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.03
Government −0.04 −0.04  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
NOTE: All fi gures are average annual percentages. Sector aggregation is discussed in the text. Alt. 1 uses the alternative import allocation 
based on the BEC. Alt. 2 uses the alternative set of import prices. Alt. 3 uses both the alternative allocation and the alternative import 
prices. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on BEA and BLS data.
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CONCLUSION
Estimated GDP from the expenditure side demonstrates the increas-
ing role of imports in U.S. economic activity. In this chapter, we have 
examined a narrow set of issues related to import measurement and the 
effects on estimates of the sources of GDP growth from an industry per-
spective. Between 1998 and 2011, the value of imports relative to GDP 
increased from 12.7 percent to 17.7 percent. Over the same period, based 
on the value-added approach to measuring GDP, the share of imported 
intermediates used in domestic production increased from about 9 per-
cent in 1998 to 13 percent in 2011 for the economy as a whole, and from 
16 percent in 1998 to 25 percent in 2011 in manufacturing. Because of 
interest in how these imports are treated in the measurement of GDP 
by industry, we have documented the current approach to capturing the 
role of imports on measures of growth and productivity at the industry 
level and have shown how import measurement at the industry level is 
related to aggregate measures of growth and productivity. The industry 
production account that we analyze in this chapter is an important ele-
ment of quantifying the impact of imports on the U.S. economy.
Because a basic requirement in assembling industry estimates of 
real value-added and MFP growth is knowing the values of imports by 
type that are used by all industries in the economy, we have discussed 
the application of the import proportionality assumption in the BEA 
industry accounts and compared this to an approach that relies on the 
broad economic classifi cations published by the United Nations. We 
fi nd that estimates of GDP and MFP growth by industry show no major 
differences based on the BEC allocation. We attribute this to the level 
of detail at which the BEA applies the import comparability assump-
tion, which is much fi ner than the 63-sector level at which the annual 
accounts are published. 
Another component of the accounts that affects measures of GDP 
and MFP by industry is made up of the prices that serve to defl ate 
imports used across industries. We compare the current practice, which 
relies heavily on published BLS import price indexes, to an import price 
that pools goods across countries. This approach allows us to capture 
import switches from a new, lower-priced entrant into the export mar-
ket, which Houseman et al. (2011) have argued may be missing from 
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the offi cial import prices. Again, we do not fi nd signifi cant impacts on 
the industry growth rates, or on the sectoral growth decomposition at 
the aggregate level. 
The industry production account approach that we make use of 
in our analysis reinforces the notion that the economy-wide impact of 
increasing imports depends on industry measures of import use. While 
there is some evidence that the alternative methodologies that we con-
sider have some minor industry-specifi c measurement effects, across 
industries these effects often cancel each other out. Thus, at higher lev-
els of aggregation there are very few observable differences across the 
methodologies that we analyze. It is worth recalling that our analysis 
focuses solely on different treatments of imported goods in the accounts.
Surely, measurement issues related to the growth in globalization 
will not dissipate. This study was based on the 2002 benchmark input-
output table, which forms the basis of the annual industry accounts. The 
2007 benchmark input-output table, which became available in Decem-
ber 2013, incorporates updated information on the structure of inter-
industry purchases, and the annual industry accounts will be revised 
to refl ect this new information. Looking further ahead, the treatment 
of factoryless goods production is a measurement area that is gaining 
attention. Methodologists for the GDP-by-industry account are actively 
involved in discussing methods to treat factoryless goods and how to 
incorporate these concepts into their estimates. 
Notes
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and not necessarily 
those of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis or the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
We are grateful to Peter Kuhbach, Amanda Lyndaker, and Sarah Osborne for their help 
in constructing the labor data, Greg Linder for his help with the trade data, and Gabriel 
Medeiros for his help in assembling the alternative intermediate input estimates. We 
thank Robert Inklaar, Jiemin Guo, Susan Houseman, Peter Kuhbach, Wendy Li, Carol 
Moylan, Sarah Osborne, Rachel Soloveichik, and Sally Thompson for their very help-
ful comments and suggestions, as well as the organizers and participants in the confer-
ence on “Measuring the Effects of Globalization.”
1. The vintage of data used in this project is consistent with the GDP by industry 
and annual Input-Output accounts, released in December 2012. The latest data are 
updated here: http://www.bea.gov/industry/index.htm.
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2. Strassner, Yuskavage, and Lee (2010) use data from multinational companies 
(MNC) and compare reported use of imports by broad type to the import propor-
tionality assumption. They fi nd broadly consistent results between current practice 
and the MNC data and attribute some of the differences to the difference between 
establishment and company concepts.
3. Because our analysis covers 1998–2011, we use the 1996 concordance for 1998–2001, 
the 2002 concordance for 2002–2006, and the 2007 concordance for 2007–2011. 
Concordances are available here: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/conversions/
HS%20Correlation%20and%20Conversion%20tables.htm.
4. There are limited cases where the BEC code for a given six-digit commodity is 
ambiguous in the published concordance. For example, the six-digit harmoniza-
tion code can be listed multiple times and assigned to BEC codes that do not give 
a unique map to intermediate input, consumption, or investment. In these cases, 
we default to the import proportionality assumption for the proportion of this item 
included in this six-digit harmonization code.
5. In constructing the “GDP by Industry” accounts, typically reexports are netted 
out from the value of imports, but in constructing the value to be used to allocate 
imports across broad economic categories, we do not net out reexports.
6. The foundation for this mapping is made up of the census guidelines on appropriate 
NAICS codes for each harmonization code (when this information is available).
7. An import is assigned to “undetermined” if the six-digit harmonization code to the 
BEC map is ambiguous. 
8. An alternative is to assume that capital goods get sold only to fi nal demand, but 
this leads to all of the capital goods that typically get embedded in other goods 
being allocated to fi nal demand.
9. UN Comtrade provides quantity data in units recommended by the World Cus-
toms Organization. We construct prices for each of the 13 quantity types and con-
struct value-share-weighted growth rates for each item (across quantity type). We 
use the value and quantity to defi ne the implicit price. A previous version of this 
research used only data that was reported in kilograms.
10. In a regression with observations weighted by import values of UN Comtrade 
Törnqvist prices on BEA prices, the coeffi cient on the BEA prices is about 0.7 for 
the 2002–2011 period but declines to −0.1 over the 1997–2002 period.
11. The BEA has details on about 150 import prices from the BLS.
12. Industry output and intermediate input for the baseline case is taken from the 
1998–2011 annual revision of the GDP-by-industry data (http://www.bea.gov/
industry/gdpbyind_data.htm). Capital and labor services are extrapolated through 
2011 using internal estimates and include a labor and capital composition adjust-
ment based on the approach of Jorgenson, Ho, and Samuels (2011). 
13. This decomposition is the direct-aggregation-across-industries approach of 
Jorgenson et al. (2007).
14. Note that this differs from the concept of aggregate TFP used in Jorgenson et al. 
(2007) by their reallocation terms.
15. Because of differences in index number methodology, there are small differences 
between published estimates and estimates given here. 
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16. This excludes the purchases by the “Forestry, fi shing, and related activities” indus-
try itself. It is based on the 2007 annual input-output table.
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The Impact of 
Globalization on Prices 
A Test of Hedonic Price Indexes for Imports
Mina Kim 
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Marshall B. Reinsdorf 
International Monetary Fund
Sourcing patterns for many types of imported products have 
changed dramatically over the past two decades as emerging economies 
have become major producers of the manufactured products consumed 
in the United States. In addition, goods with regular quality improve-
ments due to new or improved technology have also increased their rep-
resentation in U.S. imports. The U.S. export and import price indexes 
are constructed using a “matched-model” approach that is likely to 
miss price reductions for imports that occur when sourcing shifts from 
high-cost countries to low-cost countries of origin. The matched-model 
approach is also likely to miss changes in quality-adjusted prices that 
occur when new models that embody improved technology enter the 
market. Hedonic methods for quality adjustment could help to resolve 
these problems. This chapter demonstrates the feasibility of applying 
these methods to import price index data by estimating hedonic indexes 
for two products that have experienced changes in sourcing and tech-
nological progress: televisions and consumer cameras. The hedonic 
indexes imply that signifi cant upward bias in matched-model import 
indexes for these products arises both from changes in sourcing and 
from new technologies. 
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WHY STUDY HEDONIC INDEXES FOR IMPORTS? 
An important element of globalization is the growth of export-
oriented manufacturing industries in emerging economies, bringing 
with it expanded opportunities to source imports from new locations 
where costs are lower. Since the mid-1990s, shifts in sourcing to emerg-
ing economies have become more common for a wide variety of con-
sumer products and intermediate inputs, including electronic goods, 
textiles, and apparel. Such shifts in sourcing create measurement chal-
lenges for price statisticians since direct price comparisons of the items 
from the new and previous source countries are usually not possible. 
Another element of globalization has been the rapid growth in 
imports by countries like the United States of products for which tech-
nological improvements are an important phenomenon, such as elec-
tronic goods. For products with evolving technologies, comparisons 
of new models to previous models may again be impossible without a 
way to do a quality adjustment, but omitting new and existing models 
will cause bias if the new models tend to enter with lower- (or higher-) 
quality-adjusted prices. 
Changes in source country and changes in technological char-
acteristics both present a risk of bias for the U.S. import price index 
(MPI) because the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) International Price 
Program (IPP) constructs its indexes as matched-model indexes. In a 
matched-model index, only continuing items (models that match) are 
used in the index calculation. Changes in sample composition resulting 
from item replacements or sample rotations are handled by linking the 
incoming items into the index. Linking means that any item that is not 
present in both the initial and the comparison period is excluded from 
the calculation of the change in the index. Linking therefore prevents the 
MPI from capturing any cost savings that an importer enjoys by switch-
ing suppliers. Any remaining gap that exists between the infl ation-
adjusted price of the old supplier and the price of the new supplier is, in 
effect, attributed to quality change. The bias in the MPI from failing to 
capture price reductions caused by shifts in sourcing resembles the phe-
nomenon of outlet substitution bias in the consumer price index from 
consumers switching to low-priced outlets like Walmart (Reinsdorf 
1993).1 
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A matched-model index avoids making possibly specious compari-
sons of items that may be of differing quality. Rather than omitting 
price changes that occur during item replacements, as the matched-
model method does, hedonic price indexes adjust for quality differ-
ences in a way that allows these price changes to be taken into account. 
Hedonic methods therefore offer a potential solution to the biases cre-
ated by globalization. Indeed, by using other kinds of data as a proxy 
for U.S. import data, hedonic techniques have already been applied to 
these or related problems. In particular, Grimm (1998) uses proprietary 
data on worldwide markets for semiconductors to construct hedonically 
adjusted defl ators for exports and imports of semiconductors in the U.S. 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs) for the years 1981 to 
1997. To our knowledge, however, no one has yet applied hedonic 
regression techniques to trade data directly.
LITERATURE ON BIAS IN IMPORT PRICE INDEXES
Changes in sample composition can also occur in the import index 
for reasons other than sourcing changes and technological progress. 
Recent research fi nds that an important part of overall price change for 
exports and imports occurs at times of product entry and exit. Nakamura 
and Steinsson (2012) analyze a sample of the microdata that the BLS 
used to compile the import and export price indexes. They fi nd that 
items in the sample tend to be subject to frequent replacement and tend 
to have rigid prices during their lifespan in the sample (44.3 percent 
of the items in import price samples never have a price change). They 
conclude that a high proportion of price changes must therefore occur 
at the time of item replacements. 
In Nakamura and Steinsson (2012), the sign of the bias in the 
matched-model index depends on whether the index has an upward or 
downward trend: If the price index is trending downward, excessive 
fl atness of the matched-model index means that it has an upward bias. 
With the matched-model index, there is an assumption that changes in 
quality-adjusted prices at times of item replacements are, on average, the 
same as the observed price changes for continuing items. This assump-
tion implies corrections to estimated changes in the index for nonoil 
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   295 2/16/2015   8:35:29 AM
296   Kim and Reinsdorf
imports that raise the standard deviation of quarterly log changes from 
1.1 percent to 1.6 percent. This in turn would imply that the matched-
model index for imports is signifi cantly fl atter than it should be.2
The assumption that quality-adjusted price changes associated with 
item replacements have the same mean as price changes for continuing 
items may, however, be unrealistic for products undergoing rapid tech-
nological progress or for entry by new producers in low-wage countries 
that have cost advantages. For these kinds of goods, even a matched-
model index that is trending downward might have an upward bias 
because the changes in quality-adjusted prices at times of item replace-
ments are smaller than the average price change of continuing items. 
Erickson and Pakes (2011) provide evidence that unmeasured price 
changes associated with item replacements tend to be systematically 
lower than the measured price changes when a product is undergoing 
improvement as a result of technological progress.3 
The lower prices that import buyers obtain by sourcing from China 
and other emerging economies have also been topics of several papers. 
Thomas, Marquez, and Fahle (2008) infer the size of the price reduc-
tions that U.S. importers realize by switching to sources from emerging 
economies on the basis of purchasing-power parity data from the Penn 
World Tables. More recently, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) have 
directly looked at prices from traditional sources of semiconductors and 
from new sources in China and fi nd that the China price is 17 percent 
lower for an identical semiconductor. Finally, Reinsdorf and Yuskavage 
(2013, Table 1) show that changes in import sourcing to countries like 
China could plausibly have resulted in an upward bias in the MPIs for 
consumer durable goods, including computers but excluding motor 
vehicles, of up to almost 1 percent per year.4 
An indirect method for estimating the bias in a matched-model 
import price index from new and disappearing varieties was introduced 
by Feenstra (1994). In applying the method, varieties are usually dis-
tinguished on the basis of source countries. The model underlying this 
method implies that a variety may be bought in limited quantities just 
because it is different, but that because market shares are inversely pro-
portional to quality-adjusted prices, for a variety to sell well it must 
have a low quality-adjusted price. If the post-entry share of the entering 
varieties is greater than the pre-exit share of the exiting varieties, the 
estimated bias in the matched-model index will be positive. Feenstra 
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et al. (2013) use this method to estimate the bias associated with vari-
ety entry and exit in the defl ator for nonpetroleum imports in the U.S. 
national accounts, with new countries of origin treated as new variet-
ies. They fi nd an average bias of about 0.6 percent per year, indicating 
substantial net gains in market share by new supplying countries. This 
estimate refl ects a combination of several factors, including entry of 
low-priced producers in emerging low-cost locations, lower quality-
adjusted prices made possible by technological progress, and a general 
broadening of the available range of varieties as markets thicken. 
Finally, Houseman et al. (2011) and Mandel (2007, 2009) focus on 
price effects that are due to the offshoring of production from the United 
States to lower-cost locations. Offshoring substantially reduces the price 
paid by buyers of intermediate inputs, yet this price reduction cannot be 
captured either in the MPI or in the producer price index. Alterman 
(2009 and Chapter 10 of this volume) proposes a buyer’s price index 
for intermediate inputs as a way of capturing the effects of substitution 
from local to offshore production. Note, however, that if the buyer’s 
price index relies exclusively on the matched-model approach to handle 
quality change, it may miss some of the price changes associated with 
changes in where the intermediate inputs are produced because the off-
shored version of the product may not be matched with the previous 
local version of the product. Hedonic methods are likely to be needed 
to enable the buyer’s price to fully measure the effects of changes in 
source countries. 
HEDONIC PRICE INDEXES FOR IMPORTS 
Hedonic price indexes do not exclude from the index calculation 
observations that are only present in one time period. They are based 
on hedonic regressions that model the effects of items’ characteristics 
on the price. 
The history of hedonic price index research extends back for more 
than 80 years, and in the years since the Stigler Commission report 
included Griliches’s (1961) chapter applying this method to autos, 
there have been innumerable empirical applications of this technique 
to the consumer or producer price indexes. Aizcorbe, Corrado, and 
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Doms (2003) explore conditions under which matched-model and time-
dummy hedonic quality-adjustment techniques lead to comparable 
measures of prices. They fi nd that the two approaches give numerically 
similar estimates when rates of entry and exit are low, or when observa-
tions are at high frequency and changes in characteristics occur gradu-
ally over time.
One traditional specifi cation of a hedonic regression model includes 
dummy variables for time periods along with a set of characteristics 
variables. If the dependent variable is log price, the coeffi cient on a time 
period’s dummy variable is the logarithm of its price index. Another 
common approach employs fi tted coeffi cients from a regression using 
data from time period s to predict the price that an observation from the 
other time period, say time period t, would have had, had it been pres-
ent in period s. An analogous regression run for period t is then used to 
predict the prices of items that only existed in period s. The predicted 
prices can then be included in the calculation of the index. 
Recently, Erickson and Pakes (2011) have developed a modifi cation 
of this hedonic technique that accounts for the selection bias caused 
by exiting goods being supplanted by more technologically advanced 
goods. Their technique accounts for unobserved price-determining 
characteristics by making use of the information in the residuals from 
the standard hedonic regression. In principle, the method should work 
well for handling the data limitations faced by the IPP, as it does not 
require that a large number of characteristics be observed. Unfortu-
nately, a key assumption is not met: Erickson and Pakes assume that 
for a given set of characteristics, the marginal cost is the same across 
sellers. This assumption does not hold true in our data.
Despite the high degree of interest in the questions that hedonic 
methods might help to answer, to our knowledge this chapter is the 
fi rst to estimate a hedonic import price index using data collected from 
importers by a statistical agency. Data limitations are probably the main 
reason for the lack of research on hedonic indexes for import prices. 
Many countries construct most of their export and import indexes as 
unit value indexes from customs data values and volumes for detailed 
classes of items, such as the 10-digit categories of the Harmonized Sys-
tem (which is an internationally agreed-upon classifi cation scheme for 
traded commodities). A unit value in these indexes will typically cover 
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   298 2/16/2015   8:35:31 AM
The Impact of Globalization on Prices   299
a variety of items whose characteristics vary, so no particular set of 
characteristics can be ascribed to an observation. 
The United States no longer uses unit values for its export and 
import indexes except in special cases: The BLS began to produce 
complete sets of specifi cation-based price indexes for goods imports in 
1982 (Alterman 1991, p. 113). This means that the observations in the 
U.S. import index sample have well-defi ned characteristics. Neverthe-
less, detailed characteristics information can be diffi cult to collect from 
respondents in IPP surveys, so the import price index database often 
lacks full information. 
We found that for items that have a make and model number, the 
problem of missing characteristics information could be largely over-
come by performing Internet searches on the make and model num-
ber of the sampled items. Except for the items that exited before the 
Internet became pervasive, we were generally able to fi nd good product 
description information using this method from owner’s manuals or 
other product literature. 
DATA DESCRIPTION
To construct experimental hedonic indexes and benchmark matched- 
model indexes for imports, we use three subsets of the import price 
data from the International Price Program (IPP) Research Database 
(Blackburn, Kim, and Ulics 2012). In particular, we use the description 
fi eld in the IPP database to assemble data sets on imports of consumer 
televisions, consumer cameras, and bananas.5 Bananas are intended as 
a kind of control group. Unlike televisions and cameras, they are rela-
tively homogeneous (though besides the main Cavendish variety, the 
sample also contains some specialty varieties). 
The description fi eld in the IPP database is also the basis for the 
quality variables that we construct for each product type. The variables 
used in the hedonic models cover the characteristics that are well docu-
mented in the description portion of the IPP database, although even for 
these variables blanks sometimes have to be fi lled in through Internet 
searches on make and model number. (See Appendix Table 9A.1 for 
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the list and description of quality characteristics that we are able to pull 
from the database.) 
The data set for televisions and bananas covers the months between 
January 2000 and December 2010. Unfortunately, for cameras the data 
on quality and monthly prices become too sparse after March 2006, so 
our camera indexes end at that point.
The IPP database contains two types of prices: reported prices and 
net prices. To derive the net price, the BLS adjusts the reported price 
as needed for discounts, duties, freight charges, and the exchange rate. 
The net prices are estimates of actual transaction prices in dollars and 
are used for the offi cial import and export price indexes. Thus, we also 
use the net prices. In addition, for certain commodities, the BLS allows 
reporters to give “index” prices.6 These types of prices, which were 
reported for some of our banana items, are excluded from our analysis.
We include intrafi rm “transfer” prices in our study to keep sample 
sizes from becoming too small. We do, however, include a dummy vari-
able for intrafi rm prices in our hedonic regressions because these prices 
behave differently from arm’s length prices; they are characterized by 
less stickiness, less synchronization, and greater exchange rate pass-
through, as found in Neiman (2010). For tractability, we assume that the 
intrafi rm pricing strategy is the same across fi rms and time throughout 
this study. As shown in Table 9.1, the share of intrafi rm prices is high 
for cameras and bananas.
Table 9.1  Share of Prices That Are Intrafi rm in Each Month
Televisions Cameras Bananas
Mean 0.41 0.89 0.85
Min. 0.15 0.72 0.62
Max. 0.64 1.00 1.00
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
In the IPP database, many items are repriced less often than every 
month, so monthly prices are often temporarily missing. Temporarily 
missing prices can also occur because the respondent fails to report a 
price one month.7 We experimented with two ways of imputing tempo-
rarily missing prices. The simple method of carrying forward the last 
observation to fi ll in the missing prices is a standard practice in research 
using IPP data. (See, for instance, Nakamura and Steinsson [2012] and 
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Gagnon, Mandel, and Vigfusson [2012].) Given that for many products 
in the IPP long periods of price rigidity are common, this method is a 
reasonable approximation. 
On the other hand, for offi cial price indexes, the BLS generally 
imputes missing values by adjusting the last observation to refl ect an 
estimate of the subsequent price change using either “cell-relative” 
imputation or “class-mean” imputation.8 We found that our results were 
insensitive to whether we used cell-relative imputation or the simple 
carry-forward method favored by researchers, so below we will focus 
on indexes that include carry-forward imputations. Table 9.2 reports 
the share of missing values that are imputed for each subset considered. 
Table 9.2  Share of Prices That Are Imputed in Each Month
Televisions Cameras Bananas
Mean 0.03 0.04 0.00
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. 0.32 0.50 0.12
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Both televisions and cameras exhibit a great deal of cross-sectional 
variation in price levels. Television prices vary 300-fold, while camera 
prices vary 500-fold. Television prices are much less sticky than camera 
prices. In the television sample, items change price an average of 6.4 
times during their time in the sample, while in our camera sample items 
on average have only 1.6 price changes between entering and exiting.9
Source countries shifted for both televisions and cameras over our 
sample periods; televisions shifted from Mexican imports to Chinese 
imports (see Figure 9.1), while cameras moved away from Japanese 
imports to imports from China and Thailand (Figure 9.2). The growth 
in television screen sizes over our sample period is also noteworthy 
(Figure 9.3). 
Televisions experience slightly more sample entry than sample 
exit throughout the period that we study. Cameras, on the other hand, 
experience almost one and a half times more exits than entries of items 
into the sample. On average about 4.7 percent of televisions in a given 
month are no longer present in the next month, while for cameras the 
hazard rate for sample attrition is 5.6 percent per month (see Table 9.3 
for a summary of exit reasons). The mean duration of a television in the 
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Figure 9.1  Change in Share for the Source Country for Television 
Imports, 2000–2010
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Malaysia
China
South Korea
Other
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Figure 9.2  Change in Share for the Source Country for Camera Imports, 
2000–2005
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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sample is 18.1 months (with a standard deviation of 12.9 months). This 
is slightly shorter than the 21 months that would occur if the hazard rate 
for exit were constant. On the other hand, mean duration of an item in 
the camera sample, at 17.8 months (with a standard deviation of 11.6 
months), is consistent with a constant hazard rate for sample exit.
Bananas behave very differently from televisions and cameras. 
Prices for bananas only vary sixfold, refl ecting their greater homoge-
neity. Moreover, bananas change prices very frequently compared to 
Figure 9.3  Change in Share for Imported Television Sizes, 2000–2010
13–20 inches20–30 inches
30–45 inches 45+ 
inches
2000 television sizes
13–20 inches
20–30 
inches
30–45 inches
45+ inches
2010 television sizes
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 9.3  Mean Share of Items Experiencing Permanent Exit in Each 
Month, by Reason (mean)
Televisions Cameras Bananas
Refusal 0.01 0.00 0.01
Out of business 0.00 0.00 0.00
Out of scope 0.02 0.04 0.00
Out of scope, replaced 0.01 0.01 0.01
NOTE: “Out of scope” items are items that are no longer traded. Reporters sometimes 
are able to give a quote for a replacement item. At other times, there is no replacement.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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televisions and cameras; on average, a banana quote changes price 19.3 
times during the time that it is in our sample. Bananas in our data set 
primarily are imported from Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Colom-
bia, and Ecuador. Colombia, Ecuador, and Guatemala have increased 
their representation in the import price index sample, while the share of 
the sample from Honduras has fallen and the one from Costa Rica has 
remained about the same (Figure 9.4). On average, about 1.9 percent 
of bananas in each period are no longer present in the next period. The 
mean duration of an item in the banana sample is substantially longer 
than those of televisions or cameras, at 32.2 months (with a standard 
deviation of 23.9 months). 
BASELINE NONHEDONIC MEASURES OF PRICE CHANGE
Before calculating sets of hedonic price indexes, we calculate two 
baseline measures of price change. The fi rst of these simply tracks the 
change in the geometric average price of the sample. The average price 
index should exhibit similar behavior to a unit value index: Like a unit 
Figure 9.4  Change in Share for Source Country for Bananas, 2000–2010
Guatemala
Honduras
Costa RicaColombia
Ecuador
Other
2000 banana imports
Guatemala
Honduras
Costa Rica
Colombia
Ecuador
Other
2010 banana imports
t l
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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value index, it does not hold the sample composition constant when 
comparing time periods. (We cannot calculate true unit-value indexes 
because we do not have the necessary data on quantities.) Changes in 
sample composition are likely to alter the average quality level repre-
sented in the sample, so the behavior over time of the average price 
refl ects both price and quality developments. Defl ating the average 
price index by a price index that holds quality constant yields an index 
of quality change.
Second, we construct matched-model indexes to use as benchmarks 
to compare to our hedonic price indexes. The matched-model indexes 
of the MPI include item weights in a Laspeyres-like index formula.10 
We do not have the item weight information needed to replicate these 
Laspeyres matched-model indexes, so our matched-model indexes are 
calculated as modifi ed Jevons indexes of the prices of the continuing 
items, for which less detailed weights based on customs data are used.11 
A matched-model Laspeyres index is calculated as a share-weighted 
arithmetic average of price relatives of continuing items, while the 
logarithm of our weighted, matched-model Jevons index is a share-
weighted average of logarithms of these same price relatives. We also 
include our calculated weights for observations in all of the indexes that 
we calculate so that the overall weight for each source country is pro-
portional to its importance in the trade data for the product in question. 
BLS policies on disclosure of nonpublic data allow us to report only 
publication-level indexes. We are unable to report indexes at the level 
of the individual products that make up a publication-level index, nor 
can we report coeffi cient estimates that would allow someone to repro-
duce one of these unpublished indexes. Therefore, besides calculating 
matched-model indexes for the three products of interest, we calculate 
matched-model Jevons indexes for the other products contained in the 
published index and then aggregate up to the level of the published 
index. For example, for bananas, we simulate the relevant published 
index for “edible fruits and nuts” (Harmonized System Code 08, or HS 
08) by combining our index for bananas with an index for other edi-
ble fruits and nuts with weights based on the number of items in each 
category. 
Despite these limitations, we can use the difference between the 
aggregated matched-model indexes and the aggregated hedonically 
adjusted indexes to infer the effects of the quality adjustment on the 
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products of interest. In particular, we divide the change in the logarithm 
of the more aggregate index by the weight of televisions or cameras in 
that index to fi nd the implied change in the logarithm of the index for 
televisions or cameras. 
HEDONIC INDEXES 
Sample size limitations affect what kinds of hedonic models we can 
investigate. The simplest specifi cation we try is the pooled time dummy 
hedonic regression, which assumes that the effect of quality character-
istics on the log price is constant over the whole span of time covered 
by the sample. The general form of the pooled time dummy regression 
equation is
(9.1) pit = αt + Xit β + εit , 
where pit is the log price of item i at time t, and Xit is a vector of quality 
characteristics such as the television’s screen size and screen type. The 
price index comparing time t to t −1 is then just the exponential differ-
ence between αt and αt −1. 
As a more fl exible alternative to the pooled hedonic regression, we 
also estimate a set of overlapping hedonic regressions that use a moving 
window of just 24 months for their sample. The time periods covered 
by these regressions have 12-month overlaps so that a cumulative price 
index from the beginning of the overall sample can be constructed from 
a sequence of transitive comparisons. Ideally, we would have run these 
regressions on monthly data, but, in practice, to get around sample size 
problems, we had to pool the observations for each quarter. The moving-
window approach has the advantage of allowing the coeffi cients on 
characteristics to change over time if evolving technologies and market 
conditions alter the hedonic relationships.12 
We fi t these models by both including and excluding country dum-
mies from the set of variables in Xit in Equation (9.1). The specifi cation 
that includes country dummies assumes that price differences between 
countries of origin are due to quality differences between these coun-
tries, while the specifi cation that omits the country dummies assumes 
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that price-level differences between countries of origin are real. The 
truth probably lies between these alternatives—ease of doing business 
and quality assurance may vary by country, but on the other hand, the 
large gains made by countries offering lower prices suggest that the 
value of the quality differences is small in comparison with the price 
differentials. 
Rather than leaving the country dummies out of the hedonic regres-
sion, a hedonic index that includes price changes due to changes in 
source country can instead be calculated by adding back the part of 
the hedonic index’s quality adjustment coming from changes in source 
countries. Using the pooled hedonic index as an example, let ât be the 
fi tted coeffi cient on the time dummy for period t (with the time dummy 
omitted in the base period), Δp–   be the change in the average log price, 
and ΔX be the change in the average characteristics including the coun-
try dummies. The log hedonic index with country dummies included 
equals the raw price change minus a quality adjustment equal to the 
predicted effect of the average characteristics change: 
(9.2) ât = Δp–   − (ΔX)βˆ .
Now break X into a physical attributes part and a country mix part:
(9.3) ât = Δp–   − (ΔXPA)βˆPA − (ΔXCM)βˆCM .
The index that includes the effect of source country changes in the mea-
sure of price change is
(9.4) ãt = ât + (ΔXCM)βˆCM .
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
HS 8528 and Televisions
The fi rst set of hedonic indexes that we estimate are for imported 
televisions. As explained above, BLS disclosure policies prevent us 
from showing research indexes that would correspond to an unpub-
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lished level of detail, so we show indexes at the lowest published level 
that includes televisions, HS code 8528. HS 8528 covers televisions 
and other video devices.13 
Comparisons of the offi cial index with our hedonic indexes would 
be affected by more than just the differences in compilation methods 
that we want to investigate, so we construct a matched-model import 
index of our own for use in these comparisons. The key feature of 
the offi cial import index is its use of the matched-model index. Our 
matched-model index replicates that feature, but it differs in the choice 
of aggregation formula. Whereas the offi cial index has a modifi ed 
Laspeyres formula, we use a Jevons (geometric means) index formula to 
combine the matched-model indexes for televisions with that for other 
video devices. Also, whereas the usual Jevons index is an unweighted 
geometric mean of price relatives, our Jevons indexes include country 
weights that refl ect the relative importance of different source coun-
tries in the trade data. Note, however, that our weights do not precisely 
match the weights used for the offi cial index. 
Our matched-model Jevons index with country weights closely 
tracks the offi cial matched-model index for HS 8528 most of the time 
(Figure 9.5). It also has a similar long-run trend. Over the whole period 
of January 2000 to December 2010, our matched-model index falls 
at an average rate of 5.7 percent per year, close to the offi cial index’s 
6 percent per year rate of decline. On a few occasions the indexes 
diverge, however. In May of 2001, August–September of 2005, and 
April of 2008, our index has a higher rate of change than the offi cial 
index, while in August–September of 2008 and April–May of 2009 our 
index measures lower infl ation. 
Televisions and video devices experienced rapid increases in qual-
ity over the period covered by the sample, including the displacement 
of CRT screens by superior fl at-screen technologies (plasma, LCD, and, 
fi nally, LED) and an increase in the average screen size. These qual-
ity improvements substantially affected the average price of a televi-
sion. The difference between the growth rate of the average price and 
the growth rate of the matched-model index refl ects the value of the 
quality improvements. In contrast to the rapidly falling matched-model 
indexes, the weighted average price rises at an average rate of 5.6 per-
cent per year. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the matched-
model Jevons index correctly measures the pure price change, we can 
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   308 2/16/2015   8:35:39 AM
The Impact of Globalization on Prices   309
infer that quality improvements added more than 11 percent per year 
to the annual growth rate of the average price of televisions and other 
video devices over the period that we study. 
Next, we check the accuracy of the matched-model index by com-
paring it to hedonic indexes. To estimate the effects of the entry of new 
source countries whose prices may be lower, one alternative is to con-
trol for physical characteristics of televisions, but not source countries, 
in the hedonic model. Including dummy variables for country of ori-
gin in the hedonic regression would cause the hedonic index to include 
country effects in its quality adjustments. 
A weakness of this approach is, however, that it is vulnerable to 
omitted variable bias. If characteristics and countries are correlated, 
some of the effects of the omitted country variables could be refl ected 
in the coeffi cients on the physical characteristics. This may then cause 
effects of changes in country mix to be embedded in the coeffi cients on 
the physical characteristics. 
Figure 9.5  Matched-Model and Average Import Price Indexes for HS 
8528: Televisions and Other Video Devices
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors’ calculations.
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Including country dummies in the hedonic regression makes the 
coeffi cients on the physical characteristics less likely to include effects 
of changes in source countries that are correlated with changes in phys-
ical characteristics. The coeffi cients on the country dummies can be 
used to adjust the hedonic index so that it includes the price effects of 
changes in country mix, as shown in Equation (9.4). (Note, however, 
that a problem of collinearity between countries and characteristics 
may not be completely solved by this technique, because if the sample 
size is not large enough, such collinearity would likely lead to high 
variances for the coeffi cient estimates.) The difference between the 
adjusted hedonic index and the matched-model index will then include 
the price effects of changing source countries that are missed by the 
matched-model index. If the adjustment is not made, the difference 
between the raw hedonic index that includes country dummies and the 
matched-model index will estimate the amount of quality change from 
improvements in physical attributes due to technological advances that 
is missed by the matched-model index. 
Of the two types of hedonic indexes that we estimate for televi-
sions, the moving-window hedonic index is likely to be more reliable 
than the pooled hedonic index. In the pooled hedonic regression, a sin-
gle set of coeffi cients on the quality characteristics and country dum-
mies (if included) is estimated for the entire time interval covered by 
the sample, so a characteristic’s effect on the logarithm of a TV price is 
constrained to be constant over a long interval. On the other hand, the 
moving-window approach allows the slope coeffi cients to evolve over 
time by estimating separate sets of hedonic coeffi cients for overlap-
ping pairs of years. Over longer time intervals, technological progress 
signifi cantly alters the shadow value of at least some television charac-
teristics, and changes in prices and income could change the demand 
for characteristics in ways that affect their shadow values. Suppose, 
for example, that the price differential for large screens declines over 
the course of the period covered by the sample, and that near the end 
of the sample period imports from China start to grow rapidly, with a 
specialization in smaller screen sizes. The pooled hedonic regression 
would then tend to underestimate the relative quality of the Chinese 
televisions in the period when they are growing, and hence tend to over-
estimate the quality-adjusted price level of televisions from China. 
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Another advantage of the moving-window regression approach is 
that one can see what the estimate of the bias would have been if the 
analysis had stopped earlier than December 2010. Differences between 
the matched-model index for HS 8528 and indexes for HS 8528 that 
incorporate moving-window hedonic price indexes for televisions are 
shown in Figure 9.6. The growth-rate gap between the matched-model 
index and the adjusted moving-window hedonic index is not uniform 
over time; some earlier stopping points would have implied larger esti-
mates of the bias in the matched-model index. Adjusting the hedonic 
index for the changes in source countries lowers its growth rate by 
0.016 index points and brings the estimate of the bias in December 2010 
of the matched-model index up to 0.042 index points. The unadjusted 
moving-window hedonic index for HS 8528 is about 0.026 index points 
Figure 9.6  Differences between Weighted Matched-Model and Weighted 
Overlapping Hedonic Indexes for HS 8528: Televisions and 
Other Video Devices
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lower than the matched-model index in December of 2010, suggesting 
that incomplete measurement of the gains from improved technology 
adds about 0.026 to the matched-model index. 
Omitting the country dummies implies a slightly smaller estimate of 
the bias in the matched-model index of 0.032 index points in December 
2010. This implies that the bias in the matched-model index due to the 
failure to capture price declines from changing source countries is only 
about 0.006 index points in December 2010. The difference between 
the hedonic index that includes country dummies and the hedonic index 
from the regression with no country dummies may underestimate the 
country mix effect because of omitted variable bias. The differences 
between the weighted matched-model index and the various hedonic 
indexes, stated in terms of differences in average annual growth rates, 
are shown in Table 9.4.
Table 9.4  Amounts by Which Matched-Model Index Growth Rate 
Exceeds Moving-Window Hedonic Growth Rates for HS 8528 
(% per year, 2000–2010)
Country dummies included 0.44
Country dummies excluded 0.53
Adjusted for changing country mix 0.72
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
We also estimate pooled hedonic indexes as a kind of robustness 
check on the moving-window hedonic results. Figure 9.7 shows the dif-
ferences between the pure matched-model index for HS 8528 and the 
indexes that incorporate pooled hedonic price indexes for televisions. 
Like the moving-window hedonic indexes, the pooled hedonic indexes all 
imply positive estimates for the ending bias in the matched-model index. 
Indeed, the pooled version of the unadjusted hedonic index that includes 
country dummies implies the same estimate of bias owing to under-
estimation of gains from improvements in technology as the moving-
window version, 0.026 index points. 
On the other hand, the pooled specifi cation produces a lower hedonic 
index than the moving-window specifi cation in the case where country 
dummies are omitted from the model, and a slightly higher hedonic 
index in the case where country dummies are included and an adjust-
ment is made for the effects of changing country mix. Under the pooled 
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specifi cation, the no-country-dummies index is 0.064 index points 
below the matched-model index in December 2010, while the adjusted 
hedonic index is just 0.034 index points lower than the matched-model 
index. Under the pooled specifi cation, the adjusted hedonic index 
implies a bias in the matched-model index from changing sourcing 
of 0.008 index points, while the no-country-dummies hedonic index 
implies that this bias is 0.038 index points. These differences in aver-
age annual growth rates between the pooled hedonic indexes and the 
matched-model index are shown in Table 9.5.
Figure 9.7  Differences between Weighted Matched-Model and Weighted 
Hedonic Indexes for HS 8528: Televisions and Other Video 
Devices
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Table 9.5  Amounts by Which Matched-Model Index Growth Rate 
Exceeds Pooled Hedonic Growth Rates for HS 8528 (% per 
year, 2000–2010)
Country dummies included 0.43
Country dummies excluded 1.11
Adjusted for changing country mix 0.58 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Television Component of HS 8528 
Even though we cannot show the television component of HS 8528 
as a separate index, we can calculate how sensitive the television index 
is to the choice of method. To fi nd the difference between a matched-
model index and a hedonic index for televisions, we divide the differ-
ence between the logarithmic matched-model and hedonic indexes for 
HS 8528 by the weight of the television component of HS 8528, which 
is 0.343. The implied difference for televisions in the fi nal period can 
then be converted into an average annual growth rate over the 11 years 
covered by the sample.
The growth rate of the matched-model index for televisions is 2.2 
percent per year above that of the adjusted moving-window hedonic 
index (Table 9.6). Subtracting the 1.3 percentage points coming from 
unmeasured technological improvements (measured by the unadjusted 
hedonic index) leaves 0.9 percentage points of the bias in the matched-
model index growth rate to be attributed to changing source countries. 
To gauge the robustness of the results to the estimation method, we 
show in Table 9.6 some alternative estimates of the bias in the matched-
model index. Omitting the country dummies rather than adjusting for 
the predicted effect of changing country mix reduces the estimate of the 
total bias implied by a moving-window hedonic index to 1.6 percent 
per year. Pooling all the years rather than running overlapping regres-
sions on pairs of years reduces the estimate of the total bias based on the 
model with country dummies to 1.8 percent per year but increases the 
estimate based on the model with no country dummies to 3.4 percent 
per year. Subtracting the estimate of the bias from technology-related 
quality change from each of the alternative estimates of the total gives a 
range of estimates of 0.5 to 2.1 percent per year for the effect of chang-
ing source countries.
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Table 9.6  Estimates of Bias in a Matched-Model Index for Televisions 
Implied by Different Specifi cations of the Weighted Hedonic 
Regression 
Type of hedonic 
regression
From hedonic 
regression excluding 
country dummies
(% per year)
From using country’s 
coeffi cients to adjust 
for change in country 
mix (% per year)
From hedonic 
regression with 
country dummies, 
undermeasurement 
of technology-related 
quality change
(% per year)
Moving window 1.6 2.2 1.3 
All years pooled 3.4 1.8 1.3 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
HS 90 and Cameras
Besides televisions, we investigate differences between hedonic 
and matched-model indexes for cameras. Cameras are a component of 
the published import index for HS 90, “Optical, photographic, mea-
suring, and medical instruments,” so we show indexes for HS 90 that 
incorporate matched-model and hedonic indexes for cameras. Even 
though fewer than 4 percent of the observations classifi ed in HS 90 are 
for cameras during the period we examine (January 2000–March 2006), 
the HS 90 index is suffi ciently sensitive to the choice of method for its 
cameras component to produce interesting results. 
The baseline for the comparisons with hedonic indexes is again a 
matched-model index meant to simulate the offi cial methodology. Most 
of the time our weighted matched-model Jevons index has virtually the 
same rate of change as the offi cial index for HS 90, and it exhibits 
similar turning points (Figure 9.8). However, there are two episodes 
where our matched-model index is fl at or slowly rising at the same time 
that the offi cial indexes are falling. The fi rst episode occurs in June–
September of 2001, and the second occurs in January–March of 2006. 
An index of the weighted average price is also shown in Figure 9.8. 
A notable decline in the average price relative to the matched-model 
index occurs between June 2001 and April 2002. The growing gap 
between the matched-model and average-price indexes implies that the 
average quality of imported cameras was declining over that time inter-
val. An alternative explanation could, of course, be that the matched-
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model index is upwardly biased. Part of the relative decline in aver-
age price comes from the emergence of inexpensive digital cameras 
as a popular camera type, and another part of the decline seems to be 
due to changes in source countries. Such collinearity between physi-
cal changes in characteristics and changes in source countries tends 
to reduce the precision with which independent slope coeffi cients for 
these two kinds of effects can be identifi ed in a hedonic regression. 
The moving-window hedonic index with country dummies assumes 
that price differentials between countries refl ect quality differences. 
According to this index, the matched-model index has a cumulative bias 
of zero up to January 2004 (Figure 9.9). In other words, the adjustments 
for declining quality that are implicit in the matched-model procedure 
are deemed to be correct, on average, up to 2004. Over the subsequent 
two years, however, changes in physical characteristics embodied in 
Figure 9.8  Matched-Model and Average Import Price lndexes for HS 90: 
Cameras and Other Photographic, Measuring, and Medical 
Instruments
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors’ calculations.
Offi cial BLS index
-
- i
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new camera models do appear to cause declines in quality-adjusted 
prices that are missed by the matched-model index. 
Adjusting the moving-window hedonic index so it includes effects 
of country-sourcing changes gives a different picture. In fact, this 
adjusted hedonic index behaves much like the index of the average 
price up to 2004. Figure 9.8 shows that in early 2002, the average price 
index dropped precipitously relative to the matched-model index; as a 
result, the matched-model index considerably overstates price change 
in early 2002, according to the adjusted moving-window hedonic index. 
Thereafter, the cumulative bias in the matched-model index implied by 
the adjusted hedonic index rises slowly but consistently until the end of 
the sample period. 
Figure 9.9  Difference between Matched-Model Index and Hedonic 
Indexes for HS 90: Cameras and Other Photographic, 
Measuring, and Medical Instruments
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The implication that physical changes in cameras between 2000 
and 2004 did not affect their average quality level seems questionable. 
The low slope coeffi cients on physical characteristics in the model with 
country dummies could refl ect the imprecision caused by collinearity 
and small sample sizes. In fact, the hedonic index with no country dum-
mies implies that roughly half of the large decline in the average price 
index relative to the matched-model index is caused by falling quality 
that is due to changes in physical characteristics. This quality adjust-
ment results in a smaller estimate of the total bias in the matched-model 
index than is produced by the adjusted hedonic index.
The pooled approach to fi tting the hedonic regression may also help 
with the problem of collinearity and small sample size. The magnitude 
of the adjustment for country mix is markedly smaller using the pooled 
regression model, and the behavior of all three hedonic indexes is plau-
sible (Figure 9.10). 
The growth rate differences between the matched-model index 
and the various moving-window approaches and the pooled hedonic 
indexes are summarized in Table 9.7. The two approaches agree on the 
total size of the bias in the matched-model indexes, but the moving-
window hedonic implies that a larger portion of this bias comes from 
changing source countries. 
Table 9.7  Differences in Average Growth Rate between the Matched-
Model Index and Hedonic Indexes for HS 90
Moving-window 
hedonic Pooled hedonic
Country dummies included 0.21 0.31
Country dummies excluded 0.29 0.33
Adjusted for changing country mix 0.36 0.36
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Camera Component of HS 90 
The weight of cameras within the HS 90 aggregate is about one-
thirtieth, so we infer the effects of hedonic adjustment on the cameras 
index by scaling up the effects on the logarithmic HS90 index by a 
factor of 30. Table 9.8 shows the implied differences in average annual 
growth rates. The fi rst two rows are based on the last date available for 
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each individual time series, while the third row of Table 9.8 uses the 
ending date for the pooled hedonic indexes that is used for the moving-
window hedonic indexes. (The pooled hedonic indexes in Figure 9.10 
end three months later than the moving-window hedonic indexes 
in Figure 9.9.) If the same ending date is used, the moving-window 
and pooled approaches imply similar estimates of the total bias in the 
matched-model index of about 11.5 percent per year. On the other hand, 
if a longer period is used for the pooled hedonic regression, the pooled 
indexes are all 0.9 percentage points below the comparable moving-
window hedonic index. 
According to the moving-window indexes, the bias in the matched-
model index caused by declines in quality-adjusted prices associated 
Figure 9.10  Difference between Matched-Model Index and Hedonic 
Indexes for HS 90: Cameras and Other Photographic, 
Measuring, and Medical Instruments
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with new technology amounts to 6.7 percent per year, whereas based 
on the pooled hedonic indexes this bias amounts to just 5.8 percent 
per year. The latter fi gure is consistent with prior literature: moving-
window estimates from an earlier study by Manninen (2005) also imply 
a bias of 5.8 percent per year in a matched-model index for digital cam-
eras from Q4 of 1999 to Q4 of 2002. (Manninen used consumer prices, 
so the matched-model index in that study may have captured the price 
declines caused by changing source countries.) 
The adjustment for the price effect of changing country mix is 4.7 
percent per year both for the moving-window hedonic regressions and 
for the full-sample pooled hedonic regression. On the other hand, using 
the shorter time period, the pooled hedonic regression attributes just 
2.3 percent per year of the total bias to changes in source country. The 
hedonic regressions with no country dummies (using either the moving 
window or the full sample for the pooled index) also imply a bias of 2.3 
percent per year from changes in source country. 
The sample period for the camera indexes is only about six years 
long, and the variances of the moving-window coeffi cient estimates 
tend to be high because of problems of small sample size and collinear-
ity between changes in physical characteristics and changes in source 
country. Imposing additional restrictions can be a way of reducing the 
variances of regression coeffi cient estimates, and holding the coeffi -
Table 9.8  Estimates of Bias in the Matched-Model Index for Cameras 
Implied by Different Specifi cations of the Weighted Hedonic 
Regression 
Type of hedonic 
regression
Estimate from 
hedonic regression 
excluding country 
dummies
(% per year)
Estimate from 
adjusting for change 
in countries using 
country coeffi cients 
(% per year)
Estimated 
unmeasured 
technology-related 
quality change from 
hedonic regression 
with country 
dummies
(% per year)
Moving window  9.0 11.4 6.7 
All years pooled 8.1 10.5 5.8 
All years pooled, same 
ending month as for 
moving window
10.1 11.6 9.3 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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cients constant over our relatively short panel data set on cameras does 
not seem highly restrictive. Thus, in this case, the pooled approach may 
produce more reliable estimates of the hedonic model than the more 
fl exible moving-window approach. 
Bananas
As a check on whether our hedonic indexes for televisions and cam-
eras could be producing spurious measures of the effects of evolving 
technology, we calculate the same sort of hedonic indexes for bananas. 
We would not expect to fi nd evidence of unmeasured gains from tech-
nological progress for this product, nor is there a reason to expect that 
large cost savings have been realized by changing source countries for 
this product. However, as noted above, bananas have had changes in 
source country, so price effects from changes in source country may not 
equal zero. 
Bananas have a weight of about one-fi fth in the publication-level 
import index for HS 08, the category “edible fruits and nuts.” After 
excluding “index prices” (which are reference prices reported by 
respondents who prefer not to provide an actual transaction price), our 
matched-model index for HS 08, edible fruits and nuts, usually tracks 
the shorter-term movements of the offi cial index for HS 08, and over 
the longer run it shows very similar growth to the offi cial index (Figure 
9.11). Its average growth rate over the whole sample period is 0.73 
percent, compared with 0.65 percent per year for the offi cial index. The 
average price index, on the other hand, has a long-run growth rate of 
1.18 percent per year. 
The hedonic indexes for bananas behave very differently from 
those for televisions and cameras. In contrast to the estimates of upward 
bias in matched-model import indexes for televisions and cameras, they 
imply that some price increases are missed by the matched-model index 
(Figure 9.12). Thus, in this case there is no evidence of unmeasured 
price declines from factors such as technological progress. However, 
this difference in the sign of the matched-model index’s bias is consis-
tent with the hypothesis that matched-model indexes tend to be too fl at, 
missing increases when prices are generally rising and decreases when 
prices are generally falling. The indexes for televisions and cameras 
have a downward trend, while banana prices have an upward trend. 
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Furthermore, comparing the unadjusted hedonic index that includes 
country dummies to either 1) the index with no country dummies or 
2) the index that was adjusted to treat price differential between coun-
tries as true price differences rather than quality differences shows that 
sourcing for bananas has a slight tendency to migrate to more expensive 
countries. The unadjusted hedonic index that includes country dummies 
grows on average 1.28 percent per year, whereas the adjusted index 
grows 1.19 percent per year. In contrast, for televisions and cameras, 
sourcing had a strong tendency to migrate to less expensive countries. 
CONCLUSION
The import and export price indexes are constructed as matched-
model indexes. If new entrants have lower quality-adjusted prices than 
incumbents, and incumbents either exit or fail to adjust their prices to 
Figure 9.11  Matched-Model and Average Import Price Indexes for HS 
08: Edible Fruits and Nuts 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors’ calculations.
Offi cial BLS index
-
-
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match those of the entrants, the matched-model index will be upwardly 
biased, other things being equal. Thus, when technological progress 
leads to frequent entry of new models with lower quality-adjusted 
prices, matched-model indexes can easily suffer upward bias. Further-
more, the movement of production to lower-cost foreign locations can 
also lead to price reductions that would not be measured by a matched-
model import index, because sourcing an item from a new country usu-
ally results in that item being treated as a new item. Hedonic index 
methods are a possible way to address these concerns. Yet they have 
not been viewed as feasible for import price indexes because of the lim-
ited collection of information on product characteristics and, in some 
cases, small sample sizes for purposes of estimating a hedonic regres-
sion model. 
Figure 9.12  Difference between Matched-Model Index and Hedonic 
Indexes for HS 08: Edible Fruits and Nuts
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One goal of this chapter is to disprove the view that hedonic indexes 
are not feasible for imports. Our results show that hedonic methods 
indeed are a realistic alternative for at least some of the imported 
products that have experienced technological progress and changes in 
sourcing. Our results also provide evidence on the existence and size 
of the biases in a matched-model-type import index for two of these 
products, televisions and cameras. They support the hypothesis that 
technological progress and changes in source countries have led to 
reductions in quality-adjusted prices that are incompletely refl ected in 
the matched-model import price index. In the case of televisions, our 
preferred adjusted moving-window hedonic regression implies a bias 
in the matched-model index of 2.2 percent per year, of which 1.3 per-
centage points come from undermeasured gains from new technology 
and 0.9 percentage points come from unmeasured price savings from 
country substitution. For cameras, our preferred pooled hedonic regres-
sion specifi cation implies a total bias in the matched-model index of 
10.5 percent per year, of which 5.8 percentage points come from under-
measured gains from new technology and 4.7 percentage points come 
from country sourcing changes. 
Notes
The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and should not be attributed 
to the IMF, its management, or its executive directors; nor do they refl ect the views of 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
 1.  For a recent study with estimates of outlet substitution bias, see Greenlees and 
McClelland (2011).
 2.  Gagnon, Mandel, and Vigfusson (2012) prefer different assumptions and fi nd 
smaller effects of omitted price changes for exiting and entering items than those 
found by Nakamura and Steinsson (2012). 
 3.  For example, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) show that new producers in 
China supply identical-quality semiconductors at lower prices than established 
producers in other countries. Thomas, Marquez, and Fahle (2008) attempt to mea-
sure price reductions from substitution to low-cost countries for a wider range of 
products. 
 4.  For motor vehicles, the upper-bound estimate for the bias from import sourcing 
changes is a bit smaller, at about 0.7 percent per year, while for apparel it is about 
0.25 percent per year.
 5.  We focus on color televisions sized 13 inches or larger and exclude television/
VCR combinations. We do not include plantains in the analysis of bananas.
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 6.  When respondents are worried about disclosure of their transaction price, they can 
give an index price that approximates the behavior of the actual price instead of an 
actual transaction price.
 7.  Almost 12 percent of the televisions experience these temporary exits, as opposed 
to about 6 percent for bananas.
 8.  When using the cell-relative method, the missing value is determined by the 
change in the index value for the nonmissing values in a particular class. When 
using the class-mean method, the missing value is determined by the mean of 
the nonmissing values for a particular class. The International Price Program also 
sometimes uses linear interpolation to impute prices.
 9.  In calculating these average durations and price change frequencies, we included 
items for which the observable life span was truncated because they entered before 
January 2000 or exited after the end of our sample (December 2010 for televisions 
or March 2006 for cameras). Correcting for truncation bias will raise our estimates 
slightly.
 10.  The Laspeyres indexes used by the BLS are more precisely described as Lowe 
indexes because their weights are based on values from a previous year; these 
values have subsequently been updated for price change. From 1997 to 2001 the 
weights in the MPI came from 1995. After 2001 the weights began to be updated 
annually, with a lag of two years. 
 11.  The standard defi nition of a Jevons index is an unweighted geometric mean of 
price relatives. Within any given classifi cation group our Jevons indexes are, 
indeed, unweighted, but weights are applied when we aggregate over the clas-
sifi cation groups that make up a Jevons index. These weights come from the same 
year used for the offi cial index and refl ect trade values in that year. 
 12.  In future research we plan to test the method of full hedonic imputation. This 
method uses the estimated coeffi cients from the comparison period regression to 
predict prices of items that were present in the base period, and it uses the esti-
mated coeffi cients from the base period to predict prices of items present in the 
comparison period.
 13.  For national accounts purposes it would be helpful to have separate data on val-
ues and prices of imported televisions and video monitors. Televisions are mostly 
used for fi nal consumption, but video monitors have signifi cant uses as investment 
goods. Because of the way investment is measured in the U.S. national accounts, 
an inaccurate split between imports of fi nal consumption goods and imports of 
investment goods could affect the measurement of GDP.
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Appendix 9A
Table 9A.1  Quality Characteristics Used in Hedonic Regressions
Product Characteristics
Televisions
Type Plasma, CRT, LCD, projection, LED
Size
Brand Premium (Sony, Sharp, LG, Samsung, Panasonic) or other
Intrafi rm
Country of origin
Cameras
Type Point-and-shoot, Polaroid, SLR
Format Digital, fi lm
Focus Autofocus, fi xed focus, manual focus
Brand Canon, Nikon, or other
Intrafi rm
Country of origin
Bananas
Type Cavendish or other
Grade Grade 1 or 2
Crate size
Intrafi rm
Country of origin
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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Producing an Input Price Index
William Alterman
formerly of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
This chapter is designed to address the need—and especially the 
feasibility—of producing what is referred to as an input price index 
(IPI) at the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).1 The current interest 
in this set of proposed price indexes grew out of concerns that the BLS 
does not directly measure price decreases associated with the dramatic 
rise in offshoring (or its corollary, onshoring) in its industrial price pro-
grams.2 These new price indexes would help alleviate unease that cur-
rent estimates of several key indicators of the U.S. economy—includ-
ing gross domestic product (GDP), productivity, and infl ation—may be 
inadequate. 
Currently, the BLS has three price indexes that cover the production 
(or supply) of goods: 1) the U.S. Import Price Index (MPI), 2) the U.S. 
Export Price Index (XPI), and 3) the Producer Price Index (PPI). The 
MPI only covers goods that are being imported, the XPI only covers 
the export of goods, and the PPI only covers goods and services that 
are produced domestically. Thus, a good that is domestically produced 
and repriced by the PPI, and subsequently has its production sent over-
seas, will no longer be tracked in the PPI. Correspondingly, the MPI 
will not begin to price that particular item until after it has become an 
import. Therefore, neither program will directly show the price change 
that occurs when the item goes from domestic production to foreign (or 
vice versa). 
In order to address this limitation, the BLS would need to develop 
an entirely new set of “input” price indexes, which would directly price 
goods and services that are inputs into the production function of a 
domestic company. Indeed, the BLS itself recognized the need for this 
type of series over 30 years ago when the old “wholesale price index” 
was transformed into the more comprehensive and systematic output-
based producer price indexes. At that time, the BLS actually piloted a 
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“buyers’” index, but, primarily because of budget limitations, this ear-
lier effort at an input price index was never extended.
This chapter will detail the problem in the current methodology for 
price indexes that an import price index would be designed to over-
come, as well as review some of the evidence on the need for these data. 
Finally, the chapter will discuss the practical aspects and limitations of 
attempting to produce such an index. These include surveying the data 
sources necessary for drawing a sample of establishments and items to 
reprice, evaluating possible sources for appropriate weights in an input 
price index, determining a proper index estimation formula, and verify-
ing the publication structure necessary to support the different uses of 
these series. 
THE PROBLEM 
An example of how the BLS constructs an import price index and 
a producer price index will help to illuminate the problem described 
above. Let us look at how both indexes would refl ect price changes in 
the manufacturing of furniture. Table 10.1 contains prices for four differ-
ent chairs. All chairs that are being produced domestically sell for $10, 
while all imported chairs sell for $5. Chair A is only produced domesti-
cally, while Chair D is only imported. During the year, the remaining 
two chairs shift from domestic production to being imported—Chair B 
in March and Chair C in May. 
The PPI tracks only Chair A for the entire period, and Chairs B 
and C for the months that they are domestically produced. The MPI 
tracks only chair D for the entire period, and chairs B and C only for the 
months they are imported. Thus, both the PPI and the MPI for chairs 
would refl ect no change during the entire reference period.3
Is there a way to combine the two indexes to refl ect the impact 
of a switch from domestic production to importing the same chairs? 
Since the indexes are always unchanged, no amount of recombin-
ing or reweighting will produce anything other than a series showing 
unchanged prices. The only way to construct a price index that would 
show the price decline resulting from the offshoring of chairs B and C 
would be to directly track the price changes of items as they move from 
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domestic to foreign and vice versa. This is not possible under the meth-
odology (and concepts) currently in use in the bureau’s two industrial 
price programs.4
WHY AN INPUT PRICE INDEX IS IMPORTANT
Although the BLS was aware of the potential data gaps between 
XPI, MPI, and PPI, the shifts over time between domestic and foreign 
production may have been gradual enough that it was not evident that 
the limitation of the indexes could be introducing biases into the nation’s 
economic data. This potential gap in BLS data, however, became more 
serious as the proportion of the U.S. economy tied to the global econ-
omy expanded, and especially in conjunction with the growing percep-
tion that U.S. jobs were being lost to foreign competition and foreign 
workers.
The potential shortcomings in the BLS indexes were highlighted in 
an article in BusinessWeek (Mandel 2007) and subsequently in a study 
funded by the Sloan Foundation and the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA).5 As the article and the study point out, an accurate estimate of the 
trend in prices paid by domestic U.S. establishments for inputs of both 
goods and services is crucial to a number of broad and critical measures 
Table 10.1  Tracking Prices When Sourcing Shifts
Jan. ’09 Feb. ’09 Mar. ’09 Apr. ’09 May ’09 June ’09
Chair A Domestic ($) 10 10 10 10 10 10
Chair B Domestic ($) 10 10
Chair B Imported ($) 5 5 5 5
Chair C Domestic ($) 10 10 10 10
Chair C Imported ($) 5 5
Chair D Imported ($) 5 5 5 5 5 5
 
PPI (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
MPI (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Combined index (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Input index (%) 100.0 100.0 85.7 85.7 71.4 71.4
SOURCE: Author’s construction.
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of the economy, such as GDP and productivity. For example, in order 
to properly estimate GDP by industry (as constructed by the BEA) and 
by industry productivity estimates (as constructed by the BLS), the pro-
ducers of these economic data must subtract input costs. Although these 
data are usually readily available on a current dollar basis, in order to 
convert these nominal values to a constant dollar basis—that is, to an 
infl ation-adjusted basis, also referred to as a real (as opposed to a nomi-
nal) basis—they must be adjusted by changes in price levels. However, 
the appropriate price measures paralleling these input values are not 
currently being produced by the BLS. Consequently, the BEA and BLS 
must make use of whatever price data are available. Generally, this has 
required the agencies to make use of the PPI price indexes or the import 
price indexes.
The argument has been made that using these next-best sources may 
lead to signifi cant mismeasurements in the economy. For example, the 
BusinessWeek story estimated that the increase in real GDP from 2003 
to mid-2007 may have been overestimated by $66 billion. 
As evidence of this, the article’s author, Mandel, points out the 
apparently contradictory behavior of consumer prices for furniture—
which had been falling—at the same time that the indexes for domestic 
producer prices as well as import prices for this category had both been 
moving higher. Conversely, the article also infers that the lack of an 
input price index may lead to a signifi cant overestimate of productiv-
ity in U.S. industry. A rise in a nation’s productivity is considered the 
key factor in an economy’s ability to improve that nation’s standard of 
living, as it is presumed that increases in real hourly earnings should 
move in conjunction with gains in productivity. If, in fact, GDP and 
productivity are being overestimated, this implies that the gains from 
trade (i.e., the terms of trade) are being underestimated and that, in real 
terms, the value of imports is greater than currently measured. 
A growing body of literature—much of it in conjunction with the 
original 2009 conference and a second conference in 2013—has looked 
into the increasing role of imports in intermediate inputs in the U.S. 
economy, the current price index methodology used in the BLS, and 
their implications in U.S. estimates of GDP and productivity. For exam-
ple, Kurz and Lengermann (2008) note that foreign inputs accounted 
for one-third of growth in the manufacturing sector between 1997 and 
2005. Houseman et al. (2011) further explore the subject and fi nd that 
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as a result of the mismeasurement of the shift from domestic to low-
cost foreign suppliers, the growth in real value-added in manufacturing 
may have been overstated by between 0.2 and 0.5 percentage points 
from 1997 to 2007. Along similar lines, Feenstra et al. (2009) attri-
bute a substantial portion of the apparent acceleration in productiv-
ity gains after 1995 to gains in the terms of trade and to tariff reduc-
tions. Additional work on this topic has been conducted by Houseman, 
Bartik, and Sturgeon (Chapter 5, this volume), who raise concerns over 
potential overestimates of productivity in the computer sector. In look-
ing at Japanese data, Fukao and Arai (Chapter 7, this volume) conclude 
Japan also has “a relatively large offshoring bias.” Using data from 
38 economies, Inklaar (Chapter 6, this volume) fi nds evidence of sys-
tematic bias as a result of offshoring for the advanced economies. In 
related work, Nakamura and Steinsson (2009) fi nd limitations in the 
import and export price indexes associated with “product replacement 
bias.” Finally, Nakamura et al. (Chapter 2, this volume) see the need 
for a large increase in data collection by statistical agencies as well as 
changes in their price index methodology that would allow for more 
direct comparisons of closely related items from different sources. 
In order to provide additional evidence of the growing need for a set 
of input price indexes that incorporate both domestic and foreign sourc-
ing, I analyzed the most recent available data on the role of imports 
in domestic supply. In 1975, imports, as measured in current dollars, 
represented less than 7 percent of inputs into manufacturing. By 2007 
the fi gure had climbed to almost 28 percent (see Figure 10.1). Equally 
important is that between 1997 and 2007 the percentage of imports 
in inputs increased by an average of more than 0.40 percent a year, 
whereas in the previous decade the percentage had increased by less 
than 0.25 percent a year. This point is interesting because it implies 
that there is an acceleration in companies’ shifting their products from 
domestic sourcing to foreign sourcing, making the need for additional 
data more critical.6
Indeed, globalization may be happening so quickly that the ability 
of traditional measures to capture these shifts has become increasingly 
problematic. For example, the household wood furniture manufactur-
ing industry—the industry highlighted in the BusinessWeek article—
recorded a dramatic increase during the past decade in the value of 
imports, which jumped from $13.2 billion in 1999 to $27.0 billion in 
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2007. The article also points out that, according to offi cial statistics,
productivity went up 23 percent and output rose 3 percent between 
2000 and 2005 (Mandel 2007). Interestingly, in 2006 the preliminary 
estimate from the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) for the 
household wood furniture sector recorded an increase in the value of 
domestic production, up from $13.0 billion in 1999 to $13.5 billion 
in 2006 (U.S. Census Bureau 2013). However, when the fi nal fi gures 
were revised the following year, the number was adjusted substantially 
downward, to only $8.6 billion. This may be due in part to the diffi culty 
of properly (and in a timely manner) coding companies to the correct 
North American Industry Classifi cation System (NAICS) number when 
they shift from being a manufacturer to being essentially a wholesaler. 
The key point is that economic data tasked with refl ecting current trends 
must be fl exible enough to allow for continual changes in the composi-
tion of the economy.7 Ideally, an input price index will facilitate this 
Figure 10.1  Imports as a Percentage of Domestic Supply Manufacturing 
Sector 
NOTE: There is a break in the series in 1998. Data prior to 1998 are based on the 
Standard Industrial Classifi cation (SIC) code for manufacturing. More recent data are 
based on the North American Industry Classifi cation System (NAICS).
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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fl exibility, as it allows for rapid capturing of changes in suppliers (and 
prices) of inputs.
EARLIER ATTEMPTS TO CONSTRUCT INPUT OR BUYERS’ 
PRICE INDEXES
The seminal 1961 report of the NBER Price Statistics Review Com-
mittee, the so-called Stigler Report (Stigler 1961), made a number of 
recommendations surrounding the wholesale price indexes—the name 
given to the industrial price series then being produced by the BLS. One 
of the recommendations called for the creation of a set of conceptually 
rigorous input and output price indexes. A second recommendation was 
that the bureau should rely on buyers’ prices and not on sellers’ prices. 
The report included a study that suggested that buyers’ prices were 
more likely than list prices to refl ect the prices of actual transactions. 
Using Buyers’ Prices
In response to the Stigler Report and subsequent studies, the then-
BLS commissioner as well as others expressed concerns that the cost of 
collecting buyers’ prices would outweigh the potential benefi ts because 
of potential problems such as buyers’ prices from an invoice sometimes 
not refl ecting real transaction prices, diffi culties capturing retroactive 
price adjustments based on cumulative volume, and fi nancial assistance 
given by sellers to buyers for advertising and other expenses.8 The BLS 
did, however, agree that the project had merit on a case-by-case basis 
in order to facilitate analysis of price trends in industries where transac-
tion pricing was especially problematic.
A more detailed study looking into the advantages of buyers’ prices 
was subsequently published in Stigler and Kindahl (1970), which 
pointed out the differences in price trends between buyers’ and sell-
ers’ prices. Because much of the concern with the then-named BLS 
wholesale price index (WPI) focused on the use (or potential misuse) 
of so-called list prices, BLS economists began working with the sellers 
who were participating in the price survey to encourage the reporting of 
actual transaction prices. In doing so, they made substantial progress in 
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some industries in improving the quality of the received prices. In addi-
tion, the bureau also began the process of evaluating specifi c products 
where buyers’ prices should be collected because of the unavailability 
of transaction prices from sellers. As a result of this study, in Janu-
ary 1972 the newly renamed PPI began publishing a commodity index 
for aluminum ingots using buyers’ prices from a selected sample of 
reporters. 
Building on this work, in 1974 the bureau attempted a systematic 
sampling approach to obtaining buyers’ prices. This project was under-
taken with the goal of determining the feasibility and cost of collecting 
prices directly from buyers in order to either calculate price indexes or 
evaluate the quality of the transaction prices being reported by sellers. 
The project identifi ed product areas where sellers refused to provide 
transaction data, or the quality of current transaction data was question-
able, and where there were homogeneous products frequently purchased 
by buyers in consistent quantities. The project focused on titanium forg-
ings instead of aluminum ingots because the PPI was able to create a 
sampling frame and document the typical transaction characteristics of 
buyers in this product area. Even after signifi cant resources had been 
spent on this project, pricing issues remained, and an effective process 
had not been identifi ed to refi ne and systematically sample from the 
frame. As a result, the project was dropped, and the program switched 
its focus back to obtaining good transaction prices from sellers even in 
these more diffi cult cases. No further work was done on buyers’ prices, 
and in 1980, the BLS introduced indexes calculated using sellers’ trans-
action prices from the systematic sample for the primary aluminum 
industry output index. When this occurred, the buyers’ price commod-
ity index for aluminum ingots was dropped.
Input/Output (and Other) Price Indexes
Also in response to the Stigler Report, the BLS began examining a 
more systematic approach to creating input and output price indexes (as 
well as other indexes) for industries. For example, in the early 1960s the 
PPI built output industry-sector price indexes (ISPI) for some industries 
by combining the judgmentally sampled data collected for the com-
modity indexes using different classifi cation structures and weighting. 
Finally, in the mid-1970s, the PPI began a comprehensive revision in 
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order to plan and implement many improvements that had been rec-
ommended over the years, including in the Stigler Report. The long-
term goal of the revision was to expand the PPI’s coverage to include 
every industry in the private economy and to publish a system of price 
indexes that included the following:
• Industry output indexes
• Industry input indexes 
• Detailed commodity indexes 
• Industry-based stage-of-processing indexes
In the late 1970s the Bureau began systematically sampling industries, 
and starting in 1980 it began introducing industry output indexes on a 
regular basis. Throughout the years, the PPI continued expanding the 
number of industry output indexes, and as of 2013 it covered 98 percent 
of domestic goods manufacturers and 72 percent of in-scope domestic 
service industries. 
While the practical work focused on an output price index, work 
did proceed on the theory of an input price index, culminating in a BLS 
working paper by Archibald (1975). Furthermore, as an attempt to ful-
fi ll the recommendations of the Stigler report, and as a component of 
the stage of processing indexes, the bureau did publish a set of input 
price indexes from 1988 to 2003. These indexes were calculated by 
reweighting output prices using input weights. This allowed the use of 
output price indexes at a great level of detail. However, these indexes 
did not include imports, nor did they directly account for substitution 
from a buyer’s perspective. Thus they assumed that sellers’ prices are a 
good proxy for buyers’ prices and that prices for imports and domestic 
production move similarly. The BLS discontinued these series in 2003, 
but the method is still used in the BEA and BLS for constructing input 
price indexes where necessary.9
CURRENT USES AND USERS OF THE DATA 
The fundamental question facing the BLS, of course, is, “Can the 
Bureau produce an input price series that will meet the needs of its 
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primary users?” In order to answer this question, one must fi rst delve 
into the intricacies of the construction of the outputs of the two primary 
potential users of these data, the Offi ce of Productivity and Technology 
(OPT) at the BLS, and the Industry Sector Division (ISD) of the BEA. 
The Offi ce of Productivity and Technology at the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics
We will start with the OPT, which produces three sets of estimates of 
multifactor productivity (MFP), or output per unit of combined inputs. 
First, OPT publishes multifactor productivity estimates for the broad 
private business and private nonfarm business sectors of the economy. 
These sectors represent 74 percent of U.S. GDP. In calculating these 
series, outputs are measured on a value-added basis, and consequently 
the multifactor productivity measure only shows the returns to labor and 
capital.10 The value of material inputs does not enter into these calcula-
tions. However, staff does use detailed price indexes to defl ate inputs 
of capital expenditures. Physical capital, as measured by the OPT, con-
sists of 42 types of equipment and software, 21 types of nonresidential 
structures, nine types of residential capital, inventories (manufacturing 
available for three stages of fabrication), and land. Defl ation of each 
capital expenditure category is actually done at the detailed fi ve- or six-
digit input-output (I-O) level. 
Second, the OPT also publishes annual multifactor productivity 
measures for total manufacturing and 18 broad three-digit NAICS man-
ufacturing industries, comparing sectoral output (total output excluding 
intraindustry or intrasector transactions) to a broad set of inputs, includ-
ing capital, labor, energy, materials, and business services (KLEMS) 
inputs. Consequently, MFP measures in this set of manufacturing indus-
tries refl ect the return on each of these inputs to production. (Note that 
on a value-added basis, manufacturing represented 12 percent of GDP 
in 2012.) In the manufacturing sector of the economy and in individual 
industries, intermediate purchases constitute the largest component of 
inputs. The nominal dollar and constant dollar values of energy, materi-
als, and services used by the OPT are obtained from the BEA. 
Finally, the OPT publishes more detailed annual multifactor pro-
ductivity measures for 86 four-digit NAICS manufacturing industries, 
plus air transportation and line-haul railroads. These productivity mea-
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sures also compare industry sectoral output to a broad set of combined 
inputs. The OPT publishes estimates of intermediate purchases, capital, 
and labor for each of the detailed manufacturing industries. The index 
of intermediate purchases for each industry is constructed by combin-
ing separate quantities (or constant dollar costs) of electricity, fuels, 
materials, and purchased services. In order to defl ate nominal dol-
lar cost inputs for each industry, weighted defl ators for materials and 
for services are calculated by combining detailed price indexes using 
weights derived from the cost of commodities consumed by each indus-
try, as shown in the detailed benchmark I-O tables produced by the 
BEA. I-O commodities from the benchmark I-O tables generally relate 
to the primary products of six-digit NAICS industries, or occasionally 
a combination of industries. For materials commodities that are heavily 
imported, the OPT’s Division of Industry Productivity Studies (DIPS) 
combines PPIs and import price indexes using weights from the BEA’s 
import matrix. DIPS also uses PPIs in creating weighted defl ators for 
defl ating the annual fuel purchases of each industry. 
The OPT also uses PPIs to defl ate capital expenditures. Price defl a-
tors for each equipment asset category are constructed by combining 
detailed PPIs with weights from the BEA capital fl ow tables at roughly 
the six-digit level. For the DIPS detailed manufacturing industry mea-
sures, physical capital consists of 25 categories of equipment, two cat-
egories of structures, three categories of inventories, and land.11 Since 
industry MFP calculations are based on annual data, the nominal input 
values are adjusted by annual PPIs (representing the average of 12 
monthly price indexes). 
The Industry Sector Division at the Bureau of Economic Analysis
The Industry Sector Division at the BEA is responsible for pro-
ducing the annual industry accounts and the benchmark input-output 
accounts. These accounts, which shed critical light on the relationships 
between U.S. industries, take a value-added approach to, and are con-
sistent with, the BEA’s fl agship GDP estimates. Although the BEA does 
not publish detailed annual real I-O estimates, it does publish annual 
price and quantity indexes for 65 detailed industries, including 19 man-
ufacturing industries, which do require data on the real value of inputs. 
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As the BLS does in its work, the BEA attempts to make its adjust-
ments at the most detailed level possible. For example, at the BEA, the 
effort to construct updated values for intermediate inputs of goods and 
services entails making adjustments to approximately 3,500 different 
items, of which roughly 2,300 represent categories of goods. Ideally, 
like the BLS, the BEA would like to have a level of detail that lists 
input price indexes by industry for each of the 1,179 six-digit NAICS 
categories. In practice, however, since the cost of producing that many 
separate price indexes could prove prohibitive, like the BLS, the BEA 
would accept a set of product-based input price indexes. In addition, 
at a minimum, category defi nitions should be consistent with the 12 
expense categories recently added to the Census Bureau’s Annual Sur-
vey of Manufactures (ASM) forms (most of which are services inputs). 
While the BEA currently only produces annual estimates of GDP by 
industry, there has been growing interest in providing these estimates 
on a quarterly basis. 
In sum, although superfi cially the level of publication required to 
produce the currently published set of economic data is comparatively 
high, in actuality the detail necessary to properly support these esti-
mates may be considerably more disaggregated. 
Limitations
It is important to point out that the construction of an input price 
index by itself may not directly alleviate the potential mismeasure-
ment issues associated with the problem noted. This is worthy of note 
because GDP can be estimated using two different methods: It can be 
constructed by measuring fi nal sales (Method 1) or it can be estimated 
using a value-added approach (Method 2).12 The current methodology 
in the United States focuses on the former of these two approaches, 
illustrated in the following equations: 
(10.1)  Y= C + I + G + (X – M) (Expenditures/Final Sales Approach)
(10.2)  Y = Σ (Si – Ci) (Production, or Value-Added, Approach),
where Si represents total sales for industry i, and Ci represents the input 
costs for the same industry. 
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As mentioned earlier, in order to calculate real—or constant dol-
lar—GDP, all of these values must be adjusted for infl ation using appro-
priate price indexes. Under Method 1, the adjustments for infl ation do 
not take into account adjustment for infl ation that is due to offshoring. 
This is because an input price index does not play a role in the computa-
tion, since the formula still relies on the current import price index, with 
its associated potential limitations. Fixing the potential problem could 
entail shifting the construction of GDP to Method 2.13 
In order to further illuminate why the BLS cannot construct an 
import price index that directly registers these price changes, it helps 
to review the current methodology. The procedure for producing import 
price indexes starts out with a very robust frame from which to draw a 
sample. It includes nearly the entire set of transactions of all merchan-
dise brought through U.S. Customs and Border Protection and into the 
United States. It breaks transactions out by individual shipments, prod-
uct categories, and of course, companies. A sample of specifi c compa-
nies and the items they imported is then drawn from this frame, and the 
BLS attempts to collect prices on a monthly basis for these items. Note, 
however, that the sample only consists of goods that are already being 
imported. It is not practical to ascertain from an importer (who in many 
cases may only be an intermediary) whether in the past he sourced 
an item domestically. It would also be hard to get information in the 
reverse situation, asking an importer who no longer imports whether 
the sampled good is now produced domestically and, if so, what the 
price is. Presumably, constructing an input price index may potentially 
provide some indication of the magnitude of any differences in price 
trends being missed by import prices or producer prices as sourcing 
shifts from one to the other. This might be possible if, as the pricing data 
is being collected, the respondent is able to report whether the item was 
bought domestically or from a foreign source. From a practical stand-
point, however, it is not clear how this information could be properly 
and effectively incorporated into the producer or import price index 
production process. 
It should also be pointed out that an input price index will not allevi-
ate problems arising when goods and services that had been previously 
produced in-house are now shifted to being outsourced (either domesti-
cally or to a foreign source). This, too, is considered a growing phe-
nomenon, but unless data on prices associated with the in-house cost of 
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producing an item can be directly compared with the outsourced price, 
it is not clear how the BLS could evaluate shifts in prices associated 
with this phenomenon.
STEPS TO PRODUCE AN INPUT PRICE INDEX
While there is little dispute over the potential advantages of adding 
an input price index to the family of price indexes produced by the BLS, 
there are the fundamental questions of both the feasibility and the cost 
of producing a usable and comprehensive set of indexes. 
Developing a Sample
From a practical standpoint, the fi rst and perhaps the biggest hurdle 
in developing an input price index is developing a frame from which 
to draw a sample of establishments. While U.S. manufacturing only 
accounts for approximately one-seventh of the value-added output of 
the U.S. economy, I determined that, in part because of data availabil-
ity, this would be the fi rst sector where I would attempt to develop a 
sample. An earlier work (Alterman 2009) cited the Economic Census 
produced by the U.S. Census Bureau, which that agency conducts every 
fi ve years (in years ending in “2” and “7”). In that survey, all U.S. man-
ufacturing fi rms are asked to include detailed data on their cost of mate-
rials, parts, and supplies consumed in the reference year. 
In addition, the less comprehensive but timelier ASM, which is 
based on a sample of 50,000 manufacturing establishments, includes a 
limited amount of data on purchases, providing one category for total 
cost of materials, parts, containers, packaging, and other expenses.
One shortcoming of these surveys is that, while data on capital 
expenditures are also collected, they are only split three ways: into 
expenditures on 1) motor vehicles, 2) computers, and 3) other. Another 
potential shortcoming is the timeliness, or lack thereof, of these sources 
of data. Since the detailed data are only collected once every fi ve years, 
it may be that by the time the BLS is able to draw a sample and initi-
ate these establishments into a market basket, the establishments or the 
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products that they buy may be out of date and no longer refl ective of 
their current market. 
Although much of the focus has been on the manufacturing sector, 
the service sector represents nearly two-thirds of GDP. Unfortunately, 
currently the amount of detailed cost data collected by census for the 
service industry surveys is more limited. In general, the collection forms 
include some detailed data on purchased services, but only limited data 
on purchased equipment and materials.14 Interestingly, while the cen-
sus collects very little detailed data on material costs in the noncensus 
years for manufacturing industries, the level of detailed data collected 
on the cost of business services, though limited, is roughly the same, 
whether it is for the Service Annual Survey or the quinquennial Census 
of Service Industries. In general, the surveys break out the purchases 
of business services into fi ve categories: 1) computer services, 2) com-
munication services, 3) advertising and related services, 4) professional 
and technical services, and 5) repair and maintenance services. 
Until recently, BLS staff have only been able to access the manu-
facturing data from the Economic Census while on-site at the Research 
Data Center at Census Bureau headquarters in Suitland, Maryland. In 
April 2012, however, the BLS and the Census Bureau signed a memo-
randum of understanding (MOU) that allowed the BLS to bring these 
data in-house, thus allowing the bureau to more readily determine 
whether these data can be used to develop an appropriate sample.15 The 
fi rst data sets were transmitted to the BLS in mid-December 2012 and 
included information on the detailed cost of materials for over 67,000 
individual establishments (primarily manufacturers but also including 
some mining and agricultural companies) that reported information as 
part of the 2007 Economic Census. The data set represented a subset 
of the roughly 328,000 U.S. establishments that are coded by the cen-
sus as manufacturing establishments and included breakouts of the cost 
of materials for approximately 1,340 individual eight-digit material 
codes.16 
The fi rst question that needs to be addressed in drawing a sample 
is, of course, “What do you want to publish?” Presumably one could 
construct an input price index either by including all inputs for a given 
industry, or by including only inputs of a specifi c material. After discus-
sions with staff from the BEA as well as the OPT, it was determined 
that from a practical standpoint it would be best to, at least initially, 
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construct input price indexes that were product-specifi c. In the 2009 
paper, I stated that a full set of input material price indexes covering 
material inputs to manufacturers would require sampling and pricing 
roughly 15,000 individual items and calculating and publishing indexes 
for 600 six-digit categories.17 Subsequently, these numbers have been 
further refi ned for this exercise.
In attempting to draw a sample, the program would start off with 
several assumptions:
• The sample would, if possible, use the standard BLS methodol-
ogy, involving a multistage stratifi ed probability-proportionate-
to-size (PPS) method. 
• A published price index should contain a minimum of 25 re-
priceable items. 
• Because of refusals, out-of-scopes, nonresponses, and deteriora-
tion rates, the bureau would need to oversample. 
• A cap would be placed on the maximum number of price quotes 
requested from any individual establishment.
• The sample would only include establishments coded as manu-
facturers. However, data requested would also include materials 
produced by mining and agricultural industries, including a large 
value for crude petroleum purchases by the petroleum refi nery 
industry. 
• Purchases of capital expenditures were beyond the scope of this 
project.
• The sampling process also would set minimum dollar criteria for 
a given establishment’s annual expenditure on cost of materials. 
In accessing the detailed census data, it was apparent that there were 
some complications with the underlying data. For example, although 
the census collects the cost of materials by eight-digit material codes, 
which are roughly based on an NAICS structure, these eight-digit codes 
do not necessarily aggregate to a specifi c six-digit NAICS. In fact, of 
the 473 six-digit NAICS codes in manufacturing, only about one-half 
had eight-digit material codes mapped to them. In the other cases, the 
eight-digit material codes were apparently suffi ciently broad that they 
cut across six-digit NAICS industries.18 This creates a number of prob-
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lems. For example, it would be diffi cult to construct a set of indexes at 
higher levels of aggregation. Also, it would be hard to match up input 
data with the corresponding domestic output or import data, which 
would be useful for data verifi cation. Another potential problem with 
the data stems from the high proportion of the reported values for a 
given establishment that are not coded to any specifi c materials cat-
egory. Approximately one-quarter of the reported value is coded to a 
“not elsewhere specifi ed” type code. 
The strategy used to construct a sampling algorithm for an input 
price index draws heavily on the algorithms used in the bureau’s Pro-
ducer Price Program and especially on the methodology from the 
bureau’s International Price Program (IPP), which in addition to the 
import price indexes also produces a set of export price indexes. Like 
the detailed data collected in the Economic Census, the U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (formerly the U.S. Customs Service) database 
provides a very detailed breakout (through a 10-digit Harmonized Sys-
tem code) of the value of imports by establishment. The customs data 
are also broken out by month, which permits the BLS not only to sam-
ple by detailed product areas but also to sample only those imports of 
a given company that are consistently traded over time. Unfortunately, 
the Economic Census data only refl ect annual fi gures, so in using these 
data there is no way to assess the consistency of a company’s purchases 
over the course of a year.19
Although many of the basic methodological challenges associated 
with producing these new indexes are similar to the issues success-
fully addressed in the Bureau’s current price index programs, there are 
additional questions that must be addressed. For example, given the 
once-every-fi ve-years time frame for the Economic Census, are the data 
too far outdated for reliable use by the time any sample drawn from 
this census is used to initiate establishments and items into a survey? 
One possible alternative would be to rely upon the somewhat smaller 
ASM, which is conducted in every noncensus year. However, while this 
survey does collect information on an establishment’s cost of materi-
als, the ASM does not collect data by eight-digit material categories.20 
Thus, any establishment-specifi c information on the value of their indi-
vidual purchases would have to be collected as part of the process of 
initiating those potential respondents into the program. Of course, the 
current procedure in drawing an item sample for the producer price 
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indexes already relies heavily on using data supplied by establishments. 
However, it is unclear whether establishments would have available the 
same level of detail for their purchases as they have for their sales. 
In any event, we did attempt to draw a sample using the data from 
the 2007 Census of Manufactures. The algorithm relied primarily on 
the sampling criteria and sample rotation developed for the import price 
indexes. As did that algorithm, the formula for the proposed input price 
index made several assumptions:
• A sample would be drawn—and establishments and their selected 
items initiated into the program—every two years.
• Prices collected from each sample would be collected for four 
years. 
• Each index would consist of data drawn from two samples. (For 
example, a sample would be drawn in Year One and a separate 
sample would be drawn in Year Three. The index for Year Four 
would include data from both the samples drawn in Year One 
and those drawn in Year Three.)
• In order to draw a sample large enough to support publishing 
an index, a given product area would need to be sampled for 30 
quotes. (Since an index consists of two overlapping samples, this 
would imply that a given published index would consist of the 
remaining data available from what had been 60 potential items.)
• Establishments with a cost-of-materials value (for a specifi c cat-
egory) of more than $1 million would be treated as being consis-
tent with a maximum burden of six for that category. Where an 
establishment/category did not meet this threshold, the category 
would have a maximum quote burden of two. 
• Each sample would consist of approximately 2,500 establish-
ments and approximately 15,000 quotes. (Note that the sample 
could also be staged, which would result in 1,250 establishments 
being initiated every year.)
• The samples would be drawn to support the publication of any 
six-digit category with a value of over $3 billion. All product 
areas, however, would be sampled and would be used in higher 
stages of aggregation. 
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Although the eight-digit cost-of-materials codes do not fully nest 
to six-digit categories, the sample was drawn as if they did. There were 
a total of 373 six-digit groupings, of which about 100 would be poten-
tially publishable. These 100 six-digit cost-of-materials groups each 
had a minimum dollar value of $3 billion in 2007. Publication assump-
tions could, of course, be adjusted depending on the exact requirements 
of the end users of these data at the BEA and the OPT. 
The selection of the actual item that the Bureau would need to reprice 
on a periodic basis would normally be done by a BLS fi eld economist 
during a so-called initiation visit to the establishment. This procedure is 
one that is already done by staffers when collecting data for the bureau’s 
PPI and IPP programs, and it involves a number of trade-offs. Ideally, 
the selection would be based on a probability proportionate to the value 
of a given item a company purchases within the selected category. In 
theory, if a company buys a certain amount of various types of steel, the 
fi eld economist, using data supplied by the respondent, would be able 
to select a specifi c steel product that the BLS would attempt to collect 
data on. In practice, however, these procedures would likely have to 
take into account the fact that the selected item may not be purchased 
on a regular basis, or the respondent may not have any data available 
on how much of each different type of steel the company purchased in 
a given period. Since the BLS already has experience in dealing with 
these types of issues in its current programs, developing an appropriate 
fallback procedure does not necessarily present a problem. However, it 
does lead to what is perhaps the key issue to be faced, which is the abil-
ity of the program to reprice the same item month after month, quarter 
after quarter, or year after year, from the same source. 
Pricing
Maintaining a constant set of items to reprice over time may prove 
the most intractable barrier to constructing a comprehensive set of input 
price indexes. Whereas on the output side companies tend to ship their 
goods (or offer their services) every month, it is not clear whether they 
buy the same item on a regular basis, especially for capital equipment 
such as computers. This may place a heavier burden on the imputation 
method chosen for valuing prices in missing periods.21 Alternatively, 
the BLS may have to use an altogether different approach, such as com-
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bining prices from different respondents (in cases where the item speci-
fi cations are identical). A related question is how to handle changes in 
the pricing specifi cations. Here are some factors to consider: 
• What is our general approach toward quality adjustment when a 
buyer switches products or suppliers? That is, in an ideal situa-
tion where we can get the exact information that we desire, what 
would we ask for? 
• What are the acceptable fallbacks if we can’t obtain the desired 
information? 
• What if, in fact, the buyer uses multiple suppliers? Do we select 
a specifi c supplier or use some sort of average? 
• If we select one, how and when do we switch to a price from a 
different supplier? 
• Should the price include or exclude transportation costs? 
• If other services are bundled with the product (e.g., installation), 
how do we handle those situations? 
• Do we want to include government purchases? 
• If so, how would we sample for them, since they wouldn’t be 
included in data at the Census Bureau? 
• How do we coordinate requests for buyers’ prices with requests 
for sellers’ prices within the same fi rm? 
Eventually, though, the bureau will need to attempt to collect infor-
mation from a sample of representative companies. A fi nal decision on 
some of these issues will probably entail balancing the requirements of 
a price index with the reality of the bureau’s sometimes limited ability 
to collect data from private industry through voluntary surveys.
 The BLS determined that a critical fi rst step in this process would 
be to get feedback from a representative group of establishments on 
their buying practices, their ability and willingness to voluntarily sup-
ply data to the BLS, and their receptivity to, and interest in, the bureau’s 
effort to produce these price index series.22 To that end, in May 2012, 
staff at the BLS set up a focus group with members of the Institute 
for Supply Management (ISM) in conjunction with that organiza-
tion’s annual meeting. Founded in 1915 as the National Association 
of Purchasing Agents, ISM is considered one of the largest and most 
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respected supply management associations in the world and boasts 
a total membership of nearly 40,000. Prior to the meeting, the focus 
group members were sent a set of questions designed to elicit input on 
the feasibility of the bureau’s effort to produce a new set of indexes. In 
general, the focus group participants indicated that their establishments 
would almost certainly have the data available that the BLS would need 
to construct these indexes, and they did not believe cooperation issues 
would be any different from what the bureau currently experiences with 
establishments. 
Estimation Formula 
With one exception, as opposed to the questions associated with 
sampling and repricing, the issues surrounding the estimation formula 
are comparatively easy. Weights can either be derived from the sam-
pling frame, from the respondents themselves, or from some combina-
tion thereof. One concern with using the weights derived from the sam-
pling frame is the age of the data. Since the detailed data are collected 
only once every fi ve years, the data may be out of date by the time they 
are actually used in the calculation of the indexes. A comparison of 
these values from one census to the next may shed light on the volatility 
of these fi gures. 
There are various considerations involved in what actual formula to 
use, such as choosing between arithmetic and geometric mean formu-
las, but these do not present intractable barriers. One interesting aspect 
of the formula relates to theoretical differences between the price index 
formula for the output from a production function and the price index 
formula for inputs into a production function. The theory assumes that 
a fi rm will attempt to maximize profi ts by minimizing costs while maxi-
mizing revenue. On the output side, theory tells us that an establishment 
will attempt to shift sales to its goods or services that over time are 
becoming relatively more expensive compared to its other outputs. On 
the input side, the fi rm would attempt to shift costs toward its expense 
categories that are becoming relatively cheaper. Consequently, all else 
being equal, the price index of fi rms’ outputs would tend to show at 
least no decline in the relative quantity of the more expensive goods 
being sold, while on the cost side, the index should in theory refl ect 
at least no increase in the purchase of goods or services that are more 
expensive. What is interesting, however, is that these assumptions are 
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based on partial equilibrium models where the model is only looking 
at one side of the equation. But of course one establishment’s sales are 
another establishment’s purchases, and in a general equilibrium model, 
there is no a priori theory of exactly what constitutes the correct direc-
tion of substitution.23 
One notable issue in estimating these indexes relates to how one 
goes about constructing industry-specifi c price indexes. Note that in 
calculating GDP, Method 2 relies on collecting data for both outputs 
and inputs by industry. While a product-based input price index would 
use every establishment’s purchases of a specifi c good (or service), an 
industry-specifi c input price index would only use goods or services 
purchased by establishments in that specifi c industry. For example, pre-
sumably all establishments must purchase energy, be it electricity, gas, 
petroleum products, or other forms. Would the BLS attempt to calcu-
late a separate energy index for each industry, or would it combine all 
energy data into one generic input energy index? For now the approach 
is based on practical consideration—i.e., do we have enough data for 
separate energy series, or does each of the different energy series trend 
nearly the same? Of course, a proxy for an industry-specifi c input price 
index could be constructed using individual product-level price indexes 
but aggregating them using the proportions appropriate for a particular 
industry’s purchasing patterns. 
Developing a Pilot
A longer-term effort to produce input price indexes can be bro-
ken down into four phases, based on availability of data. This effort 
will require additional approvals and funding as well. The four phases 
include
 1) Input indexes covering manufacturers’ material costs,
 2)  Input indexes covering manufacturers’ capital equipment costs, 
 3)  Input indexes covering manufacturers’ business services costs, 
and
 4)  Input indexes covering service industries’ material, capital 
equipment, and business services costs.
Ideally, each phase would start with a pilot prior to going into pro-
duction. For each pilot, the BLS would conduct research and develop 
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the methodology, procedures, and systems associated with each of the 
following steps:
• Obtain permission from the Offi ce of Management and Budget.
• Select a set of industries for the pilot.
• Evaluate the data sources that are available for a sampling frame. 
Because of the availability of detailed cost data from the quin-
quennial Census of Manufactures, the fi rst phase would focus on 
input indexes of cost of materials for manufacturing industries.
• Develop the collection materials and procedures and train staff.
• Select a sample of establishments for the pilot.
• Conduct the pilot test and evaluate the results.
• Based on the results of the pilot, fi nalize resource and data re-
quirements for developing and maintaining an input price index, 
including publication goals, required sample size, expected bur-
den, and estimated time frame for publication.
SUMMARY
There has been a long-standing interest in both producing an input 
price index and obtaining prices from buyers. The dramatic growth in 
imports as a source of domestic supplies has also served to underscore 
the increasing need for these data. There would be, however, a signifi -
cant cost to developing these new series data, and it would take some 
time to put them into production. As resources permit, the bureau will 
continue its research on this topic. 
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Notes
 1.  This paper was the result of combining works from two related conferences. 
The fi rst conference was called “Measurement Issues Arising from the Growth 
of Globalization” and was held November 6–7, 2009, in Washington, D.C. The 
second conference was “Measuring the Effects of Globalization,” held Feb-
ruary 28–March 1, 2013, also in Washington, D.C. I would like to thank Mike 
Horrigan, John Greenlees, Steve Paben, Maureen Doherty, Ted To, Mina Kim, 
Jenny FitzGerald, and David Friedman for their contributions and comments. I 
would also like to thank Shawn Klimek and Lynn Riggs at the U.S. Census Bureau 
for their assistance in gaining access to census data. All views expressed in this 
paper are those of the author and do not necessarily refl ect the views or policies of 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics or the U.S. Census Bureau.
 2.  Note that the Consumer Price Index is designed to pick up these price changes but 
is only used to adjust estimates of domestic consumption. 
 3.  This assumes that the prices of chairs A, C, and D do not decrease in response to 
the change in the price of Chair B resulting from the switch from domestic pro-
duction to being imported. The bureau, however, has conducted an analysis of PPI 
data that provides some evidence that prices from domestic producers are infl u-
enced by the degree of import penetration in their industry. See Doherty (2012).
 4.  Note that the PPI does currently construct output price indexes for wholesalers 
and retailers; these indexes presumably include data on both imported and domes-
tically produced goods. However, these indexes are only gross margin indexes, 
and as such they only represent the difference between their selling price of a good 
and the acquisition price for that same item. In addition, the data collected do not 
delineate between import goods and domestic goods.
 5.  Information on the Sloan Foundation study, and the subsequent conference, can be 
found here: http://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context
=externalpapers. A summary of the conference was included in the February 2011 
issue of the Survey of Current Business. 
 6.  If the rate of change was consistent over time, it might have been easier to model 
a “discount” factor to apply to import prices in order to adjust for this shift.
 7.  Price indexes, for example, must take into account ongoing shifts in the market 
basket of items being priced, as some products are discontinued and new items 
enter into consumption. 
 8.  Actually, prior to the Stigler Report, the PPI had done some work in evaluating 
the use of buyers’ prices. In 1942, the PPI did a study of buyers’ prices for eight 
selected items of steel mill products for six time periods and compared them to list 
prices. The results of the study showed that the buyers’ prices moved differently 
from list prices for short periods of time but that longer-term list and invoice prices 
were comparable. 
 9.  Note that the bureau does have extensive experience with constructing price 
indexes that, in theory, are input price indexes, since both the import price indexes 
and the Consumer Price Index are constructed from buyers’ prices. 
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   354 2/16/2015   8:36:13 AM
Producing an Input Price Index   355
 10.  Labor input for private business and private nonfarm business estimates include 
labor composition effects. These labor composition effects refl ect the fact that the 
hours worked are adjusted for changes in the composition of workers over time. 
 11.  Note that the BLS makes use of product-specifi c data in constructing defl ators for 
a set of input price indexes for a given industry’s material costs. Ideally, an input 
price index would be industry-specifi c, but that may prove cost-prohibitive. 
 12.  There is also a third approach, commonly referred to as the Income Approach, 
which is not directly relevant to this discussion. 
 13.  In practice, Method 1 is actually more effective at measuring total domestic con-
sumption.  Indeed, the defl ator for “C” uses the CPI, which does include imported 
consumer goods.  However, Method 1 is not as effective in estimating domestic 
production. Note, however, that even if the BLS had a complete set of input price 
indexes, Method 2 might still have some data problems, as information currently 
collected on purchases by industry and related information may not be as timely 
or as detailed as the data currently collected for Method 1. 
 14.  For example, in contrast to the forms for the furniture manufacturing industry, 
the collection form for the parallel furniture wholesale sector does not provide 
the same level of detail on material costs, while the collection form for the retail 
furniture industry does not collect any information on the cost of materials.
 15.  “Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
the U.S. Census Bureau 61-12-MOU-06,” signed on April 12, 2012. Under the 
terms of the agreement, the BLS does not have access to fi rms consisting of only 
one establishment, as their information is considered to fall under the purview of 
Title 26 of the United States Code, comprising federal tax regulations, and cannot 
be made available to the BLS. 
 16.  Note that a company can consist of more than one establishment and that the data 
set analyzed at the BLS only included data from approximately 19,000 multiestab-
lishment manufacturers (referred to as “enterprises”). However, these multiestab-
lishment enterprises were estimated to account for roughly 93 percent of materials 
that were purchased by all manufacturers in 2007. The published data from the 
census Web site puts the total cost of “materials, parts, containers, packaging, etc., 
used” in 2007 at approximately $2.63 trillion (U.S. Census Bureau 2013). For 
comparison purposes, in 2007 the United States exported goods valued at $1.15 
trillion and imported goods worth $1.97 trillion. In 2007 domestic manufacturers 
shipped products with a gross value of $5.34 trillion. 
 17.  For comparison purposes, the BLS’s International Price Program collects prices 
for approximately 25,000 items and publishes 1,050 series, whereas the BLS’s 
Producer Price Program includes approximately 100,000 quotes and publishes 
9,500 series. 
 18.  It should be noted that in the new 2012 NAICS manual, the number of six-digit 
NAICS industries has been reduced to 364. One follow-up project would be to 
attempt to revise the eight-digit material codes so they accord more readily to six-
digit NAICS codes. 
 19.  The BLS price indexes come out monthly, which enables researchers to know how 
sporadic trade is. This helps in developing a repriceable market basket of items. 
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 20.  As part of the MOU signed by the Census Bureau, the BLS also requested access 
to the detailed multiestablishment data from the Annual Survey of Manufactures. 
These data were delivered during the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2013 and are 
being analyzed by the BLS in order to assess the survey’s utility in drawing a 
sample for an input price index. 
 21.  In constructing a sample for the import price index, the International Price Pro-
gram has the advantage of accessing the universe of import transactions from the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency, which allows for drawing a sample 
only of those items and importers who trade consistently over the course of a year. 
 22.  Data collection for all BLS price programs is conducted on a voluntary basis. 
 23.  For further elucidation, see Kim and To (2009).
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Televisions, 11
 data sets for imported, in  
 experimental study, 299–304,  
 300t, 301t, 303t, 324n5, 325n7
 example of, in import sourcing bias,  
 198–201, 198t, 214n7, 215n8
 imported, and hedonic compared to  
 matched-model indexes, 307–314,  
 324
 source country shares for, as imports,  
 301, 302f, 303f
Texas, manufacturing growth in, 158
Texas Instruments (fi rm), IDM plants of,  
 170, 183n13
TFP (total factor productivity). See Total  
 factor productivity
Thailand, imports from, 301, 302f
Törnqvist formula, 156
 Comtrade prices and, 266, 287n10
 import sourcing bias with, vs. Fisher  
 index, 199–200, 214n7
 index for value-added price change  
 and, 202, 268
Total factor productivity (TFP)
 canceling out estimates of, growth  
 biases, 224, 239, 240t
 Domar-weighted MFP and, 269,  
 287n14
 industrial sectors and, in Japan, 242– 
 245, 243t, 247, 248
 upward bias of, 220, 235, 238t, 242,  
 249n9
Trade associations
 Common Platform technology  
 alliance, 94, 117n4
 GSA, 106, 118n14
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   378 2/16/2015   8:36:27 AM
Index   379
Transportation sector, 134
 MFP growth rates under alternative  
 treatments, 282, 284t
 price index bias and, 2, 6, 203
TSMC. See Taiwan Semiconductor  
 Manufacturing International Corp.
Turkey
 among “other” emerging economies,  
 206, 207t
 import sourcing bias of, and  
 manufacturing MFP growth, 212,  
 213f
UN. See United Nations
Uniform Code Council (UCC), name  
 change for, 59, 72n39
Unit values
 behavior of, indexes, 304–305
 BLS and, 22, 24–25, 64–65, 67, 68n1,  
 69n5, 72nn44–45, 73n46, 299
 highly erratic, for Malta in WIOD,  
 214n6
 international trade prices and, 134,  
 136–138, 144n5, 144n7, 196, 199,  
 203, 215n9
 PPI and, 21–22, 68n1
 producing, for computers, 67, 73n48
 Stigler Committee and, 24–25, 50–51,  
 69n5
Unit-value adoption barriers, 50–60
 data collection changes, 57–60
 goods with different UPCs but same  
 primary attributes, 54
 goods with same primary attributes  
 but not UPCs, 55–57, 65–66
 historical misuse of unit-value  
 indexes, 50–52, 72nn34–36
 proper treatment of auxiliary  
 attributes, 53–54
United Kingdom, 206
 import sourcing bias and  
 manufacturing MFP growth in,  
 210, 211t, 215nn20–21
 materials sourcing from, 207t, 215n15
United Manufacturing Corp. (fi rm),  
 Taiwan-based manufacturer  
 contracts and, 167f
United Nations (UN), 285
 Comtrade data from, 9, 167f, 195– 
 196, 203, 260, 266, 287nn9–10
 as umbrella organization, 22, 29,  
 69n11
United States (U.S.)
 among “other” advanced/developed  
 economies, 206, 207t, 215n18,  
 227
 component states of, 154, 159f (see  
 also specifi cs, e.g., Idaho)
 effects on economy of increasing  
 imports by, 253–255, 285
 fabless fi rms for design and marketing 
 located in, 105
 price differences with Asian  
 countries, 227, 228–229, 230,  
 249n6
 trade defi cits of, 138, 154, 166, 167f
United States (U.S.), manufacturing  
 in, 158, 234ff
 customer delivery prices and, 220,  
 227–228
 global capacity of semiconductor  
 production, 167–168, 168f, 169t,  
 170–172, 171t
 import sourcing bias and MFP growth  
 in, 210, 211t, 215nn20–21
 job losses and, 151–152, 154, 157,  
 158, 173, 177, 182nn2–3, 183n11,  
 184n18
 manufacturer identifi cation and,  
 155–156, 156f
 production location and, 12, 157–161
 value-added production and, 151– 
 152, 152f, 156f, 175, 182n2,  
 183n16, 270, 271f, 276–277
UPC (Universal Product Code), 13
 auxiliary attributes of, 25, 69nn6–7
 history of, 58–59, 72n37, 72nn39–40
 primary attributes and, 54–57
 rules for using, 22–23, 25
 unit values and, 65–66, 73n47
U.S. BEA. See Bureau of Economic  
 Analysis
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   379 2/16/2015   8:36:28 AM
380   Houseman and Mandel
U.S. BLS. See Bureau of Labor Statistics
U.S. Bureau of the Census. See Census  
 Bureau
U.S. Congress, help for American  
 manufacturers, 151–152, 182n1
U.S. CPI. See Consumer Price Index
Utilities
 imports allocated to intermediate  
 inputs by, 261t, 262, 265
 measured value-added growth in,  
 271f, 272f, 278f, 279f
Value-added production
 alternative estimates of, growth,  
 270–277, 271f, 272f–275f, 287n15
 competitiveness and, in computer and  
 semiconductor industries, 154– 
 155, 181
 double defl ation as calculation  
 process for, growth, 201–203
 growth rates under alternative  
 treatments of, 281t, 282, 283t
 impact of, on manufacturing  
 productivity growth, 200–203,  
 334–335
 international data and, 16, 204,  
 215nn10–11
 measures of, by industry, 255–256,  
 286n1 (see also Multifactor  
 Productivity (MFP) growth)
 U.S. manufacturing and, 151–152,  
 152f, 156f, 175, 182n2, 183n16,  
 270, 271f, 276–277
Vermont, manufacturing growth in, 161t,  
 182n9
Wages, international trade impact on, 12,  
 174, 252–253
Walmart (fi rm), data collection model of,  
 60, 72n41
Welfare, price change effects on, 128,  
 144n6
West Virginia, manufacturing in, 158, 159f
Wooden products, 243t
 domestic vs. foreign chairs and price  
 changes in, 332–333, 333t
 retail vs. wholesale furniture costs,  
 345, 355n14
 value of household furniture imports,  
 335–337, 354n7
Woodland, Norman Joseph, bar-code  
 design and patent by, 58
World Customs Organization, quantity  
 data units recommended by, 287n9
World Input-Output Database (WIOD),  
 207t
 deviation from import proportionality  
 assumption by, 258, 287n2 
 thirty-eight economies in, 197, 203– 
 204, 215n10
Wyoming, manufacturing growth in, 161t
XPI (Export Price Index), 51, 73n50, 131
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   380 2/16/2015   8:36:29 AM
About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofi t research 
organization devoted to fi nding and promoting solutions to employment-
related problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the 
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in 
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn 
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during 
economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unemploy-
ment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of publications. 
Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a research pro-
gram conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists; 2) a com-
petitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal research 
program by providing fi nancial support to researchers outside the Institute; 3) a 
publications program, which provides the major vehicle for disseminating the 
research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in the fi eld; and 
4) an Employment Management Services division, which manages most of the 
publicly funded employment and training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication pro-
grams are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public 
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge 
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solutions 
to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, conse-
quences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income 
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements; 
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic devel-
opment and local labor markets.
313
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   313 2/16/2015   8:36:29 AM
Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb   314 2/16/2015   8:36:30 AM

Measuring Globalization
Volume 2
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   i 2/16/2015   8:38:20 AM
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   ii 2/16/2015   8:38:39 AM
Measuring Globalization
Better Trade Statistics 
for Better Policy
Volume 2
Factoryless Manufacturing, 
Global Supply Chains, and 
Trade in Intangibles and Data
Susan N. Houseman
and
Michael Mandel
Editors
2015
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   iii 2/16/2015   8:38:39 AM
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Measuring globalization : better trade statistics for better policy / Susan N. Houseman 
and Michael Mandel, editors.
  volumes cm
 Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
 ISBN 978-0-88099-488-0 (v. 1 : pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-88099-488-6 (v. 1 : 
pbk. : alk. paper) —ISBN 978-0-88099-489-7 (v. 1 : hardcover : alk. paper) — ISBN 
0-88099-489-4 (v. 1 : hardcover : alk. paper)
 1.  Commercial statistics.  I. Houseman, Susan N., 1956- II. Mandel, Michael J.
 HF1016.M44 2015
 382.01’5195—dc23
2014047579
 © 2015
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are 
the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design.
Index prepared by Diane Worden.
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   iv 2/16/2015   8:38:39 AM
vContents
Acknowledgments vii
1  Introduction 1
  Michael Mandel
Part 1: Factoryless Manufacturing
2 Refl ecting Factoryless Goods Production in the U.S. Statistical  13
 System 
  Maureen Doherty
3 Measuring “Factoryless” Manufacturing:  Evidence from  45
 U.S. Surveys
  Fariha Kamal, Brent R. Moulton, and Jennifer Ribarsky
4 The Scope of U.S. “Factoryless Manufacturing” 81
  Kimberly Bayard, David Byrne, and Dominic Smith
Part 2: Global Supply Chains
5 Incomes and Jobs in Global Production of Manufactures:  121
 New Measures of Competitiveness Based on the World 
 Input-Output Database
  Marcel P. Timmer, Bart Los, and Gaaitzen J. de Vries
6 Measuring Trade in Value-Added and Beyond 165
  Nadim Ahmad
7 Import Uses and Domestic Value-Added in Chinese Exports:  205
 What Can We Learn from Chinese Microdata?
  Shunli Yao, Hong Ma, and Jiansuo Pei
Part 3: Trade in Intangibles and Data
8 A Formulary Approach for Attributing Measured Production  229
 to Foreign Affi liates of U.S. Parents
  Dylan G. Rassier and Jennifer Koncz-Bruner
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   v 2/16/2015   8:38:40 AM
vi
9 Data, Trade, and Growth 263
  Michael Mandel
Authors 287
Index  289
About the Institute 313
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   vi 2/16/2015   8:38:40 AM
vii
Acknowledgments
This book and its companion volume are the culmination of a research 
and conference project to document data gaps and biases in national statistics 
arising from the growth of globalization and to propose solutions for statistical 
agencies. We are indebted to the members of our advisory committee—Bill 
Alterman, Carol Corrado, Richard Freeman, David Friedman, Mike Horrigan, 
Ron Jarmin, Brad Jensen, Marshall Reinsdorf, and Marcel Timmer—who pro-
vided guidance on research topics and authors for commissioned papers as 
well as on directions for future research. We thank Mike Horrigan and the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics for hosting a preconference meeting, Diana Carew 
for organizing the fi nal conference, and Lillian Vesic-Petrovic for providing 
outstanding research assistance. 
The work for this project was supported by a generous grant from the 
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. 
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   vii 2/16/2015   8:38:40 AM
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   viii 2/16/2015   8:38:41 AM
11
Introduction
Michael Mandel
Progressive Policy Institute
Why should economists care about correctly measuring global-
ization? Obviously having a better picture of the global economy is a 
desirable end in itself. But more important is the relationship between 
good data and good policy: An accurate description of the global links 
among nations, businesses, and individuals is essential to optimal deci-
sion making by policymakers. Without such knowledge, policymakers 
are essentially fl ying blind. 
Consider policy toward manufacturing enterprises. The federal, 
state, and local tax codes contain quite a few explicit benefi cial provi-
sions for manufacturing, in addition to direct and indirect subsidies. 
Moreover, there’s an intense debate about whether manufacturing in 
countries such as the United States has been hollowed out or remains 
robust. 
From this perspective, policymakers at every level of government 
would fi nd it helpful to have direct information about the sorts of jobs 
that are created when manufacturers outsource production but keep 
the highly paid research and development (R&D), product develop-
ment, and marketing jobs at home. Yet very little such data has existed 
heretofore. 
This volume covers three topics where current statistical meth-
odologies for tracking trade don’t provide enough information for 
policymakers. These areas are “factoryless manufacturing,” value-added 
trade in supply chains, and trade in services, intangibles, and data. 
These areas are connected by a common thread: Rapid changes in 
the global economy have outstripped the traditional statistical presenta-
tion of export and import data by commodity and industry, as published 
by national and international statistical agencies. This has meant that 
such agencies no longer provide enough information for policymakers 
and researchers. The traditional presentation of trade statistics does not 
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allow economists to trace out the implications of global supply chains, 
which disaggregate production among countries in new and unexpected 
ways. Moreover, economists have very little data on cross-border fl ows 
of intangibles and data, which are poorly reported in the conventional 
trade statistics and yet increasingly important. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 describe a way of augmenting the conventional 
industrial classifi cations by creating a new category called “factory-
less goods producers” (FGP). Such a change—and the data collection 
changes that would accompany it—would have the effect of providing 
policymakers with a new source of information about the impacts of 
global supply chains in manufacturing. 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 examine the measurement of value-added trade. 
In a world of global supply chains, policymakers need to know more 
than straightforward gross exports and imports for each commodity. 
An export may contain large amounts of imported components, while a 
particular imported commodity may be an essential part of high-value 
exports. As a result, trade negotiators would greatly benefi t from hav-
ing access to value-added trade statistics so they can determine which 
categories of exports are most benefi cial to the domestic economy. 
Similarly, value-added trade statistics would be invaluable for state 
and local economic development policy. Governments often offer tax 
and training incentives to companies without being able to correctly 
measure the true spillover benefi ts to the local economy. 
Even domestic macroeconomic policy relies heavily on a good un-
derstanding of globalization. As we saw during the fi nancial crisis, the 
credit contraction leapt across national borders in unanticipated ways. 
Today, U.S. consumption, investment, and production are heavily de-
pendent on global supply chains. A credit or political shock in China, 
for example, could plausibly have large effects on infl ation or consump-
tion in the United States and other countries. 
Finally, Chapters 8 and 9 address the diffi cult issues of measuring 
cross-border fl ows of intangibles and data. Like value-added trade, get-
ting better measurements of these increasingly important components 
of the global economy could signifi cantly affect trade policy, tax policy, 
economic development policy, and even macro policy. 
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FACTORYLESS GOODS PRODUCTION
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 deal with correctly measuring the increasingly 
important phenomenon of factoryless goods production and contract 
manufacturing services (CMS). Companies such as Apple and Nike—
which do research in new technology, design new products, market 
the products, and receive the profi ts from the sale of the products—are 
subcontracting out most or all of their actual production to other com-
panies, either in the United States or globally. The issue is whether the 
fi rst type of company—which may own no factories but may perform 
all the high-end functions of manufacturers—should be classifi ed in the 
manufacturing industry. 
On one level, this is a straightforward classifi cation question. Under 
the North American Industry Classifi cation System (NAICS) currently 
used in the United States, a company that outsources production could 
be classifi ed in either manufacturing, wholesaling, or some other indus-
try altogether. What’s needed is a consistent way of identifying such 
fi rms that the main statistical agencies—the U.S. Census Bureau, the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis (BEA)—can agree on. Then the FGPs would buy manufacturing 
services from other companies (providers of CMS), which would do the 
actual factory production. 
But the topic of FGPs turns out to raise some profound theoreti-
cal, practical, and policy issues as well, going beyond the narrow 
sphere of economic statistics. Manufacturing is important as a source 
of high-paying jobs and innovation for the economy. By separating out 
the production aspect of manufacturing from the product development 
and marketing aspect, FGPs make it possible to understand where the 
value-added and high-paying jobs are created in the research/product 
development/production/marketing chain. 
In turn, if FGPs are buying manufacturing services from overseas 
contract manufacturers, the statistical agencies have to explicitly mea-
sure the quantity and price of purchased manufacturing services as part 
of imports. 
At the time of the conference that these volumes grew out of, “Mea-
suring the Effects of Globalization,” held February 28–March 1, 2013, 
in Washington, D.C., U.S. statistical agencies were operating under a 
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2011 mandate from the Offi ce of Management and Budget (OMB) to 
integrate the concept of FGPs into the sprawling U.S. system of eco-
nomic statistics. As a result, agencies began planning and researching 
how to best track FGPs, and the three chapters in this volume refl ect 
that effort. 
However, since then, the OMB has relaxed its mandate. An August 
8, 2014, OMB directive in the Federal Register notes the following:
The Economic Classifi cation Policy Committee (ECPC), which 
advises OMB on periodic revisions to NAICS, recently reported 
to OMB that results of preliminary research on the effectiveness 
of survey questions designed to identify Factoryless Goods Pro-
ducers (FGPs) [show] inconsistent results. These results indicate 
that questions tested in the 2012 Economic Census fail to yield re-
sponses that provide accurate and reliable identifi cation and clas-
sifi cation of FGPs. The ECPC has advised that additional research, 
testing, and evaluation are required to fi nd a method for accurate 
identifi cation and classifi cation of FGPs, and that this process 
could take several years. Given these initial research results and 
the large number of public comments submitted on the topic of 
FGPs, OMB here announces that the FGP recommendation will 
not be implemented in 2017. (Federal Register 2014, p. 46558)
The Federal Register note goes on to say this:
Without the deadline imposed by the 2017 NAICS revisions, the 
relevant statistical agencies will now have the opportunity to com-
plete the additional research, testing, and evaluation needed to de-
termine the feasibility of developing methods for the consistent 
identifi cation and classifi cation of FGPs that are accurate and reli-
able. (Ibid.)
From this perspective, the chapters in this volume stand as a road 
map for future research. In Chapter 2, “Refl ecting Factoryless Goods 
Production in the U.S. Statistical System,” Maureen Doherty gives a 
brief history and overview of the rationale behind creating the cate-
gory of factoryless goods production. She shows how the United States 
chose a somewhat different approach from international statistical 
organizations. 
In Chapter 3, “Measuring ‘Factoryless’ Manufacturing: Evidence 
from U.S. Surveys,” Fariha Kamal, Brent R. Moulton, and Jennifer Ri-
barsky identify data that the BEA and the Census Bureau are already 
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collecting on both producers and users of CMS. Using this data, the 
chapter provides a snapshot of companies that are engaged in these 
activities. 
Chapter 4, “The Scope of U.S. ‘Factoryless Manufacturing,’” by 
Kimberly Bayard, David Byrne, and Dominic Smith, estimates the ex-
tent of U.S. factoryless manufacturing using corporate fi nancial reports 
and Economic Census microdata. The authors calculate that manufac-
turing value-added would have been 5 to 20 percent greater for 2007 
if all FGPs were reclassifi ed to manufacturing, and that value-added 
would have been 20 to 30 percent greater for 2007 for semiconductor 
manufacturing if FGPs were included. 
VALUE-ADDED TRADE  
Factoryless goods producers make up only one aspect of global sup-
ply chains, however. The next three chapters take a more general look 
at value-added measures of trade. Value-added measures of trade ac-
knowledge that exports of many goods and services are actually heavily 
dependent on imported intermediates. For example, a smartphone ex-
ported from China may contain chips originally made in Japan or South 
Korea (Kraemer, Linden, and Dedrick 2011). Similarly, exports of fi -
nancial services from New York investment banks may in theory rely 
on intermediate services generated in the London offi ces of these banks. 
Value-added measures of trade, rather than reporting gross exports, 
account for these imported intermediates by subtracting them out. Thus, 
value-added trade in theory represents the actual domestic value gener-
ated by exports. 
Value-added trade measures are a very useful conceptual step for-
ward. They are not a full solution, however. First, most countries do 
not have the right surveys in place to directly track usage of imported 
intermediates by industry. Second, value-added trade measures do not 
solve the import price bias issues raised in the fi rst volume. For exam-
ple, consider a piece of electronics assembled in China from imported 
components, and then exported to the United States. China’s share of 
the fi nal sales price might be quite low in this calculation. However, 
that assumes Chinese wages for the cost of assembly. If assembly was 
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shifted to the United States, then the cost of assembly at U.S. wages 
would be a much bigger share of the fi nal sales price. 
Nevertheless, major steps have been made in assessing value-added 
trade, as described in the chapters in this volume. In Chapter 5, “In-
comes and Jobs in Global Production of Manufactures: New Measures 
of Competitiveness Based on the World Input-Output Database,” Mar-
cel P. Timmer, Bart Los, and Gaaitzen J. de Vries analyze global value 
chain income (“GVC income”) for 20 countries, including the United 
States, Japan, Brazil, China, India, Russia, and the major economies of 
Europe. The authors defi ne GVC income as the income generated in a 
country by participating in global manufacturing production, including 
the large contribution of nonmanufacturing industries. 
The authors show that in advanced countries, GVC income gener-
ated by capital and high-skilled labor is rising. This fi ts the common 
story that global shifts in manufacturing have benefi ted workers with 
more education. Some of these gains are coming in service jobs, since 
the authors demonstrate that the manufacturing sector is the direct 
source of only half of the GVC income. On the downside, the same 
analysis shows that high-skilled-job opportunities have declined in the 
United States since 1995, while rising in Europe and Japan.
The methodology described in the chapter relies on tracing out 
cross-border fl ows of intermediates, as described in the World Input-
Output Database (WIOD), an effort funded in part by the European 
Commission (Timmer 2012). A similar effort, funded by the Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), is described in Chapter 6, “Mea-
suring Trade in Value-Added and Beyond,” by Nadim Ahmad. This 
chapter describes the methodology behind the Trade in Value-Added 
(TiVA) database, the assumptions behind the methodology, and the ini-
tiatives launched to improve the quality of those assumptions and the 
underlying data. 
An August 2013 report that draws on the TiVA database, published 
subsequent to the 2013 globalization conference, estimates that be-
tween 30 and 60 percent of the value of the exports of G20 countries 
are either composed of imported inputs or are intermediate inputs for 
other countries (OECD, WTO, and UNCTAD 2013). In addition, 42 
percent of the value-added of exports for G20 economies are made up 
of services, which closely matches the estimate in the previous chapter. 
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Finally, there’s a broader policy point that often escapes policymak-
ers—succeeding in international markets requires an ability to import 
high-quality intermediate inputs, as countries such as China have done. 
From both a political and economic framework, China represents 
one particularly important application of the value-added framework. 
In Chapter 7, “Import Uses and Domestic Value-Added in Chinese 
Exports: What Can We Learn from Chinese Microdata?,” Shunli Yao, 
Hong Ma, and Jiansuo Pei estimate China’s domestic value-added share 
in exports by combining two enterprise-level sources of microdata. The 
chapter provides an excellent background for the types of data that the 
Chinese statistical authorities are collecting, as well as upper and lower 
bounds for domestic value-added shares. 
INTANGIBLES AND DATA
The next two chapters address the diffi cult questions of measuring 
cross-border fl ows of intangibles and data. Chapter 8, “A Formulary 
Approach for Attributing Measured Production to Foreign Affi liates of 
U.S. Parents,” by Dylan G. Rassier and Jennifer Koncz-Bruner, focuses 
on the proper geographical attribution of the income generated by intan-
gible capital such as patents, software, and other intellectual property. 
The problem is that the knowledge embodied in intangible capital is 
a “shared input” across an entire enterprise. The return on intangible 
capital could in theory be attributed to the country where the capital 
was created, the country where the intangible capital was used for pro-
duction, the country where the product that incorporates the intangible 
capital is sold, or the country where the intangible capital is nominally 
located for legal or tax purposes. 
The BEA publishes data on income and assets by country for foreign 
affi liates of U.S. multinationals. The current methodology is to attribute 
the income generated by intangible capital owned by a multinational 
to the country where the capital resides for legal or tax purposes. That 
results in apparent anomalies where certain countries such as Bermuda 
and Ireland show relatively high levels of assets and income for the for-
eign affi liates of U.S multinationals, apparently out of proportion with 
the actual economic signifi cance of those countries. 
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Rassier and Koncz-Bruner propose using proxy measures such as 
compensation, net physical assets, and sales in order to provide a bet-
ter estimate of the location of income and economic activity of foreign 
affi liates of U.S multinationals. The proposed methodology results in 
only a small shift of income, in the aggregate, between foreign affi liates 
and U.S. parents. But the global location of income outside the United 
States shifts signifi cantly. In particular, the proposed methodology shifts 
income across global regions including Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin 
America, and the Middle East by more than 10 percent of value-added.
The proposed methodology, however, does not actually deal with 
some of the conceptual problems raised by shared inputs. It would be 
better, in some sense, to be able to measure the creation and use of in-
tangible capital separately, and provide some theoretical guidance for 
how the data can be used 
In the fi nal chapter, “Data, Trade, and Growth,” Michael Mandel 
examines a topic that is rarely considered—how to measure cross-
border fl ows of data. These days no international commerce can be 
conducted without an associated fl ow of data. That includes fi nancial 
data, entertainment, the data that accompanies back-offi ce functions 
such as human resources, sales data, and production data. Estimates 
from TeleGeography suggest that cross-border data fl ows rose at an av-
erage annual rate of 49 percent between 2008 and 2012.
The problem is that these cross-border fl ows of data, while clearly 
economically valuable, are often not picked up by the trade statistics. 
In the current methodology used by the BEA and most other statistical 
agencies globally, data is classed as a service—and a service export by 
defi nition occurs when a foreign person pays a domestic person for a 
service. Similarly, an import of services by defi nition occurs when a 
domestic person pays a foreign person for services. 
However, the global architecture of the Internet allows and even 
encourages data to cross national borders without leaving a signifi cant 
monetary footprint. In particular, major Internet providers exchange 
data without exchanging money, opening up the possibility of a packet 
of data traveling around the world without leaving a single monetary 
trace. 
As a result, Chapter 9 offers evidence that economically important 
cross-border data fl ows are simply not being counted by current inter-
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national economic statistics. It is likely that both the level and the rate 
of growth of data trade are being signifi cantly understated. 
This mismeasurement issue has several important policy impli-
cations. First, it seems likely that the data sector, and the companies 
making up the data sector, are bigger contributors to domestic and 
global growth than policymakers realize. That in turn leads to the sec-
ond implication: To the degree that trade negotiators for the United 
States (and for other countries) prioritize their negotiation objectives 
according to the relative economic importance of different sectors of 
the economy, the undermeasurement of the data sector will adversely 
affect policy. To put it a different way, if wheat exports are easier to 
measure than trade in data, then U.S. trade policy will place too much 
emphasis on reducing barriers to agriculture exports and not enough on 
maintaining the free fl ow of data. 
The second policy implication is that international tax policy may 
be distorted by undermeasurement of cross-border data fl ows. Tax pol-
icy is, at base, a balancing act between revenue raised and distortions to 
market outcomes. But it requires good information about the economy 
in order to make good choices. 
And third, attempts by various countries to implement barriers to 
the free fl ow of data may do considerably more economic damage than 
the current trade statistics show.
Taken together, these two volumes show that progress is being 
made in the diffi cult problems of measuring globalization. However, 
there’s a long way to go before global trade statistics truly provide poli-
cymakers with the information that they need. 
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BACKGROUND
The goal of a country’s national statistical agencies is to provide 
relevant, timely, and accurate information on that country’s economy.1 
Over time, as technology changes and organizations mature and change 
the way they operate, there can be changes in both the mix of outputs 
produced in an economy and in the way fi rms operate to achieve their 
goals. One of the biggest challenges faced by producers of national eco-
nomic statistics is to adapt to these structural changes in the economy in 
order to continue to provide relevant data. Usually, structural economic 
alterations occur gradually over time; however, with the continual rapid 
technological advances of the past 20 years, there have been signifi -
cant shifts in the way fi rms operate. Two of the biggest changes are the 
growth of global value chains and the fragmentation of production. 
Global value chains and production fragmentation are interrelated 
phenomena. A value chain is the set of interrelated economic activities 
that contribute to the provision of a good or service, starting with prod-
uct development and ending with customer service. When some of the 
economic activities occur in different countries, the chain is considered 
a global value chain (Center on Globalization, Governance, and Com-
petitiveness 2006). A production chain is the set of economic activities 
within or among fi rms in a global value chain that are required to pro-
duce specifi c products. A production chain is typically controlled by a 
lead fi rm and is considered to be global when the production activities 
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are dispersed across countries (Chang, Bayhaqi, and Yuhua 2012). The 
relationship between production chains and global value chains is illus-
trated in Figure 2.1.
Traditionally, product development and at least some transforma-
tion activities of the production chain for manufactured products were 
performed by establishments classifi ed as manufacturers. Over the past 
two decades, vast improvements in technology, communications, and 
transportation have allowed fi rms to share intellectual property and 
closely control all steps of the transformation process without directly 
performing any of the transformation steps. This allowed fi rms to 
improve profi tability by focusing on innovation and product and mar-
keting decisions instead of on the generic services and volume produc-
tion portions of the value chain, which were then outsourced (Gereffi , 
Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005). As a result, some establishments revo-
lutionized their business processes even further and began to perform 
all of the functions typically associated with manufacturing except for 
the transformation steps. 
These changes have introduced complexities into the production 
of economic statistics, forcing a reexamination of traditional economic 
measurement concepts related to industry classifi cation for establish-
ments and to the value of a country’s outputs, exports, and imports 
by both the U.S. and international statistical communities. Economic 
activity classifi cation systems did not address how to handle the out-
put of establishments that outsourced certain production tasks. In addi-
tion, to the extent that production tasks were outsourced internationally, 
questions were raised concerning how the outsourced activities were 
handled in national accounts and balance of trade statistics. 
This chapter will fi rst look at the response of international statistical 
organizations to these phenomena and then turn its attention to the U.S. 
response, highlighting how the latter differed in some aspects from the 
international response. The chapter will then review implementation 
planning and issues within the U.S. statistical system.
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Figure 2.1  Global Value/Supply/Production Chains
a Traditionally, conception, design, and product development are controlled by the lead fi rm; nowadays, however, some of these activities 
are outsourced to other fi rms, as is indicated by the dashed line. Arrows on both ends of a line indicate that a process can go in either 
direction.
b The players in the global production/supply/value chain include domestic and foreign fi rms.
SOURCE: Chang, Bayhaqi, and Yuhua (2012) of the Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC) Policy Support Unit.
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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
The United Nations Statistics Division and the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) Statistics Department set standards and produce man-
uals and guidelines for a number of different international economic 
statistics. These groups routinely evaluate their standards and make 
periodic updates in order to stay current as businesses change the way 
they operate over time. In the past decade, each undertook an extensive 
multiyear evaluation and update of their processes, at least in part to 
refl ect the impact of globalization. There were some differences in the 
timing of these efforts, but there was a great deal of collaboration across 
projects, and each project included widespread outreach to both gather 
input and obtain comments on drafts.
One of the standards that the United Nations Statistics Division is 
responsible for is the International Standard Industrial Classifi cation of 
All Economic Activities (ISIC). As the name implies, this classifi cation 
is the international standard for the classifi cation of productive eco-
nomic activities. The main purpose is to provide a standard set of eco-
nomic activities so that entities can be classifi ed according to the activ-
ity they carry out. The United Nations Statistics Division, along with 
the Technical Subgroup of the Expert Group on International Economic 
and Social Classifi cations, began planning a regularly scheduled update 
of ISIC in 2001. A draft of ISIC Revision 4 was approved in 2006 by the 
United Nations Statistics Division and released in 2008 (United Nations 
Statistical Commission 2006). 
Clarifi cation of the classifi cation of an establishment that outsources 
its principle economic activity was one of the many issues addressed in 
this revision of the ISIC. With respect to outsourcing, it was determined 
that if any establishment outsources part but not all of its production 
activities, it should be classifi ed as if it were carrying out the com-
plete process. If an establishment outsources its complete production 
process, it is also classifi ed as if it were carrying out the complete pro-
duction process, as long as the output of the production process is not 
goods. Goods producers that outsource their entire production process 
are classifi ed as if they were carrying out the complete process only if 
they are the economic owner of the output. Under these rules, an estab-
lishment is the economic owner of an output only if they are the legal 
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owner of the physical input materials (Becker and Havinga 2007). If an 
establishment engaged in a goods-producing activity has all the produc-
tion done by others and does not legally own the material inputs, it is 
considered to be buying the completed goods from the contractor with 
the intent to sell them and would usually be classifi ed in the appropriate 
trade activity (European Commission et al. 2009).2 
The System of National Accounts (SNA) is the internationally 
agreed-upon standard set of recommendations on how to compile mea-
sures of economic activity and is produced by the National Accounts 
section of the United Nations Statistics Division. It describes a coher-
ent, consistent, and integrated set of macroeconomic accounts in the 
context of a set of internationally agreed-upon concepts, defi nitions, 
classifi cations, and accounting rules. In 2003, the United Nations Sta-
tistical Commission identifi ed the need for a comprehensive update of 
the 1993 System of National Accounts manual based, at least in part, on 
the impact of globalization. 
The main issue related to globalization was the treatment of goods 
that are sent from one country to another without a change in economic 
ownership. Under the 1993 SNA, when goods are sent abroad for pro-
cessing and the processed goods are later returned, a change in own-
ership is imputed in each case, even when there is none, and the val-
ues of imports and exports refl ect this imputed ownership change. The 
2008 SNA recommended that imports and exports should be recorded 
on a strict change-of-ownership basis, with imputed changes no lon-
ger assumed. Economic ownership is the criterion that is used to deter-
mine whether a change in ownership takes place. For establishments 
involved in goods production activities, the SNA uses the ISIC criteria 
that an establishment must be the legal owner of input materials for the 
material used in the production process in order to be considered the 
economic owner of the output of that process. 
According to the 2008 SNA, when goods are transferred from the 
economic owner in one country to an establishment in another country 
for further processing and the processed goods are then returned to the 
economic owner, the goods sent for processing should not be recorded 
as an export from the economic owner or an import to the processor in 
national accounts treatment. In addition, the returned processed goods 
should not be recorded as an export of the processor or as an import to 
the economic owner. Instead, the fee paid to the processing unit should 
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be recorded as the import of processing services by the country owning 
the goods and an export of processing services by the country providing 
it (European Commission et al. 2009). 
The IMF Statistics Department produces standards for concepts, 
defi nitions, classifi cations, and conventions for the compilation of bal-
ance of payments and international investment position statistics. As 
the international standard, its Balance of Payments Manual serves as a 
guide for IMF member countries that regularly report balance of pay-
ments data to the IMF. In 2003, the IMF Statistics Department also began 
working on an update to its Balance of Payments Manual in response to 
changes in the economic and fi nancial environment. The fi nal Balance 
of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, Sixth Revi-
sion (BPM6), was adopted in November 2008 (IMF 2009, p. 4).
Because BPM6 (IMF 2009) and SNA2008 (European Commis-
sion et al. 2009) were updated simultaneously, BPM6 refl ects the same 
changes in the treatment of goods sent for processing and completed 
processed goods as described in the national accounts discussion above. 
BPM6, however, is not entirely consistent with SNA2008 in that it 
explicitly includes some additional guidelines related to the ownership 
of materials to be processed and to the location of the buyer of the 
goods after processing—these are not mentioned in SNA2008. As long 
as the economic owner of the processed goods is also the economic 
owner of the material inputs to be processed, that owner may obtain 
the materials from the owner’s economy, the economy of the processor, 
or a third economy. Additionally, the fee charged by a processor to the 
owner of a processed good may cover the cost of materials purchased 
by the processor. When the goods for processing are obtained from a 
different economy than that of the economic owner, the value of those 
goods should be recorded as an import to the economic owner. Fur-
thermore, the economic owner of the processed goods does not need 
to physically take possession of them before ownership is transferred 
to a buyer. If ownership of the goods is transferred to a buyer in a dif-
ferent economy than that of the economic owner, the sale should be 
recorded as an export from the economic owner’s country (IMF 2009, 
pp. 161–163).  
The International Merchandise Trade Statistics (IMTS), produced 
by the United Nations Statistics Division, is a set of offi cial statistics that 
provides data on the movement of goods between countries and serves 
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many different users with a wide variety of needs. In 2007, the need for 
a revision of these statistics was recognized because of many factors, 
including the impacts of globalization and the changes in related statis-
tical frameworks like the System of National Accounts Manual and the 
Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual. 
As a result of these efforts, IMTS2010 was adopted in February 2010. 
The need for compatibility with SNA2008 and BPM6 was one of 
the goals of the IMTS revision; however, when the needs of all data 
users were considered, priority was given to the need for statistics that 
refl ect the physical cross-border movement of goods. As a result, IMTS 
differs conceptually from BPM6 and SNA2008 with respect to goods 
for processing and the return of processed goods. Specifi cally, IMTS 
recommends that goods for processing be recorded when they enter 
or leave the economic territory, irrespective of whether a change in 
ownership takes place. Because of these differences, it was recognized 
that adjustments to IMTS data would be necessary prior to use in the 
compilation of other statistics. In order to support the need to make 
such adjustments, IMTS2010 encourages the identifi cation (prefer-
ably by special coding) of goods for processing and goods resulting 
from such processing in trade statistics. IMTS2010 also encourages the 
identifi cation and special coding of goods that cross borders as a result 
of transactions between related parties (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs 2011).
U.S. RESPONSE
The North American Industry Classifi cation System (NAICS) is 
the standard used by U.S. statistical agencies in classifying business 
establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing 
statistical data related to the U.S. business economy. It was developed 
jointly by the U.S. Economic Classifi cation Policy Committee (ECPC 
2010),3 Statistics Canada, and Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Estadis-
tica y Geografi a to allow for a high level of comparability in business 
statistics among the North American countries, and it was adopted in 
1997. NAICS did not explicitly include guidance for the classifi cation 
of establishments that owned the design and controlled the produc-
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tion and sale of goods but outsourced all the production. From 1997 
through 2007, the NAICS manual indicated that establishments that 
were engaged in the mechanical, physical, or chemical transformation 
of materials, substances, or components into new products should be 
classifi ed in the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, it suggested that 
manufacturing establishments may process materials or may contract 
with other establishments to process their materials for them (OMB 
2007, p. 197).4 NAICS has historically classifi ed as belonging to the 
manufacturing sector apparel jobbers who perform entrepreneurial 
functions involved in other apparel and accessory manufacture; how-
ever, the manual did not defi ne exactly what was meant by entrepre-
neurial functions, nor did it differentiate between establishments that 
contract out some versus all of the transformation activities (p. 246). 
By the late 1990s, individual U.S. statistical programs were begin-
ning to adapt in response to the changes in the economy, but there was 
no consistent approach—particularly with respect to establishments 
that perform entrepreneurial functions related to production but don’t 
perform transformation activities. Some programs interpreted the 
NAICS manual’s statement related to contracting with other establish-
ments as applying only to the specifi cally mentioned apparel jobbers 
and classifi ed other such establishments in wholesale trade or manage-
ment of corporations. Others interpreted this statement more broadly 
but provided their own interpretation of what was meant by “perform-
ing entrepreneurial functions.” This led to inconsistent NAICS classi-
fi cation decisions across statistical programs for some establishments, 
making it diffi cult to draw conclusions when analyzing NAICS data 
across programs.
In response to these inconsistencies, the ECPC formed the Manu-
facturing Transformation Outsourcing Subcommittee in July 2008 and 
charged its members with defi ning manufacturing transformation out-
sourcing and identifying characteristics of establishments that outsource 
manufacturing transformation activities. The team was also responsible 
for researching international classifi cation efforts and developing clas-
sifi cation options for both establishments that outsource transformation 
activities and those that perform transformation activities for others. 
The group identifi ed three different types of establishments that could 
be involved in the production of goods: 1) the traditional integrated 
manufacturer (IM), 2) the manufacturing service provider (MSP), and 
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3) the factoryless goods producer (FGP). The characteristics of each 
type of goods-producing establishment are depicted in Table 2.1.
The team’s report also described a wide variety of classifi ca-
tion options along with the strengths and weaknesses of each, based 
on the appropriateness of product valuations and whether the option 
would support analysis. The team focused on fi ve basic classifi cation 
options, with variations for some of them. The classifi cation options are 
described in detail below.
1)  Classifi cation in manufacturing
Under the assumption that outsourcing the transformation steps of 
the manufacturing process is no different than outsourcing other steps, 
all FGPs could be classifi ed in the manufacturing sector, along with 
IMs and MSPs. This allows the full value of all goods, including returns 
to intellectual property, to be included in the manufacturing sector, 
whether produced by an IM or an FGP. 
Within the manufacturing sector, several potential options for clas-
sifying establishments were described. All three types of establishments 
could be included in the appropriate manufacturing industry, with or 
without breakouts by type of establishment. Breakouts by establishment 
by type, where possible, would facilitate data analysis of the same types 
of products but would require the collection of some new data. To the 
extent that special aggregations excluding FGP activity could be cal-
culated, this option would also allow continuous series to be created in 
industries with signifi cant amounts of FGP activity. Other possibilities 
were to create a new manufacturing subsector for all FGPs that would 
include breakouts for industries that had a signifi cant number of FGP 
Table 2.1  Characteristics of Types of Manufacturing Establishments
Integrated 
manufacturer
Manufacturing 
service provider
Factoryless 
goods producer
Owns intellectual property Yes No Yes
Owns inputs Yes May or may not May or may not
Performs transformation 
activities
Yes Yes No
Owns and sells or transfers 
fi nished product
Yes No Yes
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
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establishments or add six-digit NAICS codes into the current manufac-
turing structure where warranted. If separate industries were created, it 
would be important that the new FGP industry product details be col-
lected at the seven-digit product level of the manufacturing numerical 
list to allow for data analysis. This option would allow for the creation 
of continuous data series for currently existing manufacturing indus-
tries. To the extent that the creation of separate FGP industries might 
result in unpublishable data, it would not be a very useful distinction 
for data users. 
2)  Classifi cation in wholesale trade
All FGP establishments could be classifi ed in the wholesale trade 
sector, since the composition of labor and capital expenses for FGPs is 
similar to that in wholesale trade. This classifi cation option would also 
be consistent with the concept that the primary economic activity of an 
FGP is the selling aspect of the production process. On the other hand, 
wholesale trade margin is for the service of goods distribution only. 
The margin for an FGP would include the value of the services related 
to design and those related to overseeing transformation in addition to 
goods distribution. Two possibilities were also considered within the 
wholesale trade classifi cation option.
In the fi rst possibility, FGP establishments could be classifi ed in 
the appropriate merchant wholesale industry with or without separate 
data below that level for own-brand importers, own-brand marketers, 
and domestic FGPs in addition to the current breakouts for wholesale 
distributors. Including this additional detail supports calculations and 
analysis by allowing FGPs to be identifi ed separately from traditional 
wholesalers; however, data may be unpublishable for some of the 
breakouts, which would hinder usefulness. It is unlikely that the whole-
sale trade detail could be expanded to match the current manufactur-
ing detail, making comparisons between FGP and manufacturing data 
diffi cult.
A second possibility would be to classify FGP establishments in 
wholesale trade either in one industry or in three separate industries: 
1) own-brand importers (those that arrange transformation by overseas 
contractor and import and distribute the fi nal good), 2) own-brand mar-
keters (those that arrange transformation by overseas contractor and that 
drop-ship the output to customers), and 3) domestic FGPs (those that 
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   22 2/16/2015   8:38:49 AM
Factoryless Goods Production in the U.S. Statistical System   23
arrange transformation by domestic contractors). This second possibility 
supports calculations and analysis by allowing FGPs to be identifi ed sep-
arately from traditional wholesalers. The potential benefi t of this method 
is offset by the fact that it is unlikely that the wholesale trade detail could 
be expanded to match the current manufacturing detail, making com-
parisons between FGP data and manufacturing data diffi cult.
3) Split classifi cation between manufacturing and wholesale trade 
This option would classify establishments according to whether 
they outsource overseas in wholesale trade or whether they outsource 
domestically in manufacturing. This option prevents goods transformed 
by foreign contractors from being included in domestic manufactur-
ing when it is possible that the only domestic input was the intangible 
capital owned or leased by a domestic entity; however, it does not han-
dle the situation where both domestic and international contractors are 
used. The production process for FGPs is exactly the same whether 
the transformation is contracted out domestically or internationally, so 
having different classifi cations based on the location of the contract 
manufacturer is inconsistent with a NAICS classifi cation system based 
on production processes. In addition, switches between domestic and 
foreign contractors would result in classifi cation changes that would 
lessen the stability of the classifi cation system.
4)  Classifi cation in professional, scientifi c, and technical services 
This option would classify FGPs in research and development, since 
this is the fi rst step in the production process. If research and develop-
ment is determined to be the primary activity of FGPs, they should be 
classifi ed in this sector. However, if an FGP acquires the design of the 
product from another company, no research and design (R&D) activity 
would be performed at the establishment. Since FGPs are responsible 
for the sale of products, this option would require an expansion of the 
defi nition of this sector to include the selling process, and FGPs would 
report the value of the good as well as the value of the R&D. 
5) Classifi cation in management of companies and enterprises
This option would create a new three-digit industry code (defi ned 
as “managing the production process”) within the “Management of 
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Companies and Enterprises” sector. Input costs for FGPs are probably 
similar to those associated with other establishments in this sector. If 
management of production is determined to be the primary activity of 
FGPs, they should be classifi ed in this sector. On the other hand, this 
option focuses only on the management of the production process, not 
on the design or selling of the product. The amount of product detail 
would be signifi cantly less than would be available in manufacturing, 
limiting its usefulness for analysis purposes.
ECPC RECOMMENDATION
The ECPC evaluated the report and used it as a basis for a Janu-
ary 2009 Federal Register notice that outlined the issues surrounding 
offshoring and described some of the available classifi cation options. 
The ECPC used the Manufacturing Transformation Outsourcing Sub-
committee’s paper, the Federal Register responses, and an examination 
of international classifi cation guidance to aid its members in forming a 
fi nal classifi cation decision. 
The ECPC decided that all factoryless goods producers should be 
classifi ed in manufacturing with the specifi c industry classifi cation that 
is based on the transformation production process used by the contractor. 
Furthermore, the committee encouraged programs to provide breakouts 
for IMs, FGPs, and MSPs within each industry to support data analysis 
needs. The ECPC carefully considered the ISIC4 classifi cation recom-
mendation to base classifi cation solely on legal ownership of material 
inputs, but it decided that control of the entrepreneurial aspects of the 
production process, including economic ownership of material inputs, 
was more appropriate. In doing so, it put forth the following argument:
A strict adherence to the international recommendation to clas-
sify FGPs based solely on ownership of materials was considered 
and rejected as impractical. If the defi nition of ownership required 
physical possession, the ability to substitute between input sources 
in different countries to obtain the lowest cost could change sec-
tor classifi cation in NAICS if the inputs were sent directly from 
the producer in country B to a manufacturing service provider in 
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country C. The establishment that arranged for the production in 
country A would never take physical possession of the materials. 
If the defi nition of ownership were based on separate transactions, 
problems would still arise. Contracts between FGPs and their man-
ufacturing partners change with market conditions. Payment terms 
and the allocation of risk can shift based on variations in the avail-
ability of credit and the market power or capacity of the individual 
parties. Classifi cation of an establishment should not change sim-
ply because [that establishment has] the market power to shift the 
timing of payment for the inputs from the front of the process to 
the end of the process or because critical shortages of transforma-
tion capacity provide outsized negotiating power to a manufactur-
ing service provider. By focusing on the entrepreneurial aspects of 
the process (and therefore ownership of the goods being produced) 
rather than ownership of materials, the ECPC eliminates the afore-
mentioned ownership of materials issues. (ECPC 2010)
IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING
Both the U.S. and international statistical communities realized that 
even after all of the extensive research, outreach, and guideline update 
efforts had been completed, there was still a signifi cant amount of work 
to do in order to implement the decisions that had been made and to 
continue analyzing the best methods to measure national and interna-
tional transactions in a global economy. In response, implementation 
groups were formed both internationally and in the United States.
In 2007, the Conference of European Statisticians (CES) created 
an Expert Group on the Impact of Globalization on National Accounts. 
Specifi cally, the goal of this group was to analyze the impact of the 
updated guidelines on existing statistical measures, with a particu-
lar focus on national accounts, and to identify and propose solutions 
for problem areas. The group completed an extensive review of the 
topic and produced a detailed guide, “The Impact of Globalization on 
National Accounts,” which was fi nalized in June 2011 (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe 2011). The guide documented a wide 
variety of issues and offered solutions to many problems; however, the 
authors recognized that there was still a need for additional research 
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and included a chapter at the end outlining work still to be done. As a 
follow-up to this effort, the CES requested that Statistics Netherlands 
elaborate on the remaining issues, and this work resulted in the paper 
“In-Depth Review on Global Manufacturing” (Statistics Netherlands 
2011). It also led to the formation by the CES of a Task Force on Global 
Production, which is responsible for developing guidance on unre-
solved issues related to SNA2008 and BPM6 and on aspects related to 
implementing these standards. 
In early 2012, this Task Force on Global Production developed and 
prioritized a list of conceptual and measurement issues that needed to 
be addressed. In October 2012, the task force prepared an interim report 
that focused on the top-priority issues and presented a draft report on all 
issues to the Group of Experts on National Accounts in April 2012. The 
task force received feedback from the Group of Experts on National 
Accounts that there was a need for more emphasis on specifi c guidance 
and practicality, so the output will be fi nalized in the form of a practical 
guide to be used in the preparation of statistics on global-production-
related activities (ECE 2013). The task force also produced a report 
on factoryless goods production that questioned whether ownership 
of material inputs is an appropriate criterion for classifying an FGP in 
manufacturing (Task Force on Global Production 2013). That report 
was presented to the Expert Group on International Statistical Classifi -
cations in May 2013.
 In the United States, the ECPC recognized that the NAICS clas-
sifi cation decisions the committee adopted would affect multiple U.S. 
agencies, as well as programs within those agencies. Furthermore, the 
ECPC realized that, as with any new concept, there would likely be 
some differences in interpretation across agencies during the imple-
mentation process, and that these differences might lead to data incon-
sistencies.  As a result, the ECPC sponsored a multiagency task force 
to ensure consistent implementation of the inclusion of FGPs in the 
manufacturing sector in the 2012 NAICS. The team is composed of rep-
resentatives from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS), the Census Bureau, the Federal Reserve, and 
the International Trade Commission.
The FGP Implementation Planning Group began meeting in late 
June 2010, with the goal of defi ning a set of rules that agencies could 
use to implement the ECPC recommendation for classifi cation of FGPs 
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in the 2012 NAICS. The group’s analysis of the issues relating to 
implementation of this concept indicated that these changes must fi rst 
be implemented in conjunction with a quinquennial economic census 
in order to survey establishments in the appropriate sector. Given the 
complexity of the changes and the timing within the planning for the 
2012 Economic Census, the group determined that it did not seem fea-
sible to implement in 2012. The team considered partial or sequential 
implementation on a pilot basis by applying the new rules to only some 
establishments or industries or by applying only some of the rules, but 
it determined that this approach would be problematic since it would 
result in multiple series breaks over time, especially at aggregate levels. 
As a result, the planning group recommended that full implementation 
of the outsourcing redefi nitions should be delayed, the new goal being 
to implement them for the 2017 Economic Census. 
This recommendation was accepted by the ECPC and the OMB in 
November 2010. Implementation was deferred, and the interagency 
group was asked by the ECPC to continue the work of coordinating 
the implementation of this change. Then, in a further delay, the OMB 
announced in August 2014 that it was rescinding its earlier decision 
requiring that statistical agencies implement the classifi cation change 
of assigning FGPs to the manufacturing sector by 2017, because the 
agencies “need an opportunity to perform additional research, testing, 
and evaluation.” The remainder of this chapter will discuss the work of 
the FGP Implementation Planning Group.
U.S. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Internationally, the concept of economic ownership was integral to 
many of the decisions made relating to the handling of transactions. The 
ECPC decision to classify FGPs in manufacturing did not explicitly 
mention the concept of economic ownership, but it did focus on control 
of the entrepreneurial aspects of production, which is in essence the 
acceptance of the risks and rewards of the production process. To be the 
economic owner of a product, an establishment must control the intel-
lectual property (IP) or design, control the production process, control 
the sale of the product and assume entrepreneurial risk. A more detailed 
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description of each of those four criteria, however, is required for an 
in-depth understanding of the concept.
Control of the IP or design means that the establishment either has 
developed it internally, has purchased it from another fi rm, or has nego-
tiated to lease it from another fi rm. For a domestic establishment with 
a foreign affi liate, it is possible that the U.S. establishment could be 
leasing the IP or design from its affi liate. It is also possible that it could 
be leased to more than one economic owner. From a business-function 
standpoint, an establishment is the economic owner of the IP or design 
if it has the right to use it in its products, redistribute it, and can inde-
pendently change the design of the fi nal product.
There are many aspects to controlling the production process, 
including controlling inputs, product quality, and production levels. 
With respect to inputs, the economic owner can control inputs for the 
fi nal product in a number of different ways. The owner could purchase 
the inputs and ship them to the MSP, arrange to have them shipped to 
the MSP from another domestic or foreign location, or merely approve 
the selection of input providers and the quality of the inputs. The eco-
nomic owner also makes decisions about which products to produce 
and controls production levels and product quality. An economic owner 
can decide whether to add or delete product lines, expand his or her 
business, move into a different business, or leave the business entirely. 
Finally, the economic owner must also be able to report the cost of 
manufacturing service.
The economic owner of a product arranges to sell (or transfer in 
the case of an affi liate) the product to buyers (consumers, government, 
wholesalers, retailers, or other types of businesses, including manu-
facturers) and sets the price associated with the transaction. The eco-
nomic owner does not need to take physical possession of the product 
or arrange the details of shipments to purchasers, but the owner must be 
able to report the value of those shipments.
There are a number of indicators that an establishment has taken 
on the entrepreneurial risk related to a product. The economic owner 
absorbs the loss for any unsold fi nal products. It is also responsible for 
losses due to fi nal products that fail to meet the customer’s satisfaction, 
for which an unsatisfi ed customer would return the product to the eco-
nomic owner (or a representative of the economic owner) for a refund, 
rather than to the establishment that performed the transformation. 
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Finally, it is legally responsible for legal problems related to defects or 
other problems in the fi nal product. 
The criteria for determining economic ownership apply in the same 
way whether the relationship is between a U.S. establishment and a for-
eign establishment that performs transformation activities or between a 
foreign establishment and a U.S. establishment performing transforma-
tion activities. 
Defi ning Decision Rules
The FGP Implementation Planning Group determined that the best 
way to ensure a consistent understanding of how the classifi cation 
decision-making process that is related to outsourcing should be imple-
mented was to consider various scenarios and determine the appropriate 
classifi cation for each. Based on these discussions of potential scenar-
ios, the team reached conceptual agreement on classifi cation outcomes 
and created an outsourcing decision tree that refl ected the implementa-
tion of those concepts. In creating the scenarios, it became clear that a 
single establishment might perform both integrated manufacturing and 
manufacturing service–providing activities and at the same time have 
a factoryless goods production relationship with an unaffi liated trans-
forming establishment. As a result, those possibilities are found in the 
decision tree. The decision tree refl ects what the team considered would 
be the “ideal” implementation from a conceptual standpoint and is dis-
played in Figure 2.2.
There may be practical diffi culties in implementing this ideal sce-
nario because of external factors such as the differences between inter-
national and U.S. recommendations or issues reporting establishments 
might have in providing the information required to support classifi ca-
tion decision making. There could also be internal limitations to imple-
mentation procedures related to the availability of resources within sta-
tistical agencies. 
Several different agencies or programs currently make independent 
classifi cation decisions for establishments. As long as a potential FGP 
and an MSP don’t belong to the same enterprise, decision making using 
the decision tree is fairly straightforward and would routinely result 
in consistent decision making across agencies and programs. Multi-
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establishment enterprises in manufacturing industries generally include 
establishments that perform transformation activities and establish-
ments that control or provide support to the production activities. When 
all of the establishments of an enterprise are in the United States, 
the decision-making process is still fairly straightforward, since an 
establishment can only have FGP activity if it assumes the entrepre-
neurial risk and controls the IP or design, the production, and the sale of 
Figure 2.2  Outsourcing Decision Tree—Ideal Defi nitions
1 All foreign establishments should be treated as unaffi liated.
2 If an establishment performs a mixture of integrated manufacturer (IM), manufactur-
ing service provider (MSP), and factoryless goods producer (FGP) activities, it should 
be classifi ed into one of the three unique subindustries, IM, MSP, or FGP, based on 
where most of its activity occurs.
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
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products, and if it contracts with unaffi liated establishments to perform 
transformation activities. 
The ideal defi nitions, however, specify that all foreign establish-
ments should be treated as unaffi liated. Thus, there is a potential FGP/
MSP relationship whenever a product is transformed by a foreign affi li-
ate. In recent years, multinational enterprises (MNEs) have responded 
to improved communications and a need to manage global operations 
by unbundling management functions in the same way they have 
unbundled production functions. Global enterprises may spread typi-
cal headquarters functions across locations, even in different countries, 
based on local regulations and proximity to labor sources, customers, 
and suppliers. This can result in different locations for the fi nancial, 
legal, and decision-making functions of an enterprise (Desai 2009). 
As a result, assigning economic ownership to a specifi c establish-
ment is particularly diffi cult when analyzing the relationship between 
headquarters-type and transforming-type establishments of the enter-
prise. Within an enterprise, an establishment that doesn’t perform 
transformation may meet all the criteria for economic ownership of a 
product, but the transaction may be recorded on another establishment’s 
books for reasons such as tax purposes. In addition, it is possible that 
some of the decision-making tasks that are included in the economic 
ownership criteria may be split across more than one headquarters-type 
establishment. 
The U.S. interagency group has expressed concern that the com-
plexity of classifi cation decisions when MNEs are involved will result 
in an ineffi cient allocation of resources if each agency or program works 
independently to resolve these issues, and that will make it diffi cult for 
agencies or programs to make consistent decisions about the establish-
ments of individual enterprises, as well as to make consistent decisions 
across enterprises. Some of the countries in the European Union (EU) 
have begun to form groups to work together to ensure that the transac-
tions of MNEs are treated consistently across national accounts and 
national economic statistics. The U.S. interagency group has proposed 
a similar approach as part of the plan for the implementation of the FGP 
concept, with the formation of a standing cross-agency group to make 
classifi cation recommendations for the major multinational enterprises 
that operate in the United States. The Census Bureau, the BEA, and the 
BLS each collect a different set of detailed statistical data from enter-
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prises and establishments. Analysis of the combination of those data 
would likely result in the best decisions related to the classifi cation of 
the establishments of these enterprises and the amount of revenue that 
should be attributed to each. Given the organization of U.S. statisti-
cal programs, the formation of such a group would require new data-
sharing agreements and potentially new funding sources, and thus this 
proposal might be very diffi cult to implement. In the meantime, efforts 
to develop other approaches for handling these challenges will continue. 
Understanding Data Needs 
There are many data interdependencies among U.S. statistical agen-
cies and the programs within them. In order to successfully implement 
the manufacturing redefi nition clarifi cation, statistical agencies have 
some special needs related to the data inputs that they receive from one 
another so they can accurately calculate statistics that refl ect the inclu-
sion of factoryless goods manufacturers in manufacturing. 
Integrated manufacturers, manufacturing service providers, and 
factoryless goods producers each have a different mix of inputs and 
operating constraints. As a result, it may be necessary to produce sepa-
rate data for each type of operation in many statistical series, either as 
unpublished components of published aggregate data or as published 
series. In order to support these data analysis needs, statistical programs 
will need values for inputs and outputs broken out by type of operation. 
Some statistical agencies use the customs data provided by the 
IMTS in the production of statistics related to imports and exports. 
Since IMTS2010 gave priority to the need for statistics that refl ect 
physical border-crossing of goods, customs data provided by the IMTS 
differ conceptually from the ECPC defi nition of FGP with respect to 
goods for processing and the return of processed goods. In order to use 
customs data in compiling other statistics that follow the ECPC defi ni-
tion, data will need to be obtained from other sources to adjust customs 
data to refl ect the ECPC concept.
It is important both to statistical agencies and to other data users to 
be able to distinguish between defi nitional and economic changes so 
that these users of the data can create continuous time series and ana-
lyze data changes over time. As a result, individual statistical programs 
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will need access to conversion, or bridge data, for various data series in 
order to produce historically consistent time series. 
Statistical agencies rely on businesses to provide the data required 
to calculate economic statistics. For this reason, the interagency group 
also recognized the importance of understanding the types of data that 
establishments involved in outsourcing would likely be able to supply. 
In order to obtain this information, the group met with associations and 
companies and analyzed publicly available company data (particularly 
Form 10-Ks) to determine how companies manage and record their out-
sourcing activities. Another method used to determine data availabil-
ity was the inclusion of “special inquiry” questions on current survey 
forms for some statistical programs. These questions serve the dual pur-
pose of testing potential questions and identifying establishments that 
would likely be classifi ed as FGPs when the manufacturing redefi nition 
is implemented. The results of this research will be used as input to the 
creation of updated data collection instruments.
EXPECTED IMPACT ON ECONOMIC STATISTICS
The classifi cation of factoryless goods producers in manufacturing 
is expected to have an impact on a number of different statistical pro-
grams, some of which are listed below: 
• U.S. Census Bureau—Economic Census, annual and monthly 
wholesale trade surveys, Annual Survey of Manufacturers, sev-
eral other NAICS-based series.
• Bureau of Economic Analysis—industry accounts, inter-
national accounts, National Income and Product Accounts, 
regional accounts.
• Bureau of Labor Statistics—Current Employment Statis-
tics program, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, 
Producer Price Index program, International Price Program, 
Major Sector Productivity program, and Industry Productivity 
program.
• Federal Reserve—industrial production.
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General Expectations by Type of Measure
The exact impact of these changes will depend on the classifi ca-
tion decisions that are made for individual establishments when the 
new rules are applied, as well as on the size of those establishments at 
the time the rules take effect, whenever that may be. As a result, there 
is currently not enough information to quantify the exact impact, and 
there won’t be until that information becomes available. We do have 
enough information, however, to describe the types of changes that are 
expected for a number of different economic measures. These expecta-
tions are described in Table 2.2.
Impact on Specifi c Manufacturing Industries
Although exact impact measures cannot currently be calculated, 
existing data can be analyzed in an attempt to identify which indus-
tries are most likely to be affected by these changes and to make some 
estimates related to the size of some of the changes. The data expecta-
tions described above indicate that changes within manufacturing will 
be centered on specifi c industries. For planning purposes, it would be 
helpful to economic programs to identify which industries will likely 
be most affected by the inclusion of FGPs in manufacturing in order to 
support any required decision making. 
In order to develop measurement statistics, I make the following 
four assumptions related to manufacturing industries: 
 1) Manufacturing industries that currently purchase a relatively 
large amount of contract work have a production process that 
is consistent with the outsourcing of transformation tasks.
 2) Under current procedures, if a manufacturing establishment 
outsources all of the transformation for its products, the sales 
of those products are coded as resales. Therefore, manufactur-
ing industries with relatively high levels of resales are likely to 
have FGP activity under the new rules.
 3) The ratio of production employees to total employees will be 
lower for manufacturing industries that outsource transforma-
tion activities.
 4) Manufacturing industries with relatively high levels of imports 
for their products are likely to be involved in outsourcing.
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   34 2/16/2015   8:38:53 AM
Factoryless Goods Production in the U.S. Statistical System   35
Based on these assumptions, data from the 2007 Economic Census 
and the 2002 benchmark I-O tables were examined to fi nd measures 
that might help identify industries that currently have characteristics 
that could be indicative of FGP activity. No single measure was identi-
fi ed that could refl ect the criteria in all four assumptions. As a result, 
fi ve different measures were identifi ed, and analysis focused on the 
full set of measures rather than on any individual measure. For each 
measure, values were calculated for each six-digit NAICS manufactur-
ing industry along with weighted average values for all manufacturing 
industries. For most of the measures, values higher than the average 
were considered indicative of potential FGP activity. For the number of 
production workers divided by total employment, values lower than the 
averages were considered indicative of potential FGP activity. In order 
to further support analysis, a level was judgmentally selected for each 
measure to indicate a value that was signifi cantly higher or lower than 
the average, so that about half of the above- or below-average indus-
tries were considered to be signifi cantly above or below. The formulas 
for each measure are displayed in Table 2.3, along with the percentage 
level signifi cantly above or below.
The goal of the analysis was two-pronged. At a high level, the goal 
was to provide a big picture of the impact of this change on the manu-
facturing sector. At an industry level, the goal was to provide early sup-
port for agency planning processes by systematically identifying those 
specifi c industries that are most likely to be affected by the inclusion of 
FGPs in manufacturing and thus may need special processing. Indus-
tries were assigned to one of three categories based on the number of 
measures above average and signifi cantly above average (or, as noted 
earlier, below average, in the case of number of production employ-
ees divided by total employment). Although the fi ve measures were 
selected because of their expected relationship to potential FGP activ-
ity, the level of each of the measures for a particular industry could be 
affected by other factors as well. As a result, criteria were set for the 
three categories, assuming that an industry with fewer than fi ve mea-
sures above average could have a high likelihood of being affected by 
the inclusion of FGPs in manufacturing, while those industries with 
only one measure above average would be unlikely to be affected. Table 
2.4 displays the exact criteria that were used to assign industries to cat-
egories, as well as statistics for each of the three categories. 
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   35 2/16/2015   8:38:54 AM
36  Table 2.2  Expected Changes to Economic Measures
Measure Expected change
Total U.S. employment 
and wages
U.S. totals will not change.
Sector U.S. employment 
and wages
Values will shift across sectors, with manufacturing growing and other sectors, primarily wholesale trade, 
shrinking. Increases in manufacturing are expected to be centered on specifi c industries. This will result in 
regional shifts within sectors, including manufacturing.
Production employees U.S. totals will not change. Sector total changes will be minimal, since FGPs would have few, if any, produc-
tion employees.
Total U.S. revenue 
values 
The total will likely change, but the direction and amount of the change are unknown. 
1. FGPs may report revenues from products that would have previously been treated as imports.
2. For an FGP manufacturing establishment previously classifi ed in wholesale trade, revenues will 
increase by the difference between the wholesale trade margin and the full value of the products for 
some statistical measures.
3. For manufacturing establishments that are determined to be MSPs rather than IMs, revenues will 
decrease by the difference between the full value of the product and the value of the manufacturing 
service they provided.
Sector U.S. revenue 
values
Sector totals will change, with increases expected in manufacturing and decreases in other sectors. The 
manufacturing changes will likely be in specifi c industries. 
Value of U.S. imports The total will likely change, but the direction and amount of the change are unknown. The mix between 
goods and services will also change. The changes will be centered in specifi c product areas. 
For products transformed by foreign MSPs for domestic FGPs:
1. The full value of the products that the foreign MSPs transformed and returned to the U.S. FGPs will 
be excluded from imports.
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2. The value of the manufacturing service that they performed and any inputs they provided will be 
included in imports.
For products transformed by U.S. MSPs for foreign FGPs:
1. The full value of the products that they transformed that remain in the U.S. are included in imports.
2. The value of any inputs that they received from the foreign FGP will be excluded from imports.
Value of U.S. exports The total will likely change, but the direction and amount of the change are unknown. The mix between 
goods and services will also change. The changes will be centered on specifi c product areas. 
For products transformed by foreign MSPs for domestic FGPs:
1. The value of products that have remained in a foreign MSP’s country or that were shipped by a 
foreign MSP to another country will be added to exports.
2. The value of the inputs that the domestic FGP provided to the MSP will be excluded from exports.
For products transformed by U.S. MSPs for foreign FGPs:
1. The full value of any product that they transformed and returned to the foreign FGP will be excluded 
from exports.
2. The value of the manufacturing service that they performed and any inputs they provided will be 
included in exports.
SOURCE: Author’s compilation. 
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In order to summarize the industry results, the industry categoriza-
tion was further analyzed by aggregating the industries by subsector 
and calculating the percentage of each subsector’s value of shipments 
(VOS) that is attributable to industries in each of the three categories. 
These percentages are displayed in the Table 2.5, along with a count of 
the number of industries in the category. The analysis indicates that the 
apparel manufacturing and computer and electronic product manufac-
turing subsectors had the highest portion of their VOS from industries 
in the highest-likelihood category. This is consistent with the generally 
accepted assumption that these two subsectors will be strongly affected 
by the manufacturing redefi nition. 
Analysis of Wholesale Trade for Own-Brand Importer-Marketers
The wholesale trade survey forms for the Economic Census include 
a question related to the type of operation. One of the operation types is, 
“own-brand importer-marketer.” Own-brand importers-marketers deal 
primarily or exclusively in the parent company’s own branded prod-
ucts manufactured outside the United States. The products are either 
imported into the United States and then sold, or they are sold and then 
drop-shipped directly from a foreign location to the U.S. customer. It is 
expected that many of the wholesale trade establishments categorized 
Table 2.3  Industry Impact Analysis Measures
Measure
Average for all 
manufacturing 
industries (%)
Signifi cantly 
above/below 
average level (%)
2007 Economic Census
(Cost of contract work) / (payroll) 9.7 15
(Cost of contract work) / (cost of 
materials and parts)
5.9 10
(Cost of resales) / (total cost of materials) 2.3 5
(Number of production workers) / 
(total employment)
70.1 60
2002 benchmark I-O tables
(Imports) / (domestic production + 
imports − exports)
23.2 30
SOURCE: 2007 Economic Census and 2002 benchmark input-output (I-O) tables.
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in this operation type will be classifi ed in manufacturing using the new 
classifi cation rules. In the 2007 Economic Census, about 3 percent of all 
wholesale trade establishments were own brand importer-marketers.5 
Those establishments accounted for about 4 percent of wholesale trade 
sales and employment. If all those establishments had been classifi ed 
in manufacturing, the number of manufacturing establishments would 
have increased by about 3 percent, sales would have increased by about 
4 percent, and employment would have increased by about 2 percent. 
The wholesale trade industry groups that have the largest proportion of 
their sales from own-brand importer-marketers are offi cially known as 
“Apparel, piece goods, and notions merchant wholesalers” and “Elec-
trical and electronic goods merchant wholesalers.”
Table 2.4  Results of Manufacturing Industry Impact Analysis
Category Criteria
Number 
of 
industries
% of total 
manufactur-
ing estab-
lishments
% of total 
manufactur-
ing employ-
ment
% of total 
manufactur-
ing VOS
Highest 
likelihood
4 or 5 measures 
above average, or 
3 above average 
with more than one 
signifi cantly above 
average
150 33 30 25
Medium 
likelihood
3 measures above 
average with fewer 
than 2 signifi cantly 
above, or 2 above 
average 
160 40 34 39
Lowest 
likelihood
0 or 1 measure 
above average
161 27 36 36
NOTE: “VOS” stands for value of shipments.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on 2007 Economic Census and 2002 benchmark 
input-output (I-O) tables.
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Sector Title
 % of subsector VOS from 
industries by likelihood of impact
 No. of subsector industries 
by likelihood of impact
High Medium Unlikely High Medium Unlikely
311 Food manufacturing 3.0 20.0 76.9 2 8 37
312 Beverage and tobacco product manufacturing 0.0 52.1 47.9 0 5 4
313 Textile mills 25.2 41.7 33.1 4 4 4
314 Textile product mills 47.9 48.4 3.7 5 2 1
315 Apparel manufacturing 86.8 11.7 1.5 17 5 2
316 Leather and allied product manufacturing 43.6 56.4 0.0 5 4 0
321 Wood product manufacturing 4.1 8.3 87.6 1 2 11
322 Paper manufacturing 0.5 5.5 94.0 1 3 16
323 Printing and related support activities 21.1 65.7 13.2 4 5 3
324 Petroleum and coal product manufacturing 0.0 96.2 3.8 0 2 3
325 Chemical manufacturing 30.7 48.8 20.5 4 19 11
326 Plastics and rubber product manufacturing 0.0 13.3 86.7 0 4 13
327 Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing 17.3 28.0 54.6 7 10 7
331 Primary metal manufacturing 40.6 24.2 35.2 2 11 13
332 Fabricated metal product manufacturing 33.1 51.4 15.5 17 19 7
333 Machinery manufacturing 46.9 38.6 14.5 27 17 5
334 Computer and electronic product manufacturing 77.4 20.3 2.3 21 7 2
335 Electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing 25.1 35.9 39.0 5 9 8
336 Transportation equipment manufacturing 23.3 22.2 54.5 5 12 13
337 Furniture and related product manufacturing 17.0 35.6 47.4 4 5 4
339 Miscellaneous manufacturing 75.6 23.9 0.5 14 8 1
NOTE: “VOS” stands for value of shipments.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on 2007 Economic Census and 2002 benchmark input-output (I-O) tables.
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IMPORTANCE OF CHANGES FOR DATA USERS
Over the past 20 years, U.S. economic statistical programs recog-
nized that there have been major changes in the way businesses operate, 
particularly with respect to production fragmentation and globalization, 
but individual agencies and programs in those agencies made differ-
ent methodological decisions in response to those changes. There was 
not an integrated comprehensive examination of how these economic 
changes should be refl ected in the entire set of economic statistics. 
Business and governmental decision makers use a wide variety of 
U.S. economic statistics from different agencies and programs on a 
daily basis. To the extent that these statistics are inconsistent with one 
another or have not kept pace with changes in the economy, they may 
make it diffi cult for data users to make sound decisions. This problem 
has been recognized by both government and business data users and 
has been characterized as “using a 1950s dashboard to operate a 21st-
century machine” (Karabell 2013, p. G1). 
The collaborative effort of U.S. statistical agencies to reach agree-
ment on how to identify and handle factoryless goods producers and 
manufacturing service providers will result in more data consistency 
across agencies. In addition, it will allow statistical agencies to provide 
data about the three different types of manufacturing establishments, 
at least at an aggregate level, allowing data users to see changes over 
time and to analyze differences across the three types of establishments. 
These benefi ts will support the need of business and government lead-
ers to make informed decisions.
Notes
 1. All views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily 
refl ect the views or policies of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 2. For a detailed description of the usual classifi cation rules, refer to United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2008). 
 3. More information about the ECPC can be found at http://www.census.gov/eos/
www/naics/ecpc/ecpc.html (accessed November 12, 2013).
 4. The following link includes links to various sectors of the manual: http://www
.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?chart=2007 (accessed April 21, 2014).
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   41 2/16/2015   8:38:56 AM
42   Doherty
 5. Detailed data on wholesale trade by type of operation can be found at U.S. Census 
Bureau (2007). 
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Globalization has created new opportunities and competitive chal-
lenges, forcing producers to seek more effi cient ways to make their 
products. It has become increasingly common for producers seeking 
more effi cient means of production to divide the traditional vertically 
integrated production model into stages or tasks (known as fragments), 
thus allowing them to outsource part of their production process. When 
the resulting production arrangement is interlinked across different 
countries, the measurement challenges facing national economic statis-
tics programs increase dramatically. 
Many economic forces are driving the fragmentation of production 
to specialized establishments, both foreign and domestic. Improve-
ments in information technology have allowed fi rms to relocate produc-
tion to new and often distant locations. International cost differences 
(such as lower relative wage costs and lower trade and transport costs), 
improved logistics, and improved intellectual property rights protec-
tion and contract enforcement have facilitated the use of global sup-
ply chains and global value chains, or GVCs (U.S. International Trade 
Commission 2011). 
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A supply chain is a system of organization, technology, activities, 
information, and resources involved in moving a good or service from 
supplier to customer. It can be within an enterprise, between enterprises 
in a local economy, or among a group of countries. The supply chain is 
a network where the activities involved can be grouped using the tradi-
tional broad stages of production—from upstream research and devel-
opment (R&D) and design, through manufacturing, to downstream 
logistics, marketing, and sales. The complexity of the supply chain and 
the business relationship between the various stages can vary by indus-
try and by enterprise. A global supply chain consists of a worldwide 
network of these activities.
A value chain refers to the value-added activities required to bring 
a good or service from its conception, design, production, marketing, 
distribution, and support to fi nal customers.2 It is the value added to 
the good or service at each stage of the network. Similar to the sup-
ply chain, the complexity of the value chain and the business relation-
ship between the various stages can vary by industry and by enterprise. 
A value chain can be between enterprises in a local economy or span 
enterprises across a group of countries.  
The fragmentation of production through the use of GVCs raises 
many issues for economic measurement, including classifying the 
fi rms within these chains, measuring and classifying trade in goods and 
services, and measuring and classifying trade in intermediate inputs. 
The recently updated international guidelines for compiling national 
and international accounts include new guidelines to better capture the 
impacts of GVCs on the economy.3 The U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA), and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
have been studying ways to classify and collect data from entities that 
are part of GVCs. A key element in identifying the relationship between 
fi rms that outsource the fabrication of products—while still controlling 
the production process—and fi rms that perform the processing is con-
tract manufacturing services (CMS).
This chapter focuses on efforts to collect data on CMS and the 
challenges with identifying and collecting data on entities that are part 
of GVCs. In particular, it identifi es data that the BEA and the Census 
Bureau are already collecting on both producers and users of CMS. In 
this way, the chapter not only demonstrates that it is feasible to iden-
tify and collect data on these activities but also provides a snapshot of 
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companies that are engaged in these activities. Although the descriptive 
data presented in this chapter do not provide the full accounting of these 
activities that is recommended by the latest U.S. and international sta-
tistical guidelines, they do provide an indication of the potential scope 
and magnitude of the measurement task before us. The statistical agen-
cies will use this and other information to guide their efforts to improve 
the measurement of these activities in order to implement the latest sta-
tistical guidelines and provide more useful data on manufacturing value 
chains. This will enable them to cover both the fi rms that outsource 
fabrication services and the CMS producers that provide these services.
The chapter’s remaining sections describe new U.S. and interna-
tional guidelines and relevant data on CMS activities. Section Two, 
“Classifying ‘Factoryless’ Manufacturers,” looks at U.S. and interna-
tional recommendations on the industry classifi cation of “factoryless” 
manufacturers—units that entirely outsource the fabrication of their 
products. Section Three, “Data Collection on Contract Manufacturing 
Services,” describes the BEA and Census Bureau surveys and discusses 
data collection efforts on CMS. Section Four, “Analysis of Contract 
Manufacturing Services on the BEA’s BE-10 Survey,” discusses the 
BEA’s analysis of the CMS data reported in its surveys. Section Five, 
“Analysis of Contract Manufacturing Services on Census Bureau 2011 
COS,” treats the Census Bureau’s analysis of the CMS data reported in 
the Report of Organization Survey. Section Six, “Future Work,” con-
cludes with a discussion of future data collection endeavors.
CLASSIFYING “FACTORYLESS” MANUFACTURERS 
The North American Industry Classifi cation System (NAICS) is 
an industry classifi cation system for establishments based on a pro-
duction-oriented conceptual framework in which establishments are 
grouped together by common production processes. A production pro-
cess describes any activity in which inputs, including types of labor and 
related skills, capital equipment, raw and intermediate materials, and, in 
many cases, intangible inputs such as intellectual property, are used to 
fabricate a material good or to render a service.4 Establishments are the 
smallest operating entity for which records provide information on the 
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cost of resources—materials, labor, and capital—employed to produce 
the units of output (OMB 2007, p. 19).
With the rise of global competition, economies are becoming more 
integrated, and the use of global supply chains is rapidly increasing. 
This has complicated the application of the production function classi-
fi cation principle to units that control intellectual property and perform 
underlying entrepreneurial components of arranging the factors of pro-
duction, but outsource all of the actual transformation activities to other 
specialized units. The Offi ce of Management and Budget (OMB) calls 
these units “factoryless” goods producers, or FGPs (OMB 2010). 
Units in the manufacturing sector arrange for and bring together 
the factors of production necessary to produce a good. They accept the 
entrepreneurial risk of producing and bringing goods to market. As the 
Economic Classifi cation Policy Committee (ECPC) states in the 2012 
NAICS manual’s supporting documents, 
when individual steps in the complete process are outsourced, an 
establishment should remain classifi ed in the manufacturing sector. 
For example: 1) a decision to produce or purchase raw materials 
does not change the classifi cation; 2) a decision to use contractors 
or a professional employer organization (PEO) rather than a tra-
ditional employment contract does not change classifi cation; and 
3) a decision to outsource marketing and distribution to a whole-
saler does not change classifi cation. In each case, the decision to 
perform or outsource a function changes the establishment produc-
tion function but does not change the classifi cation. (ECPC 2010, 
p. 6)
The ECPC defi nes the characteristics of FGPs to include the follow-
ing (OMB 2010, p. 4):5
• Owns rights to the intellectual property or design (whether inde-
pendently developed or otherwise acquired) of the fi nal manu-
factured product.
• May or may not own the input materials.
• Does not own production facilities.
• Does not perform transformation activities.
• Owns the fi nal product produced by manufacturing service pro-
vider partners.
• Sells the fi nal product.
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International Recommendations
The NAICS classifi cation, employed in the United States, does 
not use ownership of material inputs as a basis for industry classifi ca-
tion. However, the International Standard Industrial Classifi cation of 
All Economic Activities (ISIC), Revision 4, which is promulgated by 
the United Nations and forms the basis for industrial classifi cation sys-
tems used by many other countries, bases classifi cation of units that 
outsource transformation solely on ownership of material inputs. “A 
principal who completely outsources the transformation process should 
be classifi ed into manufacturing if and only if it owns the input materi-
als to the production process—and therefore owns the fi nal output,” the 
ISIC says (United Nations Statistics Division 2008, p. 30). According 
to the ISIC, a unit that outsources transformation but owns the material 
inputs is a manufacturer; a unit that outsources transformation and does 
not own the material inputs is engaged in wholesale or retail trade. 
The ECPC considers a strict adherence to the ownership of materi-
als as impractical because a slight change in how the materials were 
acquired would change the industry classifi cation. For example, the 
principal could purchase the inputs and do one of two things: 1) take 
physical possession of the inputs and ship them to the contract manu-
facturer or 2) arrange to have the inputs shipped directly to the contract 
manufacturer from another domestic or foreign location. Under ISIC 
rules, the contractual arrangement of the case in which the principal 
purchases the materials directly would result in the principal being 
classifi ed in the manufacturing sector even if the principal did not take 
physical possession of the materials. However, rather than purchasing 
the inputs, the principal may simply approve the input providers from 
whom the contract manufacturer must buy and monitor the quality of 
the inputs acquired by the contract manufacturer. Under ISIC rules, this 
contractual arrangement would most likely result in the principal being 
classifi ed in a trade sector because the principal did not directly pur-
chase the material inputs. The ECPC considers controlling the produc-
tion process a more important criterion than owning the material inputs.
The ISIC classifi cation based on ownership of the material inputs 
is consistent with the treatment recommended in both the System of 
National Accounts 2008 (referred to in this chapter as SNA 2008) and 
the sixth edition of the Balance of Payments and International Invest-
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ment Position Manual (referred to in this chapter as BPM6) for goods 
sent abroad for processing (European Commission et al. 2009; IMF 
2009).6 According to this treatment, goods sent abroad for processing 
without a change in ownership should be excluded from goods trade; 
the processing fee charged by the manufacturing service provider 
should be recorded as services trade. The fee for this service is related 
to the difference between the value of the goods exported for processing 
and the value of the goods returned (imported) after processing.7 When 
goods are shipped abroad for processing and subsequently sold abroad, 
the processed goods should be recorded as U.S. merchandise exports at 
the time they are sold, and any inputs purchased abroad by the U.S. fi rm 
and processed abroad should be recorded as U.S. merchandise imports.8 
The new international guidelines state that the recording of imports and 
exports of goods should be based on the transfer of economic owner-
ship. For example, if a U.S. shoe company sent soles and leather to a 
contract manufacturer in another country for assembly of its athletic 
shoe, the U.S. shoe company—the principal—is importing manufac-
turing services from the contract manufacturer. Because the U.S. shoe 
company owns the soles, leather, and assembled athletic shoe, there is 
no international transaction; therefore, the soles and leather should not 
be recorded as U.S. exports and the assembled athletic shoe should not 
be recorded as a U.S. import.
It is important to note that although the NAICS does not base its 
classifi cation of “factoryless” goods producers strictly on change in 
ownership, the change-in-ownership principle is still the most relevant 
criterion for measuring international transactions. It is desirable to 
defi ne international transactions as transactions between residents and 
nonresidents, thus focusing on the change in ownership, regardless of 
whether the establishments engaged in the transactions are classifi ed 
in manufacturing or in another industry. Thus, adoption of the NAICS 
recommendation for FGP does not preclude the adoption of the SNA 
2008/BPM6 recommendation for the treatment of goods sent abroad 
for processing. 
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DATA COLLECTION ON CONTRACT 
MANUFACTURING SERVICES
Identifying CMS is a key element in identifying the relationship 
between fi rms that outsource the fabrication of products—while still 
controlling the production process—and fi rms that perform the process-
ing. Through preliminary outreach conducted by the Census Bureau, 
respondents appear to understand the concept of CMS and the need for 
U.S. statistical agencies to collect the data. Collecting data, however, 
could be challenging. Some respondents indicated that they were gener-
ally unable to provide CMS data because either accounting or produc-
tion management systems did not include a searchable characteristic 
that would distinguish these services.
To determine whether data collection can be robust, the Census 
Bureau and the BEA have added questions to their respective surveys 
to determine whether U.S. businesses can accurately report purchases 
and sales of CMS. See Table 3.1 for a list of all surveys conducted by 
these two agencies that contain CMS-related questions. This section 
describes three surveys that include questions about CMS. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis Surveys
The fi rst two surveys we cover are conducted by the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis; the third is done by the Census Bureau.
Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad 
Every fi ve years, the BEA conducts the Benchmark Survey of U.S. 
Direct Investment Abroad (BE-10) to track the economic activity of 
U.S. multinational companies and their foreign affi liates.9 The BE-10 
benchmark survey covers the entire universe of U.S. direct investment 
abroad in terms of value and is the BEA’s most comprehensive sur-
vey of such investment in terms of subject matter. The survey collects 
detailed information on the fi nancial structure and operations of U.S. 
parent companies and their foreign affi liates and on the transactions and 
positions between the parents and their affi liates. 
Any U.S. person that had a foreign affi liate is required to report.10 If 
the respondent is a U.S. corporation, the respondent reports transactions 
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Form number Survey name Year Sponsoring organization
Used in this 
chapter?
BE-10A Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad for U.S. Parents
2009 Bureau of 
Economic Analysis
Y
BE-120 Benchmark Survey of Transactions 
in Selected Services and Intellectual 
Property Products with Foreign Persons
2011 Bureau of 
Economic Analysis
N
NC-99001 Company Organization Survey 2011 Census Bureau Y
MC31101–MC33975a Census of Manufactures 2007, 2012 Census Bureau N
WH42101–WH42237a Census of Wholesale Trade 2007, 2012 Census Bureau N
a Only industries where the CMS question is applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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for the fully consolidated U.S. domestic enterprise, which excludes for-
eign branches and other foreign affi liates. The BEA defi nes an entity as 
a foreign affi liate if it meets the following criteria:
• If it is incorporated abroad, it is always considered a foreign af-
fi liate. Most affi liates meet this criterion.
• If the entity is not incorporated, it is a foreign affi liate if it
 - is subject to a foreign income tax, has a substantial physical 
presence abroad as evidenced by employees permanently lo-
cated abroad, etc.;
 - has separate fi nancial records that would allow the prepara-
tion of fi nancial statements; or
 - takes title to the goods it sells and receives revenues from the 
sale, or receives funds from customers for its own account for 
services it performs.
To understand the activity of U.S. multinationals with respect to 
manufacturing services, the BEA added questions on purchases and per-
formance of contract manufacturing to the 2009 Benchmark Survey of 
U.S. Direct Investment Abroad for U.S. parents that are not banks (BE-
10A).11 The questions were added to identify a group of fi rms engaged 
in manufacturing services that could be used either as a sample frame 
for a special survey on that topic or as a way to identify fi rms engaged 
in CMS that may be linked to data collected by the Census Bureau. 
A data link is performed when company identifi cation codes from the 
BEA fi les are matched to the corresponding companies in the Census 
Bureau fi les. A data link project provides access to additional data items 
that the BEA did not collect. 
The BE-10 survey defi nes contract manufacturing as “contracting 
with a fi rm to process materials and components, including payments 
for fabricating, assembling, labeling, and packaging materials and com-
ponents.” Because the BEA was trying to identify a group of fi rms that 
engaged in contract manufacturing, only yes/no questions were added 
to the survey. The BE-10 CMS defi nition was broader than the interna-
tional guidelines’ defi nition of “manufacturing services” as constituting 
the processing of materials and components owned by others. However, 
the BEA requested respondents to answer the question of whether they 
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owned some or all of the materials used by the contract manufacturers 
or whether they did not own the materials.
Benchmark Survey of Transactions in Selected Services and 
Intellectual Property Products with Foreign Persons
The BEA conducts the Benchmark Survey of Transactions in 
Selected Services and Intellectual Property Products with Foreign 
Persons (BE-120) to track U.S. imports and exports of services and 
intellectual property products. The BE-120 benchmark survey collects 
information on U.S. international trade in all types of services and intel-
lectual property for which information is not collected on other BEA 
surveys and is not available to the BEA from other sources. The major 
types of services transactions not covered by the BE-120 survey are 
travel, transportation, insurance (except for payments for primary insur-
ance), fi nancial services (except for payments by nonfi nancial fi rms), 
and expenditures by students and medical patients that are studying or 
seeking treatment in a country different from their country of residence.
The survey covers U.S. persons that have engaged in services or 
intellectual property transactions with foreign persons. As with the U.S. 
direct investment abroad reporting unit, the respondent is required to 
report transactions for the fully consolidated U.S. domestic enterprise. 
Questions separately identifying receipts and payments for CMS were 
added to the 2011 BE-120 survey.12 Contract manufacturing services, 
as defi ned in the BE-120, are “manufacturing services on materials and 
components owned by others and covers processing, assembly, label-
ing, packing and so forth undertaken by businesses that do not own the 
goods concerned.”
The BEA is in the process of collecting these data to determine 
whether respondents can separately identify the costs of the manufac-
turing service as well as the destination of the goods after processing. 
Reporting by companies on the contract manufacturing questions is 
voluntary, and initial review of these questions indicates a low response 
rate. 
Census Bureau Surveys
To date, there are three data sources that cover explicit questions 
about CMS. Jarmin, Krizan, and Tang (2011) analyze the CMS-specifi c 
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questions in the 2007 economic censuses, which include both the Cen-
sus of Manufactures and the Census of Wholesale Trade. Fort (2013) 
utilizes the CMS question in the 2007 Census of Manufactures to study 
the role of communication technology on a fi rm’s decision to fragment 
its production process within and outside national boundaries. Bayard, 
Byrne, and Smith (Chapter 4, this volume) present a case study of “fac-
toryless” goods–producing fi rms in the semiconductor industry using 
the 2002 and 2007 Census of Wholesale Trade. A third survey, the 2011 
Report of Organization Survey (Form NC-99001, called the Company 
Organization Survey, or COS), has heretofore been unexplored by 
researchers. This chapter will focus on analyzing the 2011 COS, which 
asks detailed questions about both providing and purchasing CMS.13 
2011 Company Organization Survey 
The COS covers all multiunit companies with 250 or more employ-
ees and a selection of smaller companies to support other Census 
Bureau surveys. Companies with fewer than 250 employees are only 
selected for the COS when administrative records indicate that the 
company may be undergoing organizational change and is adding or 
dropping establishments. The COS is conducted annually in the four 
years between economic censuses.14 The COS is designed primarily 
to maintain the Business Register, a current list of business establish-
ments in the United States that is used to conduct establishment-level 
economic surveys every fi ve years.15 Therefore, it has heretofore not 
directly been used to conduct economic research. However, the 2011 
COS included a section that asked fi rms about their activities pertain-
ing to purchasing and providing CMS.16 These questions are some of 
the most detailed questions pertaining to the CMS activities of a fi rm 
from any survey currently in use. Although not nationally representa-
tive, analyzing responses to these questions furthers our understanding 
of the characteristics of fi rms engaged in CMS activities.
The survey unit in the COS is the company, which is linked to a fi rm 
identifi cation code.17 However, the unique identifi er is the survey unit 
identifi er. It would be useful to create a fi rm-level data set that can be 
linked to other Census Bureau data sets for further analysis. It is not pos-
sible to achieve this simply by aggregating the data by fi rm identifi ers, 
since CMS activities are indicated by categorical variables. Therefore, 
“Y” is assigned to a fi rm in response to a question (that requires “Y” or 
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“N”—”yes” or “no”) where multiple survey units under that fi rm identi-
fi er responded differently to the question. For example, if survey unit 
A responds “Y” to question 2 in the 2011 COS under Section 3D while 
survey unit B responds “N” (or does not respond), then “Y” is assigned 
to the fi rm to which both units belong. After the preceding adjustments 
have been made, the COS contains records for 34,228 unique fi rms.
Using the fi rm identifi er, the fi rm-level data set is then linked to the 
2010 Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) to identify three key fi rm 
characteristics: 1) fi rm age, 2) total employment, and 3) sector. The 
LBD is a longitudinally linked data set of all business establishments 
that operate in the United States except for farms, government-owned 
or government-operated entities, and private households (Jarmin and 
Miranda 2002). For multiunits or fi rms with multiple plants, age is cal-
culated as the difference between the year of interest and the year of 
establishment of its oldest plant. Since multiunit fi rms may operate in 
several sectors of the economy, the fi rm is considered to be operating in 
the sector where the largest share of its employment is housed.18 Since 
the LBD is an establishment-level data set, employment is fi rst aggre-
gated up to the fi rm level by sector. The fi rm is then assigned its “pre-
dominant” sector, and its employment is aggregated to the fi rm level.19 
Finally, the fi rm-level data, which now include information about fi rm 
age, total employment, and sector, are linked to the 2011 COS. Of 
34,228 fi rms in the COS data set, 34,191 fi rms are linked to the LBD. 
The fi nal analysis data set is a fi rm-level data set that includes 
information about the fi rm’s age, total employment, the sector in which 
it operates, and several indicator variables based on responses to the 
CMS-related questions.20 The fi rms are categorized into four mutually 
exclusive categories: 1) provides CMS only, 2) purchases CMS only, 3) 
both provides and purchases CMS, and 4) does none of the aforemen-
tioned. Within the category of fi rms that purchase CMS, the analysis 
further distinguishes among those that purchase CMS in three ways: 1) 
within the United States only, 2) outside the United States only, and 3) 
both within and outside the United States. Among fi rms that purchase 
CMS outside the United States, it is possible to further identify whether 
a fi rm does so from its foreign affi liates. Analysis of the responses to 
the second part of Question 2 and Question 3d is done only for survey 
units that belong to a unique fi rm identifi er, because there is no straight-
forward yes-or-no rule that can be implemented in this instance. There 
are 33,865 such observations.
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The 2011 COS is further linked to the 2007 Census of Manufac-
tures (CM) and the 2009 Linked/Longitudinal Foreign Trade Transac-
tions Database (LFTTD) to create two separate data sets: the COS-CM 
and the COS-LFTTD.21 The COS-CM provides data on the total value 
added and the total value of shipments of each fi rm in the COS that 
belongs to the manufacturing sector. These fi rms represent about 27 
percent of fi rms in the fi nal COS analysis data set. The COS-LFTTD 
provides data on the total value of exports and the total value of imports 
of each fi rm in the COS because the LFFTD links the universe of export 
and import transactions to fi rms and considers all 10-digit Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System (commonly called Har-
monized System, or HS) products. The Harmonized System is an inter-
nationally standardized system of names and numbers for classifying 
traded products. Approximately 33 percent of the fi rms in the fi nal COS 
analysis data set exported in 2009, and 24 percent imported that year.
ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT MANUFACTURING SERVICES 
ON THE BEA’s BE-10 SURVEY
The results presented in this chapter are based on reported data for 
3,830 U.S. parent companies. CMS questions were only included on the 
parent’s survey form, and no corresponding questions were included on 
the foreign affi liate’s form. Specifi c examples of a fi rm’s purchase or 
performance of CMS cannot be described, because the data are confi -
dential. However, hypothetical examples of purchases of CMS include 
the manufacturing of Company A’s computer based on specifi cations of 
the design of the computer provided by Company A, and the assembly 
of Company B’s semiconductor chips by a foundry. In each case, a fi rm 
is contracting with another unit to process materials and components 
based on specifi cations supplied by the purchasing fi rm.
Each U.S. parent is classifi ed by industry using the International 
Survey Industry (ISI) classifi cation system. For the most part, the ISI 
classifi cations are equivalent to NAICS four-digit industries; at its most 
detailed level, the NAICS classifi es industries at a six-digit level. The 
ISI system is less detailed than the NAICS because it is designed for 
classifying enterprises rather than establishments (or plants). Each U.S. 
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parent is classifi ed in a sector that accounted for the largest percent-
age of its sales. The sector classifi cation is chosen fi rst because many 
direct investment enterprises are active in several industries; it is not 
meaningful to classify all their data in a single industry if that industry 
is defi ned too narrowly.22
The fi rst step in the analysis was to analyze how U.S. parents 
responded to the question of whether they purchased or provided CMS. 
The respondents were asked to consider CMS activity performed by 
their foreign affi liates as purchasing CMS from others. As shown in 
Table 3.2, approximately a quarter of U.S. parents reported purchases 
of CMS from foreign or domestic contract manufacturers, while three-
fourths reported no purchases of CMS. Only 8 percent of U.S. parents 
reported performing CMS for nonresidents. Not surprisingly, the major-
ity, or 72 percent, of U.S. parents that reported purchases of CMS are 
classifi ed in the manufacturing sector. As shown in Table 3.3, the other 
two sectors with signifi cant purchases of CMS are wholesale (13 per-
cent) and information (5 percent).
Table 3.4 presents the characteristics of U.S. parents who are clas-
sifi ed within the manufacturing sector by three-digit NAICS-based ISI 
industry classifi cation and by fi rm size (measured as total domestic 
employment of the U.S. parent). Table 3.4 shows that U.S. parents that 
purchased CMS were large fi rms with more than 250 employees and 
Table 3.2  U.S. Parents Who Purchased or Performed Contract 
Manufacturing Services (CMS), 2009
 No. of respondents % of respondents
Parents who purchased CMS:
Yes 888 23
No 2,860 75
No response 82 2
Parents who performed CMS:
Yes 324 8
No 3,423 89
No response 83 2
NOTE: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
SOURCE: BEA’s 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, http://
www.bea.gov/surveys/pdf/2009be10i_web.pdf.
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were concentrated in industries that are known for outsourcing transfor-
mation activities to contract manufacturers. Examples of these indus-
tries include computer and electronic product manufacturing, machin-
ery manufacturing, chemical manufacturing (includes pharmaceutical 
manufacturing), and transportation equipment manufacturing.
Table 3.3  U.S. Parents Who Purchased Contract Manufacturing 
Services (CMS), by Sector, 2009 (%)
Manufacturing Wholesale Information
Professional, 
scientifi c, tech-
nical services Other
72 13 5 1 9
NOTE: “Manufacturing” includes all two-digit NAICS industries in sectors 31–33; 
“Wholesale” includes NAICS industries in sector 42; “Professional, scientifi c, and 
technical services” includes NAICS industries in sector 54; “Other” includes all other 
industries.
SOURCE: BEA’s 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.
Table 3.4  U.S. Parents Who Purchased Contract Manufacturing Services 
(CMS), by Manufacturing Subsectors, 2009
Total Small Med. Large
All manufacturing industries (NAICS sectors 
31–33)
642 93 104 445
Computer and electronic product mfg. (334) 153 30 32 91
Machinery mfg. (333) 82 17 14 51
Chemical mfg. (325) 80 9 13 58
Miscellaneous mfg. (339) 61 10 15 36
Transportation equipment mfg. (336) 54 2 4 48
Food mfg. (311) 36 6 3 27
Electrical equipment, appliance, and 
component mfg. (335)                            
33 2 6 25
Fabricated metal product mfg. (332) 31 7 4 20
Plastics and rubber products mfg. (326) 28 2 3 23
Primary metal mfg. (331) 22 2 1 19
NOTE: “Large” includes fi rms with 250 or more employees, “Medium” includes fi rms 
of between 100 and 249 employees, and “Small” includes fi rms of between 1 and 99 
employees. 
SOURCE: BEA’s 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.
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Because the international guidelines consider ownership of the 
materials used by the contract manufacturer in determining whether 
the contract manufacturer is selling manufacturing services or selling a 
good, questions were added to the BE-10 survey to determine whether 
U.S. parents could separately identify such transactions. U.S. parents 
who purchased CMS were asked to indicate whether they owned the 
materials used by contract manufacturers and whether the services 
were purchased from businesses inside or outside the United States. 
A respondent could answer “yes” to more than one type of arrange-
ment; about 10 percent of U.S. parents that purchased CMS responded 
“yes” to all four types of arrangements, indicating that they used con-
tract manufacturers located both in the United States and abroad and 
that they both owned the materials and did not own the materials used 
by the contract manufacturer. As shown in Table 3.5, U.S. parents were 
more likely to purchase CMS from U.S. contract manufacturers and to 
provide the material inputs to them (65 percent) than to purchase CMS 
from foreigners (about 37 percent). Interestingly, U.S. parents were just 
as likely to own the material inputs as to not own them when purchas-
ing CMS from foreigners. Of the approximately 325 U.S. parents that 
reported purchasing CMS from outside the United States, nearly half 
of the respondents answered “yes” to both owning the material inputs 
and not owning the material inputs used by the contract manufacturer. 
This suggests that separately identifying purchases of CMS based on 
the ownership of the materials used by the contract manufacturer may 
be diffi cult to collect on an enterprise survey.  
Table 3.5  U.S. Parents Who Purchased CMS, 2009
Category       N
U.S. parents who purchased CMS 888
U.S. parents who owned materials used by contract manufacturers 
located inside U.S.
579
U.S. parents who owned materials used by contract manufacturers 
located outside U.S.
330
U.S. parents who did not own materials used by contract manufacturers 
located inside U.S.
369
U.S. parents who did not own materials used by contract manufacturers 
located outside U.S.
323
SOURCE: BEA’s 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.
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Table 3.6 compares selected statistics of U.S. parents who pur-
chased CMS with those of all U.S. parents and all U.S. companies. 
Table 3.6 shows that U.S. parents classifi ed in manufacturing, whole-
sale trade, and information that purchased CMS had a higher value-
added per employee compared to the value-added per employee of all 
U.S. parents and of all U.S. companies. This fi nding suggests that fi rms 
Table 3.6  Selected Statistics for U.S. Parents and for All U.S. Companies, 
by Sector, 2009
 Value-added (in 
$ millions)a
Employees
(in 
thousands)b
Value-added 
per employee 
($)
U.S. parents who purchased CMSc
All industries 585,366 4,112 142,366
Manufacturing 400,369 2,413 165,910
Wholesale trade 44,286 307 144,240
Information 33,338 141 236,555
Other industries 107,374 1,251 85,859
All U.S. parentsc
All industries 2,595,776 22,933 113,191
Manufacturing 1,034,139 6,864 150,655
Wholesale trade 124,433 1,065 116,795
Information 287,628 1,712 168,056
Other industries 1,149,576 13,292 86,490
All U.S. companies
All private industries 12,018,095 112,139 107,171
Manufacturing 1,540,226 11,856 129,911
Wholesale trade 768,548 5,620 136,752
Information 615,445 2,814 218,708
Other industries 9,093,876 91,849 99,009
NOTE: Figures may not sum to total because of rounding.
a Statistics on value-added for all U.S. companies are from the BEA’s GDP by Industry 
series, as published in Table 3, p. 55 of Barefoot (2012). 
b Statistics on employees for all U.S. companies are from the BEA’s National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIPA) Table 6.4D, “Full-Time and Part-Time Employees by 
Industry,” http://www.econstats.com/nipa/NIPA6_6_4D_.htm.
c Statistics for U.S. parents are from the BEA’s 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad, as published in Table 3, p. 55 of Barefoot (2012). 
SOURCE: See table notes a, b, and c.
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that use contract manufacturers to make their products may be more 
productive than fi rms that do not use contract manufacturers, though 
it is also possible that fi rms that use contract manufacturers have high 
value-added per employee by contracting out low value-added tasks, 
without any difference in output per quality-adjusted unit of inputs.
As was stated earlier, no corresponding CMS questions were 
included on the foreign affi liate’s survey forms. Thus, a direct linkage 
cannot be made as to whether the U.S. parent purchased CMS from 
its foreign affi liate or from an unaffi liated foreigner. Table 3.7 shows 
that U.S. parents that purchased CMS exported a higher share of their 
total exports to their foreign affi liates (50 percent) than did all U.S. 
parents to their foreign affi liates (39 percent). In addition, U.S. parents 
that purchased CMS had a slightly higher share of export of goods sent 
for further processing to foreign affi liates (62 percent) than did all U.S. 
parents (57 percent).
ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT MANUFACTURING SERVICES 
ON CENSUS BUREAU 2011 COS
Table 3.8 presents the distribution of fi rms by various CMS activity 
categories in the linked COS-LBD data set. Panel A of Table 3.8 shows 
Table 3.7  U.S. Trade in Goods (in $ millions) Associated with U.S. 
Parents, 2009
U.S. parents who 
purchased CMS
All U.S. 
parents
Exports of goods to all foreigners 204,467 535,409
To foreign affi liates 102,768 207,479
For further manufacture 63,747 117,624
For resale without further manufacture 31,027 66,632
Other 7,993 23,223
To other foreigners 101,699 327,930
Imports of goods from all foreigners 194,879 679,521
From foreign affi liates 97,659 233,578
From other foreigners 97,220 445,943
SOURCE: BEA’s 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.
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that 92 percent of the fi rms in the survey do not engage in any CMS 
activity. Among the remaining fi rms, there is an almost even share that 
either provide or purchase CMS, and only 1 percent that both provide 
and purchase CMS. Panel B shows that within the group of fi rms that 
purchase CMS, about 39 percent do so within the United States only, 20 
percent do so outside the United States only, and 37 percent purchase 
CMS both inside and outside the United States. Finally, Panel C shows 
that of the fi rms that purchase CMS outside the United States, more 
than half of these fi rms do so from their foreign affi liates. Overall, a 
small share of fi rms engage in CMS activities, and among those that 
purchase CMS, a larger share purchase domestically. These observa-
tions are consistent with those made in Fort (2013) using the 2007 Cen-
sus of Manufactures.
Table 3.9 presents two key fi rm characteristics associated with fi rms 
engaged in various CMS activities: size (measured as total employ-
Table 3.8  Percentage Distribution of Firms by CMS Activity
Panel A: All fi rms
No CMS activity 92
Provide CMS only 3
Purchase CMS only 4
Provide and purchase CMS 1
Panel B: Firms that purchase CMS
Inside U.S. only 39
Outside U.S. only 20
Inside and outside U.S. 37
Panel C: Firms that purchase CMS outside U.S.
From affi liates 53
NOTE: This table provides the percentage share of the count of fi rms within each CMS 
activity category. Panel A is computed as a share of the total number of unique fi rms in 
the data; Panel B is computed as a share of the total number of unique fi rms that pur-
chase CMS (the rows “Purchase CMS only” and “Provide and purchase CMS” from 
Panel A); and Panel C is computed as a share of the total number of unique fi rms that 
purchase CMS outside the United States (the rows “Outside U.S. only” and “Inside 
and outside U.S.” from Panel B). Panel B does not add up to 100 percent because 
some fi rms did not respond and so could not be categorized. 
SOURCE: Linked COS-LBD data set.
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ment) and age. Panel A of Table 3.9 reports the average employment 
and age at fi rms within each CMS category. Firms that both provide and 
purchase CMS are the largest in terms of average employment, while 
those that provide CMS only are the smallest. Panel B shows that fi rms 
that purchase CMS both inside and outside the United States are much 
larger than those that purchase CMS either inside or outside the United 
States only. Finally, Panel C shows that fi rms that purchase CMS from 
their affi liates located abroad are the largest. An average fi rm in the sur-
vey is about 24 years old, and the average fi rm age does not vary greatly 
by CMS activity. The overwhelming majority of fi rms in the COS have 
been in existence for 10 or more years.
Table 3.10 provides further detail on the size distribution of fi rms in 
the survey by CMS activity. Firms with 250 or more employees are con-
sidered to be large, those with 100 to 249 employees to be medium, and 
those with one to 99 employees to be small. Since the COS primarily 
Table 3.9  Average Firm Size and Age by CMS Activity
Employment Age
Panel A: All fi rms
No CMS activity 1,366 23
Provide CMS only 761 26
Purchase CMS only 1,871 25
Provide and purchase CMS 4,315 25
Panel B: Firms that purchase CMS
Inside U.S. only 1,065 25
Outside U.S. only 1,817 25
Inside and outside U.S. 4,427 24
Panel C: Firms that purchase CMS outside U.S.
From affi liates 5, 054 25
NOTE: This table provides the average employment and age of fi rms within each CMS 
activity category; Panel A is computed for the total number of unique fi rms in the 
data; Panel B is computed for the fi rms that purchase CMS (the rows “Purchase CMS 
only” and “Provide and purchase CMS” from Panel A); and Panel C is computed for 
fi rms that purchase CMS outside the United States (the rows “Outside U.S. only” and 
“Inside and outside U.S.” from Panel B). 
SOURCE: Linked COS-LBD data set.
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surveys large fi rms, the results in this table are not directly comparable 
to those in Table 3.4 and should be interpreted with the COS survey 
frame in mind. Within the group of fi rms that do not engage in any 
CMS activity, well over half the fi rms are large, and the remainder can 
be almost evenly divided between small and medium-sized fi rms. This 
pattern also holds for those that purchase CMS only or both provide and 
purchase CMS. Three-quarters of fi rms that provide CMS only are large 
or medium, and a quarter are small. Among fi rms that purchase CMS, 
those that do so outside the United States only and those that purchase 
CMS both outside and inside the United States exhibit similar fi rm-size 
distributions. As shown in Table 3.9, an overwhelming share of fi rms 
that purchase CMS from their foreign affi liates are large. However, of 
the fi rms that provide CMS only, about 40 percent are large and 30 
percent are medium-sized. Firms that purchase CMS inside the United 
States only have a similar size distribution.
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show the sectoral distribution of fi rms engaged 
in various CMS activities. The COS asked fi rms whether they operated 
Table 3.10  Distribution of Firm Size by CMS Activity
Large Medium Small
Panel A: All fi rms 60 18 22
No CMS activity 61 18 22
Provide CMS only 41 34 25
Purchase CMS only 58 22 20
Provide and purchase CMS 55 24 21
Panel B: Firms that purchase CMS
Inside U.S. only 45 27 28
Outside U.S. only 64 19 17
Inside and outside U.S. 66 20 14
Panel C: Firms that purchase CMS outside U.S.
From affi liates 74 17 9
NOTE: This table provides the percentage share of fi rms in three size categories within 
each CMS activity category. “Large” includes fi rms with 250 or more employees, 
“Medium” includes fi rms of between 100 and 249 employees, and “Small” includes 
fi rms of between 1 and 99 employees. 
SOURCE: Linked COS-LBD data set.
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a manufacturing facility where products are completed or partially pro-
duced. Table 3.11 reports the share of fi rms within various categories 
that responded “Y” or “N” or had missing data. Table 3.12 shows the 
distribution of fi rms within one of three broad sectors: 1) manufactur-
ing, 2) wholesale and retail, or 3) all remaining sectors of the economy. 
Panel A in Table 3.11 and Panel A in Table 3.12 show that an over-
whelming majority of fi rms that report engaging in some CMS activity 
also operate a manufacturing facility. Seventy-four percent of the fi rms 
that do not engage in any CMS activity report not operating a manufac-
turing facility; this fi nding is corroborated by the fi nding that 76 percent 
of these fi rms operate in sectors other than manufacturing, wholesale, 
or retail. In addition, 97 percent of the fi rms that provide CMS only 
or both provide and purchase CMS reported operating a manufactur-
ing facility, and over 80 percent of them operate in the manufactur-
ing, wholesale, or retail sectors. However, within the group of fi rms 
that purchase CMS only, 77 percent report operating a manufacturing 
Table 3.11  Distribution of Firm Response to Operating a Manufacturing 
Facility, by CMS Activity
% that answered “Yes”
Panel A: All fi rms
No CMS activity 22
Provide CMS only 97
Purchase CMS only 77
Provide and purchase CMS 97
Panel B: Firms that purchase CMS
Inside U.S. only 85
Outside U.S. only 77
Inside and outside U.S. 81
Panel C: Firms that purchase CMS outside U.S.
From affi liates 85
NOTE: This table provides the percentage share of fi rms that responded “Yes” to Ques-
tion 1 under Section 3D of the 2011 Company Organization Survey (COS) within 
each CMS activity category. The left-out category is “No,” except for under “No CMS 
activity.” Four percent of the responses are missing.
SOURCE: Linked COS-LBD data set.
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facility and operate in the manufacturing, wholesale, or retail sectors; 
the share is smaller compared with fi rms only providing CMS or both 
providing and purchasing CMS. 
Table 3.13 is based only on responses of survey units that have a 
one-to-one link to a fi rm identifi er.23 It shows the percentage share of 
revenues (costs) generated (incurred) from providing (purchasing) CMS 
as a share of total revenues and net sales (cost of sales from expenses). 
Three-quarters of the fi rms providing CMS report less than a quarter of 
total revenues and net sales originating from providing CMS. A little 
over three-quarters of fi rms purchasing CMS also report less than a 
quarter of the total cost of sales from expenses originating from pur-
chasing CMS. This suggests that for most fi rms engaged in some CMS 
activity, the activity constitutes a relatively small share of total revenues 
or total costs.
Table 3.12  Distribution of Sectors by CMS Activity
Manu-
facturing
Wholesale/
retail Other
Panel A: All fi rms
No CMS activity 18 16 76
Provide CMS only 76 7 17
Purchase CMS only 58 16 16
Provide and purchase CMS 75 7 18
Panel B: Firms that purchase CMS
Inside U.S. only 66 10 24
Outside U.S. only 56 22 22
Inside and outside U.S. 62 15 23
Panel C: Firms that purchase CMS 
outside U.S.
From affi liates 64 15 21
NOTE: This table provides the percentage share of fi rms in three broad sectors of the 
economy within each CMS activity category. “Manufacturing” includes all two-
digit NAICS industries in sectors 31–33; “Wholesale/retail” includes two-digit 
NAICS industries in sectors 42, 44, and 45; and “Other” includes all other industries. 
SOURCE: Linked COS-LBD data set.
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Finally, Table 3.14 shows the average output per employee as well 
as export and import values of fi rms by various CMS activities. The fi rst 
column shows the log of value-added per employee (VA/L), and the 
second column shows the log of total value of shipments per employee 
(TVS/L). Firms that engage in some type of CMS activity exhibit both 
higher (VA/L) and (TVS/L) than those that do not. Among fi rms that 
purchase CMS, those that purchase both inside and outside the United 
States exhibit the highest average output per employee, using both 
measures. 
The last two columns show the average export and import values, 
in millions of dollars, respectively. Focusing on the third column, fi rms 
that both provide and purchase CMS have higher average export value 
compared to all other fi rms in the sample. Firms that do not engage in 
any CMS activity and fi rms that provide only CMS have very similar 
average export values. Firms that purchase CMS inside and outside the 
United States have the highest average export values among fi rms that 
purchase CMS. Focusing on the last column, fi rms engaged in some 
CMS activity display much higher average fi rm import values compared 
to those that do not, and, of these, fi rms that both purchase and pro-
vide CMS have the highest value. Firms that purchase CMS inside and 
outside the United States have the highest average import value among 
fi rms that purchase CMS. Among fi rms that purchase CMS outside the 
Table 3.13  Distribution of Percentage Share of Revenue and Costs by 
CMS Activity
% of operating revenues and net sales (cost 
of sales from expenses) from (for) CMS
Provide 
CMS
Purchase 
CMS
Less than 25 75 79
25 to 49 5 9
50 to 74 4 5
75 to 99 8 5
100 8 2
NOTE: This table provides the percentage share of fi rms in fi ve mutually exclusive 
categories in response to Questions 2 and 3d from the 2011 COS form (see Appen-
dix 3A, Illustration 3A.1). The second column shows the percentage share of fi rms 
that receive x percent of operating revenues and sales from providing CMS; the third 
column shows the percentage share of fi rms that incur x percent of cost of sales from 
expenses for purchasing CMS. 
SOURCE: Linked COS-LBD data set.
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Table 3.14  Output per Employee and Trade Value by CMS Activity
Log 
(value added/
employment)
Log (total value 
of shipments/
employment)
Export value
(in $ millions)
Import value 
(in $ millions)
Panel A: All fi rms
No CMS activity 4.23 4.98 29 82
Provide CMS only 4.45 5.19 30 232
Purchase CMS only 4.63 5.31 113 190
Provide and purchase CMS 4.61 5.30 241 289
Panel B: Firms that purchase CMS
Inside U.S. only 4.58 5.27 32 104
Outside U.S. only 4.53 5.22 68 144
Inside and outside U.S. 4.73 5.40 284 327
Panel C: Firms that purchase CMS outside U.S.
From affi liates 4.75 5.44 334 417
NOTE: The above statistics are calculated for manufacturing fi rms only.
SOURCE: Linked COS-CM and COS-LFTTD data sets.
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United States, those that do so from their affi liates are larger traders and 
have higher value-added per employee than those that do not.
FUTURE WORK 
This chapter analyzes existing data on fi rms’ activities relating to 
providing or purchasing CMS as a means to measure “factoryless” 
manufacturing, where the manufacturer undertakes the entrepreneurial 
steps in the global supply chain but does not transform any of the mate-
rial inputs. Our primary goal was to analyze the characteristics of fi rms 
that report engaging in various CMS activities to provide a preliminary 
glimpse into factoryless goods producers. However, comprehensive 
work is needed, and indeed is underway, as described below, to do three 
things: 1) quantify the scope of FGP activity, 2) look at how the CMS 
data discussed in this chapter compare to CMS data in other existing 
surveys, and 3) evaluate the feasibility of the proposed changes in the 
defi nitions to the manufacturing sector and import and export fl ows. 
The recently updated international guidelines for services on physi-
cal inputs owned by others (goods for processing) are designed to better 
capture the impacts of GVCs on the economy. The BEA is evaluating 
whether implementation of the new guidelines is feasible. Successful 
implementation of this recommendation requires detailed information 
on not only the processing fees received and paid by U.S. fi rms for 
CMS but also the underlying goods transactions. Data for these trans-
actions are currently either not available in the U.S. statistical system 
or not separately identifi able. Despite these data challenges, the BEA 
continues to investigate options for implementing this new treatment of 
manufacturing services.
The results from the BEA BE-120 survey will be available soon. 
Once the results are available, the BEA can evaluate whether the value 
of receipts and payments for CMS can be reported along with the des-
tination of the goods after processing. To determine the feasibility of 
adjusting the merchandise trade statistics to remove goods that cross 
the border without a change in ownership, the BEA is also continuing 
to work with the Census Bureau to explore options for identifying the 
merchandise trade transactions of U.S. fi rms that purchased manufac-
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   70 2/16/2015   8:39:06 AM
Measuring “Factoryless” Manufacturing   71
turing services from overseas contractors or that provided manufactur-
ing services to foreigners.   
The CMS questions on the enterprise-level COS discussed in this 
chapter represent initial steps in determining whether further data col-
lection is likely to be robust and whether the Census Bureau can identify 
“factoryless” manufacturers in its surveys. As a next step, the Census 
Bureau added special inquiries to the 2012 Economic Census to collect 
information at the establishment level that will better identify “factory-
less” manufacturers and assess whether suffi cient data can be collected 
on the value of the manufacturing service and the associated revenue on 
sales of products produced by contract manufacturers.24 
An interagency effort across the Census Bureau, the BEA, and the 
BLS is underway to analyze census microdata in support of consistent 
and accurate implementation of the decision to classify FGPs in the 
manufacturing sector as soon as the agencies can perform the research, 
testing, and evaluation necessary to do so. One of the main goals of 
this effort is to estimate the number of establishments, the total value 
of shipments, and the total employment that will be moved across vari-
ous sectors with the eventual implementation of the FGP concept in 
the Economic Census. Furthermore, comparisons will be made between 
the results from the special inquiry questions in the economic censuses 
and the COS in order to refi ne the questions that will be used by agen-
cies and programs to identify FGPs on data collection instruments. The 
agencies must take care that as changes are made in the measurement 
of manufacturing activities, whether in the production of services or in 
the shipments of goods, these changes are implemented in a way that 
consistently and correctly allocates manufacturing value-added to the 
domestic and nonresident producers, in order to avoid overstating or 
understating U.S. gross domestic product.
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1. The research in this chapter was undertaken while this author was at the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
2. For more information on GVCs, see APEC Policy Support Unit (2012).
3. The System of National Accounts 2008 (European Commission et al. 2009) pro-
vides recommendations for compiling the national accounts, and the sixth edition 
of the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (IMF 
2009) provides recommendations for compiling the international accounts.
4. For more information, see the Economic Classifi cation Policy Committee’s “Issue 
Paper No. 1” (ECPC 1993).
5. See Doherty (Chapter 2 of this volume) for a discussion of identifying FGPs in the 
U.S. Statistical System. 
6. The System of National Accounts 2008, published by fi ve international organi-
zations, is the international guideline for compilation of gross domestic product 
and other national accounts statistics (European Commission et al. 2009), and the 
Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, published by 
the International Monetary Fund, is the international guideline for compilation of 
balance of payments and international investment position statistics (IMF 2009).
7. In practice, this may not hold. Maurer and Degain (2010) state that, for most cases, 
the value of the manufacturing service or the processing fee is not simply the 
difference between the value of the goods before processing and the value after 
processing. 
8. For more information, see BPM6, Chapter 10, Sections 10.65–10.66 (IMF 2009, 
p. 162). For a discussion of the measurement issues related to goods for process-
ing, see United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2011), pp. 71–84.
9. The term “affi liated” refers to a direct investment relationship, which exists when 
a U.S. person has ownership or control, directly or indirectly, of 10 percent or 
more of a foreign business enterprise’s voting securities or the equivalent, or when 
a foreign person has a similar interest in a U.S. business enterprise.
10. A U.S. “person” includes companies.
11. See questions 28–30 on the 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment 
Abroad for U.S. parents that are not banks (BE-10A) at http://www.bea.gov/
surveys/pdf/be10a_web.pdf.
12. See Schedule D on the 2011 Benchmark Survey of Transactions in Selected Ser-
vices and Intellectual Property with Foreign Persons (BE-120), at http://www.bea
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.gov/surveys/pdf/be120.pdf, p. 12. Prior versions of the survey recorded receipts 
and payments for contract manufacturing services within the “other services” 
category.
13. The 2012 Economic Census includes a similar set of questions to those in the 2011 
COS. It will provide the richest set of information at the establishment level once 
the data collection process is completed. 
14. See http://www.bea.gov/surveys/pdf/be120.pdf. for further details.
15. The COS data are unedited and have had no adjustments for survey nonresponse. 
16. Form NC-99001, Section 3D, Questions 1–3; see https://www.census.gov/econ/
overview/mu0700.html for a description of the survey. Also see Appendix 3A.
17. A company is an economic unit comprising one or more establishments under 
common ownership or control. The COS may survey different subsidiaries of the 
same company, so several survey units may belong to one fi rm identifi cation code.
18. Industry assignments remain qualitatively unchanged if payroll information is 
used instead to assign sectors.
19. Sales data are not readily available for all fi rms in the sample. Therefore, employ-
ment is used to assign a sector.
20. The LBD contains information on employment within the United States only; 
therefore, fi gures on employment at foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent companies 
are not available in the linked LBD-COS data set. 
21. The 2007 CM and 2009 LFTTD are the most recent available years. See Bernard, 
Jensen, and Schott (2009) for an overview of LFTTD, including match rates.
22. For more on the BE-10 U.S. Direct Investment Abroad methodology, see http://
www.bea.gov/international/pdf/usdia_2004f/Text%20sections/methodology.pdf.
23. See the subsection of this chapter titled “Census Bureau Surveys,” pp. 54–55, for 
details.
24. See Question 26 on the 2012 Economic Census manufacturing sample forms, 
located at http://bhs.econ.census.gov/ec12/php/census-form.php. An example of 
such a form is found at https://bhs.econ.census.gov/2012forms/MC31101.pdf.
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 COMPANY ACTIVITIES - continued
D. MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES
In 2011, did your company do any of the following activities related to manufacturing?
1. Operate manufacturing facilities (such as a factory, plant, or mill) where prod-
ucts are completed or partially produced?
9709  Yes - Go to line 2
9710   No - Go to line 3
2. Provide contract manufacturing services to other companies incorporating their 
patents, trade secrets, or proprietary technology?
9711  Yes
9712   No - Go to line 3
Estimate the percent of operating revenues and net sales, as reported in B, 
from contract manufacturing services.
9713   Less than 25%
9714   25 to 49%
9715   50 to 74%
9716   75 to 99%
9717   100%
3. Purchase contract manufacturing services from other companies or foreign 
subsidiaries of your company incorporating your company’s patents, trade 
secrets, or proprietary technology?
9718  Yes
9719   No - Go to , CERTIFICATION
a. Use 3rd party contract manufacturing services inside the U.S.?
 9720   Yes
 9721   No
b. Use 3rd party contract manufacturing services outside the U.S.?
 9722   Yes
 9723   No
Appendix 3A
Excerpts from Three Survey 
Forms Used in This Chapter
Questions on contract manufacturing services activities included these from 
the 2011 Report of Organization Survey (Form NC-99001):
Illustration 3A.1  Excerpt from Form NC-99001
75
(continued)
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   75 2/16/2015   8:39:08 AM
76   Kamal, Moulton, and Ribarsky
Questions on purchases of contract manufacturing services included these 
from the 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad for U.S. 
parents (Form BE-10A):
Illustration 3A.2  Excerpts from Form BE-10A
Illustration 3A.1 (continued)
c. Use your company’s foreign subsidiaries’ or affi liates’ contract manu-
facturing services at locations outside the U.S.?
 9724   Yes
 9725   No
d. Estimate the percent of the cost of sales from expenses for contract 
manufacturing services.
 9726   Less than 25%
 9727   25 to 49%
 9728   50 to 74%
 9729   75 to 99%
 9730   100%
1. Did this U.S. reporter purchase contract manufacturing services from others 
(including foreign affi liates)? (Yes/No)
2. The U.S. reporter owned some or all of the materials used by the contract 
manufacturers and the companies providing the manufacturing services 
were: 
a.  Located inside the U.S. (Yes/No)
b.  Located outside the U.S. (Yes/No)
3. The U.S. reporter did not own the materials used by the contract manufactur-
ers and the companies providing the manufacturing services were:
a.  Located inside the U.S. (Yes/No)
b.  Located outside the U.S. (Yes/No)
This survey also included a question on performance of contract manufac-
turing services for others:
1. Did this U.S. reporter perform contract manufacturing services for others 
(including foreign affi liates) outside the U.S.? (Yes/No)
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Questions on purchases of contract manufacturing services included these 
from the 2011 Benchmark Survey of Transactions in Selected Services and 
Intellectual Property Products with Foreign Persons (Form BE-120):
Illustration 3A.3  Excerpts from Form BE-120
 1.  Did you purchase contract manufacturing services from foreign persons in Fis-
cal Year 2011?
 2.  Are you able to report the fee you paid for contract manufacturing services?
• If yes—enter the amount you paid foreign persons for contract manufac-
turing services. 
 3.  The payments for manufacturing services in Question 2 were (check the appro-
priate box):
   Based on accounting records.
   Estimated by persons knowledgeable regarding these transactions.
 4.  Destination of goods produced after you purchased contract manufacturing 
(check the appropriate box):
   Goods do not enter United States.
   Goods are imported into the United States.
  A portion of the goods remain abroad and a portion are imported into the 
United States.
   Destination is unknown.
Questions on receipts for contract manufacturing services include the 
following:
 1. Did you perform contract manufacturing services for foreign persons in Fiscal 
Year 2011?
 2. Are you able to report the fee you received for performing contract manufactur-
ing services?
• NOTE: This may include the cost of the materials you purchased to per-
form this service.
• If yes—enter the amount received from foreign persons for contract man-
ufacturing services you performed on goods owned by foreign persons 
and go to Questions 3 and 4.
 3.  The receipts for manufacturing in Question 2 were (check the appropriate box):
   Based on accounting records.
   Estimated by persons knowledgeable regarding these transactions.
 4.  Destination of goods produced after you performed contract manufacturing 
(check appropriate box):
   Goods remain in the United States.
   Goods are exported from the United States.
  A portion of the goods remain in the United States and a portion are 
exported from the United States.
   Destination is unknown.
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The “factoryless manufacturing” (FM) business model is employed 
by a rising share of U.S. fi rms. Factoryless manufacturers outsource the 
fabrication of products but maintain control of the production process, 
own the associated intellectual property, and bear the entrepreneurial 
risk. FM is an important component in the role of U.S. fi rms in global 
manufacturing value chains. Currently, U.S. Census Bureau programs 
assign establishments engaged in factoryless manufacturing, known as 
factoryless goods producers (FGPs), to the wholesale trade sector. U.S. 
statistical agencies are considering classifi cation of FGPs in the manu-
facturing sector in the future, if collecting data on FM is shown to be 
feasible.
This chapter estimates the scope of U.S. factoryless manufactur-
ing using three approaches. First, we use fi nancial reports for S&P 500 
companies to show that FM is prevalent and increasing in the United 
States and that FM, once only common in the production of apparel, 
electronics, toys, and pharmaceuticals, has spread to a broader array of 
products. Second, we use Economic Census microdata to estimate that 
manufacturing value-added would have been 5 to 20 percent greater for 
2007 if all FGPs were reclassifi ed to manufacturing. Third, using a list 
of FM semiconductor companies matched to Economic Census micro-
data, we estimate that value-added would be 20 to 30 percent greater 
for semiconductor manufacturing, an industry where FM is especially 
prevalent, if FGPs were included. These results suggest that outsourc-
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ing and offshoring of product fabrication by U.S. fi rms is coupled 
with signifi cant domestic production management. Thus, identifying 
FGPs in economic data is important for the study of fragmentation and 
globalization.
In the next section, “Defi ning and Measuring Factoryless Manufac-
turing and Factoryless Goods Producers,” we defi ne factoryless manu-
facturing (a company concept) and discuss the treatment of factoryless 
goods producers (an establishment concept) in U.S. economic statistics. 
In the third section, “The Extent of U.S. Factoryless Goods Production,” 
we look at the extent of FM using company reports, and we examine the 
prevalence of FGPs using Economic Census establishment data. The 
fourth section, “The Structure of Factoryless Manufacturing Firms in 
the Semiconductor Industry,” presents a close look at the establishment 
structure of FM fi rms in the semiconductor industry. Alternative esti-
mates of the size of the manufacturing sector when FGPs are included 
are found in the fi fth section, “U.S. Manufacturing with Factoryless 
Goods Producers Included,” with a particular focus on semiconductor 
manufacturing. In Section Six, “Selected Effects of Reclassifi cation 
and Relevance for Economic Analysis,” we speculate on the effects of 
reclassifying FGPs for selected economic measures, and we discuss the 
role that better data on factoryless manufacturing may play in the study 
of economic issues. Section Seven offers a conclusion.
DEFINING AND MEASURING FACTORYLESS 
MANUFACTURING AND FACTORYLESS 
GOODS PRODUCERS
In 1997, the Offi ce of Management and Budget (OMB) intro-
duced the North American Industry Classifi cation System (NAICS), 
an approach to classifying establishments into industries “according to 
similarity in the processes used to produce goods or services” (OMB 
1998, p. 13).1 NAICS defi nes the manufacturing sector to be the set 
of establishments “engaged in the mechanical, physical, or chemical 
transformation of materials, substances, or components into new prod-
ucts.” Yet NAICS acknowledges that the relevant transformation may 
happen outside the establishment: “Manufacturing establishments may 
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   82 2/16/2015   8:39:10 AM
The Scope of U.S. “Factoryless Manufacturing”   83
process materials or may contract with other establishments to process 
their materials for them. Both types of establishments are included in 
manufacturing”  (OMB 1998, p. 105)
Since the introduction of NAICS in 1997, the outsourcing of pro-
cessing materials into products—hereafter, “fabrication” for conve-
nience—has risen dramatically, elevating the importance of consistent 
treatment of this practice across statistical programs. The Economic 
Classifi cation Policy Committee (ECPC) of the OMB studied the issue 
and defi ned three types of establishments: 
1) Integrated manufacturers (IMs) 
2) Manufacturing service providers (MSPs)
3) Factoryless goods producers (FGPs)
FGPs have the following characteristics (OMB 2009): They
• own the rights to the intellectual property or design (whether in-
dependently developed or otherwise acquired) of the fi nal manu-
factured product, 
• may or may not own the input materials, 
• do not own production facilities, 
• do not perform transformation activities, 
• own the fi nal product produced by MSP partners, and 
• sell the fi nal product. 
In contrast, IMs and MSPs own production facilities and perform 
transformation activities, and MSPs do not own the intellectual prop-
erty or the fi nal product. 
In the absence of clear guidance from NAICS, the approach used 
to classify FGPs has differed across statistical agencies. U.S. Census 
Bureau practice has been to classify such establishments in the “Whole-
sale trade” sector.2 In contrast, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) 
Producer Price Index (PPI) program collects prices from FGPs for use 
in some manufacturing PPIs, and the BLS’s Current Employment Sta-
tistics (CES) program classifi es some reporting FGP establishments in 
the “Management of companies and enterprises” sector.3 In 2011, the 
OMB adopted the ECPC’s proposal to classify FGP establishments in 
the manufacturing sector “beginning no later than 2017” (OMB 2011); 
however, in August 2014 the OMB backed off from that decision, say-
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ing that “agencies need an opportunity to perform additional research, 
testing, and evaluation.” U.S. statistical agencies are currently studying 
the feasibility of this proposal.4
As noted above, the NAICS defi nition of the manufacturing sec-
tor is fl exible enough to allow for a manufacturing establishment to be 
“engaged” in fabrication even if the fabrication takes place at another 
establishment. But the notion that an establishment can be in manufac-
turing if no fabrication takes place on-site is somewhat controversial 
(OMB 2011).5 The BLS’s Business Processes and Business Functions 
(BPBF) classifi cation system provides a helpful framework for consid-
ering the characteristics that distinguish manufacturing establishments 
from those in other sectors. The manufacturing “operations” business 
process includes the tasks of producing goods, assembling products, 
and fabricating components, as well as those of managing produc-
tion and conducting quality assurance (Brown 2008).6 In this scheme, 
FGPs perform the production management and quality assurance por-
tions of manufacturing operations. In addition, other business processes 
may be performed by the FGPs as well, such as product design and 
development.7
For the purpose of characterizing companies (groups of establish-
ments under common ownership), we defi ne the term “factoryless man-
ufacturing” (FM) to be the use of contract manufacturing to produce 
some or all of the fi nal products sold by a company, provided the com-
pany controls the intellectual property or design. We expect that at least 
one of the establishments of an FM company will be an FGP.
Factoryless manufacturing emerged in the U.S. apparel sector in the 
1950s when U.S. companies shifted fabrication to Japan (Gereffi  2002). 
In the 1970s, FM became common for consumer goods, especially toys 
(Steiner 1995).8 The role of contract manufacturing in the production 
of fi nal goods in electronics has risen dramatically over time as well—
in particular, the revenue of major offshore fi nal electronics MSPs has 
risen markedly over the past 10 years (Figure 4.1).9 Finally, the use of 
factoryless manufacturing has surged for semiconductors: The share of 
semiconductor sales accounted for by FM fi rms, predominantly U.S. 
companies, climbed from 3 percent in 1993 to 25 percent in 2012 (Fig-
ure 4.2). 
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THE EXTENT OF U.S. FACTORYLESS 
GOODS PRODUCTION
Evidence from Company Financial Reports
In fi nancial reports fi led with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), manufacturing companies often indicate that they use 
factoryless manufacturing for some or all of their production.10 For 
example, the 2012 annual report for Nike Inc. notes, “Our principal 
business activity is the design, development, and worldwide market-
ing and selling of high quality footwear, apparel, equipment, accesso-
ries, and services” and that “virtually all of our footwear is produced 
by factories we contract with outside of the United States.” Similarly, 
the 2012 annual report for electronics manufacturer Juniper Networks 
Inc. states, “Our manufacturing is primarily conducted through contract 
Figure 4.1  Sales of Selected Taiwanese Contract Electronics 
Manufacturers
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations based on  public fi nancial reports. Companies included 
are contract electronics fi rms traded on the Taiwan Stock Exchange: Hon Hai (Fox-
conn), Quanta, Compal, HTC, Inventec, WNC, and ASUS.
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manufacturers,” and goes on to say that Juniper employees “manage 
relationships with contract manufacturers, manage our supply chain, 
and monitor and manage product testing and quality.” These compa-
nies report that they outsource some or all of their fabrication activity, 
but that they manage production and perform product design in-house. 
Other examples are shown in Table 4.1.
To get a sense of the breadth of factoryless manufacturing by U.S. 
companies, we searched for evidence of FM activity in the annual 
reports of all fi rms in the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 for both 2002 
and 2012.11 Specifi cally, we reviewed the reports for references to the 
use of contract manufacturing for fabrication of the companies’ fi nal 
products.12 Table 4.2 summarizes the results of our review of the annual 
reports. For 2012, we fi nd that about half (46 percent) of fi rms reporting 
manufacturing of any kind use FM. This is substantially higher than the 
31 percent share observed for 2002. About four-fi fths of the FM com-
panies use MSPs for only a portion of their output, and approximately 
one-fi fth rely exclusively on MSPs for fabrication.
Figure 4.2  Share of Global Industry Shipments for Factoryless 
Manufacturing of Semiconductors
SOURCE: Global Semiconductor Alliance.
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Table 4.1  Selected S&P 500 Companies Reporting Factoryless Goods 
Production, by Primary Product Grouping, 2012
Toys and games
Hasbro Inc.
Mattel Inc.
Apparel
Abercrombie & Fitch Co.a
Nike Inc.a
Electronics
Advanced Micro Devices Inc. (semiconductors) a
Qualcomm Inc. (semiconductors) a
Amazon.com Inc. (electronic readers) a
Apple Inc. (computing, communications, consumer)
Cisco Systems Inc. (communications) a
Pharmaceuticals
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
Eli Lilly and Co.
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals
Clorox Co.
Colgate-Palmolive Co.
Food, beverage, and tobacco
Campbell Soup Co. (food)
Monster Beverage Corp. (beverage) a
Philip Morris International (tobacco)
Paper, plastic, and wood products
Avery Dennison Corp. (paper products)
Newell Rubbermaid Inc. (plastics products)
Electrical equipment
General Electric Co.
Machinery
Applied Materials Inc.
Transportation equipment
Delphi Automotive
Medical supplies excluding pharmaceuticals
Boston Scientifi c Corp.
a Company using FGP exclusively—i.e., a company with no integrated manufacturing 
activity.
SOURCE: Classifi cation based on authors’ analysis of 2012 annual reports fi led with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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As we expected from the evidence reviewed at the end of Section 
Two, in both 2002 and 2012, factoryless manufacturing was used by a 
very high share of fi rms manufacturing toys, apparel, and most elec-
tronic products (Table 4.3). For example, in both 2002 and 2012, all 
companies in the “Toys and games” category of the S&P 500 employed 
FM practices.  Firms in the “Toys and games” sector represented 2 per-
cent of all manufacturing companies in the index in both years. The FM 
business practice is also quite common among fi rms producing pharma-
ceuticals and medicine.
Also of note is the degree to which factoryless manufacturing spread 
to a broader array of goods from 2002 to 2012. For example, only 9 per-
cent of large cap fi rms in the “Food, beverage, and tobacco” sector used 
FM in 2002, but the share had soared to 52 percent by 2012.  Several 
other industries also experienced strong growth in the share of fi rms 
using FM over the past decade: notable gains were recorded for the sec-
tors “Paper, plastic, and wood products,” “Chemicals excluding phar-
maceuticals,” “Transportation equipment,” and “Electrical equipment.”
Evidence from Economic Census Data
The Economic Census collects extensive information on U.S. 
establishments every fi ve years, and questions on the 2002 and 2007 
Economic Censuses shed light on the prevalence of FGPs. Wholesale 
trade establishments were asked whether they sold products manufac-
Table 4.2  Prevalence of Factoryless Manufacturing among Companies in 
the S&P 500 Index with Manufacturing Activity
2002 2012
Count Share (%) Count Share (%)
No factoryless manufacturing 172 70 120 54
Any factoryless manufacturing 74 30 104 46
Exclusively factoryless 
manufacturing
12 16 21 20
Mixed factoryless and integrated 
manufacturing
62 84 83 80
n = 246 n = 224
SOURCE: Classifi cation based on authors’ analysis of annual reports fi led with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.
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tured for them by contract manufacturers and whether they engaged in 
product design.13 We consider an affi rmative answer to either question 
to be supporting evidence for classifying the establishment as an FGP, 
though the questions are not defi nitive.14 More than 30 percent of estab-
lishments answered “yes” to at least one of these questions in a majority 
of wholesale industries in 2002 (Tables 4.4 and 4.5).
Table 4.3  S&P 500 Sector Distribution and Share of Companies Using 
Factoryless Manufacturing (%)
Share of companies 
using factoryless 
manufacturinga
Sector share of 
total S&P 
manufacturing
Sector 2002 2012 2002 2012
Toys and games 100 100 2 2
Apparel 86 100 3 4
Electronic components (including 
semiconductors)
77 94 9 7
Computers and communications 
equipment
70 82 11 8
Pharmaceuticals and medicine 48 70 10 9
Food, beverage, and tobacco products 9 52 10 14
Paper, plastic, and wood products 6 45 7 5
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals 15 37 8 8
Other fi nal electronics (industrial, 
defense, aerospace, etc.)
15 37 5 8
Medical excluding pharmaceuticals 
(including electromedical 
equipment)
10 23 4 6
Transportation equipment 0 22 7 4
Electrical equipment 0 17 3 3
Machinery 6 17 8 11
Metal, nonmetallic mineral, and 
petroleum products
6 0 7 8
Unclassifi ed (conglomerates, 
miscellaneous production)
43 33 6 3
a Includes companies employing a mix of factoryless manufacturing and integrated 
manufacturing.
SOURCE: Authors’ classifi cation based on company reports fi led with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission.
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NAICS
Code Industry description
Design/ 
engineer 
products sold
Purchase 
contract 
manufacturing 
services Both Either
Durable goods
4231 Motor vehicles and parts 8 13 3 18
4232 Furniture and home furnishings 25 26 10 41
4233 Lumber and other construction materials 14 20 4 30
4234 Professional and commercial equip. and supplies 19 18 7 30
4235 Metal and mineral 15 26 5 36
4236 Electrical and electronic goods 21 20 7 34
4237 Hardware, plumbing, heating equip. and supplies 15 17 4 28
4238 Machinery, equip. and supplies 19 22 7 34
4239 Miscellaneous durable goods 25 21 10 36
Nondurable goods
4241 Paper and paper products 22 25 10 37
4242 Drugs and druggist sundries 22 26 11 37
4243 Apparel, piece goods, and notions 42 35 21 56
4244 Grocery and related 13 14 4 23
4245 Farm product raw material 6 6 1 11
4246 Chemical and allied products 24 24 8 40
4247 Petroleum and petroleum products 3 8 1 10
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4248 Beer, wine, distilled alcoholic beverages 5 14 1 18
4249 Miscellaneous nondurable goods 21 17 7 31
Total, durable and nondurable 18 20 6 32
Memo:
Establishments of FGP semiconductor companies 51 22 18 55
Firms of FGP semiconductor companies 67 56 48 75
NOTE: Response rate was approximately 50 percent. Special question was on all Census of Wholesale Trade forms in 2002. Establish-
ments reclassifi ed to wholesale trade during census processing did not receive a survey form with this question.
SOURCE: 2002 Census of Wholesale Trade.
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NAICS
Code Industry description
Design/
engineer 
products sold
Purchase 
contract 
manufacturing 
services Both Either
Durable goods
4231 Motor vehicles and parts 6 8 3 11
4233 Lumber and other construction materials 12 16 4 24
4234 Professional and commercial equip. and supplies a 23 20 12 31
4235 Metal and mineral 13 23 5 31
4236 Electrical and electronic goods 15 16 7 24
4238 Machinery, equipment, and supplies a 15 15 7 23
4239 Miscellaneous durable goods 18 17 8 27
Nondurable goods
4241 Paper and paper products 17 16 7 26
4242 Drugs and druggist sundries 22 27 14 35
4243 Apparel, piece goods, and notions 35 29 16 48
4244 Grocery and related 13 12 4 21
4245 Farm product raw material 5 6 1 10
4248 Beer, wine, distilled alcoholic beverages 4 5 2 7
4249 Miscellaneous nondurable goods a 17 12 6 23
Total, durable and nondurable 15 15 7 23
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Memo:
Establishments of FGP semiconductor companies 52 40 35 57
Firms of FGP semiconductor companies 68 42 47 63
NOTE: 2007 response rate was approximately 53 percent for establishments receiving forms. Survey forms for some wholesale trade 
industries did not include these questions. Statistics are shown for covered six-digit industries within each four-digit industry group. 
Industry groups marked with an asterisk have omitted industries. Industry groups with no coverage are 4232, 4237, 4246, and 4247. 
Establishments reclassifi ed to wholesale trade during census processing did not receive a survey form with this question. The “Purchase 
contract manufacturing services” column combines results for separate questions on domestic and foreign CMS.
SOURCE: 2007 Census of Wholesale Trade.
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Prevalence among pharmaceutical and apparel wholesalers is par-
ticularly high, as we expected in light of our company report analysis. 
Interestingly, “Electrical and electronics wholesaling” is not among 
the industries with the highest prevalence of FGPs. However, when we 
matched known semiconductor FM companies to census fi rm records 
(as discussed in the next section), we found that 75 percent have at 
least one wholesale establishment reporting design or use of contract 
manufacturing.15 
Results for prevalence of contract manufacturing use and product 
design by industry were similar in 2007 to what they were in 2002; 
unfortunately, the questions asked were somewhat different in the two 
years, making it hard to discern trends. Furthermore, in 2007 the ques-
tions were not asked of establishments in all industries, as they had 
been in 2002 (Bernard and Fort 2013).
Estimates in Related Work
Other studies have estimated the scope and scale of factoryless 
manufacturing using the Economic Census and other data. No survey 
contains an ideal set of questions for identifying FM, and consequently 
approaches in studies of FM have varied signifi cantly.
Doherty (Chapter 2 of this volume) focuses on wholesalers who 
reported their type as “own-brand importer-marketer” (OBM), a term 
that is similar to FGP, but one that only applies to the use of offshore 
contract manufacturing. In the 2007 Economic Census, 3 percent of 
wholesale establishments self-identifi ed as OBMs, which is a reason-
able lower bound on FGP prevalence. However, because domestic out-
sourcing is much more common than offshore outsourcing (Fort 2011), 
FGPs are likely to be substantially more common than OBMs. Kask, 
Kiernan, and Friedman (2002) note that the OBM share of wholesalers 
was 3 percent for the 1997 Economic Census as well. In light of other 
evidence on the rising prevalence of offshore MSPs between 1997 and 
2007, the stable share for OBMs is somewhat puzzling.
Jarmin, Krizan, and Tang (2011) look at outsourcing and offshoring 
using the same Economic Census special questions used in this study, 
but they employ a different FGP classifi cation rule, which requires that 
establishments report “resales” as their primary activity in addition to 
reporting use of contract manufacturing and performance of product 
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design. Conditioning on resale—the sale of products bought and sold 
without further processing—is problematic in that we expect that FGPs 
may contract for the service provided by the MSP, rather than purchas-
ing the good itself. Also, as noted above, creating the product design 
is suffi cient to establish ownership of the intellectual property, but not 
necessary—designs can be purchased or licensed by FGPs. Jarmin, 
Krizan, and Tang estimate that FGPs account for 1 percent of establish-
ments within the manufacturing and wholesale trade sectors combined. 
Bernard and Fort (2013) use a defi nition of FGP that differs from the 
ECPC standard in that a wholesale establishment that fabricates prod-
ucts on-site and does not use contract manufacturing can be counted 
as an FGP. We view reports of fabrication at wholesale trade establish-
ments as evidence of one of two possibilities: 1) misclassifi cation of an 
IM to wholesale trade, or 2) an FGP establishment with secondary IM 
activity. Despite the conceptual differences, Bernard and Fort fi nd that 
the inclusion of FGPs in manufacturing leads to an increase in gross 
output ranging from 5.2 to 19.4 percent—estimates that are similar to 
ours. The range in Bernard and Fort depends on the assumptions made 
about respondents who did not answer the key questions.
Kamal, Moulton, and Ribarsky (Chapter 3 of this volume) exam-
ine company-level data from surveys conducted by the Census Bureau 
and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and report results broadly 
consistent with ours, in that they fi nd that the use of contract manu-
facturing is common in a wide array of industries and that companies 
with a mixed FGP/IM approach are far more common than pure FM 
companies.16
THE STRUCTURE OF FACTORYLESS MANUFACTURING 
FIRMS IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
Semiconductor manufacturing is a prominent example of an indus-
try with extensive factoryless manufacturing—in 2012, 25 percent of 
global semiconductor sales came from FM companies (Figure 4.2).17 
By matching directories of FM fi rms in the semiconductor industry to 
Economic Census microdata, we are able to study the establishment 
structure of FM fi rms for this industry.18 In this section, we discuss the 
results of that matching exercise.
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We fi nd that the footprint of semiconductor FM fi rms in the Eco-
nomic Census is complex. Single-unit fi rms account for about 90 per-
cent of the company observations in our data, and of these, only about 
30 percent are located in the wholesale trade sector (Table 4.6).19 This is 
a surprising result in light of the Census Bureau directive to treat FGPs 
as wholesalers. However, the classifi cation process depends on a broad 
review of an establishment’s activities. The sole establishment of a sin-
gle-unit fi rm would likely be engaged in multiple business processes in 
addition to production management, such as product, process, and tech-
nology development; marketing and sales; strategic management; and 
any general management “back offi ce” operations that have not been 
outsourced. If one of these other activities is the primary activity of the 
establishment, as “determined by its relative share of current produc-
tion cost and capital investment,” the establishment may be classifi ed 
to an industry outside of “Wholesale trade” (OMB 1998, p. 17). Still, 
establishments in the wholesale trade sector account for two-thirds of 
the value of sales for these fi rms for 2007 (Table 4.7). About one-half 
of the 2007 employment for FM semiconductor fi rms is found in the 
wholesale trade sector. Among the smaller number of multiunit fi rms, 
the majority have units in multiple sectors (Table 4.6).
The establishments of these FM fi rms are highly concentrated in a 
few key information technology industries, corroborating our match-
ing process (Table 4.8). Many units are found outside of the whole-
Table 4.6  Firms by Establishment Structure
Category 2002 2007
Total 525 525
   Single-unit 450 470
      Manufacturing 105 100
      Wholesale 130 120
      Services 220 245
   Multi-unit 70 55
      3 Sectors 15 10
      2 Sectors 25 20
      1 Sector 30 20
NOTE: Excludes management establishments. Rounded to nearest 5. Numbers may 
not sum to totals because of rounding.
SOURCE. Economic Census, 2002 and 2007.
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sale trade sector, but note that while Census Bureau practice is to clas-
sify FGPs (establishments) in wholesale trade, establishments of FM 
companies may have primary activity in other sectors and be properly 
classifi ed there. Wholesale trade establishments for the FM fi rms are 
almost exclusively in “Other electronic parts and equipment wholesal-
ers” (which includes semiconductor wholesalers) and in “Computers, 
peripherals, and software wholesalers.” The service establishments for 
these fi rms are predominantly in “Custom computer programming and 
systems design services,” in “Physical, engineering, and life sciences 
R&D services,” and in “Engineering services.” Manufacturing estab-
lishments for the FM fi rms are heavily concentrated in “Semiconduc-
tor and related device manufacturing,” with a small but notable share 
in other electronics manufacturing industries. These manufacturing 
establishments are an indication that the associated company employs a 
hybrid FGP/IM approach to production.
Focusing on establishments in the two key wholesale industries, 
we fi nd that semiconductor FGPs are signifi cantly larger with respect 
to the value of revenue and the number of employees than non-FGPs 
within these industries (Table 4.8).20, 21 The difference in log revenue 
between FGPs and non-FGPs is 1.5, and the difference in average log 
Table 4.7  Sector Distribution of Semiconductor FM Firm Activity
Sector
Sales
($ billions)
Employment
(000s)
2002
Total 22 55
Wholesale 15 27
Services 2 10
Manufacturing 5 18
2007
Total 26 55
Wholesale 19 29
Services 2 12
Manufacturing 5 14
NOTE: Sales and employment rounded to whole numbers. Numbers may not sum to 
totals because of rounding.
SOURCE: Matched Economic Census and company data, 2002 and 2007. See data 
appendix.
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employment is 0.6. The average earnings for employees of FM fi rms is 
substantially higher as well—the mean of the log earnings distribution 
is 4.4 for FGPs and 3.7 for non-FGPs. We speculate that FGPs are more 
likely than conventional wholesalers to employ engineers and other 
technical professionals with relatively high earnings and are less likely 
to employ lower-skilled laborers, such as those devoted to managing 
warehouse inventories.
Establishments of the semiconductor FM fi rms in the two whole-
sale industries identifi ed in the previous paragraph and in superscript 
note a of Table 4.8 display a striking tendency to cluster geographi-
cally. Approximately two-thirds of wholesale revenue for semiconduc-
Table 4.8  Mean Establishment Characteristics by Firm Type and
Sector, 2002
Sector
Wholesale trade a
FM fi rm Other
Log revenue ($ 000s) 8.7 7.2
Log employment 2.4 1.8
Log avg. earnings ($ 000s) 4.4 3.7
Services b
FM fi rm Other
Log revenue ($ 000s) 7.8 5.8
Log employment 2.9 1.5
Log avg. earnings ($ 000s) 4.4 3.7
Manufacturing c
FM fi rm Other
Log revenue ($ 000s) 9.6 7.9
Log employment 4.2 2.8
Log avg. earnings ($ 000s) 4.1 3.8
a Dominant industries (and their NAICS codes) for the wholesale trade sector include 
“Other electronic parts and equipment” (423690) and “Computers, peripherals, and 
software” (423430).
b Dominant industries (and NAICS codes) for the services sector include “Custom com-
puter programming services” (541511) and “Computer systems design” (541512).
c Dominant industries (and NAICS codes) for the manufacturing sector include “Semi-
conductor and related device manufacturing” (334413) and other industries within 
“Computer & electronic product manufacturing” (334).
SOURCE: 2002 Matched Economic Census and company data. See data appendix.
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tor FGPs comes from plants located in just three metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs), and the top 10 MSAs for FGP activity account for 87 
percent of FGP revenue (Table 4.9). In contrast, the other establish-
ments within the two key wholesale trade industries are more geograph-
ically diverse. The top three MSAs account for only 26 percent of rev-
enue, and the top 10 MSAs account for only 56 percent. We conjecture 
that in contrast to wholesalers as conventionally defi ned—a warehouse 
or sales offi ce—which are drawn to centers of business activity and 
transportation hubs, FMs locate FGPs close to other establishments in 
their industry to benefi t from active local markets for specialized labor 
and other inputs. Silicon Valley for electronics and New York City for 
apparel are well-known examples (Porter 1998). 
The composition of employment in the semiconductor manufactur-
ing industry would be much different with FGPs included in its scope. 
The mean of the log earnings distribution is 4.4 for FGPs in “Wholesale 
trade,” noticeably greater than the 3.8 average for log earnings in the 
“Electronics manufacturing” sector (NAICS 334), excluding semicon-
ductor FGPs. 
Table 4.9  Geographic Concentration of Wholesale Sales, 2002
FM semiconductor fi rms Other fi rms
MSA Sales share MSA Sales share
1 43 1 10
2 11 2 8
3 11 3 8
4 6 4 7
5 3 5 6
6 3 6 5
7 3 7 3
8 3 8 3
9 2 9 3
10 2 10 3
Total 87 Total 56
NOTE: MSA rankings generated separately for FM and non-FM companies. “FM” 
stands for “factoryless manufacturing.” See text for defi nition.
SOURCE: 2002 Matched Economic Census and company data. See data appendix.
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U.S. MANUFACTURING WITH FACTORYLESS GOODS 
PRODUCERS INCLUDED
Total Manufacturing Using Economic Census Special Questions
As noted in the section beginning on p. 82, the OMB has encour-
aged economic statistical agencies to assess the feasibility of classifying 
FGPs in the manufacturing sector. What remains unknown, however, is 
the effect of this reclassifi cation on the size of the sector. The 2002 
and 2007 Economic Censuses of Wholesale Trade both include two 
questions on contract manufacturing and design that offer an oppor-
tunity to assess the difference that classifying FGPs to manufacturing 
would make. For 2007, we estimate that if one reclassifi ed to manu-
facturing those establishments answering “yes” to both questions, the 
value-added for the sector would be greater by $96 billion, or 4 percent 
(Table 4.10).22 Using a more lenient assumption—that an affi rmative 
answer to either question suffi ces to identify an establishment as an 
FGP, manufacturing value-added would be greater by $303 billion, or 
13 percent. For 2002, manufacturing would be 3 percent greater using 
the strict defi nition, and 14 percent greater using the lenient defi nition. 
Unfortunately, response rates for these questions are quite low, and 
these results implicitly assume nonresponse is a negative answer. We 
imputed answers for nonrespondents and found manufacturing value-
added would have been 5 to 20 percent higher in both years, which we 
take to be our most plausible estimate.23
Semiconductor Manufacturing Using Matched FM Company Data
Next, we narrow our focus to the semiconductor industry, and we 
use the matched company-establishment data. We count sales of the 
wholesale establishments of FM fi rms as manufacturing revenue and 
estimate that the value of shipments for the semiconductor industry in 
2007 would have been $92 billion—26 percent higher than the $75 bil-
lion reported in the 2007 Economic Census. The share of the (broader) 
semiconductor industry accounted for by plants of FM fi rms (including 
those already in manufacturing) would have been 28 percent.24
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Interestingly, the FGP share of industry shipments for 2002 is little 
different from its share for 2007. Consequently, semiconductor industry 
shipments, including shipments from FGPs, rose 3.7 percent (annual 
rate) between 2002 and 2007, an increase only slightly greater than 
the 3.4 percent reported under the current classifi cation system. Mean-
while, the FM portion of the global semiconductor industry ballooned 
from $15 billion in 2002 to $54 billion in 2007 (Figure 4.2). Because 
U.S. companies account for a very large share of global FM revenue, 
this could suggest that U.S. FM companies were expanding rapidly dur-
ing this period, but that the expansion was primarily at offshore estab-
lishments. However, such a scenario could be the result of companies 
keeping earnings overseas for tax avoidance purposes.
Table 4.10  Total Value-Added for Establishments Reporting Product 
Design, Use of Contract Manufacturing, or Both ($ billions)
Levels 2002 2007
Baseline
Either CMS or design  260  303 
Both  60  96 
Baseline + imputed response
Either CMS or design  364  413 
Both  94  152 
Total manufacturing value added  1,888  2,383 
Increase to manufacturing (%)
Baseline
Either CMS or design 14 13
Both 3 4
Baseline + imputed response
Either CMS or design 19 17
Both 5 6
NOTE: Selected wholesale trade industries (423690, 423430). Manufacturing value-
added from the Census of Manufacturers.
SOURCE: Economic Census, 2002 and 2007.
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SELECTED EFFECTS OF RECLASSIFICATION AND 
RELEVANCE FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Because the impact of the NAICS guidance for FGP classifi cation 
will refl ect not only the effect of conceptual differences but also the 
signifi cant measurement challenges faced by statistical programs in 
adopting the change, no defi nitive analysis can be made of its effect 
on measures of economic activity. Nevertheless, for the sake of discus-
sion we provide a speculative assessment of the effect on some key 
economic measures.
Manufacturing Value-Added
To begin with, estimates in this chapter and in other work suggest 
that classifi cation of FGPs to the manufacturing sector will materially 
increase that sector’s value-added. However, it is important to note 
that the total nominal value-added of the economy should not change, 
because the increase in manufacturing will be offset by decreases in 
other sectors. The expansion of the scope of the manufacturing sector 
beyond establishments engaged in fabrication on-site will introduce an 
appreciable discontinuity in statistics for the manufacturing sector. That 
said, the change has the appeal of introducing continuity in the treat-
ment of production management activities and product development. 
When those tasks are colocated with fabrication, their value-added is 
counted as manufacturing, and the outsourcing of fabrication arguably 
should not move their value-added out of that sector. To quote from the 
OMB decision on the issue, “Goods producers arrange for and bring 
together all of the factors of production necessary to produce a good. . . . 
When individual steps in the complete process are outsourced, an estab-
lishment should remain classifi ed in the manufacturing sector.” That 
goal will be served by classifying FGPs in the manufacturing sector, 
but it would be desirable to also report economic statistics that allow for 
analysis of manufacturing with FGPs excluded.25
In addition, classifying FGPs to manufacturing will change the 
industry composition of the sector because FGPs are not evenly preva-
lent across wholesale trade industries (Tables 4.4 and 4.5). For example, 
we expect the change will temper the long decline in U.S. production of 
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electronics. We consider a provocative example for illustration: Value-
added in the “Electronic computer manufacturing” industry (NAICS 
Industry 334111), as reported by the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of 
Manufacturers (ASM), dropped from $26 billion to $9 billion between 
2008 and 2010, and it fell further, to $3 billion, in 2011. In addition to 
the economy-wide effects of the recent recession, such as businesses 
postponing computer investment, the decline can be partially attributed 
to a shift in the composition of household computer spending toward 
tablet computers, especially the iPad, produced by Apple Inc., a com-
pany that relies primarily on offshore MSPs for fabrication. 
To the extent that offshore iPad fabrication is managed by domes-
tic FGPs, a portion of value-added for this type of product will be 
counted in the U.S. computer industry under the new classifi cation 
rules. According to Apple annual reports, Apple’s global iPad revenue 
surged from $5 billion to $20 billion between 2010 and 2011. Assum-
ing Apple’s gross margin share of overall revenue, approximately 40 
percent, applies to sales of iPads, and assuming for the sake of argu-
ment that half of that margin is value-added at domestic Apple FGPs, 
under the new NAICS guidance $6 billion in value-added at these FGPs 
would be counted in the manufacturing sector and would roughly off-
set the $6 billion decline in domestic computer manufacturing reported 
in the ASM. This somewhat fanciful example illustrates how the new 
classifi cation approach may have fi rst-order effects and change the nar-
rative for some industries where FM is prevalent.
Trade
It is also worth noting that the new treatment of FGPs has the poten-
tial to cause signifi cant changes in the composition of U.S. trade fl ows, 
though net trade is in principle unaffected. An FGP that purchases con-
tract manufacturing will record as its own production the product fab-
ricated by the MSP. If the MSP is located abroad and the product is 
delivered to a foreign market, the sale will be treated as a U.S. export, 
even though the fi nished good did not cross the U.S. border. In contrast, 
if the product is shipped to the U.S. market from the foreign MSP, it 
will not be treated as a U.S. import, even though the good did cross 
the U.S. border. In both cases, an import of manufacturing services 
will be recorded. Thus, the relative importance of services and goods 
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in total trade may differ under the new system. The new treatment of 
FGPs has the potential to cause signifi cant changes in the composition 
of U.S. trade as recorded in the National Income and Product Accounts 
(NIPAs), though net trade is in principle unaffected.
Measurement Effects
In addition to the conceptual changes mentioned above, we note 
two ways in which aggregates conceptually unaffected by the change 
in treatment of FGPs may nevertheless be affected as measured. First, 
the accuracy of economic statistics whose construction relies on the 
combination of data generated by different statistical programs, such as 
industrial production and labor productivity, will be aided by the better 
alignment of FGP classifi cation practices. Such statistics are at risk of 
inadvertent mismeasurement if differences with respect to current FGP 
classifi cation are not taken into account. The added clarity with regard 
to the treatment of FGPs will serve to reduce the risk of such errors.
Second, measurement of the prices needed to defl ate nominal value-
added and trade fl ows for FGPs and MSPs will require signifi cant 
attention. Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) study prices for manu-
facturing services in the semiconductor industry and fi nd that the well-
known challenges faced in quality-adjusting product prices also exist 
for semiconductor manufacturing services. If the composition of trade 
shifts from goods to services, the relative quality of price measures for 
services will affect the resulting real balance of trade.26 
Economic Issues
Deeper understanding of the use of the FM business model may 
lead to insights into important economic questions. Among these are 
the following four: 
 1)  What is the effect of offshoring on domestic activity—do 
management and design follow fabrication offshore, or does 
offshoring enhance that domestic activity through gains from 
trade?27 
 2)  What is the impact of this shift in manufacturing approach 
on manufacturing employment—does the loss of production 
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worker jobs to offshoring coincide with a gain in domestic 
knowledge-worker jobs?28 
 3)  How much of the substantial contribution of information tech-
nology (IT) production to productivity growth can be attrib-
uted to FGP activity, and how much to fabrication?29 
 4)  What is the role of FGPs in global “trade in tasks”? Can FGP 
data lead to more appropriate input-output tables for use in the 
burgeoning work on decomposing product value into contribu-
tions from different economies through value-added trade?30
CONCLUSION
Using company data, we document our premise that factoryless 
manufacturing is becoming more prevalent and is employed in the pro-
duction of an increasingly wide variety of goods. With Census Bureau 
establishment microdata, we fi nd evidence that factoryless goods pro-
ducers are present in a broad mix of industries in the wholesale trade 
sector. We present a case study of the semiconductor industry using a 
data set constructed by matching company data and census establish-
ment data. Here, we fi nd that FGPs are larger in terms of revenue and 
employment, have higher average earnings, and cluster markedly more 
than conventional wholesale trade establishments. Finally, we estimate 
that shifting FGP activity from wholesale trade to manufacturing may 
increase manufacturing value-added by 5 to 20 percent. In the case of 
semiconductors, we fi nd that value-added in 2007 would be 26 percent 
higher if census data were used. We provide examples of anticipated 
effects on economic statistics from the clarifi cation of the treatment of 
FGPs and note several areas of economic study that may benefi t from 
the change. 
Implementing the OMB guidance on the treatment of FGPs pres-
ents substantial challenges for U.S. statistical agencies going forward 
(Doherty, Chapter 2 of this volume). As was noted earlier, factoryless 
manufacturing is far from new, and looking backward, there is the 
daunting task of building a history consistent with the clarifi ed scope 
of manufacturing, which will be needed to fully exploit the data. How-
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ever, bearing in mind the evident size of the FGP phenomenon and the 
role that better measures of FGPs may play in discussion of pressing 
economic issues, we consider the clarifi cation of the treatment of fac-
toryless goods producers to be a welcome effort to update the U.S. sta-
tistical system.
Notes
This chapter stems from a paper that was prepared for presentation in 2013 at the “Mea-
suring the Effects of Globalization” conference, organized by the Progressive Policy 
Institute and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and funded by the 
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. We are grateful for the feedback we received from par-
ticipants at the conference. We also benefi ted from additional feedback from Maureen 
Donoghue, Teresa Fort, Susan Houseman, Javier Miranda, John Murphy, Bill Powers, 
Jennifer Ribarsky, Falan Yinug, and participants in a workshop at the U.S. Census 
Bureau. The Global Semiconductor Alliance and IHS iSuppli provided data, and we 
also appreciate their guidance on the semiconductor industry. Remaining errors are our 
own.
All results have been reviewed by the Census Bureau to ensure that no confi dential 
information is disclosed. References to specifi c companies are based exclusively on 
purchased data, public fi nancial reports, and news accounts, not on confi dential census 
information. The views expressed are not the views of the Census Bureau.
Affi liation for Bayard and Byrne is the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The 
views expressed should not be attributed to the Board of Governors or other mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve staff. Affi liation for Smith is the University of Minnesota 
Department of Economics. Direct correspondence can be addressed to the following: 
david.m.byrne@frb.gov. 
1. An establishment is a company unit, such as a plant, warehouse, or offi ce. The 
Offi ce of Management and Budget defi nes it this way: “The establishment . . . 
is the smallest operating entity for which records provide information on cost of 
resources . . . employed to produce the units of output. . . . The establishment . . . 
is generally a single physical location” (OMB 1998). 
2. A summary of a recent study of the FGP classifi cation issued by the Economic 
Classifi cation Policy Committee noted, “To the extent that FGPs can be identifi ed, 
the Census Bureau statistical programs classify them to wholesale trade” (Murphy 
2009). However, this guidance does not apply to apparel. (John Murphy, chair of 
the ECPC, in discussion with author Byrne, September 2013.)
3. Presentation by the FGP Implementation Planning Group at the Semiconductor 
Industry Association’s annual meeting, September 11, 2012. The group’s presen-
tation was titled “Redefi ning Manufacturing in NAICS 2012: The Factoryless 
Goods Producer (FGP).” 
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4. For a discussion of the deliberations leading to this decision and the alternatives 
considered, see Doherty (2013).
5. The Federal Register notice from August 17, 2011 (found in Federal Register 
76[159]: 51240–51243), describes the announced NAICS classifi cation standard 
for FGP establishments as a clarifi cation, but it also acknowledges that “the inclu-
sion of revenues from FGP activities in manufacturing will effectively change the 
traditional defi nition of manufacturing.”
6. Although the Business Processes and Business Functions classifi cation system 
was not referenced in the FGP classifi cation deliberations, it provides a useful 
framework for thinking about the nature of factoryless manufacturing. BPBF is 
based on the concepts developed for the Global Value Chains Initiative and was 
employed in the BLS’s Mass Layoff Statistics Program, which was discontinued 
in June 2013 (Sturgeon 2002; Sturgeon and Gereffi  2008).
7. The NAICS manual notes that “almost all manufacturing has some captive 
research and development or administrative operations, such as accounting, pay-
roll, or management” (OMB 1998).
8. Steiner (1995, 1997) was an early advocate for modifying classifi cation practices 
to account for FM activity, though the term “factoryless goods producer” had 
not been coined at the time. Steiner notes that in the 1970s, for a “host of con-
sumer goods,” manufacturing moved offshore but the companies “did the research 
and development, the production engineering, and were responsible for quality 
control.”
9. In the electronics sector, the complicated web of component production, design, 
and management cannot always be simplifi ed to an FGP-MSP relationship. (See 
Dedrick and Kraemer [2002]; Grunwald and Flamm [1985]; and Sturgeon and 
Lee [2001].)
10. Under Regulation S-K of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, annual reports to the 
SEC on Form 10-K are required to include discussion of risks “likely to result in 
registrant’s liquidity increasing or decreasing in a material way.” 
11. Because the S&P 500 is constructed to be representative of the “large cap” seg-
ment of the U.S. equities market, these results do not apply to smaller fi rms. Small 
and medium-sized fi rms are an important topic for further study. One potential 
benefi t of decoupling production management from fabrication and the associated 
fi xed costs may be that smaller-scale enterprises are more viable, thus promoting 
fi rm creation. That being said, Kamal, Moulton, and Ribarsky (Chapter 3 of this 
volume) fi nd that two-thirds of fi rms reporting the use of MSPs or the provision of 
contract manufacturing are large—they have 250 or more employees.
12. References to contract manufacturing of components of the fi nal product, pur-
chase of “private label” merchandise, licensing of company designs, and provision 
by the company of contract manufacturing services to others were not treated as 
evidence of factoryless manufacturing. 
13. The survey forms for the Census of Wholesale Trade are included in Appendix 4B.
14. Specifi cally, the 2002 question asked whether fabrication was “performed for this 
establishment by another company,” but offshore fabrication by another establish-
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ment of the same company would be suffi cient to meet the defi nition of FGP. The 
2007 contract manufacturing question is also not a perfect match. With regard to 
design, to be an FGP, the establishment must own the rights to the design, but it 
may be independently developed or otherwise acquired. 
15. A negative response to both of these questions by an establishment of an FM fi rm 
need not be erroneous. For example, a pure sales offi ce for an FM fi rm would 
properly be classifi ed in “Wholesale trade.” 
16. Kamal, Moulton, and Ribarsky use the Company Organization Survey, conducted 
by the Census Bureau, and the BEA’s Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Invest-
ment Abroad as well as its Benchmark Survey of Transactions in Selected Ser-
vices and Intellectual Property Products with Foreign Persons.
17. For a detailed discussion of FGPs and MSPs in the semiconductor industry, see 
Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013). To avoid confusion, we do not use the industry-
specifi c term “fabless” for FM fi rms or the term “foundries” for manufacturing 
service providers.
18. See Appendix 4A for a description of the sources and matching process.
19. A handful of these single-unit fi rms have a second establishment in the manage-
ment sector. These establishments are omitted from the fi rm structure calcula-
tions. Results for the management sector did not meet Census Bureau standards 
for disclosure. 
20. Most fi rms have no more than one establishment in these wholesale industries, and 
the results are little changed by treating each establishment separately. 
21. Note that our “other” group may contain establishments of FM companies pro-
ducing products other than semiconductors. We believe this would lead us to 
understate the differences between our semiconductor FGPs and true wholesale 
establishments. 
22. We focus on value-added for now because of issues involved in double-counting 
gross output if an FGP purchases contract manufacturing services from a domestic 
establishment already in the scope of manufacturing. The value-added approach 
has limitations as well. We calculate value-added in the wholesale sector as sales 
minus the cost of merchandise and change in inventory. These results will be 
biased downwards if the reported cost of merchandise refl ects the value of product 
design or of the management of the fabrication process performed at the FGP—for 
example, if its valuation on import includes the FGP’s value-added.
23. For each question, we predict the probability that each nonresponding establish-
ment would answer “yes” based on observable characteristics. We then add the 
value-added of the establishment, weighted by the predicted probability, to the 
manufacturing sector, in addition to the full value-added for the respondents in 
our baseline estimates. In unreported results, we also use the weighting scheme 
developed by Fort (2011) to develop predicted probabilities of answering a ques-
tion conditional on observables. We then multiply value-added for an establish-
ment that answered both questions by the inverse of the predicted probability. This 
methodology yields estimates that differ by only a few percentage points from the 
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results reported. Our estimates of the magnitude of the proportional increment to 
manufacturing gross output are similar as well.
24. Because very little MSP activity for the semiconductor industry was located 
domestically in 2007, the magnitude of double-counting when using gross output 
is unlikely to be signifi cant. 
25. At the time of this writing, it has not been determined whether such detail will be 
made available in U.S. economic statistics. 
26. On the importance of prices for imported intermediates for productivity measure-
ment, see Houseman et al. (2011).
27. Levinson (2013) notes the relevance for policymakers of the question of whether 
manufacturing is becoming “hollowed out”—that is, whether a greater share of 
value-added is taking place offshore.
28. Helper, Krueger, and Wial (2012) note the dwindling role of the manufacturing 
sector as a source of “high-wage jobs, especially for workers who would other-
wise earn the lowest wages.”
29. Byrne, Oliner, and Sichel (2013) note that the contribution from factoryless 
goods production is an important area for extension of the contribution of IT in 
productivity.
30. On “trade in tasks,” see Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). On developments 
in the measurement of value-added trade, see Ahmad (Chapter 6 of this volume), 
Timmer et al. (2013), and Yao, Ma, and Pei (Chapter 7 of this volume).
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Appendix 4A 
Data Construction
For the case study of the semiconductor industry, we linked company 
directory entries to the Census Business Register.1 The Business Register is 
a database of U.S. business establishments and companies that serves as a 
sampling frame for Census Bureau fi rm and establishment surveys.2 For each 
establishment in the Business Register there are identifi ers that allow the estab-
lishment to be linked to corresponding records in Census Bureau economic 
surveys. In addition, the Business Register contains a fi rm identifi er for each 
establishment, which enables us to locate other establishments within the same 
fi rm.
To generate our list of census fi rm identifi ers corresponding to FGP com-
panies, we began with a list of 1,579 FGP semiconductor companies created 
from a directory published by Gartner, a high-tech consultancy, and a directory 
published by the Global Semiconductor Alliance (GSA), a trade association 
representing a wide variety of companies involved in semiconductor design 
and fabrication. Gartner provided a worldwide directory of semiconductor 
FGP companies active in 2001. The GSA provided a worldwide directory of 
all semiconductor FGP companies active as of 2012 and a supplemental list 
of mergers and acquisitions between 2005 and 2012.3 The supplemental list 
proved critical because of the high frequency of fi rm birth and fi rm death in 
the industry. We reviewed public records for these companies to amend incom-
plete records. Eliminating companies that we believed were not operational 
in either 2002 or 2007 based on a review of public records left us with a list 
of 1,475 companies (Table 4A.1). The list contains the name, headquarters 
address, and year of occurrence for major events (establishment, dissolution, 
merger, acquisition) for each company.
111
Table 4A.1  Match Statistics
Company list  1,475 
Matched to business register  1,050 
Total Firm IDs  1,125 
Matched to 2002 EC establishments  525 
Matched to 2007 EC establishments  525 
Matched to either 2002 or 2007  750 
NOTE: Rounded to nearest 25.
SOURCE: Company data matched to Economic Census (EC) data for 2002 and 2007. 
See Appendix 4A.
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First, for 2002 and 2007, we matched all companies in operation in either 
census year to a three-year window of the Business Register ending in the 
census year. For this fi rst stage, we only exploit the company name, by fi nding 
the name or names in the Business Register that match the greatest number of 
leading characters for the FGP company name. We then reviewed a randomly 
selected set of 1,000 of the approximately 40,000 potential matches gener-
ated, and we judged whether the entries were a match when considering both 
full-name information and address variables. This set of matches was used to 
estimate the importance of all available match-quality variables using a probit. 
Variables included an indicator of state match, number of leading digits of 
the zip code in common, company name-spelling distance, address-spelling 
distance, and whether the establishment operated in a high-tech industry. The 
estimated index function was then used to rank possible matches for each com-
pany on our list from most to least probable. Then we reviewed by hand the 
matches for each company in descending order until we judged that we had 
either found a match or there was no match for the company.
Using this name-matching procedure, we located 71 percent of these FGP 
companies in the Census Business Register fi les (Table 4.6).4 Sometimes, 
however, we could not fi nd in the Economic Census fi rm identifi ers that had 
appeared in the Business Register. In the end, we were able to locate establish-
ments for about 50 percent of the companies on our list of FGP fi rms in the 
Economic Census microdata for 2002 and 2007. Once we link fi rms from the 
GSA and Gartner directories to the census data, we identify all establishments 
connected to those fi rms and include them in our fi nal data set.
Appendix Notes
 1. For more detail on the matching process, see Smith (2013).
 2. See Jarmin and Miranda (2002).
 3. Both the GSA and Gartner directories contained companies from around the 
world. We attempted to fi nd matches for both foreign and domestically headquar-
tered companies because we assumed many of the foreign companies would have 
a U.S. presence. For the foreign companies we were forced to rely on only name-
matching characteristics.
 4. It is important to note that our list contains many fi rms headquartered abroad that 
may have no U.S. presence.
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Form WH-42103
28 ESTABLISHMENT ACTIVITIES
A. Indicate activities that were performed by this establishment or were performed for this establishment by another
company during 2002.
(Mark "X" ALL that apply.)
1. Product Development
This activity was
performed by this
establishment
This activity was
performed for this
establishment by
another company
This activity was
not provided by
this establishment
a. Product design/engineering ................ 0921 0941 0961
b. Materials fabrication/processing/assembly/blending ..... 0922 0942 0962
2. Order Fulfillment
a. Bundling or kitting (combining multiple items into a
prepackaged product) ................... 0923 0943 0963
b. Pick and pack (taking goods from inventory and packaging
them to fill orders) .................... 0924 0944 0964
c. Warehousing ....................... 0925 0945 0965
d. Breaking bulk (reducing large shipments into smaller
portions for customers) .................. 0926 0946 0966
e. Local delivery (within a city, town, or other local area,
including adjoining towns and suburban areas) ....... 0927 0947 0967
f. Long distance delivery (beyond local areas and commercial
zones) .......................... 0928 0948 0968
g. Less than truckload .................... 0929 0949 0969
3. Other Services
a. Customs brokerage (providing the services of a licensed
customs broker) ...................... 0930 0950 0970
b. Logistics consulting (providing advice and expertise) .... 0931 0951 0971
c. Processing of returned merchandise ............ 0932 0952 0972
B. During 2002 did this establishment:
1. Manage inventory owned by this establishment AND held at this location? ...
2. Manage inventory owned by this establishment BUT held at a customer’s
location? ...................................
3. Manage inventory owned by another company BUT held at this location? ....
4. Manage inventory owned by another company AND held somewhere other than
at this location? ...............................
0936
0956
0976
0994
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0937
0957
0977
0995
No
No
No
No
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Thank you for completing your 2007 ECONOMIC CENSUS form.
- -
$$CENSUS_REMARKS$$
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Form WH-42311 (02-02-2012)
26 SPECIAL INQUIRIES - Continued
C.
 
PURCHASE OF CONTRACT MANUFACTURING
 1.
 
Did this establishment purchase contract manufacturing services from other companies or foreign plants of
your company in 2012?
Include:
 •
 
Products for which the manufacturing (i.e., transforming or otherwise processing materials or
components based on specifications provided by your company) was outsourced to other companies.
 
•
  
Products for which the manufacturing was performed by your company's foreign plants.
Exclude:
 
 
•
 
Services for packaging and assembling.
 •
 
Purchases of merchandise for resale (sale of products bought and sold without further processing or
transformation).
1011 Yes - Go to line 2
1012 No - Go to 30  
2012
$ Bil. Mil. Thou.
2.
 
Report the costs incurred by this establishment for contract
manufacturing purchased in 2012 .................. 1013
3.
 
Report the value of sales, shipments, receipts, or revenue generated
in 2012 from products whose purchases were reported as contract
manufacturing costs in line 2 .................... 1015
27 – 29 Not Applicable.
 
REMARKS (Please use this space for any explanations that may be essential in understanding your reported data.)
PLEASE PHOTOCOPY THIS FORM FOR YOUR RECORDS AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL.
Thank you for completing your 2012 ECONOMIC CENSUS form.
 
Date
completed
E-mail address Month Day Year
  
Tele-
 
phone - - - Fax - -
Area code Number Extension Area code Number
Name of person to contact regarding this report Title
 
Is the time period covered by this report a
calendar year?
Yes No - Enter time period covered
Month Year Month Year
FROM TO
30 CERTIFICATION - This report is substantially accurate and was prepared in accordance with the instructions.
$$CENSUS_REMARKS$$
INFORMA
TION CO
PY 
DO NOT 
USE TO 
REPORT
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Incomes and Jobs in Global 
Production of Manufactures
New Measures of Competitiveness Based 
on the World Input-Output Database
 
Marcel P. Timmer
Bart Los
Gaaitzen J. de Vries
University of Groningen
OVERVIEW
It is frequently argued that globalization has entered a second phase. 
In the early twentieth century, rapidly falling transport costs ended the 
need for colocation of production and consumption. Competitiveness 
of countries in the fi rst phase was determined by domestic clusters of 
fi rms, mainly competing sector to sector. More recently, fostered by 
rapidly falling communication and coordination costs, the production 
process itself was unbundled, as the various stages of production need 
not be performed near each other anymore. In this new phase, inter-
national competition increasingly plays itself out at the level of tasks 
within fi rms, rather than at the level of products. And trade in goods 
is increasingly replaced by trade in tasks (Baldwin 2006). This creates 
new challenges for the way in which the competitiveness of nations is 
analyzed. 
Traditional measures indicate that China and other emerging coun-
tries have rapidly improved in competitiveness since the late 1990s, 
both in quantity and in quality, as attested to by booming exports of 
technologically sophisticated products. But recent product case studies 
suggest that European, Japanese, and U.S. fi rms still capture major parts 
of these value chains, as they specialize in high-value-added activities 
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such as software, design, branding, and system integration. China and 
other emerging countries are mainly involved in the assembling, test-
ing, and packaging activities, which are poorly compensated. A typical 
fi nding is that China keeps less than 4 percent of a product’s export 
value as income for its labor and capital employed in the production 
process of electronic goods (Ali-Yrkkö et al. 2011; Dedrick, Kraemer, 
and Linden 2010). To refl ect this new reality, a new measure of com-
petitiveness is needed that is based on the value added in production by 
a country, rather than the gross output value of its exports. Or, as put 
by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006, pp. 66–67), “Such measures 
are inadequate to the task of measuring the extent of a country’s inter-
national integration in a world with global supply chains. . . . We would 
like to know the sources of the value-added embodied in goods and the 
uses to which the goods are eventually put.”
Recently, Timmer et al. (2013) introduced a new concept that allows 
one to analyze the value that is added in various stages of regionally 
dispersed production processes. It is defi ned as the income generated in 
a country by participating in global manufacturing production, abbrevi-
ated by the term “GVC income” (for global value chain income). Com-
pared to traditional competitiveness indicators such as a country’s share 
in world exports, this new metric has three advantages. First, it indi-
cates to what extent a country can compete with other nations in terms 
of activities related to global manufacturing, rather than by compet-
ing in manufacturing products as measured by exports. These activities 
take place in manufacturing industries but also in services industries. 
Second, it is a refl ection of an economy’s strength to compete in both 
domestic and global markets. Third, income and employment effects of 
trade in tasks for separate groups of workers (such as low- and high-
skilled) can also be determined in the same unifi ed framework, refer-
ring to the concept of “GVC jobs.”1 
The main aim of this chapter is to establish a series of stylized facts 
on GVC incomes and jobs that can serve as a starting point for deeper 
analysis of the causes of global manufacturing production. Whereas 
Timmer et al. (2013) focused their analysis on trends in European com-
petitiveness, this chapter takes a more global view and provides analy-
ses for 20 major countries in the world, including the United States, 
Japan, major economies in Europe, Brazil, China, India, and Russia.
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In the remainder of this chapter, we fi rst outline our methodology 
for slicing up global value chains (in the next section, Section Two—
“GVC Incomes and Jobs: Methodology”) and introduce the concepts 
of GVC income and GVC jobs. We identify GVCs by tracing the fl ow 
of goods and services across industries and countries as described in a 
world input-output table. Using a decomposition technique that is built 
upon the original insights by Leontief (1949), we slice up the value of 
manufacturing expenditure into incomes for labor and capital in vari-
ous countries. These are the incomes of factors that are directly and 
indirectly needed for the production of the fi nal manufacturing goods. 
The empirical analysis is based on a new database, called the World 
Input-Output Database (WIOD), which combines national input-output 
tables, bilateral international trade statistics, and data on production fac-
tor requirements. A crucial characteristic of this database is the explicit 
measurement of national and international trade in intermediates. In 
Section Three, “The World Input-Output Database (WIOD),” we dis-
cuss the major features of this database. 
Section Four, “Trends in Manufactures’ GVC Incomes,” provides 
trends in GVC income shares across regions and major countries in 
the world. The analysis is based on demand for fi nal manufacturing 
products, and we show the dependency of countries on domestic and 
foreign sources of demand. We also show that only about half of the 
GVC income originates in the manufacturing sector itself, which indi-
cates the importance of interindustry linkages in the production of 
manufacturing goods. In Section Five, “Manufactures’ GVC Income 
by Production Factor,” we focus more in-depth on the role of differ-
ent factors of production. We show how in advanced countries GVC 
income generated by capital and high-skilled labor is increasing, while 
incomes for medium- and low-skilled workers in manufactures produc-
tion are declining. In Section Six, “Manufactures’ GVC Jobs,” we study 
the number of jobs involved in GVC production of manufactures and 
fi nd a strong difference between Europe and the United States. Low- 
and medium-skilled jobs are on the decline in all advanced countries, 
but whereas in Europe and Japan high-skilled job opportunities have 
increased, they have declined in the United States since 1995. 
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GVC INCOMES AND JOBS: METHODOLOGY
In this section we outline the method to slice up GVCs, as intro-
duced by Timmer et al. (2013). The basic aim of this empirical analysis 
is to decompose expenditure on a fi nal product into a stream of fac-
tor incomes around the world. By modeling the world economy as an 
input-output model in the tradition of Leontief, we can use his famous 
insight, which links up changes in consumption to changes in the dis-
tribution of factor income both within and across countries. Basically, 
we will provide the macroeconomic equivalent of famous product case 
studies that suggest a new division of labor and value in electronics, 
such as Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2010) for iPods and electronic 
notebooks and Ali-Yrkkö et al. (2011) for a study of mobile phones. 
These studies suggest a division of activities between mature and 
emerging economies where the former concentrate on activities that 
require skilled labor and capital (in particular, intangibles), while the 
latter mainly contribute through unskilled labor.
The GVC income metric provides a macroeconomic complement 
to the product case studies described above. It covers a wide set of 
products and analyzes not only the fi rst-tier suppliers but also second-
tier and higher-order suppliers. The method provides a full decomposi-
tion of the value of consumption in a country and traces the associated 
income fl ows for labor and capital in various regions in the world. We 
model the global production system through input-output tables and 
international trade statistics. The approach follows the seminal insight 
from Leontief (1949) and traces the amount of factor inputs needed to 
produce a certain amount of fi nal demand. Value is added at various 
stages of production through the utilization of production factors such 
as labor and capital. These links between expenditure and income are 
illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
The arrows in Figure 5.1 indicate fl ows of products and factor ser-
vices, which are mirrored by payments that fl ow in the opposite direc-
tion. The central link between income and consumption is the production 
process, in which value is added through the deployment of labor and 
capital in the various stages of production. This production process can 
be highly fragmented, as the case study of the iPod illustrates. Through 
international trade, consumption in Country B will lead to income for 
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Figure 5.1  Links between Expenditure, Production, and Income 
Country A Consumption by A Production in A Capital and labor in A
Country B Consumption by B Production in B Capital and labor in B
Country C Consumption by C Production in C Capital and labor in C
Flows of
fi nal 
products
Flows of
intermediate 
products
Flows of
factor 
services
SOURCE: Authors’ construction.
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production factors in other countries, either through importing fi nal 
goods, or through the use of imported intermediates in the production 
process of Country B. Through these indirect linkages, consumption in 
Country A will generate income in Country C even though Country C 
does not trade directly with Country A. These indirect effects are siz-
able, as international trade in intermediate goods is high.
To model the international production linkages, we use a world 
input-output model that obeys the identity that at the global level con-
sumption is equal to all value-added generated.2 Below we will outline 
how this identity can be used to consistently decompose the value of 
consumption by a country into income in any country in the world. 
To do this we rely on the fundamental input-output identity introduced 
by Leontief (1949), which states that Q = BQ + C, where Q denotes 
outputs, C is consumption, and B is an input-output matrix with inter-
mediate input coeffi cients. B describes how a given product in a coun-
try is produced with different combinations of intermediate inputs. The 
identity states that a good produced is either used as an intermediate 
input in another production process or is consumed. It can be rewritten 
as Q = (I − B)−1C, with I being an identity matrix.3 (I − B)−1 is famously 
known as the Leontief inverse. It represents the total production value 
in all stages of production that is generated in the production process of 
one unit of consumption. 
To see this, let Z be a vector column, with the fi rst element rep-
resenting the global consumption of iPods produced in China, which 
is equal to the output of the Chinese iPod industry, and the rest zeros. 
Then BZ is the vector of intermediate inputs, both Chinese and foreign, 
needed to assemble the iPods in China, such as the hard-disc drive, 
battery, and processors. But these intermediates need to be produced as 
well. B2Z indicates the intermediate inputs directly needed to produce 
BZ, and so on. Thus

1n
nB Z  
represents all intermediate inputs needed for the iPod production. Then 
the total gross output value related to the production of Z is given by
ZBIZBZ
n
n 1
1
)( 


  . 
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Using this insight, we can derive production factor requirements 
for any vector Z. Let F be the direct factor inputs per unit of gross out-
put. An element in this matrix indicates the share in the value of gross 
output of a production factor used directly by the country to produce a 
given product. These are country- and industry-specifi c—one example 
would be the value of low-skilled labor used in the Chinese electronics 
industry to produce one dollar of output and to add up to value-added 
by construction in our data. The elements in F are direct factor inputs in 
the industry, because they do not account for value embodied in inter-
mediate inputs used by this industry. To include the latter as well, we 
multiply F by the total gross output value in all stages of production that 
is generated in the production process defi ned above, so that 
(5.1)  CBIFK 1)(  ,  
in which C indicates the levels of consumption4 and K is the matrix of 
amounts of factor inputs attributed to each consumption level. A typical 
element in K indicates the amount of a production factor f from country 
i, embodied in consumption of product g in country j. By the logic of 
Leontief’s insight, the sum of all elements in a column of K will be 
equal to the consumption of this product. Thus we have completed our 
decomposition of the value of consumption into the value-added by 
various production factors around the world.5
For the purpose of this chapter, we are also interested in the effects 
of foreign versus domestic fi nal demand for growth in GVC income and 
jobs. For a particular country i, we defi ne foreign fi nal demand (CFOR) 
and domestic fi nal demand (CDOM) so that CFOR + CDOM = C. Substitut-
ing this in the linear system given above, one can now derive the gross 
output generated because of fi nal demand from home country i, and that 
generated because of fi nal demand from other countries, so that 
(5.2)    FORDOMFORDOM KKCBIFCBIFK   11 )()( . 
 
In this equation, we have decomposed the amount of factors used in 
each sector of the home economy as given by K into the amount used 
to satisfy domestic fi nal demand (KDOM) and the amount used to sat-
isfy foreign demand (KFOR). The latter measures value-added exports, 
defi ned by Johnson and Noguera (2012) as the amount of value-added 
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   127 2/16/2015   8:39:28 AM
128   Timmer, Los, and de Vries
produced in a given source country that is ultimately embodied in fi nal 
products absorbed abroad. 
In Table 5.1 we provide an example of a GVC decomposition for 
fi nal expenditures in the United States on electrical machinery in 1995 
and 2008. The expenditure value is given at the basic price concept. A 
key distinction in the System of National Accounts is between a value at 
basic prices and at purchasers’ prices. The latter is the price paid by the 
fi nal consumer and consists of the basic price plus trade and transport 
margins in the handling of the product and any (net) product taxes. The 
basic price can thus be considered as the price received by the producer 
of the good. In 1995, the share of the value added in the United States 
was over 50 percent, but this swiftly dropped in the period following 
that year. Instead, value was increasingly added in other parts in the 
world, both within NAFTA and outside. China in particular benefi ted 
from U.S. demand for electrical machinery and captured more than 20 
percent of the value in 2008. Partly this was by exporting fi nal goods to 
the United States that had been produced in China (direct contribution), 
but also it was accomplished indirectly through the production of inter-
mediates (such as parts and components) that are used in the United 
States and elsewhere to produce fi nal goods destined for the U.S. mar-
NOTE: Table shows breakdown of fi nal expenditure by households, fi rms, and govern-
ment in the United States on electrical machinery products (ISIC Rev. 3 industries 30 
to 33) into value-added in regions at basic prices, excluding domestic trade and trans-
port margins, and in billions of U.S. dollars, defl ated to 1995 prices with the overall 
U.S. CPI. “East Asia” includes Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. “EU 27” includes all 
countries of the European Union.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
Table 5.1  V alue-Added in Final Expenditure on Electrical Products in 
United States (billions of 1995 US$)
1995 2008 Change
Total expenditure in US$, of which 217 253 36
   Domestic value-added 119 106 −13
   Foreign value-added, of which 98 147 49
     Canada and Mexico 10 15 5
     China 7 53 46
     East Asia 37 24 −13
     EU 27 19 28 9
     Other 25 27 2
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ket. The decline in value-added in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is 
illustrative of the major shifts that occurred in production stages across 
Asia as China was increasingly used as a production location by East 
Asian multinationals (Fukao, Ishido, and Ito 2003), an issue we will 
return to later.
THE WORLD INPUT-OUTPUT DATABASE (WIOD)
To implement the new GVC metrics, one needs to have a data-
base with linked consumption, production, and income fl ows within 
and between countries. For individual countries, this type of informa-
tion can be found in input-output tables. However, national tables do 
not provide any information on bilateral fl ows of goods and services 
between countries. For this type of information, researchers have to rely 
on data sets constructed on the basis of national input-output tables in 
combination with international trade data. Various alternative data sets 
have been built in the past, of which the Global Trade Analysis Proj-
ect (GTAP) database is the most widely known and used (Narayanan 
and Walmsley 2008). Other data sets are constructed by the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; see Ahmad, 
Chapter 6 of this volume; IDE-JETRO (2006); and Yamano and Ahmad 
[2006]). However, all these databases provide only one or a limited 
number of benchmark year input-output tables, which preclude an anal-
ysis of developments over time. And although they provide separate 
import matrices, there is no detailed breakdown of imports by trade 
partner. 
For this chapter, we use a new database, called the World Input-
Output Database (WIOD), that aims to fi ll this gap. The WIOD pro-
vides a time series of world input-output tables from 1995 onwards, 
distinguishing between 35 industries and 59 product groups. The con-
struction of the world input-output tables will be discussed in the fol-
lowing subsection. Another crucial element for this type of analysis 
comes from detailed value-added accounts that provide information on 
the use of various types of labor (distinguished by educational attain-
ment level) and capital in production. This is discussed in the subsec-
tion titled “Factor Input Requirements.”
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World Input-Output Tables: Concepts and Construction
In this subsection we outline the basic concepts and construction 
of our world input-output tables. Basically, a world input-output table 
(WIOT) is a combination of national input-output tables in which the 
use of products is broken down according to their origin. In contrast 
to the national input-output tables, this information is made explicit in 
the WIOT. For each country, fl ows of products both for intermediate 
and fi nal use are split into domestically produced or imported. In addi-
tion, for imports, the WIOT shows which foreign industry produced 
the product. This is illustrated by the schematic outline for a WIOT in 
Table 5.2. It illustrates the simple case of three regions: 1) Country A, 
2) Country B, and 3) the rest of the world. In the World Input-Output 
Database we will distinguish between 40 individual countries and the 
rest of the world, but the basic outline remains the same.
The rows in the WIOT indicate the use of output from a particular 
industry in a country. This can be intermediate use either in the country 
itself (use of domestic output) or by other countries (in which case it is 
exported). Output can also be for fi nal use,6 either by the country itself 
(fi nal use of domestic output) or by other countries (in which case it is 
exported). Final use is indicated on the right side of the table, and this 
information can be used to measure the C matrix defi ned in Section 
Two, “GVC Incomes and Jobs: Methodology.” The sum of all of the 
uses is equal to the output of an industry, denoted by Q in Section Two. 
A fundamental accounting identity is that total use of output in a row 
equals total output of the same industry, as indicated in the respective 
column in the left-hand part of the table. The columns convey informa-
tion on the technology of production, as they indicate the amounts of 
intermediate and factor inputs needed for production. The intermedi-
ates can be sourced from domestic industries or imported. This is the B 
matrix from Section Two. The residual between total output and total 
intermediate inputs is value-added. This is made up by compensation 
for production factors. It is the direct contribution of domestic factors 
to output. We prepare the F matrix from Section Two on this infor-
mation after breaking out the compensation of various factor inputs as 
described in the next subsection, “Factor Input Requirements.”
As building blocks for the WIOT, national supply-and-use tables 
(SUTs) were used; these are the core statistical sources from which 
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Table 5.2  Schematic Outline of World Input-Output Table (WIOT), Three Regions
Intermediate industry Final domestic
Country A Country B Rest of world Country A Country B Rest of world Total
Country A 
industry
Intermediate 
use of domestic 
output
Intermediate 
use by B of 
exports from A
Intermediate 
use by RoW of 
exports from A
Final use of 
domestic output
Final use by 
B of exports 
from A
Final use by 
RoW of exports 
from A
Output in A
Country B 
industry
Intermediate 
use by A of 
exports from B
Intermediate 
use of domestic 
output
Intermediate 
use by RoW of 
exports from B
Final use by 
A of exports 
from B
Final use of 
domestic output
Final use by 
RoW of exports 
from B
Output in B
Rest of world 
(RoW) 
industry
Intermediate 
use by A of 
exports from 
RoW
Intermediate 
use by B of 
exports from 
RoW
Intermediate 
use of domestic 
output
Final use by A 
of exports from 
RoW
Final use by B 
of exports from 
RoW
Final use of 
domestic output
Output in RoW
Value-added Value-added Value-added
Output in A Output in B Output in RoW
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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national statistical institutes (NSIs) derive national input-output tables. 
In short, we derive time series from national SUTs. Benchmark national 
SUTs are linked over time through the use of the most recent National 
Accounts statistics on fi nal demand categories, as well as through the 
use of gross output and value-added by detailed industry. This ensures 
both intercountry and intertemporal consistency of the tables. As 
such, the WIOT is built according to the conventions of the System of 
National Accounts and obeys various important accounting identities. 
National SUTs are linked across countries through detailed international 
trade statistics to create so-called international SUTs. This is based on 
a classifi cation of bilateral import fl ows by end-use category (interme-
diate, consumer, or investment), in which intermediate inputs are split 
by country of origin. These international SUTs are used to construct 
the symmetric world input-output of the industry-by-industry type. 
See Timmer (2012) for a more elaborate discussion of construction 
methods, practical implementation, and detailed sources of the WIOT. 
Dietzenbacher et al. (2013) provide an in-depth technical discussion. 
The construction of the WIOT has a number of distinct charac-
teristics. First, we rely on national supply-and-use tables rather than 
input-output tables as our basic building blocks. SUTs are a natural 
starting point for this type of analysis, as they provide information on 
both products and industries. A supply table provides information on 
products produced by each domestic industry, and a use table indicates 
the use of each product by an industry or fi nal user. The linking with 
international trade data, which is product-based, and with factor use, 
which is industry-based, can be naturally made in an SUT framework.7 
Ideally, we would like to use offi cial data on the destination of 
imported goods and services. However, in most countries these fl ows 
are not tracked by statistical agencies. Nevertheless, for imports, most 
do publish an input-output table constructed with the import propor-
tionality assumption, applying a product’s economy-wide import share 
for all use categories. For the United States, researchers have found that 
this assumption can be rather misleading, in particular at the industry 
level (Feenstra and Jensen 2012; Strassner, Yuskavage, and Lee 2009). 
Therefore, we are not using the offi cial import matrices but instead use 
detailed trade data to make a split. Our basic data are the bilateral import 
fl ows of all countries covered in WIOD from all partners in the world 
at the HS6-digit product level, taken from the UN Comtrade database. 
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Based on the detailed description, products are allocated to three use 
categories: 1) intermediates, 2) fi nal consumption, and 3) investment, 
effectively extending the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) clas-
sifi cation. We fi nd that import proportions differ widely across use cat-
egories and, importantly, also across country of origin. For example, 
imports by the Czech car industry from Germany contain a much higher 
share of intermediates than imports from Japan. This type of informa-
tion is refl ected in our WIOT by using detailed bilateral trade data. The 
domestic use matrix is derived as total use minus imports.
Another novel element in the WIOT is the use of data on trade in 
services. As yet, no standardized database on bilateral service fl ows 
exists. These fl ows have been collected from various sources—includ-
ing the OECD, Eurostat, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO)—checked for consistency, and 
integrated into a bilateral service trade database. 
Clearly, the validity of the fi ndings in this chapter relies heavily 
on the quality of the databases used. The WIOD has been constructed 
with the aim of making maximum use of the publicly available data 
on national input-output tables, international trade statistics, and pro-
duction factor incomes. In the process of consolidating these separate 
databases, inconsistencies have been found and compromises made to 
arrive at an internally consistent world input-output table. For example, 
the well-known inconsistency between mirror trade fl ows in the UN 
Comtrade data was resolved by focusing on import fl ows only. Other 
issues relate to reexports of goods and trade in services that are not 
very well refl ected in today’s trade statistics. It is clear that present-
day statistical systems are lagging behind the developments in today’s 
world. In particular, trade in services and intangibles such as royalties 
and licences are still poorly refl ected (see, e.g., Feenstra et al. [2010]; 
Houseman and Ryder [2010]). This should have priority in the future 
development of international trade statistics.
Factor Input Requirements
For factor input requirements, we collected country-specifi c data 
on detailed labor and capital inputs. This includes data on hours worked 
and on compensation for three labor types, as well as data on capital 
stocks and compensation. Labor types are distinguished on the basis 
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of educational attainment levels, as defi ned in the International Stan-
dard Classifi cation of Education (ISCED) (low-skilled: ISCED 1 + 2; 
medium-skilled: ISCED 3 + 4; and high-skilled: ISCED 5 + 6). These 
series are not part of the core set of national accounts statistics reported 
by NSIs, and additional material has been collected from employment 
and labor force statistics. For each country covered, we chose what we 
considered the best statistical source for consistent wage and employ-
ment data at the industry level. In most countries, this was the labor 
force survey (LFS). In most cases this needed to be combined with 
an earnings survey, as information on wages is often not included in 
the LFS. In other instances, an establishment survey or social secu-
rity database was used. Care has been taken to arrive at series that are 
time-consistent, as most employment surveys are not designed to track 
developments over time, and breaks in methodology or coverage fre-
quently occur. 
Labor compensation of self-employed persons is not registered in 
the National Accounts, which, as emphasised by Krueger (1999), leads 
to an understatement of labor’s share. This is particularly important 
for less advanced economies, which typically feature a large share of 
self-employed workers in industries like agriculture, trade, business, 
and personal services. We make an imputation by assuming that the 
compensation per hour of self-employment is equal to the compensa-
tion per hour of employees. For most advanced countries, labor data 
is constructed by extending and updating the EU KLEMS database 
(www.euklems.net) using the methodologies, data sources, and con-
cepts described in O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). For other countries 
additional data has been collected according to the same principles. 
Capital compensation is derived as gross value-added minus labor 
compensation, as defi ned above. It is the gross compensation for capi-
tal, including profi ts and depreciation allowances. Being a residual 
measure, it is the remuneration for capital in the broadest sense, includ-
ing tangible capital (such as machinery and buildings), intangible (such 
as research and development [R&D], software, database development, 
branding, and organizational capital), mineral resources, land, and 
fi nancial capital. 
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TRENDS IN GVC INCOMES OF MANUFACTURES 
In this section, we explore trends in the distributions of value in 
global production chains using the decompositions introduced in Sec-
tion Two. We decompose global expenditure on manufacturing prod-
ucts into compensation for factor services that are directly or indirectly 
needed in the production of these products. Throughout the chapter we 
use the phrase “global manufacturing” to indicate the set of all produc-
tion activities directly or indirectly needed in producing fi nal manufac-
turing goods. Note that this includes not only activities in the manufac-
turing sector but also production activities in all other sectors, such as 
agriculture, utilities, business services, and so on, that provide inputs in 
any stage of the production process. Next, we defi ne “GVC income” as 
the income of all production factors that have been directly and indi-
rectly used in the production of fi nal manufacturing goods. World GVC 
income is the GVC income summed over all countries; it will be equal 
to world expenditure on manufacturing goods as we model all regions 
in the world in our empirical analysis. By defi nition, any dollar spent 
on fi nal goods must end up as income for production factors somewhere 
in the world. 
The share of a country in world GVC income is a novel indicator of 
the competitive strength of a nation. Compared to traditional competi-
tiveness indicators like a country’s share in world exports, it has three 
advantages. First, it indicates to what extent a country can compete 
with other nations in terms of activities related to global manufactur-
ing, rather than competing in manufacturing products as measured by 
exports. Second, it is a refl ection of an economy’s strength to compete 
in both domestic and global markets. Countries might gain income by 
serving foreign demand, but might at the same time lose income in 
production for the domestic market. The income share of a country in 
global manufacturing measures the combined net effect. Third, income 
and employment effects of trade in tasks for separate groups of workers 
(such as low- and high-skilled) can also be determined in the same uni-
fi ed framework, as shown later on. 
Throughout the chapter we will focus on GVC income in the pro-
duction of fi nal manufacturing goods. We denote these goods by the 
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term “manufactures.” Production systems of manufactures are highly 
prone to international fragmentation, as activities have a high degree 
of international contestability: They can be undertaken in any coun-
try with little variation in quality. It is important to note that GVCs of 
manufactures do not coincide with all activities in the manufacturing 
sector; neither do they coincide with all activities that are internation-
ally contestable. Some activities in the manufacturing sector are geared 
toward production of intermediates for fi nal nonmanufacturing prod-
ucts and are not part of GVCs of manufactures. On the other hand, 
GVCs of manufactures also include value-added outside the manufac-
turing sector (such as business services, transport, and communication 
and fi nance) and value-added in raw materials production. These indi-
rect contributions will be explicitly accounted for through the modeling 
of input-output linkages across sectors. 
Ideally, to measure competitiveness one would like to cover value-
added in all activities that are internationally contestable, and not only 
those in the production of manufactures.8 GVCs of services cannot be 
analyzed, however, as the level of observation for services in our data 
is not fi ne enough to zoom in on those services that are heavily traded, 
such as consultancy services. The lowest level of detail in the WIOD 
is “business services,” which for the most part contains activities that 
are not internationally traded, and hence are much less interesting to 
analyze from a GVC perspective. This is all the more true for other 
services, such as personal or retail services. They require a physical 
interaction between the buyer and the provider of the service, and a 
major part of the value-added in these chains is effectively not interna-
tionally contestable. More detailed data on trade in, and production of, 
services is needed before meaningful GVC analyses of fi nal services 
can be made. 
GVC Incomes of Manufactures 
Figure 5.2, Panel A, provides a comparison of the GVC incomes in 
advanced and emerging regions in the production of fi nal manufactur-
ing goods. The GVC income share of advanced countries (East Asia 
plus the United States, Canada, Australia, and the EU15) has declined 
from almost three-quarters in 1995 to just above half of world GVC 
income today. Emerging regions have rapidly increased their shares, 
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and almost all of this increase was realized after 2003. Since 2004 the 
increase in the GVC income of emerging countries has always been 
higher than that of advanced countries, reaching a peak in 2008 at a 
time when advanced countries’ GVC income stalled. The drop in the 
crisis year of 2009 was large for all countries, but recovery occurred 
much faster in the emerging economies (Figure 5.2, Panel B).
One might hypothesize that shifts in the composition of global man-
ufacturing demand in terms of the type of products being demanded 
might also be a determinant of the decline of the advanced nations in 
global manufacturing production. However, the product structure of 
global demand remained stable over the period 1995 to 2009. Follow-
ing Engel’s law, the expenditure shares of food and other nondurable 
goods, such as apparel, shoes, furniture, and toys, were on a long-term 
declining trend. Expenditure on machinery and transport equipment was 
relatively stable, around 16 percent of the total, as increasing consumer 
and investment demand from emerging markets was counteracted by 
declining demand from mature economies. Also, demand for electrical 
machinery was stagnant in the long run. The only clear upward trend 
is found for chemical products—including gasoline, cosmetics, and 
medicines—demand for which has steadily increased around the world, 
going from 12 percent of global manufacturing expenditures in 1995 
to 15 percent in 2008. But these global demand shifts are too small 
to account for the decline in advanced nations’ GVC income. Instead, 
this decline is due to losses in the amount of value-added in each prod-
uct’s GVC. This will be analyzed in more detail in the remainder of this 
section. 
In Figure 5.3 we show the shares of regions in world GVC income 
in the production of manufactures for the period from 1995 to 2011. 
The fi gure plots measures for fi ve groups of countries: 1) members of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Canada, Mexico, 
and the United States); 2) the European Union (EU), consisting of the 
27 EU member states; 3) East Asia, consisting of Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan; 4) China; and 5) BRIIAT, which includes Brazil, Russia, 
India, Indonesia, Australia, and Turkey. In Table 5.3, additional data 
for 20 major individual economies can be found for 1995 and 2008. It 
should be kept in mind that international competition is not a zero-sum 
game, and declining shares in global GVC do not necessarily mean an 
absolute decline in GVC income in a region. On the contrary, in real 
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terms, world GVC income on manufactures (defl ated by the U.S. Con-
sumer Price Index) rose by about one-third over the period 1995–2008. 
Figure 5.3 illustrates that the share of the NAFTA countries in world 
GVC income increased during the ICT bubble years, climbing as high 
as 30 percent, at which point their share was even higher than that of 
the EU. But it rapidly declined after 2001, reaching a low of 20 per-
cent in 2008. The decline of the advanced nations taken as a whole 
is particularly due to the demise of East Asia, whose share has been 
dropping rapidly since the mid-1990s. While the shares of South Korea 
and Taiwan are still increasing, the GVC income share of Japan has 
been declining precipitously. In contrast, the EU’s GVC income share 
has been relatively stable, only declining slowly over the period from 
1995 to 2008. France, Italy, and the United Kingdom slowly lost some 
shares. The German share dropped rapidly in the latter 1990s but sta-
bilized afterwards. These drops were compensated for by increasing 
shares for other EU countries, in particular the new member states. As is 
well known, the aftermath of the global fi nancial crisis hit Europe par-
Figure 5.2  GVC Incomes in Advanced and Emerging Countries, All 
Manufactures, 1995–2011
Panel A: Shares in world GVC income 
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ticularly hard, and its share dropped sharply, from 32 percent in 2003 
to 24 percent in 2011. On the fl ip side, the share of other regions in the 
world rapidly increased. China is mainly responsible for the increase 
of the emerging countries’ share, because its share accelerated after its 
ascension to the WTO in 2000. In 2007 it overtook East Asia in terms 
of share. In 2009 the Chinese GVC income share overtook that of the 
combined countries of BRIIAT. And in 2011 its share was almost equal 
to that of the NAFTA region.9 
One might argue that these shifts in regional GVC income shares 
are unsurprising, given the faster growth of China and other emerg-
NOTE: “Advanced” nations include the EU15, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Can-
ada, and the United States. “Emerging” nations include all other countries in the 
world. National currencies have been converted to U.S. dollars with offi cial exchange 
rates, defl ated to 1995 prices with the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI). World GVC 
income is equal to world expenditures on manufacturing products at basic prices.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database. Series updated 
to 2011 in April 2012. 
Panel B: Annual change (in billions of 1995 US$)
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ing economies vis-à-vis advanced regions. Higher consumption in the 
home economy would naturally lead to higher GVC incomes. But this is 
only true to the extent that demand for manufactures has a strong home 
production bias—that is, a bias mainly geared toward goods with a high 
level of domestic value-added. Given the high tradability of manufac-
turing goods, this home bias is not obvious, however. Increased Chinese 
demand for, say, chemicals or electronic equipment can be as easily 
served by imports as by Chinese domestic production. And in the lat-
ter case, a sizable share could still be captured by advanced countries 
Figure 5.3  Regional Shares in World GVC Income, All Manufactures, 
1995–2011 (%)
NOTE: Figure shows value-added by regions in the production of fi nal manufactur-
ing goods. “East Asia” includes Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. “BRIIAT” includes 
Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, Australia, and Turkey. “EU27” includes all countries 
that have joined the European Union. “NAFTA” includes Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States. Shares do not add up to 100 percent, as the remainder is the share of all 
other countries in the world.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012, 
updated to 2011.
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through the delivery of key intermediate inputs and services. The occur-
rence of falling shares in global GVC income for advanced regions in 
Figure 5.2 indicates that these regions failed to capture a large part of 
the value of the increased market for manufacturing goods in emerging 
Table 5.3  Real GVC Income, All Manufactures (in billions of 1995 US$) 
Country 1995 2008 Change
Advanced nations
United States 1,312 1,373 62
Japan 1,154 676 −478
Germany 618 664 46
France 292 330 37
United Kingdom 254 260 6
Italy 289 353 64
Spain 126 171 44
Canada 124 190 66
Australia 68 112 45
South Korea 142 157 15
Netherlands 94 119 25
Other 10 advanced 390 459 69
Total 2l advanced 4,863 4,864 1
Emerging nations
China 277 1,114 837
Russian Federation 80 246 166
Brazil 164 265 101
India 114 229 115
Mexico 99 208 109
Turkey 73 122 49
Indonesia 83 113 30
Poland 33 86 52
Czech Republic 14 41 27
Rest of world 786 1,396 610
Total emerging countries 1,723 3,820 2,097
World 6,586 8,684 2,098
NOTE: Real GVC indicates the value-added in countries to global output of fi nal manu-
factures. It includes all manufactures and is in constant 1995 prices using the U.S. 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) as the defl ator.  Some numbers in “Change” column may 
be off by 1 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
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economies. At the same time, the domestic value-added content of their 
own production declined. Both trends can be interpreted as a loss of 
competitiveness.
A number of caveats are in order. Shares in world GVC income 
are expressed in U.S. dollars using current exchange rates. For income 
changes over time, we defl ate incomes in U.S. dollars to the 1995 U.S. 
dollar value using the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI). Exchange 
rates have fl uctuated over the period considered: The dollar-to-euro 
rate10 declined sharply over 1995–2001, followed by a steep rise, which 
by 2007 had returned it to near its 1995 value. The yen-to-dollar rate 
fl uctuated around a long-term constant for this period. The yuan-to-
dollar rate was effectively constant over this period, slightly appreciat-
ing at the end of the 2000s. The choice of the U.S. dollar as numéraire 
has no impact on the GVC income measure of a country relative to 
other countries. For example, expressing GVC income shares in yen or 
euros would give identical results. But it will affect the absolute levels 
of GVC incomes and hence comparisons over time within a country. 
Second, one has to keep in mind that the location where the value is 
being added is not necessarily identical to where the generated income 
will eventually end up. The building of global production chains is not 
only through arms-length trade in intermediate inputs; it also involves 
sizable fl ows of investment, and part of the value-added in emerging 
regions will accrue as income to multinational fi rms headquartered in 
advanced regions through the ownership of capital. What is needed is to 
analyze capital income on a national rather than a domestic basis, as this 
chapter does in its data on foreign ownership. This type of information 
is notoriously hard to acquire, not least because of the notional relo-
cation of profi ts for tax accounting purposes. Hence, further research 
is needed in this area (Baldwin and Kimura 1998; Lipsey 2010). The 
decline in East Asian GVC income is likely overestimated, as it is 
also related to the offshoring of activities to China, which effectively 
became the assembly place of East Asia. Income earned by East Asian 
capital is allocated to the place of production (in this case China) and 
not by ownership, as discussed in Section Two. This difference is prob-
ably larger for East Asian countries than for NAFTA or the EU, which 
have larger FDI fl ows within the region, so that they net out in regional 
aggregate numbers.
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The Role of Domestic and Foreign Demand
By splitting the fi nal demand vector in the decomposition given in 
Equation (5.2), we can analyze the importance of domestic versus for-
eign fi nal demand in the generation of GVC income in a country. The 
GVC income due to foreign demand is identical to what Johnson and 
Noguera (2012) refer to as “exports of value-added.”11 Table 5.4 pro-
vides the share of GVC income of manufactures due to foreign demand 
for 20 major economies in the world. The overriding conclusion is that 
all countries have become increasingly dependent on foreign demand 
Table 5.4  Percentage of Real GVC Income Due to Foreign Demand, All 
Manufactures 
Country 1995 2008 Change
Advanced nations
United States 25.9 33.0 7.1
Japan 24.6 41.8 17.2
Germany 46.3 69.9 23.6
France 53.1 60.0 7.0
United Kingdom 52.6 68.5 15.8
Italy 45.2 52.8 7.6
Spain 39.1 53.3 14.2
Canada 65.8 65.8 0.0
Australia 43.9 55.3 11.3
South Korea 45.2 67.8 22.6
Netherlands 79.3 87.8 8.5
Emerging nations
China 35.3 48.7 13.5
Russian Federation 42.6 47.3 4.7
Brazil 15.7 26.0 10.3
India 17.7 29.3 11.6
Mexico 32.9 36.5 3.5
Turkey 22.5 35.3 12.8
Indonesia 28.5 38.7 10.2
Poland 42.7 63.0 20.3
NOTE: Numbers represent real GVC income for all manufactures and in constant 1995 
prices using the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) as a defl ator. Some numbers in the 
“Change” column may be off by 0.1 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
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to generate GVC income of manufactures, with the exception of Can-
ada. For all major mature economies, increases in foreign demand have 
been a necessary spur for slow or even negative growth in their value-
added shares in domestic demand. Domestic demand was not a source 
of growth in the United States, and it contributed strongly to negative 
growth in Japan, as import substitution took place against a backdrop of 
stagnating domestic demand. The direction of this trend for advanced 
countries was to be expected, as the income elasticity of demand for 
manufactures is low, and in most countries domestic demand is increas-
ingly served through imports with high foreign value-added. But this 
domestic decline was more than counteracted by a rapid increase in 
exports of value-added. The most extreme example of this shift toward 
foreign demand dependence is to be found in Germany, given the large 
size of its domestic market. In 1995, 46 percent of its GVC income 
was due to foreign fi nal demand, and by 2008 this had increased to 70 
percent. Also, dependence upon foreign demand in Japan, South Korea, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom rapidly increased over this period. 
For emerging economies, changes in foreign demand have been 
important, but they also have strongly benefi ted from growth in domes-
tic expenditure on manufacturing. In China, the share of GVC income 
due to foreign demand increased from 35 percent to 49 percent—which 
is high, but not outstanding when compared to that of countries of com-
parable size such as Japan or Germany. The share of foreign demand in 
Mexico and Russia did barely increase over this period; also, the share 
for India, while growing, is still at a relatively low level, indicating that 
the integration of these major emerging economies into world markets 
is still limited. 
Sectoral Origin of GVC Income of Manufactures
The production of manufacturing goods involves a wide variety of 
activities, which do not take place only in the manufacturing sector. 
Using the decomposition technique outlined above, one can trace not 
only the country but also the sector in which value is added during the 
production process. Typically, the value that is added through activities 
in the manufacturing sector itself is around half the basic price value 
of a good, and declines over time. In Table 5.5 we provide for each 
country the share of a sector in the total value added by the country in 
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global manufacturing expenditure. This is done for 20 major econo-
mies in 1995 and 2008, distinguishing between three broad sectors: 1) 
natural resources, including the agriculture and mining industries (ISIC 
Rev. 3 industries A to C), 2) manufacturing, including all manufacturing 
industries (D), and 3) services including all other industries (E to Q). 
The table shows that the share of manufacturing has declined between 
1995 and 2008 in all countries except South Korea and Mexico. The 
Table 5.5  Sectoral Shares in Total GVC Income, All Manufactures (% of 
total)
Natural resources Manufacturing  Services
Country 1995 2008  1995 2008  1995 2008
Advanced
United States  0.06  0.09  0.56  0.52  0.38  0.39 
Japan  0.04  0.03  0.65  0.62  0.31  0.35 
Germany  0.03  0.02  0.61  0.56  0.36  0.42 
France  0.07  0.04  0.48  0.45  0.46  0.51 
United Kingdom  0.07  0.07  0.60  0.48  0.34  0.45 
Italy  0.05  0.03  0.57  0.52  0.38  0.44 
Spain  0.09  0.05  0.54  0.51  0.37  0.43 
Canada  0.12  0.19  0.54  0.44  0.34  0.37 
Australia  0.20  0.26  0.42  0.34  0.37  0.39 
South Korea  0.10  0.04  0.62  0.67  0.28  0.29 
Netherlands  0.11  0.12  0.49  0.42  0.40  0.45 
Emerging
China  0.21  0.17  0.58  0.57  0.22  0.26 
Russian Federation  0.20  0.21  0.42  0.39  0.38  0.40 
Brazil  0.13  0.17  0.55  0.46  0.32  0.37 
India  0.22  0.18  0.42  0.41  0.35  0.40 
Mexico  0.21  0.22  0.49  0.49  0.30  0.29 
Turkey  0.09  0.13  0.64  0.52  0.27  0.36 
Indonesia  0.22  0.30  0.61  0.54  0.18  0.16 
Poland  0.15  0.10  0.53  0.49  0.32  0.42 
NOTE: The numbers represent the share of that sector in total value-added by a coun-
try’s production of fi nal manufacturing products. “Natural resource” includes the 
agriculture and mining industries (ISIC Rev. 3 industries A to C), “manufacturing” 
includes all manufacturing industries (D), and “services” all other industries (E to Q).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
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unweighted average share across all 20 countries declined from 54 per-
cent to 50 percent. This partly refl ects a shift away from traditional 
manufacturing activities, such as those carried out by blue-collar 
production workers, but also the outsourcing of white-collar activi-
ties by manufacturing fi rms to domestic services fi rms. Contributions 
from the natural resources sector are high and have increased over the 
1995–2008 period in countries such as Australia, Canada, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Russia,12 and Turkey. This pattern of value-added suggests that 
for resource-abundant countries, activities within manufacturing pro-
duction networks are reinforcing their comparative advantage. Given 
India’s low level of development, services contribute relatively much 
in that country, refl ecting its well-developed business services sector, 
which delivers intermediate services to both domestic and foreign man-
ufacturing fi rms. In China, the share of natural resources is declining, 
and activities in the services sector are starting to contribute more, but 
the level is still well below the contributions of services in Europe and 
the United States.
GVC INCOME OF MANUFACTURES BY 
PRODUCTION FACTOR
Our income data on labor and capital allow us to study which pro-
duction factors have benefi ted from the changes in the regional distri-
bution of global value-added. Increasing trade and integration of world 
markets have been related to increasing unemployment and stagnat-
ing relative wages of low- and medium-skilled workers in developed 
regions. On the other hand, those factors have offered new opportunities 
in developing regions for countries to employ their large supply of low-
skilled workers. To study these trends, we decomposed value-added 
into four parts: 1) income for capital and income for labor, further split 
into 2) low-, 3) medium- and 4) high-skilled labor. High-skilled labor 
is defi ned as workers with a college degree or above. Medium-skilled 
workers have secondary schooling or above, including professional 
qualifi cations but below a college degree, and low-skilled have below 
secondary schooling. An estimate for the income of self-employed 
workers is included in labor compensation. The income for capital is 
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the amount of value-added that remains after subtracting labor com-
pensation. It is the gross compensation for capital, including profi ts and 
depreciation allowances. As a residual measure, it is the remuneration 
for capital in the broadest sense, including tangible, intangible, mineral 
resources, land, and fi nancial capital. 
In Figure 5.4 and Table 5.6 we provide a breakdown of GVC income 
by labor and capital for major regions. This is a breakdown of the GVC 
income discussed in the previous section, “Trends in Manufactures’ 
GVC Incomes.” At the global level, the share of GVC income that goes 
to labor is coming down, while the share of capital is increasing. In 
all regions, the compensation for capital is increasing relative to labor. 
Particularly in emerging regions, this increase is important and occurs 
faster than the labor income increase. This might be related to the low 
wage/rental ratios in these regions, which are still characterized by an 
abundant surplus of low-skilled workers from agricultural and informal 
urban sectors. In advanced regions, the increasing importance of capital 
might be a refl ection of the increased investment in so-called intan-
gible assets, which are becoming increasingly important for growth in 
advanced nations (Corrado and Hulten 2010).
It is important to note that the share captured by capital in emerg-
ing markets is known to be overestimated. Our approach is based on 
domestic production accounting for the location of the production fac-
tor and is silent on the ownership, as discussed before. In the case of 
labor income, this is unproblematic, since for most countries cross-
border labor migration is relatively minor. Hence, labor income paid 
out in a particular country mostly benefi ts the workers of the country in 
which production takes place. 
Worldwide, medium- and low-skilled workers are losing out to 
high-skilled workers, as the latter’s share of GVC income is increas-
ing. As expected, GVC income for low-skilled workers has increased 
strongly in China and in other emerging economies while declining in 
the advanced regions. In the United States and East Asia, the decline was 
particularly pronounced for medium-skilled workers. Within Europe, 
medium-skilled workers in Germany lost the biggest share, and in other 
European countries the income share going to low-skilled workers also 
declined. Income for high-skilled workers related to global manufac-
turing went up in most EU countries. This is not simply the result of a 
strong supply of higher-skilled labor replacing medium-skilled workers 
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NOTE: Figure shows factor income earned by high-skilled labor and capital (HS + K) and 
by medium- and low-skilled labor (MS + LS). “EU27” includes all countries in the Euro-
pean Union. “BRIIMT” includes Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012, 
updated to 2011.
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Table 5.6  GVC Income by Production Factor and Region (shares in 
world GVC income)
 
Value-added 
by labor
Value-added 
by capital Value-added total
 1995 2008  1995 2008  1995 2008
EU27 21.5 18.9 9.7 9.8 31.2 28.7
United States 12.8 9.5 7.4 6.7 20.2 16.2
East Asia 12.9 6.1 8.1 4.6 21.0 10.7
China 2.0 5.2 2.1 7.8 4.2 13.0
BRIIMT 4.1 6.1 5.1 7.4 9.3 13.5
Other 6.4 7.3 7.9 10.6 14.3 17.9
World 59.7 53.1 40.3 46.9 100.0 100.0
Advanced 47.1 34.4 25.5 21.2 72.6 55.5
Emerging 12.6 18.8  14.9 25.7  27.4 44.5
 
Value-added by 
high-skilled  
Value-added by 
medium-skilled  
Value-added by 
low-skilled
 1995 2008  1995 2008  1995 2008
EU27 4.8 6.0 10.0 8.9 6.6 4.0
United States 4.3 4.1 7.4 4.9 1.1 0.5
East Asia 3.2 2.1 7.2 3.3 2.5 0.6
China 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.8 1.3 3.0
BRIIMT 0.8 1.4 1.7 3.0 1.7 1.7
Other 0.8 1.5 2.3 2.9 3.4 3.0
World 14.0 15.5 29.1 24.8 16.6 12.8
Advanced 12.4 12.2 24.8 17.2 10.0 5.0
Emerging 1.6 3.3  4.3 7.6  6.6 7.8
NOTE: “East Asia” includes Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. “EU27” designates the 
countries that had joined the EU as of January 1, 2013. “BRIIMT” includes Brazil, 
Russia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey. “Other” is the rest of the world. Skill 
categories classify workers by their educational attainment levels. World income is 
equal to world expenditures on manufacturing products at basic prices. Some numbers 
may not sum to total because of rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
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but essentially carrying out the same activities; if this were the case, the 
wages for high-skilled workers should have dropped and the increase 
in GVC income for high-skilled workers would be limited. However, 
relative wages for high-skilled workers did not show this pattern (see 
Timmer et al. 2013).
GVC JOBS IN MANUFACTURES
Many policy concerns surrounding globalization issues are ulti-
mately about jobs—good jobs in particular. The disappearance of 
manufacturing jobs in advanced nations is occasionally linked to pro-
duction fragmentation and the associated offshoring of activities; see 
Bardhan, Jaffee, and Kroll (2013) for an overview. It is thus useful to 
look at the structure of employment in global value chains and ana-
lyze the changes in the characteristics of workers directly and indirectly 
involved in the production of manufacturing goods—in short, GVC 
jobs in manufactures.13 For each country, we will measure the num-
ber of workers involved in the domestic territory. As the mobility of 
labor is much lower than that of capital, GVC jobs will be closer to a 
national concept than GVC income. We will characterize GVC work-
ers by sector of employment and level of skills. In the next subsection, 
“The Shift toward Service Jobs in GVCs of Manufactures,” we show 
that only about half of the workers in manufacturing GVCs are actually 
employed in the manufacturing sector. The other half are employed in 
nonmanufacturing industries delivering intermediates, and this share is 
growing. In most countries, GVC job increase in services is even higher 
than job loss in manufacturing. In the subsection titled “Specialization 
in High-Skilled Activities in Advanced Countries,” on p. 154, we ana-
lyze the skill structure of GVC workers and fi nd that there has been a 
shift away from low-skilled toward high-skilled workers for advanced 
nations. This increase is faster than the trend in the overall economy, 
suggesting increased specialization of advanced countries in GVC 
activities performed by high-skilled workers. This is in line with broad 
Heckscher-Ohlin predictions of which countries will see a comparative 
advantage when possibilities for international production fragmentation 
increase.
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The Shift Toward Service Jobs in GVCs of Manufactures
By using the number of workers rather than value-added per unit 
of output in each industry-country as the requirement vector in Equa-
tion (5.1), we can trace the number of workers directly and indirectly 
involved in the production of manufacturing goods, and their sector of 
employment. Developments in the 20 main countries over the period 
from 1995 to 2008 are shown in Table 5.7. The fi rst two columns indi-
cate the share of manufacturing GVC workers as a percentage of the 
overall workforce in the economy. In the next columns the sectoral 
structure of employment of these workers is shown. Three sectors are 
considered—1) agriculture, 2) manufacturing and 3) services (which 
also include mining, construction, and utilities)—followed by a fourth 
column for “All sectors.” The fi rst set of four columns refers to the 
absolute number of GVC workers by sector in 2008, while the latter set 
of four columns refers to the change over the period 1995–2008. Two 
main facts clearly stand out: 
 1) The declining importance of global production of manufac-
tures for overall employment in most advanced nations 
 2) The strong shift in the sector of employment of these workers 
away from the manufacturing sector toward the services sec-
tor 
The fi rst two columns of Table 5.7 show the decline in importance 
of GVCs of manufactures in providing jobs in the economies of all 
countries except China and Turkey. The job losses in Japan and the 
United States are major, around 2.9 and 4.6 million, respectively. Also, 
job loss in the United Kingdom stands out, as more than 1.6 million 
GVC jobs disappeared in that country alone. The only exception to this 
trend in advanced countries is Germany: In 2008, 26 percent of German 
employment was involved in the global production of manufactures, 
which is the highest share across all advanced countries. 
Another important fi nding on the basis of Table 5.7 is the strong 
shift toward service jobs in the global production of manufactures since 
1995. Faster growth (or slower declines) in service jobs than in manu-
facturing can be seen in all major advanced countries. As a result, in 
2008, the manufacturing sector accounted for about half of the total 
number of GVC jobs in manufactures in advanced countries. The other 
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manufactures, as  
share of all workers 
in the economy (%)
GVC workers in manufactures in 2008 
(in thousands), employed in
Change in GVC workers in 
manufactures between 1995 and 2008 
(in thousands), employed in
Agriculture
Manufac-
turing Services All sectors Agriculture
Manufac-
turing Services All sectors1995 2008
Advanced
United States 16.0 11.1 1,143 8,837 6,892 16,872 −331 −3,144 −1,138 −4,612
Japan 22.6 19.4 1,298 6,491 4,417 12,207 −794 −2,225 148 −2,871
Germany 26.8 26.4 400 5,481 4,766 10,647 −161 −666 1,388 561
France 22.0 18.7 303 2,195 2,355 4,853 −96 −423 368 −151
United Kingdom 20.1 12.6 115 1,946 1,931 3,992 −128 −1,148 −347 −1,624
Italy 29.1 25.5 333 3,553 2,559 6,444 −192 −234 517 91
Spain 23.2 17.5 271 1,827 1,494 3,592 −97 185 353 440
Canada 20.8 16.0 157 1,138 1,482 2,777 −102 −136 193 −45
Australia 18.2 14.5 165 641 855 1,661 −48 3 196 150
South Korea 29.7 22.8 655 2,646 2,077 5,378 −468 −735 524 −679
Netherlands 22.8 19.0 89 643 929 1,661 −42 −87 158 29
Emerging
China 31.7 33.3 121,342 87,568 49,468 258,378 9,963 20,508 11,965 42,436
Russian 
Federation
24.7 21.9 4,259 6,749 6,228 17,237 −1,403 −2,120 2,198 −1,325
Brazil 29.6 28.7 8,347 9,490 9,823 27,660 −705 2,450 4,118 5,863
India 27.9 27.3 57,926 41,933 26,483 126,343 2,118 10,896 7,025 20,039
Mexico 30.3 24.4 2,817 6,128 3,205 12,150 −400 1,403 1,121 2,124
Table 5.7  GVC Workers in Manufactures, 1995 and 2008
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NOTE: GVC workers are workers directly or indirectly involved in the production of manufacturing goods. Columns 3 through 6 indicate 
the total number of GVC workers by sector in 2008; columns 7 through 10 indicate the change in the number of GVC workers by sector 
between 1995 and 2008. The last column shows the change in the total number of workers in the economy for that period. Some numbers 
in the “All sectors” columns may be off by 1 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
Turkey 27.1 30.4 1,778 3,115 1,554 6,446 −341 620 584 863
Indonesia 32.1 25.6 13,921 7,427 5,725 27,073 −1,899 −425 1,380 −944
Poland 31.0 28.8 917 2,278 1,347 4,542 −468 81 368 −19
Czech Republic 30.8 30.9 93 990 553 1,636 −59 74 35 50
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half of those jobs are found in agriculture and even more so in services—
workers who are involved in the production of intermediate goods and 
services used in the manufacturing process. These fi ndings testify to the 
increasing intertwining of manufacturing and service activities. 
Following Baumol’s cost disease hypothesis, one might argue that 
this shift in the sectoral distribution of the GVC jobs might be inter-
preted as the result of differential productivity growth in manufacturing 
and services. But while there is clear evidence that productivity growth 
in manufacturing is higher than in services overall, this does not neces-
sarily hold for the service activities in GVCs of manufactures. These 
only form a subset of the services sector, and they involve in particular 
intermediate services such as wholesaling, transportation, fi nance, and 
several business services.14 These activities are generally open for inter-
national competition and likely to have much higher rates of innovation 
and productivity growth than service activities for domestic demand, 
which are dominated by personal services, education, health, and pub-
lic administration. Hence, it seems more likely that our fi ndings are 
indicative of a fundamental shift in the type of activities carried out by 
advanced countries in the global production of manufactures—a shift 
away from blue-collar manufacturing to white-collar service activities. 
This hypothesis is confi rmed when one analyzes the skill content of 
GVC jobs, as is done in the next subsection.
In the major emerging economies, most of the jobs are still added 
in the manufacturing sector, as is to be expected. For China, India, 
Mexico, and Turkey, job increases in manufacturing outnumber those 
in the services sector. In Brazil, however, services job growth appears 
to be more important. Even more strongly, in Indonesia and Russia the 
number of jobs in the production of manufactures has declined. These 
countries actually lost jobs overall for the period 1995–2008 and seem 
to have entered a premature deindustrialization phase. 
Specialization in High-Skilled Activities in Advanced Countries
In a world with international production fragmentation, the broad 
Heckscher-Ohlin predictions will still hold: Countries will carry out 
activities for which local value-added content is relatively intensive 
amongst their abundant factors. In fact, increased opportunities for inter-
national production fragmentation may have the tendency to magnify 
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the comparative advantage of countries, as suggested by Baldwin and 
Evenett (2012). A simple example will illustrate. Assume two goods, A 
and B, which are both produced with two activities: a low-skilled (LS) 
and a high-skilled (HS) activity. Before unbundling, Goods A and B are 
bundles of production activities with different skill intensities. Assume 
that Good A is on average more skill-intensive than Good B, as the HS 
activity is more important in the production of A than of B. A relatively 
skill-abundant country would specialize in the production of A, and 
a skill-scarce country in the production of B. After unbundling, each 
nation specializes in specifi c production activities. The skill-abundant 
country will specialize in the HS activities in the production of both 
goods, and the skill-scarce country in the LS activities for those goods. 
As a result, the potential range of comparative advantages across coun-
tries in activities will be greater than in the fi nal products (see, e.g., 
Deardorff [2001]).15 
To test this prediction, we analyze the number of workers by skill 
type needed in GVCs of manufactures using Equation (5.1) in combina-
tion with a skill requirement vector. This vector is based on a character-
ization of workers in each industry and country by their observable edu-
cational attainment levels, as described in Section Three, “The World 
Input-Output Database (WIOD).” This delivers the number of low- (LS), 
medium- (MS) and high-skilled (HS) GVC workers for a particular 
year. Results are given in Table 5.8. We fi nd that during 1995–2008, in 
all advanced countries combined, the increase in high-skilled jobs was 
4.6 million. Medium-skilled jobs declined by nearly 3.8 million, and 
the drop in low-skilled jobs was even bigger—9.7 million. This pattern 
of high-skilled jobs growing faster (or declining slower) than medium- 
and low-skilled jobs can be found for most countries. But there are 
some regional differences. In the United States, employment in global 
production of manufactures dropped for all workers, in particular the 
medium-skilled. This is a well-known phenomenon that characterizes a 
broader segment of the U.S. economy and has been extensively studied 
(see, e.g., Autor [2010]). More surprising is the fi nding that the number 
of high-skilled jobs has also declined. This is in stark contrast to Japan 
and the major EU countries: There, less-skilled jobs also dwindled, but 
this was at least in part compensated for by increasing opportunities for 
high-skilled jobs. 
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CONCLUSION 
A global-value-chain perspective has profound implications for how 
one thinks of competitiveness and growth. It highlights the importance 
of global production networks and the increasing interrelation of con-
sumption, production, and income across national boundaries through 
the trade of goods and services. Enhancing competitiveness and growth 
is increasingly about capturing a larger share of global value chains—
in particular, of products for which global demand is growing (Por-
ter 1990). This rise of global value chains (GVCs) is also posing new 
challenges to analyses of international trade and measures of countries’ 
competitiveness. 
Table 5.8  Change in Number of Workers in Global Production of Final 
Manufactures by Skill Type, 1995 and 2008 (in thousands)
Country Low Medium High Total
United States −1,125 −3,286 −201 −4,612
Japan −1,834 −1,399 361 −2,871
Germany −168 115 614 561
France −768 52 566 −151
United Kingdom −1,236 −560 172 −1,624
Italy −1,201 853 439 91
Spain −507 391 556 440
Canada −118 −105 177 −45
Australia −84 141 94 150
South Korea −1,110 −335 766 −679
Netherlands −119 −54 202 29
Other 10 advanced −1,441 425 840 −176
Total 21 advanced −9,711 −3,762 4,587 −8,886
All other countries 56,214 64,370 19,393 139,977
World 46,503 60,607 23,981 131,091
NOTE: Figures represent changes in the number of workers (including both employ-
ees and self-employed) involved in global production of fi nal manufactures between 
1995 and 2008, split into the number of low-skilled, medium-skilled, and high-skilled 
workers based on educational attainment. Some numbers may be off by 1 because of 
rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
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In this chapter, we take a macro perspective and analyze the value-
added of production for a wide set of manufacturing product groups. 
This is done through a newly developed accounting method in which 
we build upon an input-output modeling of the world economy in the 
tradition of Leontief (1949). The novelty of our approach is that we 
trace the value added by all labor and capital that is directly and indi-
rectly used for the production of fi nal manufactures. We call this “GVC 
income.” We also introduce the related concept of “GVC jobs,” which 
connotes the number of jobs directly and indirectly needed in the pro-
duction of fi nal goods. To measure GVC incomes and jobs for a wide 
set of countries in the world, we use the global input-output tables and 
supplementary labor accounts from the World Input-Output Database, 
available at www.wiod.org and described in Timmer (2012). 
The chapter presents new evidence on the main changes in GVC 
income and jobs across both mature and developing countries. Taken 
together, the results show that international fragmentation in the pro-
duction of manufactures has been accompanied by a rapid shift toward 
higher-skilled activities in advanced nations. These activities are 
increasingly carried out in the services sector and no longer in the man-
ufacturing sector itself. As such, the shift contributes to the so-called 
job polarization in advanced economies, as the displaced manufactur-
ing workers are likely to be absorbed into personal and distributional 
services, where low-skilled employment opportunities are still growing 
(Goos, Manning, and Salomons 2011). Emerging economies are taking 
up increasing shares in global GVC income; much of this increase has 
been driven by rapid growth in China after its accession to the WTO in 
2001. We also fi nd increasing intertwining of manufacturing and ser-
vices activities, which argues against a myopic view of manufacturing 
jobs in discussions on GVC issues. Rather than focusing on the particu-
lar sector in which jobs are lost or created, the discussion should be led 
by a view toward the activities that are carried out in GVCs, irrespective 
of the sector in which they are ultimately classifi ed. Thinking in terms 
of sectors is basically a relic of a world where fragmentation of produc-
tion, both domestically and internationally, had not progressed far. 
Although the model to measure GVC income and jobs is relatively 
straightforward, it is clear that the validity of the fi ndings relies heavily 
on the quality of the database used. The WIOD is a prototype database 
developed mainly to provide a proof-of-concept, and it is up to the sta-
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   157 2/16/2015   8:39:40 AM
158   Timmer, Los, and de Vries
tistical community to bring international input-output tables into the 
realm of offi cial statistics. The development work done by the OECD 
(Ahmad, Chapter 6 of this volume) is certainly a step in the right direc-
tion. Various weak areas in data remain, particularly in the measurement 
of trade in services and intangibles. In addition, because of the lack of 
fi rm-level data matching national input-output tables, one currently has 
to rely on the assumption that all fi rms in an industry have a similar 
production structure. If various types of fi rms, in particular exporters, 
have a different production technology and input sourcing structure 
(i.e., they import larger shares), more detailed data might reveal a bias 
in the results presented here. More information on the ownership of 
capital income, which is currently measured on a domestic basis rather 
than on a national basis, is also desirable. This is far from easy, though, 
and in pursuing this line of investigation one needs to trace not only the 
nationality of the fi rms involved but also the nationality of the ultimate 
claimants of residual profi ts. 
Arguably the most important area where more study is needed is in 
tracing where in the value chain the profi ts from lead fi rms are realized, 
as well as how these are recorded in the current statistical system. For 
example, the product case studies by Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden 
(2010), among others, suggest that the profi ts made by the lead fi rms 
in the chains can only be inferred by comparing the fi nal purchase and 
exfactory prices of the product, which include the trade margins (see 
also Gereffi  1999). The use of brand names, software, knowledge sys-
tems, and other intangibles of the lead fi rm by other fi rms in the chain 
is typically not compensated for by a direct money fl ow from the users. 
Rather, the compensation is realized indirectly through the ability of the 
lead fi rm to have the exclusive right to sell the particular product with 
a premium through its own (or through other tightly controlled) sales 
channels. This indirect compensation takes place in value chains that 
are completely within a multinational enterprise, but it also arises in 
chains that are to a large extent organized through arm’s-length trans-
actions. When the residual profi ts are realized—in other words, when 
manufacturing fi rms sell to fi nal consumers—this is picked up in our 
GVC income measure. But alternative value-chain arrangements are 
feasible.
One particular example is the existence of so-called factoryless 
goods producers (FGPs), which are proliferating in the United States. 
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These are fi rms that are manufacturer-like in that they perform many of 
the tasks and activities found in manufacturing establishments them-
selves, except for the actual manufacturing production process. In the 
current U.S. statistical system they are classifi ed in wholesaling, and 
their output is recorded as a wholesale margin rather than as manufac-
turing sales. The value-added of these fi rms should clearly be part of 
GVC incomes of manufactures but are currently not picked up, since 
GVC income is measured at basic prices, which means that trade and 
transport margins associated with fi nal consumption are not included in 
GVC incomes. This might bias downwards the total GVC income for 
the United States compared to other countries to the extent that FGP 
production is more prominent in this country than in other countries. 
The scope for this bias is not particularly large, however. Bernard and 
Fort (2013) suggest that reclassifying the FGPs to the manufacturing 
sector would increase reported U.S. manufacturing output in 2007 by 
about 5 percent in a conservative estimate and by a maximum of 17 
percent using a more liberal set of assumptions. A deeper understand-
ing of the workings of global value chains is clearly needed before our 
measurement systems will adequately refl ect all of their intricacies.
Notes
A draft version of this chapter was prepared for the conference “Measuring the Effects 
of Globalization,” held February 28–March 1, 2013, in Washington, D.C., and orga-
nized by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. It is a spin-off from the 
work done under the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) project, which was funded 
by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research and Innovation as 
part of the Seventh Framework Programme, Theme 8: Socio-Economic Sciences and 
Humanities, Grant Agreement No. 225 281. We gratefully acknowledge the helpful 
comments we received from the conference participants and in particular from Susan 
Houseman, Michael Mandel, Carol Corrado, Brad Jensen, and Robert Koopman.
1. Additional applications of the GVC income concept and analysis of fragmentation 
can be found in Timmer et al. (2014) and Los, Timmer, and de Vries (2014).
2. This identity does not hold true at the country level, as countries can have cur-
rent account imbalances driving a wedge between value-added produced and fi nal 
consumption value.
3. See Miller and Blair (2009) for an introduction to input-output analysis.
4. Throughout the paper, we analyze fi nal expenditure, including private and govern-
ment consumption, and investment.
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5. Variations of this approach are also used in the burgeoning literature on trade in 
value-added, and our approach is related to the work by Koopman, Wang, and 
Wei (2014) and in particular the work by Johnson and Noguera (2012). But rather 
than using Leontief’s insight to analyze factor content of trade fl ows, we focus on 
analyses of global value distributions.
6. Final use includes consumption by households, government and nonprofi t organi-
zations, and gross capital formation.
7. Because industries also have secondary production, a simple mapping of indus-
tries and products is not feasible.
8. When considering all goods and services produced, the GVC income of a country 
is equal to gross domestic product when fi nal demand for all goods and services 
in the world economy are taken into account. Hence, for a meaningful analysis, 
one has to limit the group of products, and we focus on those products for which 
production processes are most fragmented and which can be analyzed with the 
data at hand.
9. We do not show the value-added by the “Rest of the World,” consisting of all coun-
tries not covered individually in the world input-output database but for which an 
estimate has been made as a group (see Section Three, “The World Input-Output 
Database [WIOD]”). Its share in global GVC income rose from 14 percent in 1995 
to 17 percent in 2008.
10. The euro was introduced in 2001. For the period before 2001, we are referring to 
the Deutsche Mark.
11. Johnson and Noguera (2012) focused on foreign fi nal demand for all goods and 
services, not only on fi nal manufactures as we do here.
12. The share of the natural resource sector in Russia is severely underestimated, since 
part of the oil and gas production is classifi ed under wholesale services rather than 
under mining in the Russian national accounts. Adding the wholesale sector would 
almost double the natural resource share in 2008.
13. We will use the term “jobs” instead of “number of workers” as shorthand. But the 
underlying data pertains to number of workers rather than jobs. Ideally, one would 
like to measure hours worked.
14. It should be noted that these numbers exclude any jobs involved in the retailing 
of manufacturing goods, as we analyze fi nal demand at the basic price concept. 
15. Following this traditional international trade theory, having a greater range of 
comparative advantages across countries would generate higher welfare improve-
ments from trade. These models are essentially comparative, static of nature, and 
they disregard any dynamic effects. In the innovation and business literature, it 
has been recently argued that the separation of high-skilled, innovative activities 
in advanced countries from production in emerging economies will in the long run 
lead to a decline of innovation activity. In this literature, the spillovers from manu-
facturing and innovation activities are central (see, e.g., Pisano and Shih [2012]).
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Global value chains (GVCs) have become a dominant feature of 
today’s global economy. This growing process of international frag-
mentation of production, driven by technological progress, cost, trade 
policy reforms, and access to resources and markets, has challenged 
the conventional wisdom on how we look at and interpret trade and, 
in particular, the policies that we develop around it. Indeed, taken by 
themselves, traditional measures of trade, which record gross fl ows of 
goods and services each and every time they cross borders, may lead 
policymakers to make misguided decisions. 
In practice, two main approaches (micro and macro) have been 
used to shed light on this issue. The former is perhaps best character-
ized by the well-known Apple iPod example (Dedrick, Kraemer, and 
Linden 2010), which showed that of the $144 factory-gate price of an 
iPod dispatched from China, less than 10 percent represented Chinese 
value-added, with the bulk of the components (costing about $100) be-
ing imported from Japan and much of the rest coming from the United 
States and Korea. 
But this stylized approach can generally only be conducted for spe-
cifi c products and, even then, only reveals part of the story related to 
who benefi ts from trade and how GVCs work, as it is typically unable to 
reveal how the intermediate parts are created. For example, the message 
would be signifi cantly different if, for sake of argument, the imported 
parts from Japan used to make the iPod required signifi cant Chinese 
content. To deal with the bigger picture and also to capture all of the 
upstream effects, a number of studies have adopted a macro approach 
based on the construction of intercountry or world input-output tables 
(Daudin, Riffl art, and Schweisguth 2009; Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001; 
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Johnson and Noguera 2012; Koopman et al. 2011). And a number of pi-
oneering initiatives, such as those of the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP), collaborative efforts between the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the Institute of Developing Economies–Japan External 
Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO), and the World Input-Output Data-
base (WIOD), have helped accelerate improvements in the underlying 
statistics used to construct the results.   
But these studies and initiatives have generally been one-off in na-
ture and often require the use of nonoffi cial statistical data. What has 
been lacking thus far has been a systematic attempt to mainstream the 
development of statistics in this area. In response to this need, on March 
15, 2012, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) and WTO joined forces to develop a database of Trade 
in Value-Added (TiVA) indicators and to mainstream their production 
within the international statistics system. The fi rst preliminary results 
from this intiative were released on January 16, 2013, and some high-
lights from this fi rst release are presented in the following sections of 
this chapter. But, as described below, further work is needed (and can be 
done) in order to improve the quality of the estimates produced under 
the “trade in value-added” umbrella.   
Ultimately this chapter acts, in some ways, as a clarion call to statis-
tical agencies to alert them that the world is increasingly interconnected 
and that conventional approaches used to understand how economies 
work can no longer rely solely on national statistics. Increasingly, it is 
necessary to see the whole in order to understand how economies work 
and, for example, how to target and create industrial policies focusing 
on competitiveness (notwithstanding trade policies and the implications 
and importance of trade). National statistics build pictures based on in-
terrelationships between producers and consumers and the rest of the 
world. But these relationships, particularly those with the rest of the 
world, have become increasingly more complex, and, as such, there is 
an increasing need to consider global production within a global ac-
counting framework. This implies a departure from the traditional role 
of international organizations as compilers of internationally compa-
rable national statistics, such as national input-output or supply-use 
tables. Instead, it requires that they bring together these national tables 
to create a global table. 
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The remainder of this chapter describes the policy drivers and 
needs for such a framework, as well as the underlying methodology 
and assumptions used to estimate trade in value-added, before assess-
ing the implications for statistics offi ces, data collection, and national 
input-output tables in particular. It ends by describing longer-term fu-
ture avenues of research.
WHAT IS TRADE IN VALUE-ADDED? 
The “trade in value-added” initiative addresses the double counting 
implicit in current gross fl ows of trade. Instead of using that method, it 
measures fl ows related to the value that is added (labor compensation, 
other taxes on production, and operating surplus, or profi ts) by a coun-
try in the production of any good or service that is exported.
The simple example shown in Figure 6.1, below, illustrates this. 
Country A exports $100 of goods, produced entirely within A, to Coun-
try B, which further processes them before exporting them to Country 
C, where they are consumed. Country B adds value of $10 to the goods 
and so exports $110 to C. Conventional measures of trade show total 
global exports and imports of $210, but only $110 of value-added has 
been generated in their production. Conventional measures also show 
that C has a trade defi cit of $110 with B, and no trade at all with A, de-
spite the fact that A is the chief benefi ciary of C’s consumption. 
Figure 6.1  Exports: Gross and Value-Added Flows, in US$
SOURCE: Author’s composition.
Value-added (100)
Value-added (10)
Gross exports (110)
Gross exports
(intermediates) (100) 
A
  Country
C
  Country
B
  Country
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If instead we track fl ows in value-added, one can recalculate C’s 
trade defi cit with B on the basis of the value-added it “purchases” from 
B as fi nal demand, which reduces its defi cit on this basis to $10, and ap-
ply the same approach to A’s value-added to show C running a defi cit of 
$100 with A. Note that C’s overall trade defi cit with the world remains at 
$110. All that has changed is its bilateral positions. This simple illustra-
tion reveals how output in one country can be affected by consumers in 
another, and by how much. (An example of this is C’s consumers driving 
A’s output.) However, it can also reveal many other important insights 
into global value chains. For example, it shows that B’s exports depend 
signifi cantly on intermediate imports from A, and so reveals that protec-
tionist measures on imports from A could harm its own exporters and 
hence competitiveness. Indeed, by providing information at the level of 
specifi c industries, it is possible to provide insights in other areas, too, 
such as the contribution of the service sector to international trade. 
HOW CAN MEASURES OF TRADE IN VALUE-ADDED
INFORM POLICYMAKING?
Even though the literature on trade in value-added is quite techni-
cal, it has attracted a lot of attention from policymakers. What initially 
seemed a concern for trade statisticians is now understood as a key issue 
for the policy debate. For example, Pascal Lamy, the director-general 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), noted that “the statistical bias 
created by attributing commercial value to the last country of origin 
perverts the true economic dimension of the bilateral trade imbalances. 
This affects the political debate, and leads to misguided perceptions” 
(Lamy 2011). Recently, the French Senate devoted a special seminar to 
the related statistical and policy issues (WTO and Sénat 2011). There 
are a number of areas where measuring trade in value-added terms 
brings a new perspective and is likely to have an impact on policies. 
Seven key areas are described below:
1) Trade, growth, and competitiveness. A better understand-
ing of how much domestic value-added is generated by the 
export of a good or service in a country is crucial for devel-
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opment strategies and industrial policies. Some countries have 
capitalized on GVCs by developing comparative advantages 
in specifi c parts of the value chain. For example, in China, 
many of its exports involve assembly work, where the foreign 
content is high. Access to effi cient imports therefore matters 
as much in a world of international fragmentation as access to 
markets. Conventional gross trade statistics, however, are not 
able to reveal the foreign content of exports, and so there is 
a risk that policies to protect industries where gross statistics 
reveal a comparative advantage may decrease the competitive-
ness of those very same domestic industries. Because of this, 
mercantilist-style “beggar thy neighbor” strategies can turn out 
to be “beggar thyself” miscalculations. 
2) Domestic value-added in imports. Domestic value-added 
is found not only in exports but also in imports: Goods and 
services produced in one domestic industry are intermedi-
ates shipped abroad whose value comes back to the domestic 
economy embodied in the imports of other, and often the same, 
industries. As a consequence, tariffs, nontariff barriers, and 
trade measures—such as antidumping rights—can also affect 
the competitiveness of domestic upstream producers (as well 
as the competitiveness of downstream producers, as mentioned 
above), in addition to foreign producers. For example, a study 
on the European shoe industry undertaken by the Swedish 
National Board of Trade highlights that shoes “manufactured 
in Asia” incorporate between 50 and 80 percent of European 
Union (EU) value-added. In 2006, antidumping rights were in-
troduced by the European Commission on shoes imported from 
China and Vietnam. An analysis in value-added terms would 
have revealed that EU value-added was in fact subject to the 
antidumping rights (Isakson and Verrips 2012). 
3) Improving competitiveness in upstream domestic industries 
can boost exports. Looking at trade from a value-added per-
spective is also a way to better reveal how upstream domestic 
industries contribute to exports, even if those same industries 
have little direct international exposure. Gross trade statistics, 
for example, reveal that less than one-quarter of total global 
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trade is in services. But in value-added terms the share is signif-
icantly higher. Goods industries require signifi cant intermediate 
inputs of services, both from foreign and also from domestic 
suppliers. Looking at trade in value-added terms therefore can 
reveal that policies to encourage services trade liberalization 
and more foreign direct investment (and so policies designed 
to improve access to more effi cient services) can improve the 
export competitiveness of goods industries. 
4) Global imbalances. Accounting for trade in value-added 
(specifi cally accounting for trade in intermediate parts and 
components), and taking into account “trade in tasks,” does not 
change the overall trade balance of a country with the rest of the 
world—rather, it redistributes the surpluses and defi cits across 
partner countries. When bilateral trade balances are measured 
in gross terms, the defi cit with fi nal goods producers (or the 
surplus of exporters of fi nal products) is exaggerated because it 
incorporates the value of foreign inputs. The underlying imbal-
ance is in fact with the countries who supplied inputs to the fi nal 
producer. As pressure for rebalancing increases in the context of 
persistent defi cits, there is a risk of protectionist responses that 
target countries at the end of global value chains on the basis of 
an inaccurate perception of the origin of trade imbalances. As 
shown in the section starting on p. 172, the preliminary results 
from the OECD-WTO database point to signifi cant changes. 
5) The impact of macroeconomic shocks. The 2008–2009 fi nan-
cial crisis was characterized by a synchronized trade collapse 
in all economies. Authors have discussed the role of global sup-
ply chains in the transmission of what was initially a shock on 
demand in markets affected by a credit shortage. In particular, 
the literature has emphasized the “bullwhip effect” of GVCs 
(Escaith, Lindenberg, and Miroudot 2010; Lee, Padmanabhan, 
and Whang 1997). When there is a sudden drop in demand, 
fi rms delay orders and run down inventories, with the conse-
quence that the fall in demand is amplifi ed along the supply 
chain and can translate into a standstill for companies located 
upstream. A better understanding of value-added trade fl ows 
would provide tools for policymakers to anticipate the impact 
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of macroeconomic shocks and adopt the right policy responses. 
Any analysis of the impact of trade on short-term demand is 
likely to be biased when looking only at gross trade fl ows. This 
was recently demonstrated in the aftermath of the natural disas-
ter that hit Japan in March 2011.1
6) Trade and employment. Several studies on the impact of 
trade liberalization on labor markets try to estimate the “job 
content” of trade. Such analysis is only relevant if one looks at 
the value-added of trade. What the value-added fi gures can tell 
us is where exactly jobs are created. Decomposing the value of 
imports into the contribution of each economy (including the 
domestic one) can give an idea of who benefi ts from trade. The 
EU shoe industry example given above can be interpreted in 
terms of jobs. Traditional thinking in gross terms would regard 
imports of shoes manufactured in China and Vietnam by EU 
shoe retailers as EU jobs lost and transferred to these coun-
tries. But in value-added terms, one would have to account for 
the EU value-added, and while workers may have indeed lost 
their jobs in the EU at the assembly stage, value-added-based 
measures would have highlighted the important contribution 
made by those working in the research, development, design, 
and marketing activities that exist because of trade (and the fact 
that this fragmented production process keeps costs low and 
EU companies competitive). When comparative advantages 
apply to “tasks” rather than to “fi nal products,” the skill com-
position of labor embedded in the domestic content of exports 
refl ects the relative development level of participating coun-
tries. Industrialized countries tend to specialize in high-skilled 
tasks, which are better paid and capture a larger share of the to-
tal value added. A WTO and IDE-JETRO study on global value 
chains in East Asia shows that China specializes in low-skilled 
types of jobs. Japan, on the other hand, has been focusing on 
export activities intensive in medium- and high-skilled labor 
while importing goods produced by low-skilled workers. The 
study also shows that in 2006 the Republic of Korea was adopt-
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ing a middle-ground position but was also moving closer to the 
pattern found in Japan (WTO and IDE-JETRO 2011).
7) Trade and the environment. Another area where the mea-
surement of trade fl ows in value-added terms would support 
policymaking is in the assessment of the environmental im-
pact of trade. For example, concerns over greenhouse gas 
emissions and their potential role in climate change have trig-
gered research on how trade openness affects CO2 emissions. 
The unbundling of production and consumption and the inter-
national fragmentation of production require a value-added 
view of trade to understand where imported goods are pro-
duced (and hence where CO2 is produced as a consequence of 
trade). Various OECD studies note that the relocation of in-
dustrial activities can have a signifi cant impact on differences 
in consumption-based and production-based measures of CO2 
emissions (Ahmad and Wyckoff 2003; Nakano et al. 2009). 
EARLY EVIDENCE FROM THE OECD-WTO DATABASE
Currently, the database is based on a global input-output table that 
brings together national input-output tables for 57 economies, com-
bined with bilateral trade data on goods and services broken down into 
37 industries aggregated from a 48-industry list (see Table 6.1). The fol-
lowing provides an overview of the key messages provided by the data.2
Exports Require Imports
The data reveal that the import content of exports—the share of 
value added by the export of a given product that originates abroad—is 
signifi cant in all countries for which data are presented (40 at the time 
of this writing: all 34 OECD countries, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, 
the Russian Federation, and South Africa—see Figure 6.2). 
Typically, the larger a country, the lower the overall foreign content; 
this refl ects, in part, scale and cost. But a number of smaller economies 
also have relatively low foreign content in their exports, such as Aus-
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Table 6.1  OECD Input-Output Industry Classifi cation and Concordance 
with ISIC
ISIC Rev. 3 code Description
1 + 2 + 5 1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fi shing
10 + 11 + 12 2 Mining and quarrying (energy)
13 + 14 3 Mining and quarrying (nonenergy)
15 + 16 4 Food products, beverages, and tobacco
17 + 18 + 19 5 Textiles, textile products, leather, and footwear
20 6 Wood and products of wood and cork
21 + 22 7 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing, and publishing
23 8 Coke, refi ned petroleum products, and nuclear fuel
24ex2423 9 Chemicals, excluding pharmaceuticals
2423 10 Pharmaceuticals
25 11 Rubber and plastics products
26 12 Other nonmetallic mineral products
271 + 2731 13 Iron and steel
272 + 2732 14 Nonferrous metals
28 15 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equip.
29 16 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
30 17 Offi ce, accounting and computing machinery
31 18 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.
32 19 Radio, television, and communication equipment
33 20 Medical, precision, and optical instruments
34 21 Motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers
351 22 Building and repairing of ships and boats
353 23 Aircraft and spacecraft
352 + 359 24 Railroad equipment and transport equipment, n.e.c.
36 + 37 25 Manufacturing, n.e.c.; recycling (including furniture)
401 26 Production, collection, and distribution of electricity
402 27 Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels 
through mains
403 28 Steam and hot water supply
41 29 Collection, purifi cation, and distribution of water
45 30 Construction
50 + 51 + 52 31 Wholesale and retail trade; repairs
55 32 Hotels and restaurants
60 33 Land transport; transport via pipelines
61 34 Water transport
(continued)
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tralia, Chile, and Norway. This can be explained by their high share of 
exports of natural resource goods, such as ores, oil, and copper, which 
have, not surprisingly, a low foreign content. Geography also plays a 
role; this helps to explain New Zealand’s relatively low ratio, as well as 
its relatively high dependency on agricultural exports, which also have 
a low foreign content. For midsize economies, however, particularly 
those in Eastern Europe, the norm is that around one-third of the value 
of exports refl ects foreign content. 
Notwithstanding some of the interpretative caveats above, the ra-
tio is perhaps the single most digestible indicator of the propensity of 
a country to engage in global value chains. It reveals the existence of 
European, Asian, and North American production hubs and also the 
signifi cant dependency many countries have on imports to generate 
exports. In Mexico, with its maquiladoras, and in China, with its pro-
cessors/assemblers, about one-third of overall exports refl ect foreign 
content (and, as described below, these are considered to be conserva-
tive estimates).           
NOTE: “n.e.c.” stands for “not elsewhere classifi ed.”
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
ISIC Rev. 3 code Description
62 35 Air transport
63 36 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities 
of travel agencies
64 37 Post and telecommunications
65 + 66 + 67 38 Finance and insurance
70 39 Real estate activities
71 40 Renting of machinery and equipment
72 41 Computer and related activities
73 42 Research and development
74 43 Other business activities
75 44 Public administration and defense; compulsory social 
security
80 45 Education
85 46 Health and social work
90–93 47 Other community, social, and personal services
95 + 99 48 Private households and extraterritorial organizations
Table 6.1  (continued)
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Some care is needed in interpreting the results, however: 2009 
was an exceptional year, the year that signifi ed perhaps the nadir of 
the recent fi nancial crisis. As such, it was partly characterized by an 
unprecedented slowdown in global trade. Although the database only 
provides data as far back as 2005, illustrative data going back to 1995 
suggest that international fragmentation of production (in other words, 
the import content of exports) had been steadily rising in most countries 
over recent decades, which continued over the period 2005–2008 (Fig-
ure 6.3), despite the slowdown that began in many countries in 2008. 
But 2009 saw drops in the import content of exports, an indication that 
the greater the fragmentation of a good or service, the more likely it was 
to be affected by the synchronized slowdown in trade. In most coun-
tries, therefore, the import content of overall exports in 2009 returned 
to around the ratios seen in 2005, but in China the data point to a steady 
rise over the period, suggesting developments that saw China begin to 
move up the value-added chain.   
Figure 6.2  Domestic Content of Exports: Percentage of Total Gross 
Exports Represented by Domestic Value-Added Exports, 2009
SOURCE: OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) indicators, preliminary results 
from OECD, January 2013, http://stats.oecd.org.
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Tangible evidence of the scale of global value chains emerges more 
clearly when considering specifi c sectors. For example, between one-
third and one-half of the total value of exports of transport parts and 
equipment by most major producers originated abroad in 2009 (Figure 
6.4), driven by regional production hubs. In the United States and Ja-
pan, the shares were only about one-fi fth, refl ecting the larger scope 
in those countries of source inputs from domestic providers. However, 
this was also the case for Italy, and there it may have refl ected effi cient 
upstream domestic networks of small and medium enterprises. Interest-
ingly, in 2009, Germany exported 25 percent more transport parts and 
equipment output than the United States in gross terms but only 5 per-
cent more in value-added terms.
 Similar patterns emerge in other sectors with a high degree of inter-
national fragmentation. For example, in China and Korea, in 2009, the 
Figure 6.3  Domestic Content of Exports: Percentage of Total Gross 
Exports Represented by Domestic Value-Added Exports, 
2005, 2008, and 2009
SOURCE: OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) indicators, preliminary results, 
OECD, January 2013. 
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Figure 6.4  Transport Equipment, Gross Exports Decomposed by Source, 
2009 (billions of US$)
SOURCE: OECD-WTO TiVA indicators, preliminary results, OECD, January 2013.
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Figure 6.5  Electronic Equipment, Gross Exports Decomposed by Source, 
2009 (billions of US$)
SOURCE: OECD-WTO TiVA indicators, preliminary results, OECD, January 2013.
0
100
200
300
400
500
$U
S 
bi
lli
on
s
Foreign content
Domestic content
B
ill
io
ns
 o
f U
S$
B
ill
io
ns
 o
f U
S$
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   177 2/16/2015   8:39:48 AM
178   Ahmad
foreign content of exports of electronic products was about 40 percent, 
and in Mexico, the share was over 60 percent (Figure 6.5).
High Shares of Intermediate Imports Are Used to Serve
Export Markets
The fi gures above reveal that exporting fi rms require access to ef-
fi cient imports in order to be competitive, and so highlight the potential 
counterproductive effects of protectionist measures. But an alternative 
way of indicating the adverse effects of such policies can be seen when 
looking at the overall share of intermediate imports that are used to 
serve export markets.
In most economies, around one-third of intermediate imports are 
destined for the export market. Not surprisingly, typically, the smaller 
the economy the higher the share, but even in the United States and 
Japan these shares are 15 and 20 percent, respectively, at the total econ-
omy level, with a higher incidence of intermediate imports in some 
Figure 6.6  Intermediate Imports Embodied in Exports: Percentage of 
Total Intermediate Imports, 2009
SOURCE: OECD-WTO TiVA indicators, preliminary results, OECD, January 2013.
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highly integrated industries (Figure 6.6). In Japan, for example, nearly 
40 percent of all intermediate imports of transport equipment end up in 
exports. 
In many other countries, the share of intermediate imports em-
bodied in exports is signifi cantly higher. In Hungary, two-thirds of all 
intermediate imports are destined for the export market after further 
processing, and the share reaches 90 percent for electronic intermediate 
imports. In China, Korea, and Mexico, around three-quarters of all in-
termediate imports of electronics are embodied in exports. The database 
also shows that close to 85 percent of China’s intermediate imports of 
textile products end up in exports. 
Open and Effi cient Service Markets Matter
Services make up about two-thirds of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in most developed economies, but in gross terms, trade in ser-
vices typically accounts for less than one-quarter of their exports This 
partly refl ects the fact that signifi cant shares of services output are gen-
erally not tradable—e.g., government services, many personal services, 
and imputations such as those made in GDP calculations to refl ect the 
rent homeowners are assumed to pay themselves (between 6 and 10 
percent of GDP in most developed economies). But it also refl ects the 
fact that the service sector provides signifi cant intermediate inputs to 
domestic goods manufacturers.
Accounting for the value-added produced by the service sector in 
the production of goods shows that the service content of total gross 
exports is over 50 percent in many OECD economies, and it approaches 
two-thirds of the total in the United Kingdom (Figure 6.7). Canada, 
because of its signifi cant exports of natural resources, which typically 
have low service content, has the lowest service content of its exports in 
the G7—but even here the share is close to 40 percent. 
Typically, emerging economies and other large exporters of natural 
assets, such as Norway, Chile, and Australia, have the lowest shares 
of services. But in India, over half of the value of its gross exports 
originates in the service sector. Indonesia has the lowest share of the 40 
countries in the database at around 20 percent. 
Part of the explanation for the difference between OECD countries 
and emerging economies can be found in the relatively higher degree of 
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(largely domestic) outsourcing of services by manufacturers in OECD 
countries in recent decades, suggesting that a similar process could lead 
to improvements in the competitiveness of emerging economy man-
ufacturers. Figure 6.7 also reveals a not insignifi cant contribution to 
exports coming from foreign service providers.
Another, perhaps clearer way of illustrating the importance of ser-
vices to exports is to consider the services content of specifi c exports in 
goods-producing sectors. Figure 6.8 takes an average of all 40 countries 
in the database and shows that services make a signifi cant contribution 
(typically one-third) across all manufacturing sectors, with signifi cant 
shares provided by both foreign and domestic service providers. For 
individual sectors in specifi c countries the importance of the service 
sector is often starker. In France, for example, the data reveal that over 
half of the domestic value-added generated in producing transport 
equipment originates in the French service sector.
Figure 6.7  Services Value-Added: Percentage of Total Exports, 2009
SOURCE: OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) indicators, preliminary results, 
OECD, January 2013.
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Intermediate Imports Often Embody a Country’s Own (Returned) 
Domestic Value-Added 
Imports can also contain “returned” value-added, which is value-
added that originated in the importing country. The preliminary—and, 
one should stress, conservative—estimates in the OECD-WTO database 
show that in the United States, for example, nearly 5 percent of the total 
value of imported intermediate goods refl ects U.S. value-added, and in 
China the equivalent shares are close to 7 percent. For electronic goods, 
Chinese intermediate imports contain over 12 percent of returned Chi-
nese domestic value-added, and Korean intermediate imports contain 
close to 5 percent of returned Korean domestic value-added.
Figure 6.8  Services Value-Added: Percentage of Total Exports of Goods, 
2009
NOTE: “n.e.c.” stands for “not elsewhere classifi ed.”
SOURCE: OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) indicators, preliminary results, 
OECD, January 2013.
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What You See Is Not What You Get: Trade Patterns Change  
Bilateral trade balance positions can change signifi cantly when 
measured in value-added terms, even though the total trade balance is 
unaffected. Figure 6.9 shows that China’s bilateral trade surplus with 
the United States was over US$40 billion (25 percent) smaller in value-
added terms in 2009. (It was 30 percent smaller in 2005.) This partly 
refl ects the higher share of U.S. value-added imports in Chinese fi nal 
demand but also the fact that a signifi cant share (one-third) of China’s 
exports refl ects foreign content—the “Factory Asia” phenomenon. The 
data illustrate that signifi cant exports of value-added from Korea and 
Japan pass through China on their way to fi nal consumers, resulting 
in signifi cantly smaller Chinese trade defi cits with these countries but 
also typically higher Japanese and Korean trade surpluses with other 
countries. Similarly, the database shows that Korea’s signifi cant trade 
Figure 6.9  Difference between China’s Value-Added and Gross Trade 
Balances, 2009 (billions of US$)
SOURCE: OECD-WTO TiVA indicators, preliminary results, OECD, January 2013. 
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defi cit with Japan in gross terms almost disappears when measured in 
value-added terms.
ESTIMATING TRADE IN VALUE-ADDED 
Creating a Multiregional Input-Output Table
As mentioned above, several initiatives have tried to address the 
issue of the measurement of trade fl ows in the context of the fragmen-
tation of world production.3 The most commonly used approach to 
develop a macro picture is based on global input-output tables, using 
simple standard Leontief inverses. More detail can be found in a joint 
report by the OECD and WTO (2012) and in an online appendix to this 
chapter, “Appendix 6A: Indicator Descriptions and Defi nitions,” which 
can be found at http://www.upjohn.org/MEG/ahmad-appendix.pdf.    
Constructing a global table is a data-intensive process and pres-
ents numerous challenges. The key challenge is to identify and create 
links between exports in one country and the purchasing industries (as 
intermediate consumers) or fi nal-demand consumers in the importing 
country. In this respect, it is important to note that the data issues faced 
by the OECD are similar to those confronted by other initiatives, such 
as IDE-JETRO (which has produced intercountry input-output tables 
for Asia) or the World Input-Output Database project, with whom 
(along with the U.S. International Trade Commission) the OECD and 
WTO have been actively coordinating in order to share experiences and 
derive a set of best practices. 
The data sources at OECD are harmonized input-output tables and 
bilateral trade coeffi cients in goods and services, derived from offi cial 
sources.4 The model specifi cation and estimation procedures can be 
summarized as follows:
• Preparation of input-output (I-O) tables for reference years, 
using the latest published data sources—e.g., supply-and-use 
tables, national accounts, and trade statistics.
• Preparation of bilateral merchandise data by end-use categories 
for reference years. The published trade statistics are adjusted 
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for analytical purposes (such as confi dential fl ows, reexports, 
waste and scrap products, and valuables). Trade coeffi cients 
of utility services are estimated based on cross-border energy 
transfers. Other trade coeffi cients of service sectors are based 
on the OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services and 
the United Nations (UN) Service Trade statistics. However, 
many missing fl ows are currently estimated using econometric 
model estimates.
• Conversion of “cost, insurance, and freight” (CIF) price-based 
import fi gures to “free on board” (FOB) price-based imports 
to reduce the inconsistency issues of mirror trade. (Because of 
asymmetry in reporting exports and imports in national trade 
statistics, imports of Country A from Country B often differ 
signifi cantly from the exports reported from Country B to 
Country A). In an international I-O system, trade fl ows need to 
be perfectly symmetrical (i.e., the bilateral trade fl ows should 
be consistent at the highest relevant level of disaggregation) 
and consistent with the supply-utilization tables’ trade data.
• Creation of import matrices.
• Total adjustment (missing sectors, trade with rest of the world, 
and other factors) and minimization of discrepancy columns 
using biproportional methods.
The OECD has been updating and maintaining harmonized I-O 
tables—that is, splitting intermediate fl ows into tables of domestic ori-
gin and imports—since the mid-1990s. Usually this process follows the 
rhythm of national releases of benchmark I-O tables. The fi rst edition 
of the OECD Input-Output Database came out in 1995. It covered 10 
OECD countries, and its I-O tables spanned the period from the early 
1970s to the early 1990s. The fi rst updated edition of this database, re-
leased in 2002, increased the country coverage to 18 OECD countries, 
China, and Brazil, and introduced harmonized tables for the mid-1990s. 
The database now includes national I-O tables for 34 OECD member 
countries and 18 non-OECD countries.5
The I-O tables show transactions between domestic industries but, 
as a complement, also include supplementary tables, which break down 
total imports by user (industry and category of fi nal demand). Some 
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countries provide these import tables in conjunction with their I-O ta-
bles, but in other cases they are derived from calculations by the OECD.
The OECD’s input-output tables are based on an industry-by-
industry basis, refl ecting the fact that the underlying source data mea-
sure both the activities and production of industries. This means that the 
relationships between value-added and industrial output are unaffected 
by the statistical manipulations that will be required to build product-
by-product-based input-output tables. The industry classifi cation used 
in the current version of OECD’s I-O database is based on the Inter-
national Standard Industrial Classifi cation of All Economic Activities, 
Revision 3 (ISIC Rev. 3) (Table 6.1), meaning that it is compatible 
with other industry-based analytical data sets, and in particular with 
the OECD bilateral trade in goods by industry data set (derived from 
merchandise trade statistics through the standard Harmonized System 
to ISIC conversion keys). The system, by necessity (in other words, to 
maximize cross-country comparability), is relatively aggregated. 
Differentiating between types of companies within a given sector is es-
sential, however, to improve the quality of trade in value-added results 
(particularly in the context of exporting and nonexporting companies), 
and so part of future work will be to explore ways to do this, using mi-
crodata that could improve the quality of results (which is discussed in 
more detail in the following section).
In essence, a global I-O table is little different from a national 
I-O table except that while the matrix of fl ows of intermediate goods 
and services in a national table can be industry × industry, in a global 
I-O table, the rows and columns are country-industry combinations. 
In addition, in a global I-O table there are separate columns for each 
country’s fi nal demand. For illustration, Table 6.2 shows a two-country, 
two-sector representation.
Most of the components intuitively follow from the row and column 
headings, but by way of explanation, Z12AB  = intermediate purchase by 
Sector 2 of Country B from Sector 1 of Country A; F1AB = fi nal demand 
of consumers in Country B of output of Sector 1 in Country A. 
Typically in the above matrix, statistics offi ces are able to provide 
most of the blocks required (recalling that supply-use tables can be 
readily converted to the above format and, moreover, that the above 
format can be initially constructed as a global supply-use table, which 
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Table 6.2  A Simplifi ed ICIO System
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
Country A Country B Final demand
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 Country A Country B
Country A
Sector 1: Goods Z11
AA Z12
AA Z11
AB Z12
AB F1
AA F1
AB
Sector 2: Services Z21
AA Z22
AA Z21
AB Z22
AB F2
AA F2AB
Country B
Sector 1: Goods Z11
BA Z12
BA Z11
BB Z12
BB F1
BA F1
BB
Sector 2: Services Z21
BA Z22
BA Z21
BB Z22
BB F2BA F2
BB
Tax less subsidy on products NTZ1
A NTZ2
A NTZ1B NTZ2
B NTFA NTFB
International trade margin and insurance TIZ1
A TIZ2
A TIZ1
B TIZ2
B TIFA TIFB
Value-added
Labor compensation VL1
A VL2
A VL1
B VL2
B
Operating surplus VO1
A VO2
A VO1
B VO2
B
Tax less subsidy on production VT1
A VT2
A VT1
B VT2
B
Output X1
A X2
A X1
B X2
B
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will form the long-term approach to be used by the OECD). But even 
though some countries are able to estimate the overall import of a given 
product used by a particular industry, many are not, and none are able to 
show, systematically, the source of that import (by originating country 
and industry) by the using industry (or “fi nal demand” category). 
Central to the construction of a global input-output table, there-
fore, is the estimation of trade fl ows between industries and consumers 
across countries. Indeed, these trade fl ows in intermediate goods and 
services are the glue that binds together the national individual input-
output tables. A positive spin-off of the work is worth mentioning in this 
context. National estimates of trade (exports and imports) are not coher-
ent across countries, even after adjusting for price differences, CIF, and 
FOB. The process of constructing a global I-O table confronts this issue 
head-on. The spin-off to the work is therefore a mechanism to reveal 
where global imbalances lie. The results and policy implications of the 
work highlight the importance that should be attached to reconciling 
these fl ows at the national level. Over the coming years, this will form 
an important part of the OECD’s work program, through its Working 
Party on Trade in Goods and Services. 
Bilateral trade in goods and services and I-O balancing
Given the fact that many imports enter countries through interme-
diaries (wholesalers), it is highly unlikely that countries will ever be 
able to collect statistics that systematically show the country source 
of all imports consumed by all industries, nor does it seem likely that 
countries will be able to show which foreign industries consume their 
products. But, as shown below, it is possible, at least in the medium 
term, for countries to do more in this fi eld by capitalizing on microdata 
and links between trade and business registers.
In the short term, however, more can be—and is being—done to 
improve how imports are allocated to using industries. Most countries 
are able to produce estimates of bilateral trade in goods and services 
showing the export of a given good or service to a given partner coun-
try. And indeed, most countries are able to further reveal whether any 
particular import or export of a good (at least, for most imports and 
exports) was intermediate, an investment, or a consumer good. 
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In constructing the import (and export) fl ows of its global I-O table, 
the OECD necessarily uses a number of assumptions. The main as-
sumption used in creating these import matrices is the “proportionality” 
assumption, which assumes that the country-of-origin share of a given 
import consumed by a given industry in a given country is the same for 
all industries in that country. For countries that are not able to provide 
any “import-fl ow” matrices at all—i.e., the intermediate consumption 
of imports by origin and destination industries—the OECD necessar-
ily assumes that the share of intermediate imports in total intermediate 
consumption for a given imported product is the same for all using 
industries. Furthermore, the OECD assumes that this share is equiva-
lent to the overall share of intermediate imports to total intermediates 
supplied for that product. In all cases, the OECD has been able to sig-
nifi cantly improve the quality of the assumptions it necessarily uses by 
creating a new database of bilateral trade (for goods) that breaks down 
imports (and exports) on the basis of the nature of the traded product 
(intermediate, household, investment, other). This database is called the 
Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and End-Use category (BTDIxE), 
and is derived from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) UN 
Comtrade database, where values and quantities of imports and exports 
are compiled according to product classifi cations and by partner.6
UN Comtrade data are classifi ed by declaring country (the country 
supplying the information), by partner country (the origin of imports 
or destination of exports), and by product (according to Harmonized 
System, or HS). Trade fl ows are stored according to the product clas-
sifi cation used by the declaring country at the time of data collection. In 
general, source data are held according to Standard International Trade 
Classifi cation (SITC) Revision 2 ( Rev. 2) for the time period 1978–
1987, the Harmonized System (1988) for 1988–1995, HS Rev. 1 (1996) 
for 1996–2001, HS Rev. 2 (2002) for 2002–2006, and HS Rev. 3 (2007) 
from 2007 onwards.
To generate estimates of trade in goods by industry and by end-use 
category, six-digit product codes from each version of HS from UN 
Comtrade are assigned to a unique ISIC Rev. 3 industry and a unique 
end-use category—and hence, assigned to a basic class of goods as 
specifi ed in the System of National Accounts (SNA) (European Com-
mission et al. 2009; see Table 6.3). 
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Notwithstanding the known problems relating to the asymmetries 
that exist within bilateral trade statistics (i.e., global exports do not equal 
global imports), these bilateral statistics form the basis for populating 
the international fl ows in goods used in the OECD’s global input-output 
tables, before balancing.
The approach used for bilateral trade in services statistics is in es-
sence similar: Estimates based on offi cial bilateral statistics form the 
basis for the original estimates of exports and imports by country. How-
ever, the quality of bilateral trade in services statistics is notoriously 
poor, and so the original partner-share coeffi cients used to populate 
I-O cells of international trade in services are based on gravity model 
techniques (see Miroudot, Lanz, and Ragoussis 2009), which are sub-
sequently balanced within the overall system. 
Only very few countries have a consistency between bilateral trade 
fl ows (imports and exports) by partner country and the corresponding 
fl ows shown in their supply-use tables (the basis for the creation of 
national I-O tables), refl ecting the fact that, for goods at least, bilat-
eral trade fl ows follow merchandise trade accounting standards. As 
such, there are a number of recommendations that follow for offi cial 
statisticians: 
Coherent bilateral trade and national accounts data. Produc-
ing bilateral trade fl ows that are consistent with underlying supply-use 
tables should form a high priority of national statistics offi ces. 
Confi dential trade. In some countries, disclosure rules suppress 
six-digit HS components in UN Comtrade and also higher two-digit 
HS chapter levels. This should be avoided where possible by adopting 
other forms of preserving confi dentiality, such as suppressing another 
six-digit category.
Reexports. Adjustments are required for reexports—and, for major 
continental trading hubs, these adjustments can be signifi cant. Suffi -
cient data are available to adjust for reported trade between China and 
the rest of the world via Hong Kong, but not currently for other major 
hubs such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Singapore.
Identifying used capital goods. HS codes, and thus reported trade 
in UN Comtrade, cannot differentiate between new and old capital 
goods (such as secondhand aircraft and ships). Estimating international 
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Table 6.3  Current BEC and SNA Classes of Goods 
End-use
Final-demand goods
Product characteristics Intermediate Household consumption Industrial capital goods Other
Primary products Food and beverages (111) Food and beverages (112)
Industrial supplies (21)
Fuels and lubricants (31)
Processed unfi nished Fuels and lubricants (32) Fuels and lubricants (32)
Industrial supplies (22) Food and beverages (122)
Parts and components of 
transport equipment (53)
Parts and components of 
capital goods (42)
Processed fi nished Packed medicaments 
(part of 63)
Packed medicaments (part of 63) Capital goods (41)
Nonindustrial transport equipment 
(522)
Industrial transport equipment (521)
Nondurable consumer goods (63)
Semidurable consumer goods (62)
Durable consumer goods for 
households (61)
Durable personal consumer goods, 
e.g., personal computers (part of 61)
Durable personal consumer goods, 
e.g., personal computers (part of 61)
Mobile phones (part of 41) Mobile phones (part of 41)
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NOTE: Numbers are in Broad Economic Categories (BEC) codes. “SNA” stands for “System of National Accounts.” “n.e.c.” stands for 
“not elsewhere classifi ed.”
SOURCE: United Nations Statistics Division (2013). 
Passenger motor cars (51) Passenger motor cars (51)
Fixed-line phones (part of 62) Fixed-line phones (part of 62)
Other Goods 
n.e.c. (7)
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trade in these fl ows in a value-added context requires an elaboration 
on the input-output framework that allows these fl ows to be recorded 
in a way that aligns with total global value-added produced in a given 
period.
Unidentifi ed scrap and waste. Certain types of waste and scrap 
do not have separate six-digit HS codes—e.g., PCs and other electrical 
equipment exported (often to developing countries) for recycling.
Better services data. Moreover, for services, countries are encour-
aged to provide more detail on partner countries and also on the type of 
products (following EBOPS 2010).7
Coherent international trade data. Greater efforts are needed to 
reconcile asymmetries in international trade fl ows. 
Without the issues outlined above being resolved, the OECD’s 
global input-output table must necessarily balance global discrepan-
cies in trade using a quasi automatic (RAS) balancing procedure. This 
process constrains each country’s exports and imports to published 
national accounts totals, while also constraining estimates of national 
GDP. Resolving these asymmetries in bilateral trade statistics is a work 
in progress, and efforts to improve the nature of the balancing process 
are ongoing (Ahmad, Wang, and Yamano 2013).
Given the assumptions and balancing adjustments necessarily used, 
it is important to stress that the indicators shown in the database are 
estimates. Offi cial gross statistics on international trade produced by 
national statistics institutions result in inconsistent fi gures for total 
global exports and total global imports, inconsistencies that are magni-
fi ed when bilateral partner country positions are considered. The global 
input-output tables from which trade in value-added indicators are de-
rived necessarily eliminate these inconsistencies, such as those that 
refl ect different national treatments of reexports and transit trade (e.g., 
going through hubs such as the Netherlands), to achieve a coherent pic-
ture of global trade. For the countries for which data are presented, 
total exports and imports are consistent with offi cial national accounts 
estimates. 
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   192 2/16/2015   8:39:56 AM
Measuring Trade in Value-Added and Beyond   193
Level of detail in national supply-use and input-output (I-O)
tables—future improvements
Indicators created by input-output techniques are limited by the de-
gree of industry disaggregation that the tables provide. The national 
input-output tables used by the OECD are based on a harmonized set 
of 37 industries. In simple terms, therefore, any given indicator for a 
particular industry assumes that all consumers of that industry’s output 
purchase exactly the same shares of products produced by all of the 
fi rms allocated to that industry. 
In practice, this boils down to (but is not the same thing as) assum-
ing that there exists only one single production technique for all of the 
fi rms (and all of the products) in the industry grouping. We know that 
this is not true and that different fi rms, even those producing the same 
products, will have different production techniques (and so technical 
I-O coeffi cients), and we also know that different fi rms produce differ-
ent products and that these products will be destined for different types 
of consumers and markets.
Of chief concern in this respect is the evidence that points to exports 
having very different coeffi cients from the coeffi cients of goods and 
services produced for domestic markets, particularly when the exports 
(typically intermediate) are produced by foreign-owned affi liates in a 
global value chain. Because exporting fi rms are generally more inte-
grated into value-added chains, they will typically have higher foreign 
content ratios, particularly when they are foreign-owned. Generally, 
therefore, an ability to account for this heterogeneity in producing trade 
in value-added estimates will result in lower shares of foreign con-
tent than might be recorded if more detailed input-output tables were 
available. 
It is important to note, however, that more detail does not nec-
essarily translate into more disaggregated industries. What matters 
for developing indicators on GVCs is more detail on fi rms  trad-
ing internationally. In this sense, given a choice between doubling 
the number of industries available within current national I-O or 
supply-and-use tables or providing a split of existing industries into one 
group of exporting fi rms and another of nonexporting fi rms, the latter 
may, arguably, be preferable. 
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Ideally, therefore, countries should attempt to construct supply-use 
or input-output tables that better respond to the challenges presented by 
GVCs. In a project coordinated by the OECD and the Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce (the latter in collaboration with the Chinese National Bu-
reau of Statistics), an input-output table for China was created that split 
all of its industrial sectors into three categories: 1) processing fi rms, 2) 
other exporting fi rms, and 3) all other fi rms (Cuihong et al 2013). 
 Ideally, countries could adopt similar approaches in construct-
ing their I-O or supply-and-use tables, using splits based on national 
circumstances. Processing fi rms form a signifi cant part of China’s ex-
porters, so such a classifi cation made sense in the case of China, but 
this may not be optimal for all countries. For most countries, achieving 
changes to national I-O or supply-and-use tables may take some time. 
Other, potentially simpler, approaches, however, could be used to 
signifi cantly improve the quality of the information I-O tables are able 
to produce for analyzing GVCs. 
In October 2012, the OECD and Eurostat launched one such ap-
proach by building on the OECD-Eurostat Trade by Enterprise 
Characteristics (TEC) data collection. The TEC exercise collects infor-
mation on the turnover generated through exports broken down by size 
class, industry, and partner country. For imports, similar information is 
provided but with a more limited breakdown on the importing industry. 
But these indicators only begin to scratch the surface of the potential, 
if researchers can make links to structural business statistics (Ahmad 
et al. 2011). With these further links, they can create information on 
the direct value-added of exporting fi rms, as well as information on 
employment. In addition, they can create indicators broken down by 
whether the fi rms are foreign or domestically owned, an important ad-
ditional breakdown required for analyses of “trade in income.” (This 
topic of trade in income is further addressed under the subsection head-
ing of that name, below.) Moreover, information that links the data on 
importing fi rms with those on exporting fi rms can provide vital insights 
into the nature of global production chains. Importantly, for those coun-
tries that already produce TEC statistics, researchers could develop this 
information without necessarily using links to structural business statis-
tics, although they would have to do so on the basis of turnover fl ows. 
This information could form the basis for disaggregating I-O or supply-
and-use industries into characteristics required to better measure GVCs. 
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The questionnaire that was circulated to test the feasible and practi-
cal level of detail that could be collected, bearing in mind disclosure 
rules, focused only on export intensities (rather than on import intensi-
ties, where it was recognized that other steps would need to precede 
development of a questionnaire on that aspect). The primary purpose of 
the questionnaire was to categorize fi rms on the basis of their share of 
output generated by exports (i.e., export intensities). The form provided 
for three different levels of breakdown; it asked countries to use the 
level of breakdown that best suited their disclosure rules and resources:
1) Firms that export (i.e., more than 0 percent of output is made up 
by exports) and fi rms that don’t (0 percent of output is exported).
2) A breakdown of fi rms by export-intensity quartiles, with a sepa-
rate category for nonexporting fi rms: 0 percent, between >0 and 
25 percent, between >25 and 50 percent, between >50 and 75 
percent, and greater than 75 percent. 
3) A more aggregated breakdown of export intensity into three cat-
egories: a) nonexporting fi rms, b) fi rms with exports between >0 
and 50 percent, and c) fi rms with exports greater than 50 percent. 
Seven variables, described below, were requested in the exercise, 
and each was broken down by industry, size class, and ownership. 
However, recognizing that disclosure rules would restrict what could 
realistically be produced for public consumption, the distributors of the 
survey asked countries to prioritize their information along the follow-
ing lines: 
• Priority 1: Industries (preferably, ISIC Rev. 4) for two-digit 
groupings
• Priority 2: Export intensities (exports as a percentage of output)
• Priority 3: Ownership (a breakdown into foreign/domestic 
ownership)
• Priority 4: Size class (a breakdown preferably done by number 
of employees)
The seven variables requested were as follows: 
1) The number of statistical units, participating or otherwise, in 
exports, ideally using a concept consistent with that used in 
preparing supply-use and input-output tables. 
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2) The value-added generated by fi rms in national currency units, 
ideally at basic prices. 
3) The value of exports generated by fi rms in national currency 
units, ideally at FOB (free on board) prices. 
4) The output generated by fi rms in national currency units, ide-
ally at basic prices. 
5) The total employment of fi rms, ideally on a full-time equiva-
lent basis. 
6) The total compensation of employees of fi rms. 
7) Direct imports of fi rms in national currency units, ideally at 
CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) prices. 
Going beyond Trade in Value-Added 
Looking at trade in value-added terms provides a valuable insight 
into broader notions of competitiveness (in addition to providing in-
sights into trade policies) by illustrating interlinkages between countries 
and also by illustrating those activities (or tasks) that generate the most 
value. But additional indicators and insights can be gained by consider-
ing extensions to the accounting framework.
Trade in jobs
One immediate area relates to jobs. This requires consistent esti-
mates of employment measures (employment, employees, actual hours 
worked) using the underlying value-added estimates produced by na-
tional statistics offi ces in their supply-use tables. 
Countries have already begun to make improvements in this area, 
driven by a need to produce coherent productivity estimates by indus-
try, and it is hoped that highlighting the important insights that can be 
gained by looking at trade in jobs will reinforce and support these na-
tional initiatives aimed at improving coherence. Going a step further, 
we can state that, particularly because international fragmentation has 
meant industries across countries are less comparable than they used 
to be (as countries specialize in those stages of the underlying activity 
where they have a comparative advantage), it is increasingly becoming 
necessary to link jobs statistics to skills statistics.    
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The OECD’s ANSKILL database (in the process of being updated) 
provides information on employment and skill composition at the in-
dustry level. The database matches industry data at the two-digit level 
(classifi ed according to the ISIC Rev. 3) to occupations at the two-digit 
level (classifi ed according to International Standard Classifi cation of 
Occupations [ISCO]-88). It also includes an additional proxy for skills, 
in the form of data on the educational attainment of employees (classi-
fi ed on the basis of International Standard Classifi cation of Education 
[ISCED]-97). The database covers 26 countries, mostly for 1997–2005, 
although coverage of seven of the countries is much more limited.
For ANSKILL, the ISCO-88 occupation classifi cation corresponds 
to high-, medium-, and low-skilled levels, as follows:
• Categories 1 (legislators, senior offi cials, managers), 2 (pro-
fessionals), and 3 (technicians and associate professionals) are 
regarded as high-skilled.
• Categories 4 (clerks), 5 (service workers and shop and 
market sale workers), 6 (skilled agricultural and fi shery work-
ers), and 7 (craft and related trade workers) are regarded as 
medium-skilled.
• Categories 8 (plant and machine operators and assemblers) and 
9 (elementary occupations) are regarded as low-skilled.
The ISCED-97 educational classifi cation maps to high, medium, 
and low skill levels in ANSKILL as follows:
• Categories 1 (primary education) and 2 (lower secondary/sec-
ond stage of basic education) are regarded as low-skilled.
• Categories 3 (upper secondary education) and 4 (postsecondary 
nontertiary education) are regarded as medium-skilled.
• Categories 5 (fi rst stage of tertiary education) and 6 (second 
stage of tertiary education) are regarded as high-skilled.
Trade in income
Conventional trade statistics do not always record transactions 
between affi liates as sales or purchases of goods and services. This is 
especially true of intellectual property products (IPPs). 
Consider, for example, an affi liate enterprise, recognized in the na-
tional accounts of its resident economy as the economic owner of an 
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IPP that it uses to produce goods, which it sells. The affi liate’s value-
added would refl ect in part the return on this underlying asset, realized 
as profi ts (operating surplus). These profi ts would subsequently be re-
corded as reinvested earnings, whether or not any actual fl ows occur 
between the parent and its affi liate. Ultimately, therefore, it is the parent 
(often the entity that fi nances the underlying IPP) that benefi ts from 
the use of the IPP. (Indeed, this in itself raises questions about how 
economic ownership of IPPs should be considered with respect to mul-
tinationals—an issue that is currently being tackled by the international 
statistics community.) 
However, the diffi culties raised by the current recording of IPPs 
in the balance of payments and national accounts of countries extend 
beyond this simple example (which correctly records fl ows in line with 
current standards and guidelines). Often, for example, the national ac-
counts in the economy of the parent company will record the asset, but 
there will not be any fl ows related to the use the owner makes of its 
affi liates, which use is frequently driven by tax minimization purposes. 
Often, as well, the owner may transfer the asset to an affi liate (such as 
a special purpose enterprise, or SPE), with the parent and other affi li-
ates making explicit payments to the SPE, again driven to do so by tax 
minimization purposes. 
What is clear from the above, therefore, is that fl ows related to IPPs 
require an extension of accounting systems beyond looking merely at 
value-added fl ows in order to fully understand who benefi ts from trade 
and indeed trade liberalization (and investment). Sometimes these fl ows 
will increase value-added, sometimes they will not. But in both cases 
the benefi ciary is arguably the same (the parent company).   
But the fl ows merely illustrate a wider issue, notwithstanding the 
obvious implications they raise for multifactor productivity calcula-
tions. First, they illustrate the potential distortions that may arise when 
one factors in the scope for transfer pricing manipulations. Second, 
such interpretations extend beyond looking only at the conventional set 
of assets recognized as such in the 2008 SNA. Other knowledge-based 
assets, such as brands and organizational capital, can also increase an 
affi liate’s value-added, and even though these assets are not recognized 
in the SNA, the profi ts recorded by the affi liate compensate for their use, 
and these still fl ow back to the parent, eventually, as reinvested earn-
ings fl ows in the accounts. But these fl ows are typically not available 
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on a bilateral partner country basis, let alone a partner country–industry 
basis, which is what is needed to analyze trade in income analogously 
with trade in value-added. 
Recording these fl ows, therefore, is crucial. Part of the solution 
lies in producing supply-use tables (or indicators) that capture foreign 
ownership. Clearly, it is unlikely that it will be feasible to produce 
supply-use tables that capture foreign ownership by country for all of 
the owners of the affi liates. But a separate breakdown of activities in 
a supply-use table that differentiates between foreign- and domestic-
owned fi rms should be feasible, as it relates to confi dentiality rules and 
burdens. 
By supplementing this with bilateral trade in primary income sta-
tistics (a from-whom-to-whom framework) broken down by type of 
income (in particular, reinvested earnings and interest), it should be 
possible to create extensions to the trade-in-value-added accounting 
framework by treating the primary income fl ows (and components) as 
if they were services produced by artifi cial industries in the host country 
of the parent company.
Some of the tools to do this already exist. Foreign affi liate trade 
statistics (FATS) can be combined, for example, with information in 
supply-use tables that shows breakdowns based on ownership. And 
there is also scope to link this further to balance-of-payment (BoP) data 
fl ows. The OECD is looking at developing a more detailed accounting 
framework and set of recommendations in this area, which could form 
the basis for estimating fl ows of trade in income. 
Figure 6.10 provides an illustration of the potential impact this may 
have on our understanding of trade relationships. For illustrative pur-
poses only, the operating surplus generated by U.S.-owned affi liates 
in the “Chemicals and electronics” sector in Ireland (available from 
FATS) is considered to be equivalent to value-added generated by U.S. 
fi rms. These fl ows can then be treated as exports from the United States 
to those countries consuming the U.S. affi liate exports from Ireland, 
revealing not insignifi cant changes in bilateral trade positions. For ex-
ample, for France the trade defi cit in value-added terms becomes a trade 
surplus again, which is what gross fl ows show.
To further illustrate the potential impact of accounting for these 
fl ows between multinationals, about 70 percent of China’s gross high-
tech exports were made by foreign affi liates in 2009, according to data 
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supplied by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. Furthermore, between 
1995 and 2007, Japanese foreign affi liates increased their employment 
in China eightfold, from just over one hundred thousand employees to 
more than one million, and in Thailand fourfold, from over one hun-
dred thousand to over four hundred thousand; the pattern was similar in 
other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, such 
as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. And from 1995 to 2009, 
Japan’s primary income trade surplus increased by around $100 billion, 
more than offsetting the $50 billion reduction in its gross trade surplus 
over the same period. 
Figure 6.10  U.S. Trade Balance, Adjusted for U.S. Affi liates’ Exports 
from Ireland, $US Billions, 2009
NOTE: “VA” stands for “value-added.”
SOURCE: OECD calculations, based on the OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added 
(TiVA) database and the OECD Activity of Multinational Enterprises (AMNE) data-
base.
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Trade in CO2 (and other emissions)
One additional extension that follows from the accounting frame-
work for trade in value-added (and trade in jobs) is carbon footprints. 
Carbon footprint calculations are typically estimated using I-O tables 
(Ahmad and Wyckoff 2003). 
Incorporating capital fl ows
Other areas where extensions to the accounting framework would 
be desirable include the contribution made by capital more generally. 
Because of the way capital (gross fi xed capital formation) is recorded in 
the accounting system, analyses that look at trade in value-added do not 
fully capture how production across countries is linked and how capital 
goods (and services) produced in one country contribute to the value-
added in another. For example, all the value-added exported by Japan 
in producing machinery for manufacturers in China will be recorded as 
Chinese imports from Japan. But, arguably, the capital service values 
embodied in the goods produced and exported by China should show 
Japan as the benefi ciary. This requires high-quality capital fl ow (and 
capital stock) matrices. 
 Distribution sectors and trade
One fi nal area of work that merits attention concerns the value added 
by distributors through sales of fi nal imported goods. The estimates of 
trade in value-added do not reveal how cheap imports are also impor-
tant to retailers, who are able to generate domestic value-added through 
sales to consumers. Tariff measures will necessarily impose additional 
costs on these goods which, all other things being equal, could suppress 
demand and so in turn lead to lower value-added in the distribution 
sectors. The OECD is also considering how these estimates could be 
incorporated within its accounting framework, using margin rates for 
all products in national supply-use tables, and through this usage moti-
vating the further development of such data.   
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Notes
1. See an application of international I-O in Escaith et al. (2011).
2. For more information on the database, see OECD (2013).
3. An OECD–World Bank workshop on “New Metrics for Global Value Chains” was 
held on September 21, 2010. WTO hosted a “Global Forum on Trade Statistics” on 
February 2–4, 2011, in collaboration with Eurostat, the United Nations Statistics 
Division (UNSD), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).
4. Some research-oriented initiatives have been using the GTAP database for inter-
national input-output data. This database is not, however, based on offi cial sources 
of statistics.
5. For more details, see OECD (2012b). The list of countries includes Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, China, Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, 
India, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Romania, the Russian Fed-
eration, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, and Vietnam.
6. For more details, see OECD (2012a).
7. EBOPS stands for Extended Balance of Payments Services Classifi cation; see 
the service list of EBOPS items at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/servicetrade/mr/
rfCommoditiesList.aspx.
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What Can We Learn from Chinese Microdata?
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Estimating the economy-wide and sectoral domestic value-added in 
exports requires an input-output (I-O) table with good information on 
import uses. Normally, statistical agencies do not compile this informa-
tion at the sectoral level. The I-O experts either break down the data 
on total import uses or make an inference from available but limited 
microdata. In so doing, they often explicitly rely on the proportional-
ity assumption to assign imported inputs to different sectors, or else 
they implicitly resort to the proportionality assumption when making 
generalizations about the import use patterns by a sample of fi rms. 
However, this assumption is hardly valid in reality, because individual 
sectors normally do not have the same patterns of import use as the 
overall economy, and also because fi rms are heterogeneous and they 
often behave differently in international trade (Bernard et al. 2007). As 
a result, these approaches tend to lead to biased estimates, as shown by 
the microdata work at the U.S. Census Bureau (Feenstra and Jensen 
2012) and the microdata work for Germany (Winkler and Milberg 
2009). Meanwhile, I-O-based trade-related estimates are sensitive to 
the structure of the import matrix, such as for emission estimation, as 
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shown in Dietzenbacher, Pei, and Yang (2012), and for vertical special-
ization (VS) estimation, as in Yang et al. (2013).1
Therefore, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
launched the “Made in the World Initiative” in 2011 to promote world-
wide research on domestic value-added share (DVS) estimation and to 
enhance understanding of the global value chain, they pointed out that 
“the key challenges in the immediate future concern the quality of trade 
statistics and the assumptions made to allocate imports to users” and 
that linking traders to the manufacturers would form an important part 
of the work (Ahmad et al. 2011). In addition to the Trade by Enterprise 
Characteristics (TEC) joint project with Eurostat, the OECD’s exercise 
with Turkish microdata is another attempt to reveal the patterns of fi rm 
heterogeneity in trade and production and, based on that, to improve 
trade in value-added measures (Ahmad and Araujo 2011).
There are two threads of methodologies with which to estimate Chi-
na’s DVS in exports under an I-O framework: one relies on assumptions 
or optimization programming to derive key coeffi cients, and the other 
employs real data to obtain these coeffi cients. The former approach 
includes the work of Dean, Fung, and Wang (2011) and of Koopman, 
Wang, and Wei (2012). Koopman, Wang, and Wei split the offi cially 
published Chinese 2007 I-O tables into two parts—1) processing and 
2) normal trade—in their modifi ed Chinese I-O tables. Ma, Wang, and 
Zhu (2013) take the modifi ed I-O table that Koopman, Wang, and Wei 
developed and further split it by producers’ ownership. In doing so, 
Ma, Wang, and Zhu also incorporate micro fi rm-level data and other 
real data. Even though their approach contains real data, it falls into the 
former category, given the complexity of the I-O tables’ structure after 
two rounds of splitting and the lack of import-use information in the 
microdata, as will be shown in this chapter.
On the other hand, the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 
follows the latter approach. When compiling China’s 2007 input-output 
table, NBS researchers for the fi rst time used a survey of fi rms to pre-
pare the import-use coeffi cients. Recently, in updating the I-O tables 
and also as China’s response to the WTO/OECD Made in the World 
Initiative, the NBS decided to employ import-use matrices from two 
sources. While the NBS will keep the previous 2007 matrix, the Chi-
nese General Administration of Customs has started its own indepen-
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dent fi rm survey on import uses. The approaches by the two agencies 
are quite different. The NBS has jurisdiction over enterprise produc-
tion data collection, and its survey is an added module to its existing 
annual survey on above-scale industrial production enterprises, called 
the Annual Survey of Industrial Production (ASIP). On the other hand, 
Customs is responsible for managing the customs clearance documents 
provided by fi rms doing international trade. These fi rm-level trade data 
form the basis on which Customs conducts the survey.
The two agencies are trying to reach the same goal from different 
starting points and by taking different routes. The two microdata sets 
have rich information on fi rms’ production, fi nancial positions, and trade. 
Combined, they would be able to provide much-needed information on 
fi rms’ import uses. However, the two threads of similar work are inde-
pendent of each other. Therefore, among various sampling problems, the 
biggest problem with the two approaches is that neither of them is based 
on prior knowledge of both production and trade distribution patterns in 
the population.2 Although this chapter does not include them, surveys on 
import uses by the two agencies serve as background for our analysis of 
the combined production and trade microdata sets on import uses.
Surveys are costly. Unless existing microdata are exhausted, sur-
veys would not be effi cient and, even worse, could lead to aggregation 
bias if they were not based on samples representative of Chinese fi rms’ 
trade and production patterns, as the proportionality assumption would 
be implicitly applied.
Needless to say, the ideal approach is to make the best use of exist-
ing microdata on trade and production. Upward, Wang, and Zheng 
(2013) made the fi rst attempt to do so in estimating China’s DVS in 
exports. However, their work suffers from several fl aws. These include 
• proportionality assumption on import uses between domestic 
and export production, 
• no differentiation regarding the proprietary rights between 
the two submodes of processing trade—1) processing with 
imported materials (PWIM) and 2) processing and assembly 
with provided imported materials (P&A),
• ignoring trading agency issues, 
• treating the import and export data in the fi rm-level trade data 
set as having been used or produced by the same fi rms, and
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   207 2/16/2015   8:40:01 AM
208   Yao, Ma, and Pei
• giving no consideration of the imported inputs embodied in 
domestic inputs. 
Despite the above problems, Upward, Wang, and Zheng (2013) 
represent the right direction in which to move to pursue the microdata 
work in order to estimate the Chinese DVS in exports. This chapter 
follows this direction. Specifi cally, like Upward, Wang, and Zheng, we 
combine the two microdata sets used respectively and independently 
by the NBS and Customs. We identify the production enterprises that 
also do international trade by linking the two data sets. This enables us 
to reveal the patterns of Chinese fi rm heterogeneity in trade and pro-
duction, which justify further exploration of the microdata in import 
uses and DVS estimation. After appropriately treating the problems in 
Upward, Wang, and Zheng, identifi ed above, this chapter provides vari-
ous estimates of DVS boundaries.
The chapter has fi ve sections, counting this one. The next section, 
“Chinese I-O Table Development: Backgrounding the Microdata Work,” 
introduces the recent development of Chinese I-O tables as background 
for our microdata work. Section Three, “Chinese Microdata and Firm 
Heterogeneity,” explores the merged microdata and reports various mea-
sures of fi rm exposure to international trade to illustrate not only the 
within-sample but also the between-sample fi rm heterogeneity. Section 
Four, “Estimating DVS: Boundaries and Confi dence,” estimates Chi-
nese DVS in exports based not only on various samples pulled from the 
microdata population but also on the aggregate commodity-level trade 
data. It provides lower and upper boundaries for DVS and the associated 
confi dence levels. Section Five concludes with our speculation on how a 
fi rm survey project might improve the VS/DVS estimation.
CHINESE I-O TABLE DEVELOPMENT: BACKGROUNDING 
THE MICRODATA WORK
Recent Chinese I-O Table Development
As a tool of central planning, Chinese I-O tables traditionally had a 
domestic focus when the country was closed to the outside world, before 
1978. The treatment of international trade in the I-O tables was mini-
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mal, assuming as it did that domestic and imported goods were identi-
cal. But with China increasingly opening up to foreign trade and invest-
ment, this assumption was later relaxed so that domestic and imported 
goods were treated as differentiated products. Pioneered by Chen et al. 
(2001) and continued in Chen et al. (2012), the structure of Chinese 
I-O tables has undergone dramatic change in the past decade to refl ect 
the unique feature of Chinese foreign trade: About half of the country’s 
foreign trade is administered under the processing trade regime. The 
separation of processing trade, normal trade, and domestic production 
in the Chinese I-O tables is justifi ed by the theory of fi rm heterogeneity 
(Melitz 2003). The new I-O table has a rich trade structure and requires 
more information to fi ll in the coeffi cients, including the import-use 
matrices, which are crucial to estimating DVS in exports. 
DVS Estimation without Import-Use Information
What can we know about the Chinese DVS in exports if we do not 
know the information on import uses? Table 7.1 shows several esti-
mates based on public data. When talking about DVS in exports, one 
may be quick to think of it as a country’s net exports in goods and ser-
vices, or its current account balances. This is true only if imports used 
for fi nal domestic consumption replace the same amount of domestic 
resources, which would otherwise be used for the same domestic pro-
duction but instead are allocated to export production. This is a strong 
assumption. More often than not, imports for fi nal domestic use are not 
perfect substitutes for goods or services in the export sector. This proxy 
overestimates the foreign content in exports or underestimates the DVS 
in exports. The proxy could be treated as the lower bound of the real 
DVS in exports. As shown in Table 7.1, this measure of lower-bound 
DVS (Total DVS1_lower) ranges between 8.2 and 25.3 percent over the 
period 2001–2010, reaching its high of 25.3 percent in 2007.
Furthermore, by breaking down Chinese foreign trade into normal 
and processing trade, the numbers for which are readily available from 
major Chinese government Web sites, we could treat processing imports 
as the only imported intermediates used for exports. This allows us to 
obtain an estimate of lower-bound vertical specialization, or VS, rang-
ing from 26.4 to 37.5 percent over 2001–2010 and measuring 30.3 per-
cent for 2007, which translates into an upper bound of DVS in exports 
of 69.7 percent for that year (Total DVS2_upper in Table 7.1).
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Table 7.1  Estimates of Domestic Value-Added Shares in Exports without Import-Use Information (%)
Year
CA balances/
total exports Total L&M fi rms
Total
DVS1_lower
Processing 
imports/
processing 
exports
Processing 
imports/
total 
exports
Total 
DVS2_upper
Processing 
imports/
processing 
exports
Processing 
imports/
total 
exports
Total 
DVS3_upper
2001 10.6 63.7 35.3 64.7 64.9 49.2 50.8 
2002 11.5 67.9 37.5 62.5 67.9 51.0 49.0 
2003 8.2 67.4 37.2 62.8 67.3 51.1 48.9 
2004 8.3 67.6 37.4 62.6 69.9 50.6 49.4 
2005 16.4 65.8 36.0 64.0 67.9 49.6 50.4 
2006 21.6 63.0 33.2 66.8 62.4 44.8 55.2 
2007 25.3 59.6 30.3 69.7 57.6 40.5 59.5 
2008 24.4 56.0 26.4 73.6 — — —
2009 18.3 54.9 26.8 73.2 — — —
2010 14.7 56.4 26.5 73.5 — — —
NOTE: “CA” stands for “current account.” “L&M” stands for “large and medium-sized fi rms.” “DVS” stand for “domestic value-added 
share.” — = data not available.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from National Bureau of Statistics of China Web site and China Customs Statistics (CCS). 
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In short, with the data on current account balances and the Chinese 
trade statistics alone, we can at best estimate only a range of Chinese 
DVS in exports, which for 2007 is 25.3 to 69.7 percent. To narrow down 
the lower and upper boundaries, we need to explore other data sources, 
which is the focus of the remaining part of the chapter.
Microdata Approach: What Can We Do, and What Can’t We Do?
At the fi rm level, the Customs statistics have the same variables as 
those in the commodity-level trade statistics. Together with the fi rm 
production data, they raise the hope of estimating fi rm-level I-O tables. 
However, the following three problems hamper our efforts to do so:
 1)  The production enterprise data contain only total input use, 
but not its breakdown into domestic or foreign sources, or into 
different sectors.
 2)  The production enterprise data, normally without an import-
use module, do not have import information and only have 
total exports. There is detailed import and export information 
in the fi rm trade data set, but the trading companies may resell 
the imports to other production fi rms and may also help export 
products made by other fi rms.
 3)  Neither of the two data sets has interfi rm transaction informa-
tion in either inputs or fi nal products.
As a result, with the current Chinese fi rm-level data, it is diffi cult to 
give a precise DVS estimate. However, with rich information, it could 
be used to reveal the stylized patterns of fi rms’ trade and production 
and serve as the basis for sensible assumptions and for effi cient and 
unbiased survey design.
CHINESE MICRODATA AND FIRM HETEROGENEITY
Chinese Microdata Sets and Their Matching
We use two sets of 2007 Chinese fi rm-level data. First, the Customs 
data has product-level transaction information for 236,505 trading com-
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panies, which is the entire population of fi rm-level trade statistics. Sec-
ond, ASIP data has 336,768 enterprises—all state-owned enterprises 
and other enterprises with annual sales of more than 5 million yuan—
and covers 95 percent of industrial output and 98 percent of industrial 
exports, approximately the whole population of the Chinese industrial 
enterprises.
To merge the two data sets by fi rm name and other identifying infor-
mation produces the linked data set, which is a subset of each of the 
two data sets. This is a standard exercise for researchers working on 
Chinese microdata. They may differ in specifi c matching criteria, but 
they use a similar strategy and therefore produce similar overall results. 
In this chapter, the matching exercise includes only trade data with non-
zero exports and excludes those with zero exports but nonzero imports. 
This is a shortcoming for research on import uses. In terms of fi rm size, 
fi rms in the matched data set do both production and direct trade and 
tend to be large and medium (L&M), while fi rms in the nonmatched 
data set are generally small. Key summary statistics of the matching 
exercise for this chapter are presented in Table 7.2.
Among the 336,768 fi rms in the ASIP data set and the 236,505 
fi rms in the trade data set, only 65,545 fi rms are successfully matched, 
accounting for 19.5 and 27.7 percent of the two data sets, respectively. 
The shares are small, but they account for 82.9 percent of the total of 
79,103 exporting ASIP fi rms. In terms of trade volume, the matched 
fi rms handle 35.1 and 27.8 percent of the total exports for the two data 
sets, respectively. The ASIP data set does not have the import variable, 
and this data set accounts for only 16.9 percent of the total imports for 
the trade data set, lower than the same export share. The output and 
sales variables only appear in the ASIP data set, and they are almost the 
same in value, roughly 40–41 trillion yuan in total and 21–22 trillion 
yuan for exporting ASIP. Therefore, the L&M fi rms produce and sell 
about 18.5 percent of all ASIP fi rms’ sales/output and 34.5 percent of 
exporting ASIP fi rms’ sales/output.
There are several reasons that a large number of fi rms in the two 
data sets are not matched, in addition to the lack of accurate identifi ca-
tion information. For the 80.5 percent of the total ASIP fi rms and the 
17.1 percent of the exporting ASIP fi rms that are not matched, they 
either do not export at all or do not export directly, and therefore their 
names do not show up in the Customs registry. As for the 72.3 percent 
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of the fi rms in the trade data set that are not matched, they could be pure 
trading companies with no production at all, or they could be produc-
tion fi rms that are not included in the ASIP data set.
In the L&M data set, there are two subsets that are used in this 
chapter. The subset “L&M ASIP exp > 0” represents the fi rms whose 
exports in the production data are also positive. The last row in Table 
7.2 shows a subset of the matched data with positive imports (L&M 
imp > 0). This is the data set that Upward, Wang, and Zheng (2013) use 
in estimating China’s DVS in exports. Because it is the smallest sample 
in terms of number of fi rms, its representativeness of the whole popula-
tion is in doubt, and both fi rm heterogeneity within the data set and fi rm 
heterogeneity across samples deserve careful scrutiny if the aggregate 
DVS is to be derived from it.
Firm Heterogeneity in Trade and Production Patterns
The intermediates include two parts: 1) processing imports are 
treated as intermediates, and 2) intermediates under normal imports are 
identifi ed with the “broad economic categories” (BEC) classifi cation 
developed by the United Nations Statistics Division. Because of the 
existence of two submodes of processing imports, two different defi ni-
tions are adopted for imported intermediates under processing imports 
in estimating DVS. One defi nes all processing imports as intermedi-
Table 7.2  Summary Statistics of the 2007 Enterprise and Trade Data
Data Set Firm numbers Exports Imports Output Sales
ASIP 336,768 7.34 40.50 40.00 
Exporting ASIP 79,103 7.34 21.90 21.30 
Trade data 236,505 9.27 7.27 
L&M (matched) 65,545 2.58 1.23 7.54 7.34 
L&M ASIP exp > 0 50,277 2.31 1.05 5.95 5.81 
L&M imp > 0 37,536 2.17 1.23 5.48 5.38 
NOTE: Values for “Exports,” “Imports,” “Output,” and “Sales” columns are in trillions 
of yuan. “ASIP” stands for “Annual Survey of Industrial Production.” “L&M” stands 
for “large and medium-sized fi rms.” Blank cell = data not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from National Bureau of Statistics of 
China Web site and China Customs Statistics (CCS).
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   213 2/16/2015   8:40:03 AM
214   Yao, Ma, and Pei
ates, and the other includes only processing with imported materials, or 
PWIM. To be consistent, the second defi nition is adopted when fi rms’ 
input and output are used in estimating DVS together with import data, 
as the P&A (processing and assembly with provided imported materi-
als) imports are not counted as input and not part of the output, either.
Trade intensity by ownership is shown in Table 7.3. The shares of 
intermediate imports in processing exports are listed in the fi rst two 
columns. In comparing the shares in the L&M samples with those in 
the total population of trade statistics, we see that collective enterprises, 
wholly foreign-funded enterprises, and joint ventures behave similarly, 
whereas state-owned enterprises and private fi rms show signifi cant dif-
ferences. These differences possibly stem from the high concentration 
of pure trading companies among state-owned trading enterprises and 
the prevalence of small private fi rms in China’s processing trade sector, 
since neither of these concentrations is included in the L&M samples. 
In both the total population and the L&M samples, only wholly foreign-
funded enterprises have higher-than-average shares.
In the third and fourth columns in Table 7.3, normal imports of 
intermediates (defi ned in the BEC classifi cation as a share of normal 
exports) are listed, showing large differences between the L&M sam-
ples and the population for all types of fi rms. Therefore, L&M samples 
are not representative of the population for this indicator either. Foreign 
fi rms (wholly foreign-funded fi rms and joint ventures) and state-owned 
enterprises have higher-than-average shares in both the total population 
and the L&M samples.3
In terms of the share of processing exports in total exports, shown in 
the fi fth and sixth columns in Table 7.3, foreign fi rms (wholly foreign-
funded fi rms and joint ventures) have the highest shares, and they are 
even higher in the L&M samples (85.9 and 65.5 percent, respectively), 
far ahead of the closest state-owned enterprises (34.2 percent). But the 
opposite is true for normal export share in total exports, as foreign fi rms 
have the lowest shares, shown in the seventh and eighth columns.
Across and within sample variations
Firm heterogeneity can be revealed in many ways. As we report in 
an earlier version of this chapter, which is available on the Web (Yao, 
Ma, and Pei 2013), when constructing export intensity (export/output) 
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Table 7.3  Use of Imported Intermediates and Exports Breakdown by Firm Type, 2007 (%)
　 Imported intermediates as share of export value Share of exports by customs category 
Formula
Processing imports/ 
processing exports
Normal BEC input 
imports/normal exports
Processing exports/ 
total exports
Normal exports/ 
total exports
Firm type Total L&M fi rms Total L&M fi rms Total L&M fi rms Total L&M fi rms
Collective enterprises 41.6 41.0 37.8 14.9 24.1 15.4 75.9 84.6 
Wholly foreign-funded 
enterprises
63.1 61.9 78.7 52.4 81.8 85.9 18.2 14.1 
Joint ventures 48.3 46.7 73.7 59.2 59.7 65.5 40.3 34.5 
Private fi rms 58.7 47.2 25.6 6.4 9.8 14.9 90.2 85.1 
State-owned enterprises 63.4 38.0 104.4 64.3 26.6 34.2 73.4 65.8 
All 59.7 57.6 62.7 40.7 50.6 70.4 49.4 29.6 
NOTE: “L&M” stands for “large and medium-sized fi rms.” “BEC” stands for the “broad economic categories” classifi cation.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from National Bureau of Statistics of China Web site and China Customs Statistics (CCS). 
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and intermediates import intensity (imports input/output and imports 
input/input) indicators, we see considerable fi rm heterogeneity across 
and within sectors or samples, as well as evidence of importing agency 
problems, shown as larger-than-one intermediate import ratios over 
total output or input. To put things in perspective, Table 7.4 assembles 
some aggregate measures together with shares of value-added in out-
put, with breakdown by fi rm ownership (domestic or foreign) and size.
For import intensity, large discrepancies exist between domestic and 
foreign fi rms, as foreign fi rms’ import shares are much higher. There are 
some differences across fi rm size but more differences within the same 
size group for the share of imported input in total input, as shown by the 
difference between the weighted and simple averages, where total input 
value is used as the weight.
For export intensity, too, domestic and foreign fi rms behave differ-
ently: Again, foreign fi rms’ export shares are higher. Compared to the 
“L&M ASIP exp > 0” sample, fi rm size matters more for the “Other 
exporting ASIP” sample, in which larger fi rms tend to export a smaller 
share of total output.
Value-added share in total output (Value-added/output) is a new 
indicator. While the aggregate measures in the two samples are quite 
similar, they can differ by as much as 6.3 and 58.6 percent, respectively, 
for the sectors “Artcrafts and other manufacturing” (China Industrial 
Classifi cation [CIC] 42) and “Tobacco” (CIC 16), as shown in the tables 
of an earlier version of this chapter (Yao, Ma, and Pei 2013).
In summary, the existence of fi rm heterogeneity is extensive, and 
the issues of proprietary rights in processing imports and trading agency 
are real. These will complicate the efforts to estimate the DVS in Chi-
nese exports.
ESTIMATING DVS: BOUNDARIES AND CONFIDENCE
Proportionality Assumption on Domestic and Export Production
Proportionality assumption regarding import uses means two things: 
1) imports are proportionally allocated among different sectors, and 
2) within each sector, they are further proportionally allocated between 
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Table 7.4  Summary Indicators by Type of Ownership and Firm Size, 2007 (%)
Type of ownership Firm size (no. of employees)
Indicator Data set Average All Domestic Foreign <50 50–200 200–1,000 >1,000
Import input/
input
L&M Weighted 
across fi rms
22.8 6.3 29.4 28.7 24.6 21.3 23.9 
59.0 22.0 71.0 38.0 57.4 69.5 29.7 
Import input/
output
L&M Weighted 
across fi rms
17.3 4.8 22.2 21.6 18.6 16.2 18.2 
16.1 5.3 19.6 18.9 15.8 15.4 18.5 
Export/output L&M Weighted 
across fi rms
45.6 37.0 59.5 55.0 50.1 50.8 52.5 
ASIP exp > 0 62.1 51.1 68.9 58.9 60.9 63.8 62.6 
Other exporting Weighted 
across fi rms
41.5 37.5 55.3 62.3 55.6 43.1 32.9 
ASIP fi rms 66.7 64.3 71.4 70.5 69.4 62.8 46.2 
Value-added/
output
L&M Weighted 
across fi rms
25.9 25.8 26.0 25.7 25.4 26.1 26.0 
26.7 25.6 27.4 24.4 26.1 27.6 28.4 
Other exporting Weighted 
across fi rms
27.1 26.9 27.6 24.1 26.6 27.1 27.8 
ASIP fi rms 28.3 27.5 30.0 23.8 27.5 31.1 31.8 
NOTE: For the fi rst indicator, total input value is used as the weight, and for the remaining three indicators, output value is used as the 
weight. “L&M” stands for “large and medium-sized fi rms.” “ASIP” stands for “Annual Survey of Industrial Production.” 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from National Bureau of Statistics of China Web site and China Customs Statistics (CCS). 
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domestic and export production. If the importing agency problem could 
be solved so that the import data truly refl ected the amount of interme-
diate imports used in a fi rm’s production, then the L&M data set would 
be able to remedy the fi rst problem. Thus, the importing agency issue is 
a focus of this chapter. As for the second problem, unfortunately, fi rm-
level data alone are of little help, as they do not contain information 
on how fi rms split intermediate imports between domestic and export 
production.
When Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) fi rst employ I-O tables to esti-
mate VS, they assume an equal percentage of foreign input in domes-
tic output and exports. Upward, Wang, and Zheng (2013) retain this 
assumption in estimating China’s vertical specialization (VS). Working 
from a data set similar to L&M, Upward, Wang, and Zheng distinguish 
between processing and normal trade and apply this assumption to nor-
mal trade only. That is, within normal trade, imports are allocated to 
domestic and export production proportionally to domestic output and 
normal exports. This assumption is oversimplifi ed but still acceptable. 
However, when Upward, Wang, and Zheng actually do the calculation, 
they use the following formula to determine the ratio of intermediate 
import in domestic output and normal exports:
(7.1) ???? ?
????
? ? ??
 .
     
This is problematic, because imports for processing and assembly (Mp&a) 
in the trade data set are included only in Xp but not in Y. Therefore, the 
denominator in the above formula gives a lower value for domestic out-
put and normal exports, or a higher share of foreign content in domestic 
output and normal exports. Mp&a accounts for 17.0 and 24.2 percent 
of L&M processing imports and total processing imports, respectively, 
and these are not trivial amounts. As such, the problem associated with 
Mp&a in the above formula cannot be ignored.
Imports for Processing and Assembly and a Lower VS Boundary
This chapter corrects this problem and modifi es the above formula 
by deducting Mp&a from processing exports when calculating the ratio 
of normal intermediate imports defi ned by BEC (Mbec):
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(7.2) ? ?
????
? ? ??? ? ?????
?
????
??
 ,   
 
where DN represents domestic output and normal exports. 
Export production often uses more foreign inputs than domestic 
production. This can be seen from trade intensity measures by owner-
ship breakdown in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, where foreign-funded enterprises 
(FFEs) have higher shares of intermediate imports in normal exports, 
total input, and total output. Because FFEs dominate Chinese foreign 
trade in both imports and exports, a link can be established showing 
that export production has higher shares of foreign intermediates than 
domestic production. Also, considering that a domestic content require-
ment is normally imposed on FFEs for domestic production, a lower 
bound of VS exists as a result of this policy. In fact, the proportional-
ity assumption regarding the import uses among domestic and export 
production, as refl ected in Equation (7.2), can be regarded as the lower 
bound:
(7.3) ??????? ? ?? ?
????
? ? ??? ? ?????
?? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? .
Trading Agency Problem
Imports and exports in the above equations mean the actual imports 
used as inputs by the fi rms and the actual exports produced by the fi rms. 
Because of the trading agency problem, trade volume from the trade 
data set does not meet this requirement at the fi rm level. However, since 
the L&M data already screened out the pure trading companies, produc-
tion fi rms doing trading agency business are more likely to deal with 
fi rms in the same sector. Based on this assumption, we fi rst sum up 
the variables across fi rms within a sector and then proceed to estimate 
sectoral VS using that formula. By so doing, we neutralize the trading 
agency problem among fi rms within a sector, but we also risk introduc-
ing aggregation bias. This can be illustrated by the following equations:
(7.4) ???????? ? ??
? ?
??
???
???
? ??
? , 
 
   
(7.5) ??????? ????
? ?
???
???
????
????
? , and
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(7.6) ??????? ?????????? ???
??
?
???
?
???
?
????
?? ? ??
??? .
Because both within and between sectors variations could be large, 
as suggested in the section titled “Chinese Microdata and Firm Het-
erogeneity,” the two approaches may generate different sectoral VS, as 
the right-hand side of Equation (7.6) is not always zero. This poten-
tial bias can also occur when estimation is done at the whole manufac-
turing level. The lower bound of VS thus should be treated with less 
confi dence.4
Upper VS Boundary
After determining that the estimation of the lower bound of VS 
should be treated with less confi dence, we now turn to the upper-bound 
VS estimation. As exports use more intermediate imports than domestic 
production, the upper limit of VS can be achieved by assuming all inter-
mediate imports are used for export production:
(7.7) ??????? ? ?? ????? .
In contrast to the lower-bound VS, the upper-bound VS estimate is 
invariant of the level of analysis, commodity, or sectoral level. It is not 
subject to the constraint of the domestic content requirement, either. As 
a result, the confi dence level is high for it, as long as we are confi dent 
in the BEC defi nition of intermediates.5
Results and Discussions
Sectoral and whole manufacturing shares of VS (VSS) over two 
samples, “L&M imp > 0” and “L&M,” are reported in Table 7.5.6 The 
lower bound of VSS is converted into the upper bound of DVS through 
the following formula:
(7.8) ??? ? ? ?
??
?
? ? ? ??? .
Across all sectors, DVS upper bounds are 61.0 and 67.2 percent for 
the respective two samples. Among all sectors, DVS’s in the CIC sec-
tors “Food manufacturing” and “Beverages” (CIC 14 and 15), “Furni-
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Table 7.5  VS Share (VSS) and DVS by Sector, Estimated with 
Microdata (%)
CICa
L&M imp > 0 L&M
Sector description
VSS_
lower
Total 
DVS4_
upper
VSS_
lower
Total 
DVS5_
upper
13 Agriculture and food processing 32.2 67.8 20.5 79.5 
14 Food manufacturing 11.5 88.5 8.3 91.7 
15 Beverages 8.2 91.8 5.5 94.5 
16 Tobacco 56.7 43.3 56.7 43.3 
17 Textile 23.1 76.9 16.2 83.8 
18 Clothing, footwear, and caps 27.9 72.1 22.7 77.3 
19 Leather, fur, feather, and products 35.7 64.3 28.1 71.9 
20 Timber and wood products 24.6 75.4 16.2 83.8 
21 Furniture 12.5 87.5 10.2 89.8 
22 Paper and products 56.9 43.1 50.3 49.7 
23 Printing and recording 26.9 73.1 24.0 76.0 
24 Culture, educ., and sports products 23.7 76.3 20.2 79.8 
25 Energy resource processing 16.6 83.4 6.1 93.9 
26 Raw chem. materials and products 49.0 51.0 39.2 60.8 
27 Medicines 19.7 80.3 14.3 85.7 
28 Chemical fi bers 51.8 48.2 48.8 51.2 
29 Rubber 39.2 60.8 35.2 64.8 
30 Plastics 55.1 44.9 47.2 52.8 
31 Nonmetallic mineral products 17.8 82.2 11.7 88.3 
32 Ferrous metals processing 72.8 27.2 37.9 62.1 
33 Nonferrous metals processing 50.9 49.1 36.8 63.2 
34 Metal products 23.6 76.4 18.9 81.1 
35 General purpose machinery 22.7 77.3 18.3 81.7 
36 Special purpose machinery 29.0 71.0 25.7 74.3 
37 Transport equipment 30.0 70.0 26.2 73.8 
39 Electrical machinery & equipment 35.6 64.4 30.8 69.2 
40 Electronics 66.6 33.4 64.9 35.1 
41 Measuring, cultural, offi ce machine 42.0 58.0 39.2 60.8 
42 Artcrafts and other manufacturing 30.9 69.1 21.8 78.2 
43 Waste recycling and processing 88.8 11.2 80.7 19.3 
All 39.0 61.0 32.8 67.2 
NOTE: Gross output (rather than total sales) is adopted in the denominator. “VSS” 
stands for “vertical specialization share.” “DVS” stands for “domestic value-added 
share.” CIC category 38 has been omitted from the table.
a “CIC” stands for China Industrial Classifi cation.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from National Bureau of Statistics of 
China Web site and China Customs Statistics (CCS).
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   221 2/16/2015   8:40:06 AM
222   Yao, Ma, and Pei
ture” (CIC 21), “Petroleum and coking processing” (shown as “Energy 
resource processing,” CIC 25), and “Nonmetallic mineral products” 
(CIC 31) are among the highest, because these domestic sectors are 
not as much globalized as the sectors with the lowest DVS’s, such as 
“Communication, computer, and other electronic equipment” (shown as 
“Electronics,” CIC 40) and “Waste recycling and disposal” (shown as 
“Waste recycling and processing,” CIC 43). The DVS patterns are con-
sistent with import intensity patterns reported in an earlier version of 
this chapter (Yao, Ma, and Pei 2013), where sectors with higher DVS’s 
tend to have lower intensity of intermediate imports, and vice versa.
Comparing the two data samples, DVS’s in the “L&M” sample are 
consistently higher than those in the “L&M imp > 0” sample, simply 
because the former data set has records with zero imports. Firms that 
do not import intermediates may buy from other production fi rms that 
are also in the importing agency business. This is another example of 
the fact that sampling matters in DVS estimation and the view that the 
trading agency problem deserves careful treatment.
Table 7.6 reports the aggregate DVS’s, both lower and upper 
bounds, for overall and normal trade estimated with different data sets 
and intermediate defi nitions. Some of the numbers are drawn from pre-
vious tables. The numbers with superscript “a” are the estimates with 
Table 7.6  Estimated DVS Boundaries (%)
Total DVS Normal DVS Shares of 
P&A in PIData scope and imports input Lower Upper Lower Upper
CA balances (DVS1) 25.3 
Total PI (DVS2) 69.7 
L&M PI (DVS3) 59.5 
L&M imp > 0 PI BEC (DVS4) 50.7 61.0a 66.9 94.5a 17.0 
L&M PI BEC (DVS5) 58.5 67.2a 77.8 96.4a 17.0 
Total PI BEC 38.9 68.0a 37.3 96.3a 24.2 
NOTE: “DVS” stands for “domestic value-added share.” “P&A” stands for “processing 
and assembly.” “PI” stands for “processing imports.” “L&M” stands for “large and 
medium-sized fi rms.” “BEC” stands for the “broad economic categories” classifi ca-
tion. Blank cell = data not applicable.
a Signifi es a number that is an estimate with less confi dence.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from National Bureau of Statistics of 
China Web site and China Customs Statistics (CCS). 
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less confi dence, in part because of the fi rm heterogeneity issue, as dis-
cussed earlier in regard to Equation (7.6).7 As a reminder, Table 7.6 also 
lists the shares of processing and assembly imports in total processing 
imports for the three data sets affected by the proprietary rights issue. 
Taking this issue into consideration helps improve the confi dence level 
in the GVC upper bounds for the three data sets.
Clearly, the range of DVS estimates varies, depending on the scope 
of the data and the associated defi nitions of intermediates. For overall 
DVS, both lower and upper bounds are estimated with confi dence, and 
the true value could be anywhere in the range of 38.9 to 69.7 percent. 
For normal trade, the DVS could be anywhere in a much wider range, 
from 37.3 to 96.3 percent.
What have we learned from our DVS estimation results? First of all, 
DVS estimates are sensitive to data samples. Cross-sample variations 
for lower and upper DVS bounds as well as the ranges of possible DVS 
are signifi cant, especially when compared to the overall DVS estimates. 
This suggests that none of the samples appear to be representative of 
the population.
Second, as refl ected by the wide range of possible GVC values, 
DVS estimates are sensitive to assumptions on import uses. This is intu-
itive, as the import uses across sectors and across domestic and export 
production directly allocate the fl ow of foreign intermediates within a 
country, and they ultimately determine the sectoral and overall DVS’s. 
It is also in line with previous fi ndings in I-O table literature—e.g., 
Dietzenbacher, Pei, and Yang (2012) and Yang et al. (2013).
Given the uncertainties surrounding the true DVS numbers, it is nat-
ural and logical to speculate about a fi rm survey project on import uses 
that aims to obtain additional information for better DVS estimation.
CONCLUSION
This chapter does not estimate the exact true DVS value because 
we do not make arbitrary assumptions. Instead, we take stock of the 
possible estimates, and in so doing we clarify several conceptual issues, 
which helps to improve the methodology in the literature. We leave a 
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wide range for possible DVS estimates and only expect them to be nar-
rowed down by future fi rm survey work.
Firm-level data have rich information that could be used to correct 
the bias in the import-use matrix caused by proportionality assumption 
in I-O table development. To realize the potential of such data, surveys 
need to overcome the nonrepresentative sampling and trading agency 
problems. They can do so, among other ways, by taking the following 
steps:
• First, identify the small production fi rms from fi rm-level trade 
data. This could be done by fi rst screening the nonmatched 
small trading fi rms and then tracking them through fi rms’ con-
tact information to verify their production status. By incorpo-
rating these small trade and production fi rms, the L&M data set 
could be expanded to include large, medium, and small fi rms 
(LMS).
• Second, select a sample of fi rms from LMS to be covered by 
the survey. The questionnaire should include questions on the 
amount of imports that are for a fi rm’s own use, the exports pro-
duced by customs regime, and the amount split between domes-
tic production and export production, among others.
Of course, various other aspects of the fi rm distribution should also 
be considered, such as ownership, sector, location, and trading partners.
Firms are able to answer questions regarding direct import uses, but 
it is diffi cult for fi rms to know the uses of imports embodied in domestic 
inputs. Probably this is the only area that would require an assumption.
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1. The term “vertical specialization” is borrowed from Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) 
and is defi ned as the value of imported intermediates in exports.
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2. Details on the NBS and Customs import use surveys are documented in an earlier 
version of this chapter (Yao, Ma, and Pei 2013), which is available on the Web.
3. The higher shares for the state-owned companies are either because some of the 
traditional state trading companies have diversifi ed their operations into produc-
tion business and therefore are kept in the L&M data set, or because import of 
primary resources is often conducted by state-owned production enterprises with 
overseas investment.
4. Less confi dence in the lower bound of VS is also due to lack of an exact minimum 
for domestic content requirement.
5. According to Timmer (2012), 14 percent of BEC codes can be both fi nal goods 
and intermediates.
6. We do not attempt to compare the numerical results with those from other studies 
because our methodology is based on a different set of concepts, which makes it 
uncomparable.
7. VS is fi rst estimated at sector level and then summed up across sectors. For VS 
estimation with the entirety of commodity trade data, in the last row of Table 7.6, 
there is no link between production output and trade data, and estimation can only 
be done with data summed over the whole database.
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The Balance of Payments and International Investment Position 
Manual, Sixth Edition (BPM), and the System of National Accounts 
2008 (SNA) both recommend attributing production to countries based 
on the residence of productive entities. The residence of an entity is 
generally determined to be the country in which a signifi cant amount of 
production takes place. In cases where an entity has little or no physical 
presence, residence is determined as the country in which the entity is 
legally incorporated or registered. In the case of a multinational enter-
prise (MNE), the residency-based framework of the BPM and the SNA 
requires that the activities of affi liated entities resident in different 
countries be measured separately in order to accurately attribute the 
economic activity of each entity to the country in which it is resident.1 
Likewise, the residency-based framework requires that cross-border 
transactions between affi liated entities resident in different countries be 
included in balance of payments statistics.
For practical reasons, statisticians generally measure production 
and other attributes of MNEs based on accounting data. While the 
BPM (International Monetary Fund 2009) and the SNA (European 
Commission et al. 2009) recommend the residency-based framework 
for attributing measured production, attribution under the framework 
is not limited to a specifi c accounting treatment. In this chapter, we 
focus on formulary apportionment as an alternative treatment to sepa-
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rate accounting, which is the basis for current measures of production. 
Under separate accounting, accounting records are maintained sepa-
rately for each entity within an MNE. As a result, accounting measures 
such as costs and profi ts are attributed to affi liated entities based on 
each entity’s purpose within the structure of the MNE and not neces-
sarily on the economic activity of the entity. In other words, account-
ing measures recorded under separate accounting may not accurately 
refl ect the economic activity of the entity. Formulary apportionment 
is commonly required by U.S. state corporate income tax regulations 
to determine the income attributable to the state for a corporation that 
operates in multiple states. Rather than keeping separate accounting 
records for operations in each state, the corporation keeps consolidated 
records and attributes income to a state based on prescribed apportion-
ment factors—such as employment, property, and sales—that refl ect 
where income is actually earned.
Residency-based separate accounting may be particularly problem-
atic for statisticians in cases where production is accomplished with 
inputs that are shared by multiple entities within the same MNE. Shared 
inputs may include intangible property such as patents, trademarks, for-
mulas, processes, and so forth, or they may include headquarter ser-
vices such as accounting, fi nance, and marketing, which do not need to 
be physically located at an entity in order to provide service (Helpman 
1984; Markusen 1984, 1997). If a statistician is able to directly observe 
the economic activity of the entity in order to determine actual produc-
tion, residency-based separate accounting may pose no particular prob-
lem. However, if the statistician only has accounting data for the entity, 
then identifying the location of production, which is the essence of the 
residency-based framework, is particularly diffi cult when the entity 
employs relatively few or no local inputs such as labor or property, 
plant, and equipment (PPE) but reports relatively signifi cant accounting 
measures related to shared inputs. As shared inputs become more com-
mon and as MNE activities increase, challenges encountered under the 
residency-based framework become more important in the U.S. inter-
national transactions accounts (ITAs) and the U.S. National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPAs) (Lipsey 2009, 2010; United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe 2011).
As is consistent with the residency-based framework, the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) attributes production to a foreign 
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affi liate of a U.S. parent according to the country in which the affi liate 
is resident. If the affi liate has little or no physical presence in the coun-
try, the BEA follows the BPM and SNA recommendations to attribute 
production to the affi liate as long as the affi liate is legally incorporated 
or registered in the country. In addition, the BEA measures produc-
tion based on accounting measures reported for the affi liate, and the 
accounting measures are determined under separate accounting accord-
ing to generally accepted U.S. accounting principles. Thus, if an MNE 
is structured in a way that attributes accounting measures to an affi liate 
based on economic activity resulting from shared inputs that are not 
actually employed by the affi liate, production may be attributed to an 
affi liate with no economic activity.
In this chapter, we use formulary apportionment, which is also 
consistent with the residency-based framework, as an alternative for 
separate accounting to measure value-added at foreign affi liates of U.S. 
parents. We fi nd that overall reattributions from foreign affi liates to 
U.S. parents are relatively small—less than 5 percent of total value-
added attributed to all majority-owned foreign affi liates and U.S. par-
ents under separate accounting. In contrast, reattributions across global 
regions including Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle 
East are greater than 10 percent of value-added under separate account-
ing. Moreover, reattributions for foreign affi liates are greater than 10 
percent of value-added under separate accounting for all industry sec-
tors except administration, information, and transportation.
In addition to applying formulary apportionment to reattribute 
value-added, we report preliminary results to reattribute service imports 
and exports between U.S. parents and their foreign affi liates. We fi nd 
a relatively large decrease in imports but no meaningful change in 
exports. The overall effect on gross domestic product (GDP) is only a 
small increase—approximately 0.1 percent. Based on our preliminary 
results, we expect to be able to provide a complete picture of the U.S. 
current account under formulary apportionment in a future paper. 
Using factor shares to evaluate the results, we conclude that value-
added attributed to foreign affi liates and U.S. parents under formulary 
apportionment yields a picture of measured production by industry 
sector and country that is more congruent with economic activity than 
related measures generated under separate accounting. Thus, formulary 
apportionment appears to be a viable alternative to separate accounting 
under the residency-based framework of the BPM and the SNA.
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Following this introductory section, the chapter is organized into 
the fi ve sections that follow. The next section provides an overview of 
related literature. The third section outlines the BEA’s current frame-
work for measuring production based on residency-based separate 
accounting and outlines the proposed framework for attributing pro-
duction based on residency-based formulary apportionment. The fourth 
section describes the BEA’s survey data on the operations of MNEs. 
The fi fth section presents the results of the formulary apportionment. 
The last section offers a conclusion.
RELATED LITERATURE
To provide context for our work, we draw upon four distinct but 
related lines of literature. First, we borrow features from the industrial-
organization (IO) literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
trade to outline a simple production model for foreign affi liates that 
underlies our choice of formulary apportionment. Second, we describe 
the international guidelines that provide a framework for organizing 
offi cial statistics on FDI and trade. Third, we review the literature that 
identifi es challenges encountered under the residency-based framework 
and proposes alternative frameworks for organizing offi cial statistics on 
FDI and trade. Fourth and fi nally, we discuss the literature on formu-
lary apportionment as it is applied in international taxation and identify 
features of formulary apportionment as a tool for attributing measured 
production to entities within an MNE.
Industrial-Organization Literature
The IO literature on FDI and trade focuses on adapting general equi-
librium trade models to include endogenous MNEs. Early work explains 
the origination of MNEs based on the organization of production into 
one of two types (Caves 1971): 1) vertical integration (Brainard 1993; 
Helpman 1984) and 2) horizontal integration (Brainard 1997; Markusen 
1984). However, Markusen (1997) argues that the outcomes identifi ed 
by vertical and horizontal models face limitations based on underlying 
assumptions; he constructs an alternative knowledge-capital model.
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Regardless of how production is organized, a useful feature of each 
of the IO models of FDI and trade is the inclusion of a local input and a 
fi rm-specifi c shared input, which can be used jointly by multiple affi li-
ates. Firm-specifi c inputs do not need to be physically present for pro-
duction to take place, but fi rm-specifi c inputs cannot generate produc-
tion without the local input. General equilibrium in each model results 
under assumptions that include foreign affi liates that produce with con-
stant returns to scale and operate in perfectly competitive markets. The 
models also assume that production is separable across affi liates and 
that markets are segmented.
International Guidelines
The international guidelines explain how offi cial FDI and trade sta-
tistics should be constructed. In paragraph 4.11 of the BPM, an economy 
is defi ned as comprising “all the institutional units that are resident in a 
particular economic territory.”2 One of the attributes of an institutional 
unit is the existence of a complete set of accounting records (BPM para. 
4.13[d]; SNA para. 4.2[d]), which implies that the possibility of separate 
accounting is required under the residency-based framework. In addi-
tion, the international guidelines consider the possibility that produc-
tion may be located somewhere other than the economic territory where 
an entity is legally incorporated or registered. In particular, paragraph 
4.134 of the BPM states, “A legal entity is resident in the economic ter-
ritory under whose laws the entity is incorporated or registered. . . . It 
must not be combined with entities resident in other economies. If [the 
entity] has substantial operations in another economy, a branch may be 
identifi ed there.” In this case, the branch is treated as an institutional 
unit subject to the criterion for accounting records (BPM para. 4.27[a]), 
and the operations of the branch are to be attributed to the correspond-
ing economic territory (BPM para. 4.26). Thus, as is consistent with 
the IO literature on FDI and trade, the international guidelines consider 
the possibility that factors of production may be located somewhere 
within an MNE other than with an affi liate to which production would 
be attributed based merely on legal incorporation or registration of the 
affi liate. Furthermore, the criterion for accounting records does not rule 
out formulary apportionment as an alternative to separate accounting 
for either the measurement or the attribution of production at the affi li-
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ate. The intent of the guidelines is that production is attributed where it 
is actually taking place.
Alternative Measurement Frameworks
Challenges in implementing the residency-based framework are 
widely addressed in international discourse and academic literature. The 
United Nations recently published a collection of papers that address the 
impact of globalization on national accounts (United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe 2011). An entire chapter is dedicated to identi-
fying and explaining challenges associated with allocating production 
to national economies under a residency-based framework. Among the 
challenges are the transfers of intangible property and the attribution of 
associated income. However, the chapter does not offer any analysis to 
identify the extent to which allocation of production may be incongru-
ent with actual economic activity. Lipsey (2009, 2010) offers evidence 
of possible distortions in U.S. outbound FDI and trade fl ows present in 
aggregate data published by the BEA for service industries. Lipsey sug-
gests the distortions are a result of global structuring of MNEs and the 
mobility of productive resources in the service industries. As a result, he 
suggests but does not develop an alternative location-based framework 
to accompany the residency-based framework for measuring trade in 
services.
Early work also suggests supplemental frameworks for organiz-
ing FDI and trade statistics based on ownership. Baldwin and Kimura 
(1998) fi nd that net sales activities of U.S. affi liates of foreign-based 
MNEs to Americans and of foreign affi liates of U.S.-based MNEs to 
foreigners are almost as high as measured U.S. imports and exports, 
respectively. Kimura and Baldwin (1998) fi nd that FDI has an even 
larger role in the Japanese economy. In each case, the authors use their 
results to highlight the usefulness of an ownership-based framework. 
Landefeld, Whichard, and Lowe (1993) explain and evaluate 
ownership-based trade measures and propose an alternative residency-
based trade measure that includes an adjustment for the net effect on 
the U.S. economy of the operations of U.S.-owned companies abroad 
and of foreign-owned companies in the United States. As a result of 
the early work on alternative organizing frameworks, the BEA pub-
lishes annual ownership-based measures of the current account of the 
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ITAs as a supplement to the residency-based framework (Whichard and 
Lowe 1995). The ownership-based framework is fully consistent with 
the international standards of the BPM and the SNA and combines with 
the residency-based measures of U.S. imports and exports the transac-
tions of affi liates that are not captured in the residency-based frame-
work. While the ownership-based framework may address some of 
the challenges encountered under the residency-based framework, the 
ownership-based framework is not intended to identify the location of 
production, which is the centerpiece for national economic accounting 
purposes. 
Formulary Apportionment Literature
While formulary apportionment is historically used in U.S. multi-
state taxation practice, the treatment of global income under formu-
lary apportionment is also explored in research. In particular, some 
researchers suggest formulary apportionment as an alternative to the 
complexities of determining transfer prices and applying the arm’s 
length standard in the determination of international tax obligations 
of MNEs. Martens-Weiner (2006) discusses the problems related to 
replacing separate accounting for companies operating in Europe with a 
system of formulary apportionment for the European Union. The issues 
span a spectrum including business attitudes toward formulary appor-
tionment, designing an apportionment formula, and tax administration 
and compliance. 
In related work, Fuest, Hemmelgarn, and Ramb (2007) fi nd that 
smaller European countries that currently attract a relatively large tax 
base under separate accounting would have a much smaller tax base 
under formulary apportionment. Avi-Yonah and Clausing (2007) pro-
pose a system of formulary apportionment that would include sales 
as a single apportionment factor. Avi-Yonah and Clausing argue that 
their proposed method would protect the U.S. tax base by preventing 
the practice of income-shifting to low-tax countries. Avi-Yonah (2010) 
proposes a hybrid system in which separate accounting is used to the 
extent that income can be attributed based on observed determinants 
and the residual profi t is attributed under formulary apportionment. 
Altshuler and Grubert (2010) simulate fi rm behavior and U.S. revenue 
collection and fi nd that different responses to tax incentives yield simi-
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lar revenue under separate accounting and formulary apportionment. 
In contrast, Hines (2010) presents evidence that the determination of 
international tax obligations under formulary apportionment may dis-
tort actual income attributable to a given country because of income 
that is unexplained by apportionment factors; this may lead to inef-
fi cient allocation of productive resources because of differences in tax 
rates across countries. 
We are not aware of any previous study that applies formulary 
apportionment to attribute measured production to entities within an 
MNE, but the attribution of measured production under formulary 
apportionment does not invoke the policy concerns described above for 
international taxation, because MNEs presumably do not make operat-
ing decisions based on surveys intended solely for statistical purposes. 
However, formulary apportionment could affect the picture of global 
production, which could have policy implications. Given the defi nitions 
and concepts underlying the international guidelines for measuring offi -
cial FDI and trade statistics and the challenges encountered under the 
resulting residency-based framework when applied to MNEs, we next 
draw upon the related IO literature to outline a simple production model 
for foreign affi liates and construct a formulary framework for attribut-
ing measured production to foreign affi liates of U.S. parents.
MEASURING PRODUCTION
Before we outline the formulary framework to attribute produc-
tion to foreign affi liates of U.S. parents, we discuss a production model 
based in part on Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), Helpman (1984), and 
Markusen (1984, 1997). Consider an MNE with one U.S. parent and 
one or more foreign affi liates. An affi liate engages in actual production, 
denoted as Q*, with locally purchased inputs such as labor and PPE, 
denoted as L, and shared inputs such as intangible property and head-
quarter services, denoted as H, as follows:3 
(8.1) Q* = f (L,H) .       
 
While we do not assume a particular functional form, we do assume 
that shared inputs cannot be utilized without local inputs (i.e., L > 0). In 
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contrast, we assume that local inputs do not necessarily require shared 
inputs (i.e., H ≥ 0).
In practice, a statistician does not observe actual production for the 
affi liate. However, value-added, denoted as Qε, can be measured for 
the affi liate with one of two approaches. As one approach, value-added 
can be measured as the difference between gross sales and intermedi-
ate inputs. In this case, a discrepancy exists between actual production 
and measured production to the extent that gross sales and intermedi-
ate inputs include related party transactions that do not refl ect market 
prices. Alternatively, value-added can be measured as the sum of costs 
incurred (other than costs of intermediate inputs) and profi ts earned in 
production. In this case, costs and profi ts refl ect returns to local inputs 
and shared inputs, and a discrepancy exists between actual production 
and measured production to the extent that returns accruing to local and 
shared inputs are over- or underattributed to the affi liate. While we can 
assume returns accruing to local inputs are properly attributed because 
they are generally determined from market transactions, we cannot 
be sure that returns to shared inputs are properly attributed, given the 
mobility of shared inputs and their related returns as well as the possible 
lack of associated market transactions. In either case, the discrepancy, 
denoted as ε, between actual production, Q*, and measured production, 
Qε, can be written as follows:
(8.2)  ε = Q* − Q ε.       
  
The objective is to choose a measurement approach to minimize ε. 
Determining the magnitude of ε is diffi cult, but Lipsey (2009, 2010) 
provides some evidence of possible distortions in statistics measured 
for foreign affi liates of U.S. parents.
Residency-Based Separate Accounting
As is consistent with the residency-based framework of the BPM 
and the SNA, the BEA attributes value-added to a foreign affi liate 
according to the country in which the affi liate is resident. If the affi liate 
has little or no physical presence in the country, the BEA follows the 
BPM and SNA recommendations to attribute value-added to the affi li-
ate, as long as the affi liate is legally incorporated or registered in the 
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country. The BEA measures value-added as the sum of costs incurred 
and profi ts earned in production. Both costs and profi ts are deter-
mined under separate accounting, according to generally accepted U.S. 
accounting principles. Under separate accounting, accounting records 
are maintained separately for each entity within an MNE. As a result, 
if the MNE is structured in a way that attributes costs and profi ts to an 
affi liate based partially or solely on economic activity related to shared 
inputs, measured value-added may be attributed to an affi liate with rela-
tively few or no local inputs and relatively little or no economic activity. 
In other words, value-added attributed to the affi liate may be distorted 
to the extent that costs and profi ts refl ect economic activity related to 
shared inputs that are not actually employed by the affi liate.4 
Figure 8.1 depicts each of the components and subcomponents of 
value-added that are published as part of the BEA’s multinational sta-
tistics. Costs incurred include four components: 1) compensation, 2) 
capital consumption allowance (CCA), 3) indirect business taxes (IBT), 
and 4) net interest paid (IP). Compensation includes payroll taxes. CCA 
is an accounting rather than an economic measure of depreciation.5 IBT 
includes taxes related to business registry and operations other than 
income taxes and payroll taxes.6 IBT is adjusted for government subsi-
dies received and production royalty payments to foreign governments 
for natural resources. Net IP includes interest expensed or capitalized 
less interest income. The profi ts component is referred to as profi t-type 
return (PTR) in the BEA’s multinational statistics and includes net 
income adjusted for foreign income taxes paid, depletion, income from 
equity investments in foreign affi liates, and realized and unrealized 
gains and losses.
Using the context of our production model, we identify the com-
ponents of value-added that refl ect returns to local inputs and to shared 
inputs. In particular, we consider compensation and CCA to only refl ect 
returns to local inputs. Compensation and CCA are returns for ser-
vices provided by labor and PPE, respectively, which need to be physi-
cally located at an affi liate in order to provide service. In contrast, IBT 
refl ects payments to the host government for the privilege of existing 
in a location, such as fees for licenses and registration, in addition to 
payments for conducting operations in the location, such as sales taxes 
and property taxes. Licenses and registration do not require a physical 
location, but we do consider sales taxes for unaffi liated sales and prop-
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erty taxes to require a physical location. Likewise, net IP and PTR can 
refl ect returns to local inputs, shared inputs, or both. However, absent 
any compensation and CCA (and IBT related to operations), measured 
value-added that includes only net IP and PTR (and IBT related to reg-
istration) under separate accounting cannot be correct, according to our 
model. According to our assumption for L in Equation (8.1), production 
is impossible without local inputs. In other words, separate accounting 
may not minimize ε in Equation (8.2). We refer to IBT, net IP, and PTR 
collectively as the shared input components of value-added. We turn 
now to formulary apportionment as an alternative to separate account-
ing for attributing value-added to foreign affi liates.
Figure 8.1  Measurement Framework for Value-Added Attributable to 
Foreign Affi liates and U.S. Parents
 
Value-added = 
  
Costs 
incurred = 
  
Compensation 
+ 
CCA 
+ 
IBT =
  
Taxes (except payroll and income) 
+ 
    Royalties paid 
  
  
– 
Subsidies received 
+ 
Net IP =
  Interest paid 
    – 
  
  Interest received 
+ 
Profits 
earned = 
  
PTR =
  
Net income 
+ 
Foreign income taxes paid 
+ 
    Depletion 
    
– 
Income from equity investments 
– 
Realized and unrealized G/L 
 
NOTE: “CCA” stands for capital consumption allowance; “IBT” stands for indirect 
business taxes; “IP” stands for interest paid; “PTR” stands for profi t-type return; and 
“G/L” stands for gain/loss.
SOURCE:  Authors’ summary based on Table 10 of Mataloni and Goldberg (1994).
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Residency-Based Formulary Apportionment
While the BPM and the SNA recommend the residency-based frame-
work for attributing measured production to entities within an MNE, 
attribution under the framework is not limited to separate accounting 
and may presumably include formulary apportionment. In contrast to 
separate accounting, formulary apportionment is based on consolidated 
accounting measures. Formulary apportionment is commonly required 
by U.S. state corporate income tax regulations to determine the income 
attributable to the state for a corporation that operates in multiple states. 
Rather than keeping separate accounting records for operations in each 
state, the corporation keeps consolidated records and attributes income 
to states based on prescribed apportionment factors that ideally refl ect 
where income is actually earned based on economic activity. Appor-
tionment factors generally include factors related to employment, prop-
erty, and sales, which refl ect the presence of local inputs and economic 
activity specifi c to the entity.
As is consistent with our production model, consider an MNE m 
with one U.S. parent and one or more foreign affi liates. Let qn denote 
measured production under separate accounting for each entity n (i.e., 
the U.S. parent and its foreign affi liates) belonging to the MNE m. For 
fl exibility, q may include total value-added or simply include the shared-
input components of value-added. Likewise, let xj,n denote apportion-
ment factor j for each entity n, and let αj denote the weight associated 
with apportionment factor j, where 1
j
j . Apportionment factor j 
should refl ect economic activity. Under formulary apportionment, mea-
sured production (denoted as −qn) attributable to entity n within MNE m 
is calculated as follows:
(8.3) 
  
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n
nq 







 
 mn .  
    .  
As noted under the horizontal brackets in Equation (8.3), measured 
production attributable to an entity under formulary apportionment, −qn ,
is a weighted average of the consolidated measured production deter-
Production
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mined for the MNE (i.e., the U.S. parent and its foreign affi liates) under 
separate accounting. Each apportionment weight is a combination of 
each apportionment factor and its associated weight.
We apply data to q in Equation (8.3) for the shared-input compo-
nents of value-added (i.e., IBT, net IP, and PTR) for foreign affi liates 
and their U.S. parents. We then add the shared input components attrib-
uted to each entity under formulary apportionment to the local input 
components of value-added (i.e., compensation and CCA) attributed to 
each entity under separate accounting in order to obtain a new measure 
of value-added for each entity under formulary apportionment.7 
DATA
We use survey data for 2009 that are collected by the BEA from 
MNEs on direct investment operations and that are used to compile the 
BEA’s published statistics on the activities of MNEs. The data include 
apportionment factors related to employment, property, and sales. We 
focus attention on results obtained for foreign affi liates classifi ed in 
select service-industry sectors because services are a growing compo-
nent of MNE activities and because of the role shared inputs potentially 
play in the production attributed to foreign affi liates classifi ed in the 
select service industry sectors (Lipsey 2010). The select service indus-
try sectors include administration; fi nance; information; insurance; 
management of companies; miscellaneous; professional, scientifi c, and 
technical (PST); and real estate and leasing. 
Data on Operations 
We use operations data collected for U.S. parents and their majority-
owned foreign affi liates (MOFAs) in the 2009 Benchmark Survey of 
U.S. Direct Investment Abroad. A foreign affi liate is an enterprise that 
has more than 10 percent of its voting stock owned by a U.S. parent. 
A MOFA is a foreign affi liate in which the combined direct and indi-
rect ownership interest of all U.S. interests is more than 50 percent. 
A U.S. parent is defi ned as a U.S. person with an investment interest, 
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either directly or indirectly, of 10 percent or more in a foreign business 
enterprise. 
Benchmark-operations survey forms are required to be completed 
for all U.S. parents (Form BE-10A). In addition, benchmark-operations 
survey forms are required for each MOFA with more than $80 million 
in assets, sales, or net income (net loss) (Form BE-10B).8 Data used in 
this study for a given U.S. parent pertain only to the activities of the par-
ent. Data for a given foreign affi liate pertain only to the activities of the 
affi liate. Data collected on the operations survey forms include income 
statement information and balance sheet information. Income statement 
information includes sales by type (i.e., goods, services, and investment 
income), location, and affi liation. In addition, income statement infor-
mation includes detailed expenses such as compensation, depreciation, 
interest, and taxes. The BEA uses information from the income state-
ment to measure value-added for each affi liate. Balance sheet informa-
tion includes details regarding assets, liabilities, and owner’s equity. 
Asset details include PPE. 
Apportionment Factors
The choice of apportionment factors and their associated weights 
infl uences the results obtained from formulary apportionment. We con-
sider three apportionment factors that are available in the operations 
data: 1) compensation, 2) net PPE, and 3) unaffi liated sales. Compen-
sation and net PPE refl ect local inputs employed in production. Unaf-
fi liated sales may also refl ect local inputs that may not be refl ected 
in compensation and net PPE. If an affi liate has no compensation or 
net PPE, production is still attributed to the affi liate under formulary 
apportionment if unaffi liated sales are greater than zero. Likewise, if 
an affi liate has no unaffi liated sales, production is still attributed to the 
affi liate under formulary apportionment if compensation or net PPE is 
greater than zero. In other words, production attributed to the affi liate 
by Equation (8.3) is assumed to be proportional to the economic activ-
ity reported for the affi liate.9 
We report the results from weighting compensation by 60 per-
cent, net PPE by 25 percent, and unaffi liated sales by 15 percent.10 We 
determine the factor weights based on each factor’s share of the mean 
value-added, as calculated by using coeffi cients from a regression of 
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value-added on the apportionment factors. We initially determine fac-
tor weights separately for two subsamples of the data: 1) MOFAs and 
U.S. parents classifi ed in select service industry sectors and 2) MOFAs 
and U.S. parents classifi ed in all other industry sectors. However, even 
though the coeffi cient estimates are statistically different for the two 
subsamples, the resulting factor weights from each subsample are 
nearly identical because of differences in the subsample means.11 Thus, 
we apply the factor weights obtained from the combined sample of 
MOFAs and U.S. parents classifi ed in any industry sector. In addition 
to obtaining reasonable factor weights, the explanatory power of the 
apportionment factors is high (i.e., adjusted r-squared = 0.84).
RESULTS
Our goal is to use formulary apportionment as a substitute for sepa-
rate accounting to reattribute measured value-added to foreign affi li-
ates of U.S. parents. Our primary approach is to consolidate the shared-
input components of value-added (i.e., IBT, net IP, and PTR) measured 
under separate accounting for a given MNE (i.e., the U.S. parent and 
its MOFAs) and reattribute to all entities within the MNE (i.e., the U.S. 
parent and its MOFAs) based on each entity’s apportionment weight. In 
this case, value-added for an entity within the MNE includes compensa-
tion and CCA under separate accounting plus the shared-input compo-
nents reattributed under formulary apportionment.
We divide the discussion of the results into four subsections: 1) 
reporting value-added and the related reattributions under formulary 
apportionment, 2) evaluating value-added under formulary apportion-
ment relative to value-added under separate accounting, 3) interpreting 
the results in the context of our production model, and 4) discussing 
implications for the U.S. current account.
Value-Added and Reattributions under Formulary Apportionment
Table 8.1 summarizes value-added by industry sector and by global 
region for MOFAs and U.S. parents. For reference, the fi rst three col-
umns report published value-added determined under separate account-
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  MOFAs U.S. parents Total MOFAs U.S. parents Total
 Select service industry sectors    
1 Administration 25.1 59.1 84.2 27.2 60.6 87.8
2 Finance 66.9 192.7 259.6 48.7 206.7 255.4
3 Information 51.0 287.6 338.7 50.7 294.6 345.2
4 Insurance 13.8 67.4 81.2 9.9 74.7 84.6
5 Management of companies −14.5 −1.3 −15.7 3.2 – 0.6 2.7
6 Miscellaneous services 10.3 28.1 38.4 8.4 28.9 37.3
7 Professional, scientifi c, technical 78.5 177.5 256.1 88.3 176.2 264.5
8 Real estate and rental and leasing 22.7 34.5 57.2 14.1 35.7 49.9
9 Subtotals 254.0 845.6 1,099.6 250.6 876.8 1,127.4
 Other industry sectors    
10 Accommodation and food services 14.3 52.7 67.0 18.2 49.1 67.3
11 Construction 4.9 22.1 27.0 (D) (D) (D)
12 Farming, fi shing, forestry 0.9 2.2 3.1 (D) (D) (D)
13 Health care and social assistance 1.5 31.8 33.3 (D) (D) (D)
14 Manufacturing 478.2 1,034.1 1,512.3 411.1 1,147.7 1,558.8
15 Mining 153.7 76.1 229.8 104.4 81.4 185.7
16 Retail trade 57.1 238.6 295.7 50.8 241.0 291.7
17 Transportation and warehousing 18.1 106.1 124.3 17.0 106.9 123.9
18 Utilities 9.5 62.0 71.5 (D) (D) (D)
Table 8.1  Value-Added by Industry Sector and by Global Region (billions of US$)
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NOTE: A “(D)” denotes data suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies. Blank cell = data not applicable. Some totals 
or subtotals may be slightly off because of rounding.
SOURCE: The fi rst three columns, under the heading "Separate accounting," include statistics published online in the BEA’s fi nancial and 
operating data on direct investment and multinational companies (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_MNC.cfm). The second three col-
umns, under the heading "Formulary apportionment," include the authors’ calculations after value-added is attributed under Equation (8.3). 
19 Wholesale trade 152.7 124.4 277.1 122.4 128.6 251.1
20 Subtotals 891.0 1,750.1 2,641.1 741.1 1,872.2 2,613.3
21 Totals for industry sectors 1,145.0 2,595.8 3,740.7 991.7 2,749.0 3,740.7
 Global regions    
22 Africa 44.9 44.9 29.7 29.7
23 Asia 241.1 241.1 210.7 210.7
24 Canada 113.7 113.7 111.3 111.3
25 Europe 599.2 599.2 523.7 523.7
26 Latin America 128.4 128.4 102.3 102.3
27 Middle East 17.7 17.7 14.0 14.0
28 United States  2,595.8 2,595.8  2,749.0 2,749.0
29 Totals for global regions 1,145.0 2,595.8 3,740.7 991.7 2,749.0 3,740.7
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ing. The second three columns of Table 8.1 present results determined 
under formulary apportionment in Equation (8.3). Table 8.2 reports 
the dollar differences and the percentage differences between value-
added under formulary apportionment and value-added under separate 
accounting from Table 8.1. Table 8.2 shows overall reattributions, reat-
tributions by global region, and reattributions by industry sector.
Overall Reattributions
Line 21 of Table 8.2 shows that the overall reattribution of value-
added from MOFAs to U.S. parents is $153.3 billion under formulary 
apportionment. The percentage decrease in value-added attributable 
to MOFAs is 13.4 percent (column 4), and the percentage increase 
in value-added attributable to U.S. parents is 5.9 percent (column 5). 
Overall, reattributions are small relative to total value-added attributed 
to all MOFAs and U.S. parents under separate accounting—less than 5 
percent. 
Reattributions by Global Region
In contrast to overall reattributions from MOFAs to U.S. parents, 
reattributions across some global regions are relatively large. In particu-
lar, the percentage decreases in value-added are greater than 10 percent 
for Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East but less 
than 10 percent for Canada (Table 8.2, column 4). Under both formulary 
apportionment and separate accounting, more value-added is attributed 
to MOFAs in Europe than in any other global region (Table 8.1, line 
25). However, Canada and Latin America change places under formu-
lary apportionment in the distribution of value-added by global region 
(Table 8.1, lines 24 and 26). Under formulary apportionment, more 
production is attributable to MOFAs in Canada than in Latin America. 
Thus, in addition to less measured production attributable to MOFAs in 
each of the six global regions, there are interregional changes in the dis-
tribution of measured production attributable to MOFAs of U.S. parents 
as a result of formulary apportionment.
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Reattributions by Industry Sector
Reattributions across some industry sectors are also relatively large. 
The percentage changes in value-added are greater than 10 percent for 
MOFAs classifi ed in all industry sectors except administration, infor-
mation, and transportation (Table 8.2, column 4). Reattributions greater 
than 10 percent also result for U.S. parents classifi ed in insurance, man-
agement, and manufacturing (Table 8.2, column 5).
Under both formulary apportionment and separate accounting, 
more value-added is attributed to MOFAs classifi ed in PST than for 
any other select service sector (Table 8.1, line 7), and more value-added 
is attributed to MOFAs classifi ed in manufacturing than for any of the 
other industry sectors (Table 8.1, line 14). The distribution of value-
added under formulary apportionment is also the same for MOFAs clas-
sifi ed in all other select service sectors except fi nance and information 
(Table 8.1, lines 2 and 3, respectively). However, the distribution of 
value-added under formulary apportionment changes for MOFAs clas-
sifi ed in accommodation, mining, transportation, and wholesale (Table 
8.1, lines 10, 15, 17, and 19, respectively). The industry distribution of 
value-added under formulary apportionment does not change for U.S. 
parents. Thus, we observe an interindustry change in the distribution 
of measured production attributable to MOFAs but not to U.S. parents. 
As is consistent both with overall reattributions and with reattri-
butions by global region, value-added reported in Table 8.1 for each 
industry sector is generally higher under formulary apportionment for 
U.S. parents and lower for MOFAs. While this is not directly observ-
able in Table 8.2, we look at the underlying data to trace reattributions 
to U.S. parents from MOFAs. Reattributions to U.S. parents classifi ed 
in manufacturing are due in large part to reattributions from MOFAs 
classifi ed in manufacturing and mining. Likewise, increases for U.S. 
parents classifi ed in information and manufacturing are explained in 
large part by decreases for MOFAs classifi ed in leasing. There are also 
reattributions from MOFAs classifi ed in fi nance to U.S. parents clas-
sifi ed in insurance. The remaining reattributions are among MOFAs 
classifi ed in management and MOFAs and U.S. parents classifi ed in 
fi nance, insurance, miscellaneous, PST, retail, and wholesale.
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  MOFAs U.S. parents Total MOFAs U.S. parents Total
 Select service industry sectors    
1 Administration 2.0 1.5 3.6 8.1 2.6 4.3
2 Finance −18.2 14.0 −4.2 −27.2 7.3 −1.6
3 Information −0.4 6.9 6.6 −0.7 2.4 1.9
4 Insurance −3.9 7.3 3.4 −28.0 10.8 4.2
5 Management of companies 17.7 0.7 18.4 122.5 53.5 116.9
6 Miscellaneous services −1.9 0.8 −1.0 −18.1 2.9 −2.7
7 Professional, scientifi c, technical 9.8 −1.3 8.4 12.4 −0.7 3.3
8 Real estate and rental and leasing −8.6 1.2 −7.3 −37.8 3.6 −12.8
9 Subtotals −3.4 31.2 27.8 −1.3 3.7 2.5
 Other industry sectors    
10 Accommodation and food services 3.8 −3.5 0.3 26.6 −6.7 0.4
11 Construction (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) (D)
12 Farming, fi shing, forestry (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) (D)
13 Health care and social assistance (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) (D)
14 Manufacturing −67.0 113.5 46.5 −14.0 11.0 3.1
15 Mining −49.3 5.2 −44.1 −32.1 6.9 −19.2
16 Retail trade –6.3 2.4 –4.0 −11.1 1.0 −1.3
Table 8.2  Value-Added Reattributable under Formulary Apportionment
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17 Transportation and warehousing −1.1 0.8 −0.3 −6.1 0.7 −0.3
18 Utilities (D) (D) (D) (D) (D) (D)
19 Wholesale trade −30.3 4.2 −26.1 −19.8 3.4 −9.4
20 Subtotals −149.9 122.1 −27.8 −16.8 7.0 −1.1
21 Totals for industry sectors −153.3 153.3 0.0 −13.4 5.9 0.0
 Global regions    
22 Africa −15.2 −15.2 −33.8 −33.8
23 Asia −30.4 −30.4 −12.6 −12.6
24 Canada −2.4 −2.4 −2.1 −2.1
25 Europe −75.5 −75.5 −12.6 −12.6
26 Latin America −26.2 −26.2 −20.4 −20.4
27 Middle East −3.6 −3.6 −20.5 −20.5
28 United States  153.3 153.3  5.9 5.9
29 Totals for global regions −153.3 153.3 0.0 −13.4 5.9 0.0
NOTE:  A “(D)” denotes data suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.  The values for “Billions of US$” (fi rst three 
columns) are calculated by subtracting value-added under separate accounting from value-added under formulary apportionment. Per-
centages (second three columns) are calculated by dividing the values for ‟Billions of US$” by the absolute value of value-added under 
separate accounting. Some totals or subtotals may be slightly off because of rounding. Blank cell = data not applicable.
SOURCE:  Authors’ tabulations.  
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Evaluation of Value-Added under Separate Accounting and 
Formulary Apportionment
We calculate approximate factor shares of value-added using the 
local input components and shared input components of value-added. 
Factor shares are informative because they reveal the relative contribu-
tions of local inputs and shared inputs to total measured production. 
We interpret factor shares using global factor shares as a reference. 
Published returns to local inputs as a share of published value-added 
are 52.8 percent for all MOFAs and 75.3 percent for all U.S. parents. 
Published returns to local inputs for all MOFAs and all U.S. parents 
combined are 68.4 percent of published value-added for all MOFAs and 
all U.S. parents combined. Thus, we use 68.4 percent as a reference for 
factor shares based on local inputs for both separate accounting and for-
mulary apportionment. Likewise, we use 31.6 percent as a reference for 
factor shares based on shared inputs. In other words, we expect the rela-
tive contributions of local inputs and of shared inputs to total measured 
production to be about 68.4 percent and 31.6 percent, respectively.
Given differences in production functions, we expect some variation 
in factor shares across MOFAs and U.S. parents, across industry sec-
tors and global regions, and across industries and countries. In addition, 
the factor shares are affected to the extent that returns to local inputs 
are included in the shared input components of value-added. However, 
given our model, in which affi liate production is a function of both 
local inputs and shared inputs, we consider differences in factor shares 
between formulary apportionment and separate accounting based on 
local inputs to be indicative of possible over- or underattributed returns 
to entities, based on shared inputs under separate accounting.12 
Table 8.3 reports factor shares based on local input components 
under separate accounting and under formulary apportionment. Table 
8.4 reports factor shares based on shared input components. Overall, the 
factor shares refl ect the net reattribution of value-added from MOFAs to 
U.S. parents presented in Table 8.2. In particular, the local input shares 
of value-added increase for MOFAs and decrease for U.S. parents under 
formulary apportionment (Table 8.3, line 21). In contrast, the shared 
input shares of value-added decrease for MOFAs and increase for U.S. 
parents (Table 8.4, line 21). Local input shares are lower for MOFAs 
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than for U.S. parents, and shared input shares are higher for MOFAs 
than for U.S. parents; however, local input shares and shared input 
shares for MOFAs and U.S. parents combined are generally closer to 
the global reference points under formulary apportionment.
Across all industry sectors, local input shares and shared input 
shares display considerable variation under separate accounting and 
under formulary apportionment. Local input shares are generally higher 
for the select service industry sectors than for the other industry sec-
tors. Local input shares for MOFAs classifi ed in fi nance, information, 
leasing, management, manufacturing, mining, miscellaneous, transpor-
tation, and wholesale increase under formulary apportionment. Con-
versely, local input shares for MOFAs classifi ed in accommodation, 
administration, insurance, and PST decrease under formulary appor-
tionment. These results imply that separate accounting may result in 
over- or underattributed returns to local inputs in some industries. 
Across global regions, local input shares increase by more than 10 
percentage points for Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East and by 
less than 10 percentage points for Asia, Canada, and Europe. Increases 
in Latin America are driven in large part by considerable increases in 
Barbados, Bermuda, and the UK Caribbean islands. Increases in Asia 
are explained primarily by increases in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singa-
pore, and Thailand. Increases in Europe are a result in part of increases 
in Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Norway. 
We do not report numerical results for individual countries, in order to 
avoid disclosure of individual companies.
Economic Interpretation
According to our production model and the related empirical frame-
work, value-added may be overattributed to a MOFA under separate 
accounting based on the availability of shared inputs within an MNE. 
The shared input components of value-added (i.e., IBT, net IP, and 
PTR) refl ect, in part, returns to shared inputs that may not actually be 
employed by the MOFA to the extent refl ected under separate account-
ing. In contrast, formulary apportionment attributes returns to shared 
inputs based on the MOFA’s proportion of economic activity refl ected 
in the chosen apportionment factors. As is consistent with our produc-
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 MOFAs U.S. parents Total MOFAs U.S. parents Total
 Select service industry sectors     
1 Administration 89.5 86.4 87.3 82.8 84.2 83.8
2 Finance 72.9 91.4 99.3 99.9 97.2 97.7
3 Information 63.8 66.0 65.7 64.3 64.5 64.4
4 Insurance 92.1 81.2 83.9 82.0 87.0 86.4
5 Management of companies 12.5 20.4 13.2 73.8 29.8 94.1
6 Miscellaneous services 61.2 82.3 76.6 74.7 78.8 77.8
7 Professional, scientifi c, technical 74.5 73.5 73.8 66.2 74.0 71.4
8 Real estate and rental and leasing 51.8 81.2 69.5 83.2 78.4 79.8
9 Subtotals 77.0 85.6 83.6 78.0 82.5 81.5
      
 Other industry sectors     
10 Accommodation and food services 77.1 71.4 72.6 60.9 76.5 72.2
11 Construction 76.3 89.7 87.3 (D) (D) (D)
12 Farming, fi shing, forestry 79.8 99.1 93.4 (D) (D) (D)
13 Health care and social assistance 73.3 79.1 78.8 (D) (D) (D)
14 Manufacturing 51.3 72.8 66.0 59.7 65.6 64.1
15 Mining 28.2 57.5 37.9 41.5 53.8 46.9
16 Retail trade 46.5 60.5 57.8 52.3 59.9 58.6
17 Transportation and warehousing 69.9 76.7 75.7 74.4 76.1 75.9
18 Utilities 39.9 49.7 48.4 (D) (D) (D)
Table 8.3  Factor Shares Based on Local Input Components
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NOTE: A “(D)” denotes data suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.  We calculate factor shares based on local 
inputs by dividing the sum of compensation and CCA by the sum of compensation, CCA, and the absolute value of shared inputs [i.e., 
local input share = (compensation + CCA) ÷ (compensation + CCA +│IBT + net IP + PTR│)]. Blank cell = data not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ tabulations. 
19 Wholesale trade 39.5 74.7 55.3 49.3 72.3 61.1
20 Subtotals 45.9 70.3 62.1 55.2 65.8 62.7
21 Totals for industry sectors 52.8 75.3 68.4 60.9 71.1 68.4
      
 Global regions     
22 Africa 29.1 29.1 44.0 44.0
23 Asia 51.8 51.8 59.3 59.3
24 Canada 63.0 63.0 64.3 64.3
25 Europe 54.6 54.6 62.5 62.5
26 Latin America 46.3 46.3 58.2 58.2
27 Middle East 45.2 45.2 56.9 56.9
28 United States  75.3 75.3  71.1 71.1
29 Totals for global regions 52.8 75.3 68.4 60.9 71.1 68.4
H
ousem
an and M
andel V
ol2.indb   253
H
ousem
an and M
andel V
ol2.indb   253
2/16/2015   8:40:16 A
M
2/16/2015   8:40:16 A
M
254    Separate accounting (%) Formulary apportionment (%)
  MOFAs U.S. parents Total MOFAs U.S. parents Total
 Select service industry sectors     
1 Administration 10.5 13.6 12.7 17.2 15.8 16.2
2 Finance 27.1 8.6 0.7 0.1 2.8 2.3
3 Information 36.2 34.0 34.3 35.7 35.5 35.6
4 Insurance 7.9 18.8 16.1 18.0 13.0 13.6
5 Management of companies 87.5 79.6 86.8 26.2 70.2 5.9
6 Miscellaneous services 38.8 17.7 23.4 25.3 21.2 22.2
7 Professional, scientifi c, technical 25.5 26.5 26.2 33.8 26.0 28.6
8 Real estate and rental and leasing 48.2 18.8 30.5 16.8 21.6 20.2
9 Subtotals 23.0 14.4 16.4 22.0 17.5 18.5
      
 Other industry sectors     
10 Accommodation and food services 22.9 28.6 27.4 39.1 23.5 27.8
11 Construction 23.7 10.3 12.7 (D) (D) (D)
12 Farming, fi shing, forestry 20.2 0.9 6.6 (D) (D) (D)
13 Health care and social assistance 26.7 20.9 21.2 (D) (D) (D)
14 Manufacturing 48.7 27.2 34.0 40.3 34.4 35.9
15 Mining 71.8 42.5 62.1 58.5 46.2 53.1
16 Retail trade 53.5 39.5 42.2 47.7 40.1 41.4
17 Transportation and warehousing 30.1 23.3 24.3 25.6 23.9 24.1
18 Utilities 60.1 50.3 51.6 (D) (D) (D)
Table 8.4  Factor Shares Based on Shared Input Components
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NOTE: A “(D)” denotes data suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.  We calculate factor shares based on shared 
inputs by dividing the absolute value of shared inputs by the sum of compensation, CCA, and the absolute value of shared inputs [i.e., 
shared input share = (│IBT + net IP + PTR│) ÷ (compensation + CCA +│IBT + net IP + PTR│)]. Blank cell = data not applicable.
SOURCE:  Authors’ tabulations.
19 Wholesale trade 60.5 25.3 44.7 50.7 27.7 38.9
20 Subtotals 54.1 29.7 37.9 44.8 34.2 37.3
21 Totals for industry sectors 47.2 24.7 31.6 39.1 28.9 31.6
      
 Global regions     
22 Africa 70.9 70.9 56.0 56.0
23 Asia 48.2 48.2 40.7 40.7
24 Canada 37.0 37.0 35.7 35.7
25 Europe 45.4 45.4 37.5 37.5
26 Latin America 53.7 53.7 41.8 41.8
27 Middle East 54.8 54.8 43.1 43.1
28 United States  24.7 24.7  28.9 28.9
29 Totals for global regions 47.2 24.7 31.6 39.1 28.9 31.6
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tion model, our results for value-added imply that too much production 
is attributed to MOFAs and too little production is attributed to U.S. 
parents under separate accounting.
Given the economic activity embodied in each of the apportion-
ment factors (i.e., compensation, net PPE, and unaffi liated sales), the 
modest overall reattributions from MOFAs to U.S. parents in Table 
8.2 and the relatively large reattributions across some global regions 
in Table 8.2 imply an overstatement of economic activity for MOFAs 
under separate accounting. Likewise, the relatively large reattributions 
across some industry sectors in Table 8.2 and across MOFAs and U.S. 
parents by industry sector in Table 8.2 reveal considerable differences 
in economic activity as refl ected under formulary apportionment and in 
economic activity as refl ected under separate accounting. Value-added 
measures constructed under a method of separate accounting generally 
imply more economic activity than under a method of formulary appor-
tionment for MOFAs classifi ed in fi nance, information, insurance, leas-
ing, manufacturing, mining, miscellaneous, retail, transportation, and 
wholesale and for U.S. parents classifi ed in accommodation and PST. 
In contrast, less economic activity is generally implied under separate 
accounting than under formulary apportionment for MOFAs classifi ed 
in accommodation, administration, management, and PST and for U.S. 
parents classifi ed in industry sectors other than accommodation and 
PST. 
The reattributions reported in Table 8.2 and the factor shares 
reported in Tables 8.3 and 8.4 generally support formulary apportion-
ment as an alternative to separate accounting. Given the results obtained 
for value-added, formulary apportionment appears to yield measures of 
production that are more congruent with economic activity for MOFAs 
and U.S. parents and more consistent with expectations based on global 
factor shares. Thus, formulary apportionment appears to be a viable 
alternative to separate accounting under the residency-based frame-
work of the BPM and the SNA.
Implications for the U.S. Current Account
In addition to applying formulary apportionment to reattribute 
value-added, we apply formulary apportionment to reattribute service 
imports and exports between U.S. parents and their foreign affi liates. 
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Since imports and exports are components of GDP, our results enable 
us to assess the effect on GDP of formulary apportionment as we apply 
it here. However, given data limitations and other practical consider-
ations, our work with the current account is very preliminary and does 
not yet incorporate income payments and receipts. Based on our prelim-
inary results, we expect to be able to provide a complete picture of the 
U.S. current account under formulary apportionment in a future paper.
We use cross-border transactions data collected from U.S. parents 
on service imports and exports with their foreign affi liates for 2008 
because the cross-border transactions data for 2008 have already been 
linked with the operations data, which contain the apportionment fac-
tors (Barefoot and Koncz-Bruner 2012).13 Based on our model, in 
which production is a function of local inputs and shared inputs, we 
do not expect exports by U.S. parents to their foreign affi liates to be 
as affected under formulary apportionment as imports by U.S. parents 
from their foreign affi liates, because the data indicate U.S. parents gen-
erally have a meaningful amount of local inputs. As is consistent with 
our expectations, exports are nearly unchanged under formulary appor-
tionment. However, the overall reattribution of imports from foreign 
affi liates to U.S. parents is $10.9 billion, which is almost 13 percent 
of published private-service imports from affi liated parties (an amount 
totaling $85.2 billion) but only about 3 percent of published total pri-
vate service imports ($371.2 billion).
Given the role imports and exports play as components of GDP, we 
also assess the overall effect of reattributing service imports and exports 
under formulary apportionment. U.S. goods and services imports 
decrease by approximately 0.4 percent, but exports remain unchanged. 
Net exports increase by approximately 1.5 percent. The overall effect 
on GDP is only an approximate 0.1 percent increase. Thus, while reat-
tributions of U.S. service imports and exports under formulary appor-
tionment have a relatively moderate effect on the foreign transactions 
component of GDP and a bit larger effect on the closely related statis-
tics of the ITAs, the impact on GDP is relatively small.14 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The BEA currently measures value-added of foreign affi liates and 
U.S. parents based on separate accounting. Based on a simple produc-
tion model and a related empirical framework, value-added may be over-
attributed to foreign affi liates under separate accounting; this is due to 
the availability of shared inputs within an MNE. In particular, the shared-
input components of value-added (i.e., IBT, net IP, and PTR) refl ect, in 
part, returns to shared inputs that may not actually be employed by for-
eign affi liates to the extent refl ected under separate accounting. In this 
chapter, we use formulary apportionment as an alternative for separate 
accounting to reattribute measured value-added to foreign affi liates of 
U.S. parents. 
We fi nd that overall reattributions from foreign affi liates to U.S. 
parents are relatively small—less than 5 percent of total value-added 
attributed to all majority-owned foreign affi liates and U.S. parents under 
separate accounting. In contrast to overall reattributions, reattributions 
across global regions including Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, 
and the Middle East are greater than 10 percent of value-added under 
separate accounting. In addition, reattributions for foreign affi liates are 
greater than 10 percent of value-added under separate accounting for all 
industry sectors except administration, information, and transportation.
In addition to applying formulary apportionment to reattribute 
value-added, we report preliminary results to reattribute service imports 
and exports between U.S. parents and their foreign affi liates. We fi nd 
a relatively large decrease in imports but no meaningful change in 
exports. The overall effect on GDP is only a small increase—approxi-
mately 0.1 percent. Based on our preliminary results, we expect to be 
able to provide a complete picture of the U.S. current account under 
formulary apportionment in a future paper.
Given the economic activity embodied in each of the apportionment 
factors (i.e., compensation, net PPE, and unaffi liated sales), the reattri-
butions summarized here imply an overstatement of economic activity 
for MOFAs under separate accounting. Using factor shares to evaluate 
the results, we conclude that value-added attributed to foreign affi li-
ates and U.S. parents under formulary apportionment yields a picture 
of measured production by industry sector and country that is more 
congruent with economic activity than related measures generated 
Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb   258 2/16/2015   8:40:17 AM
Foreign Affi liates of U.S. Parents   259
under separate accounting. Thus, formulary apportionment appears to 
be a viable alternative to separate accounting under the residency-based 
framework of the BPM and the SNA. 
Notes
The statistical analysis of fi rm-level data on U.S. multinational enterprises and com-
panies engaged in international transactions was conducted at the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, under arrangements that maintain legal con-
fi dentiality requirements. The views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the 
authors and not necessarily those of the U.S. Department of Commerce or the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis.
 1.  Throughout the chapter, we use “MNE” or “enterprise” to refer to a group of affi li-
ated entities that includes both U.S. parents and foreign affi liates. We use “entity” 
to refer to individual establishments within the MNE; such individual establish-
ments may be either a U.S. parent or a foreign affi liate. We also use “parent” or 
“affi liate” to refer to a U.S. parent or a foreign affi liate, respectively.
 2.  Economic territory is discussed in paragraphs 4.3–4.11 of the BPM, institutional 
units are discussed in paragraphs 4.12–4.56, and residence is discussed in para-
graphs 4.113–4.168.
 3.  We do not distinguish between nominal output and real output. In the absence of 
data to adjust for price differences, we treat real output as proportional to nominal 
output.
 4.  The BEA publishes estimates of value-added for MNEs as part of the annual sta-
tistics on direct investment and multinational companies.
 5.  In the NIPAs, consumption of fi xed capital is the measure of economic deprecia-
tion. Given that depreciation is a cost in affi liates’ accounting records, any differ-
ence between CCA and consumption of fi xed capital is refl ected in profi ts. Thus, 
measured value-added is unaffected (Mataloni and Goldberg 1994).
 6.  IBT includes sales tax, value-added tax, consumption tax, excise tax, taxes on 
property and other assets, duties, license fees, fi nes, penalties, and any other taxes 
other than payroll taxes and income taxes.
 7.  Equation (8.3) inevitably changes the industry and country composition of value-
added from that measured under separate accounting, because there are no restric-
tions by industry or country. In other words, value-added attributed under sepa-
rate accounting to an affi liate classifi ed in one industry may be reattributed under 
formulary apportionment to an affi liate classifi ed in another industry. Likewise, 
value-added attributed to an affi liate located in one country may be reattributed 
to an affi liate located in another country. If returns accruing to shared inputs are 
under- or overattributed to an entity under separate accounting, then statistics 
by industry and country do not accurately refl ect actual output, and reattributing 
across industries and countries is presumably justifi ed. However, we also restrict 
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reattributions by industry while assuming the same production function across 
countries within a given industry, because entities in different countries belong to 
the same MNE. While restricting reattributions by industry does affect the results 
under formulary apportionment, the restriction does not affect our conclusions.
 8.  Less information is collected for each MOFA with assets, sales, or net income (net 
loss) of less than $80 million (Form BE-10C or Form BE-10D).
 9.  In addition to compensation, net PPE, and unaffi liated sales, we consider other 
possible apportionment factors. In particular, we consider research and devel-
opment expenditures, which are reported for MOFAs. However, R&D expendi-
tures are likely in some cases to be made pursuant to intercompany cost-sharing 
arrangements. In addition, we are unable to discern the extent to which R&D 
expenditures refl ect intercompany transactions. Thus, we limit the apportionment 
factors to compensation, net PPE, and unaffi liated sales.
 10.  We also weight compensation by 100 percent in Equation (8.3), which does not 
affect our conclusions. In addition to refl ecting the number of employees employed 
by an affi liate, compensation refl ects wages. Thus, if workers are paid accord-
ing to their value marginal product, compensation refl ects variation in economic 
activity across industries and countries. In other words, using compensation as 
an apportionment factor yields relatively more output attributable to high-margin 
industries and high-wage countries and relatively less output attributable to low-
margin industries and low-wage countries. In addition, compensation is based on 
market transactions rather than accounting conventions, which may affect both net 
PPE and unaffi liated sales. Furthermore, unaffi liated sales may refl ect local inputs 
or shared inputs. Thus, compensation may provide the most objective measure of 
economic activity.
 11.  The subsample of select service-industry sectors yields factor weights of 0.63, 
0.28, and 0.09 for compensation, net PPE, and unaffi liated sales, respectively. The 
subsample of other industry sectors yields factor weights of 0.64, 0.21, and 0.15 
for compensation, net PPE, and unaffi liated sales. The combined sample yields 
factor weights of 0.61, 0.24, and 0.15 for compensation, net PPE, and unaffi liated 
sales.
 12.  Since compensation and CCA are always nonnegative, the local input components 
are always nonnegative. However, since net IP or PTR may be negative, the shared 
input components and total value-added may be negative. In order to obtain factor 
shares between 0 and 100 percent, we calculate local input shares by dividing the 
sum of compensation and CCA by the sum of compensation, CCA, and the abso-
lute value of shared inputs. Likewise, we calculate shared input shares by dividing 
the absolute value of shared inputs by the sum of compensation, CCA, and the 
absolute value of shared inputs.
 13.  The cross-border transactions include annual amounts reported on the Quarterly 
Survey of Insurance Transactions by U.S. Insurance Companies with Foreign Per-
sons (Form BE-45), the Quarterly Survey of Transactions in Selected Services and 
Intangible Assets with Foreign Persons (Form BE-125), and the Quarterly Survey 
of Financial Services Transactions between U.S. Financial Services Providers and 
Foreign Persons (Form BE-185).
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 14.  Small differences exist between foreign transactions published in the NIPAs and 
foreign transactions published in the ITAs because of adjustments for gold, U.S. 
territories, and other small statistical differences.
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Data, Trade, and Growth
Michael Mandel
Progressive Policy Institute
The architecture of the Internet is designed as a “network of net-
works.” As such, one of its key attributes is making the passage of data 
from one network to another easy. So when a user sends an e-mail, 
views a video, or downloads a fi le from a Web site, the data may pass 
through a large number of different networks on the way from its origin 
to its destination, with the routing virtually invisible to the user. This 
architecture has proven to be extremely fl exible and powerful, both 
nationally and globally. People and businesses with Internet access can 
easily get data of all sorts from around the world. Similarly, companies 
can effi ciently and cheaply provide services such as e-mail and Web 
search on a global basis, in many cases without charge. 
One sign of the Internet’s global success is this: the rapid growth of 
cross-border data fl ows. Cross-border data fl ows are growing far faster 
than conventionally measured trade in goods and services. According 
to TeleGeography, a consulting fi rm that keeps track of international 
data fl ows, demand for international bandwidth increased at an annual 
rate of 49 percent between 2008 and 2012 (TeleGeography 2012). By 
comparison, the overall volume of global trade in goods and services, 
adjusted for infl ation, rose at an annual rate of 2.4 percent over the same 
period.
Looking at the data links between the United States and Europe in 
particular, the data-carrying capacity of transatlantic submarine cables 
rose at an average annual rate of 19 percent between 2008 and 2012. 
Meanwhile, the overall volume of trade in goods and services between 
the United States and Europe, adjusted for infl ation, is barely above 
prerecession peaks.
Indeed, the global economic and fi nancial system, as it stands 
today, would not function without cross-border data fl ows. Data fl ows 
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that cross national borders are essential to almost everything: manufac-
turing supply chains, global fi nance, international medical and physics 
research, entertainment, tourism, education, social media, and commu-
nity. Indeed, cross-border data is becoming increasingly important as an 
input to production, and as a crucial element for economic growth. “The 
cross-border free fl ow of information enables international trade which 
can lead to increased innovation, productivity, and economic growth,” 
writes Meltzer (2013, p. 11) in a paper from the Brookings Institution. 
Moreover, trade in data creates positive externalities and gives 
an extra boost to global growth. Unlike exports of goods, data can be 
shipped from one country to another without depriving the fi rst country 
of the benefi ts. All other things being equal, growth in cross-border data 
fl ows can be a far more powerful impetus to consumer welfare and eco-
nomic growth than growth in trade in goods and services. 
However, despite the importance of cross-border data fl ows, cur-
rent international economic statistics are mostly uninformative and 
even misleading about their magnitude. First, note that cross-border 
data fl ows are not tracked as a separate category in the trade statistics. 
Instead, cross-border trade that involves data is lumped in with trade in 
services. For example, international telecommunications are treated as 
the export/import of a service. The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
estimates that global exports of telecommunications services totaled 
$111.5 billion in 2012 (WTO 2013). 
But treating cross-border data as a service creates the real problem: 
By international agreement among statistical agencies, the export or 
import of services is defi ned to occur when there is a monetary payment 
from a resident of one country to a resident of another in exchange for 
the service. For example, if a U.S. business hires accountants in Lon-
don, that becomes an export of accounting services from the United 
Kingdom to the United States. 
Virtually all of the existing statistics about cross-border trade in data 
are based on this monetary defi nition of service exports and imports. The 
July 2013 report from the United States International Trade Commis-
sion, Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global Economies, Part 1, identifi es 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the U.S. Census Bureau, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
and Eurostat as the main sources for statistics on “digital trade.” Each of 
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these relies on the same basic defi nition of service exports and imports 
as being tied to a monetary exchange between residents of two differ-
ent countries (U.S. Internationl Trade Commission 2013, Table 4.2, p. 
4.24). Currently, international agencies such as the International Tele-
communications Union (ITU) only collect fragmentary statistics on 
cross-border data fl ows, though they are putting more effort into esti-
mating such fi gures (see, for example, ITU [2012]).
I will show in this chapter that the effi cient global architecture of 
the Internet allows and even encourages data to cross national borders 
without leaving a signifi cant monetary footprint. As a result, economi-
cally important cross-border data fl ows are simply not being counted 
by current international economic statistics. I will offer evidence in this 
chapter that both the level and rate of growth of data trade are being 
signifi cantly understated. 
This understatement has serious policy implications. First, the data 
sector is a bigger contributor to U.S. and global growth than current 
economic statistics show. Second, to the degree that trade negotiators 
prioritize their goals according to the relative magnitude of different 
trading sectors, trade policy should place more emphasis on maintain-
ing the free fl ow of data. Similarly, international tax policy should place 
more emphasis on maintaining the free fl ow of data. 
Third, attempts by various countries to implement barriers to the 
free fl ow of data may do considerably more economic damage than the 
current trade statistics show. This is especially important in the wake 
of recent revelations about the extent to which the National Security 
Agency (NSA) has monitored data fl ows around the world. This news 
has caused a rising demand within countries such as Brazil for certain 
data to be kept within national borders—so-called data localization or 
data protectionism. The European Union is also considering new data 
privacy regulations that could potentially act as an impediment to fl ows 
of data in and out of the EU. 
Finally, it’s becoming clear that better statistics about cross-border 
data fl ows are needed to convince policymakers of how important data 
is to economic health. That might help avoid trade and tax policies that 
are detrimental to growth. It is self-evident that good policy rests on 
a foundation of accurate and comprehensive knowledge about current 
and emerging trade fl ows. 
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HOW CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS ARE
MEASURED TODAY
The WTO and national statistical agencies such as the BEA regu-
larly produce fi gures on cross-border trade in data-related services such 
as telecommunications services, computer and information services, 
and fi nancial services. Table 9.1, below, shows the reported dollar value 
of global exports of selected data-related services (WTO 2013).
According to international standards, trade in services is typically 
measured by monetary transactions between residents of one country 
and residents of another country. That’s the main principle laid out in 
the Manual on Statistics of International Trade in Services, approved in 
2010 by the United Nations Statistical Commission: 
The market price is used as the basis for valuation of transactions 
in international trade in services. Market prices for transactions are 
defi ned as amounts of money that willing buyers pay to acquire 
something from willing sellers. The exchanges are made between 
independent parties and based on commercial considerations only 
and are sometimes called ‘at arm’s length’ transactions. (United 
Nations 2011, p. 34)
Similarly, the BEA—the statistical agency in charge of tracking 
service trade—measures data-related exports and imports by tracking 
Table 9.1  Reported Global Exports of Selected Data-Related Services, 
2012, and Annual Growth Rate, 2008–2012
Service
Global exports 
($US billions)
Annual growth rate,
2008–2012 (%)
Communications services (both voice 
and data)
111.5 3.4
Financial services 303.1 0.3
Computer and information services 
(including Web search)
262.7 7.2
Royalties and license fees 289.6 5.9
Sum of selected data-related services 966.9 4.0
Merchandise exports 18,401.0 3.3
SOURCE: WTO (2013).
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the money received from “foreign persons” and the money paid to “for-
eign persons.” 
The BEA collects much of its data on service sector exports and 
imports through surveys: specifi cally the BEA Benchmark (BE-120) 
and Quarterly (BE-125) Surveys of Transactions in Selected Services 
and Intellectual Property with Foreign Persons (BEA 2011). Table 9.2 
shows the fairly long list of service and intellectual property export 
transactions that are covered in the benchmark survey. The list of 
service and intellectual property import transactions is similar, while 
the quarterly survey covers a similar but slightly shorter list of traded 
services. Many of these include cross-border data fl ows such as tele-
communication services, royalties and license fees, database and other 
information services, and fi nancial services.
These surveys feed into the widely cited monthly report “U.S. 
International Trade In Goods and Services,” including the goods and 
services trade defi cit, which is a key number for economists in govern-
ment and the private sector. In addition, the BEA produces an annual 
report on trade in services. Table 9.3 shows statistics on exports for 
selected data-related services in 2012. 
THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTERNET AND
DATA TRADE
The fi gures in the previous section raise two disturbing questions. 
First, when measured as a service, the rate of growth of the cross-border 
data-related services is barely higher than the growth rate of merchan-
dise trade, both for the globe and for the United States. Second, the 
aggregate numbers make cross-border data trade look relatively unim-
portant. For example, reported U.S. telecom exports of $14 billion in 
2012 are roughly the same size as U.S. exports of newsprint. (Box 9.1 
explains how international phone calls are treated in the trade statistics.) 
The global and national statistics on trade in services are based on 
tracking monetary exchanges between residents of different countries. 
In theory, this principle can be applied to trade in data as well. If a per-
son in the United States downloads a fi le from a Web site in a different 
country, it’s theoretically possible that he or she could be charged both 
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Types of export transactions
Receipts for intellectual property
Rights related to industrial processes and products
Rights related to books, music, etc.
Rights related to trademarks
Rights related to performance and events prerecorded on motion picture fi lm and TV 
tape (include digital recordings)
Rights related to broadcast and recording of live events and performances
Rights related to general use software
Business format franchising fees
Other intellectual property
Receipts for selected services
Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services
Advertising services
Auxiliary insurance services
Computer and data processing services
Data base and other information services
Educational and training services
Industrial engineering services
Industrial-type maintenance, installation, alteration, and training services
Legal services
Management, consulting, and public relations services (including expenses allocated 
by a U.S. parent to its foreign affi liates)
Merchandising services
Operational leasing services
Trade-related services, other than merchandising services
Performing arts, sports, and other live performances, presentations, and events
Research and development services
Telecommunications services
Agricultural services
Disbursements to fund production costs of motion pictures
Disbsursements to fund news-gathering costs and production costs of program 
material other than news
Waste treatment and depollution services
Other selected services
SOURCE: BEA Form BE-120: “Benchmark Survey of Transactions in Selected Ser-
vices and Intellectual Property with Foreign Persons,” p. 6, http://www.bea.gov/
surveys/pdf/be120.pdf (accessed December 2013).
Table 9.2  Selected Service and Intellectual Property Export
Transactions Tracked by BEA Survey BE-120
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for the cross-border telecommunications link and for the content in the 
fi le. 
However, in practice the architecture of the Internet has developed 
in such a way that many or perhaps most cross-border data fl ows do not 
result in an exchange of money between residents of different countries. 
Let us illustrate this important point with a simple example: an Ameri-
can economist who visits the Web site for the Bank of Russia (www
.cbr.ru) and wants to obtain statistics about the latest movement of the 
Russian monetary supply. 
First, imagine that these statistics were in bound volumes that had 
to be shipped from Moscow. There’s little doubt that the cost of the 
volumes and the shipping would be quite high and would register as 
imports in the trade statistics. 
But when the data is downloaded, there is no charge for content. The 
Russian central bank is not charging U.S. economists for downloading 
data. So if this cross-border data transfer is going to create a monetary 
footprint and show up in the BEA statistics, it will happen because 
the telecommunications transport across national borders involves an 
exchange of money between a U.S. resident and a non–U.S. resident. 
Obviously, the economist or his or her institution pays a domestic 
Internet service provider such as Comcast or Verizon for an Internet 
connection. But unlike an international phone call, no extra money is 
paid for the foreign Web site. The data request is passed from network 
Table 9.3  Reported U.S. Exports of Selected Data-Related Services, 
2012, and Annual Growth Rate, 2008–2012
Service
Global exports 
($US billions)
Annual growth rate, 
2008–2012 (%)
Communications services (both voice 
and data)
14.0 8.8
Financial services 76.4 4.9
Computer and information services 
(including Web search)
17.3 7.2
Royalties and license fees 124.2 5.0
Sum of selected data-related services 231.9 5.3
Goods exports  1,536.0 4.3
SOURCE: BEA international services statistics, Table 1: “Trade in Services, 1999–
2012.” http://www.bea.gov/international/xls/tab1a.xls (accessed December 2013).
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Box 9.1  The International Phone Call and Foreign Trade
Historically the major cross-border data fl ow was the conventional 
international phone call. In the United States, the originator of an interna-
tional phone call picked up a telephone, dialed 011, then the country code 
and phone number, and paid an international charge to his or her phone 
company. The provider then paid the carrier in the receiving country ac-
cording to a government-mandated settlement schedule. Conversely, the 
recipient of an overseas call did not pay an international charge—instead, 
the overseas caller paid the local provider in his or her own country, who 
settled up with the U.S. phone company. 
Under this scheme, calls from the United States to overseas points were 
classifi ed as imports, because the foreign carrier received the payments. 
Calls from other countries were classifi ed as exports, since the payments 
came to the U.S. carriers. So if U.S. customers made more overseas calls 
than they received, the telecom trade balance would be negative. Indeed, 
that was true for many years. According to an FCC report from 1998, “U.S. 
carriers owe settlement payments for the services that they bill, and are 
owed payments for the services that the foreign carriers bill. In addition, 
U.S. carriers are owed payments for switched traffi c that transits U.S. 
points. Because U.S. customers place far more calls than they receive and 
because U.S. carriers terminate more collect calls that generate surcharges 
for the originating carrier, U.S. carriers make net settlement payments to 
most foreign carriers. The total net payment for all U.S. carriers grew from 
$0.4 billion in 1980 to $5.6 billion in 1996” (Blake and Lande 1998).
Reading this explanation, however, should make it clear that this 
defi nition of telecom imports and exports is an artifact of a regulatory con-
vention that “calling party pays” for wireline calls. Suppose instead that 
we had a rule that “receiving party pays,” as in a collect call or an 800 
number. Under that alternative regulatory regime, the toll on an outgoing 
international call would be collected from the recipient of the call by his 
or her (foreign) carrier. The foreign carrier would then remit a portion of 
the charge to the originating domestic carrier. As a result, with “receiving 
party pays,” an outgoing international call would be treated as an export. 
Similarly, an incoming call would be treated as an import. Thus, a shift in 
regulatory conventions from “caller pays” to “recipient pays” would im-
mediately turn a telecom trade defi cit into a trade surplus, without altering 
the fi nal allocation of revenues to the respective telecom carriers after the 
settlement process. In addition, outgoing and incoming international calls 
are physically indistinguishable, in terms of the equipment used. 
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to network until it reaches the Russian central bank, which then sends 
the money supply fi gures back again. At some point, that data request 
passes from a U.S.-owned network to a foreign-owned network. For 
the sake of clarity of the example, let’s assume that the U.S.-owned net-
work also owns the submarine cable between New York and the United 
Kingdom, so that the interchange between the U.S.-owned network and 
the foreign network physically occurs in the UK.1
Is there an exchange of money between the U.S-owned and the 
foreign-owned network? Now we have to delve into the architecture 
of the Internet. Networks are connected in two ways, by peering or 
by the payment of transit fees. Peering is an agreement between two 
networks to exchange traffi c without exchanging money. Peering agree-
ments, especially between large networks, are so ubiquitous that they 
are basically conducted on a handshake, as one authoritative OECD 
study shows: “A survey of 142,000 peering agreements conducted for 
this report shows that the terms and conditions of the Internet inter-
connection model are so generally agreed upon that 99.5 percent of 
interconnection agreements are concluded without a written contract” 
(Weller and Woodcock 2013, p. 3).
In fact, the largest global networks—the so-called ‘Tier 1’ net-
works—almost by defi nition peer with every other Tier 1 network. That 
means if a data packet goes from AT&T’s network to British Telecom’s 
on the way from Russia, it is unlikely that money changed hands at the 
interconnect between the two. 
It might seem as if peering is a barter-type agreement that should 
generate revenue recognition on the fi nancial books, even if no money 
changes hands. However, peering takes place mostly in situations of 
balanced traffi c, so the revenues and costs would net out. The account-
ing fi rm KPMG notes that, “in our experience, peering arrangements 
between Tier 1 telecoms do not result in the recognition of revenue even 
though a service is provided and value is transferred between telecoms 
in much the same way as under traditional interconnect arrangements” 
(KPMG 2010, p. 30).
It’s worth noting that peering is a key reason that you can access 
Web sites from all over the world without having additional charges 
added to your Internet bill. 
Alternatively, smaller networks can connect to larger ones by pay-
ing transit fees—also known as buying Internet transit. In theory, these 
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Internet transit payments could show up as trade in telecommunications 
services if the smaller network was paying a provider from a different 
country for transit. However, the price of Internet transit has been drop-
ping sharply. According to the market research fi rm TeleGeography, the 
price of IP transit at major hubs has dropped by roughly 30 percent a 
year over the past fi ve years (TeleGeography 2013). To my knowledge, 
no statistical agency currently uses the price of Internet transit to adjust 
service trade. 
ESTIMATING ONE COMPONENT OF DATA TRADE
For the reasons described in the previous section, we would expect 
that the offi cial statistics on cross-border data trade (trade in data-related 
services) far understate both the actual economic value and the growth 
of cross-border data fl ows. But how big is the understatement? 
In this section I will try to answer one small piece of this ques-
tion. In particular, we will delve deeper into the measurement of U.S. 
telecom exports and construct an alternative estimate based on directly 
measuring cross-border data fl ows. For 2012, the BEA reports that 
exports of communications services from the United States amounted 
to $14 billion (payments from nonresidents to residents). Imports of 
communications services into the United States amounted to $8 bil-
lion (payments from residents to nonresidents). These numbers have 
been rising, but they are still minuscule compared to the importance 
and amount of international data traffi c in and out of the United States. 
However, a closer look helps explain why these have to be under-
statements. Let’s start with a simple example. Suppose a major U.S. 
telecom provider builds its own submarine cable to Great Britain, say, 
or Singapore. That expenditure will show up in the company’s capi-
tal spending budget, rather than as a payment for cross-border telecom 
services. Then, if the U.S. provider peers with foreign providers at the 
non-U.S. cable landing, no money will change hands at the connection 
point. The result: The telecom provider has made a major investment in 
providing cross-border data fl ows, none of which show up in the trade 
account. The export benefi ts of capital investment by the telecom indus-
try are not being counted. 
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More generally, most submarine cables are being built these days 
by a consortium of companies, each of whom gets access to a share of 
the bandwidth. The same principle shows up as in the previous exam-
ple—the spending on the cable appears as a capital investment, rather 
than as a payment for cross-border telecom services. From here, we 
can construct increasingly complicated examples that arrive at the same 
place—cross-border transport of data without a corresponding mon-
etary transfer between residents and nonresidents. 
How can we construct a better estimate of cross-border telecom 
services? In an earlier paper, I discussed the idea that the production 
and use of data should be treated as a fundamental component of eco-
nomic activity, parallel to the production and use of goods and services 
(Mandel 2012). This approach leads naturally to an increased focus on 
directly measuring data generation, data fl ows, and data storage as a 
way of understanding economic activity.
One pioneer in such efforts has been Martin Hilbert, who has been 
developing a systematic methodology for comparing the communi-
cations capacity of various media, ranging from mobile to television 
(Hilbert and López 2011). Based on this work, the International Tele-
communications Union (ITU) has been gradually moving toward direct 
measures of data fl ows, as opposed to indirect measures such as number 
of cellular subscriptions or broadband connections. A recent publica-
tion from the ITU notes,“Using the unifying metric of bits per second, 
employed for measuring global technological capacity to communi-
cate, it is possible to compare different communication technologies. 
It is also possible to analyse bits per second per capita, per technology, 
per country, or per any other relevant socio-economic or demographic 
parameter” (ITU 2012, p. 167).
This section follows in the same spirit of direct measurement of 
data fl ows. For the purposes of this section, data fl ow is measured in 
terabits per second (Tbps). The telecommunications market research 
and consulting fi rm TeleGeography estimates that the United States had 
23 Tbps of international Internet capacity in 2012, with an average utili-
zation of 29 percent and a peak utilization of 49 percent.2 This suggests 
that, on average, the U.S. cross-border data fl ow is roughly 6.7 Tbps.3
Is this volume of cross-border data a large number or a small num-
ber? I compare the cross-border data fl ow with a recent Cisco Systems–
sponsored projection of data traffi c, by country and type (Cisco Sys-
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tems 2013).4 For 2012, the Cisco study estimates Internet and IP traffi c 
in the United States at 8 exabytes per month and 13 exabytes per month, 
respectively.5 That translates into roughly 26.5 Tbps and 42.2 Tbps.6
Table 9.4, below, compares the U.S. cross-border data fl ows with 
the overall U.S. Internet and IP traffi c. I fi nd that cross-border data 
fl ows are roughly 25 percent and 16 percent of U.S. Internet and IP traf-
fi c, respectively. To put this in perspective, U.S. exports of goods and 
services are 14 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012, 
while U.S. imports of goods and services are 18 percent of U.S. GDP in 
2012. (Box 9.2 briefl y reports similar calculations for Europe.)
This calculation offers us a reasonable way of estimating the size 
of the international component of the U.S. telecom sector. According to 
the BEA (2014), the gross output for the telecommunications industry 
in 2011 was $556 billion. After adjusting for growth, that puts the gross 
output at roughly $575–$600 billion in 2012. 
If we assume that the international component of the telecom 
industry is proportional to the size of the data fl ow, the international 
component of U.S. telecom would be roughly $92–$150 billion. That’s 
compared to the $14 billion in exports and $8 billion in imports that the 
offi cial statistics report. 
Table 9.4  Cross-Border Data Flows, 2012: United States
Terabits per 
second (except 
as noted)
International Internet capacity connected to the U.S. 23.0
Average utilization (%) 29.0
Average cross-border data fl ow 6.7
(average international traffi c)
All U.S. Internet traffi c 26.5
All U.S. IP traffi c 42.2
Average U.S. cross-border data fl ow as a percentage of:
All U.S. Internet traffi c (%) 25.0
All U.S. IP traffi c (%) 16.0
SOURCE: International capacity and utilization estimates from TeleGeography (2014). 
Traffi c estimates from Cisco. IP includes both Internet traffi c and managed IP such as 
consumer video. Figures omit mobile.
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Obviously, this should be viewed as an exploratory effort, with 
plenty of caveats. However, the revised estimates intuitively make more 
sense than the offi cial statistics, in terms of measuring the importance of 
cross-border telecom services. Of course, these numbers are accompa-
nied by substantial and worrisome caveats, as well as the possibility of 
large errors in both directions. In particular, these include the following:
• Coverage and methodology may differ. Cisco’s projections 
include all IP usage. TeleGeography’s estimates of interna-
tional capacity by country do not include private networks such 
as intracorporate networks, Google and other content provid-
ers’ networks, and research networks. This factor would tend to 
underestimate the share of cross-border traffi c. 
• Double-counting is inevitable. International Internet traffi c 
is often routed through third-party countries before getting to 
its destination. Traffi c between Moscow and New York might 
be routed through London and therefore show up as part of 
European cross-border data fl ows. Traffi c between the Cana-
dian cities of Vancouver and Toronto might be routed through 
the United States and therefore show up as part of U.S. cross-
border data fl ows. And since less-developed countries may have 
Box 9.2  Europe’s Data Connections
Using a similar methodology as for the United States, we can calcu-
late interregional cross-border data fl ows as a share of Internet traffi c for 
Europe. TeleGeography estimates that international bandwidth in Eu-
rope was 56.5 Tbps in 2012, but that 78 percent of that bandwidth was 
between cities in the same region. As a result, “interregional Internet 
capacity connected to Europe” equaled 12.6 Tbps in 2012. Based on this 
fi gure, we calculate that cross-border data fl ows between Europe and the 
rest of the world equaled 16 percent of the region’s Internet traffi c and 
13 percent of the region’s IP traffi c. 
These results, which should be viewed as highly imprecise and ten-
tative, suggest that the United States is more interconnected with the rest 
of the world than Europe. The sources of error enumerated in the caveats 
above are potentially very signifi cant. 
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better Internet connections with the United States and Europe 
than with each other, it’s possible for intra-African traffi c, say, 
to be routed through New York or London. This factor would 
tend to overestimate the share of cross-border traffi c.
• When comparing estimates/forecasts from different 
sources, timing matters. International Internet capacity, as 
estimated by TeleGeography, has been growing at almost 50 
percent per year. Domestic U.S. Internet traffi c, as projected by 
Cisco, has been growing roughly as fast. As a result, calculat-
ing cross-border data fl ows as a share of Internet traffi c can be 
heavily infl uenced if one source is using yearly averages while 
the other source (TeleGeography) is using a particular point in 
time (April of each year). The direction of bias is uncertain.
• Compression may distort the statistics. Widespread and 
growing use of compression means that “we communicate 
around three times more information through the same installed 
infrastructure as we did in 1986” (Hilbert 2011, p. 7). It’s pos-
sible that cross-border data fl ows may be compressed more 
intensively than purely domestic data fl ows. 
MEASURING THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF
CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS
Why are we concerned with correctly measuring cross-border data 
fl ows? The classic justifi cation for the benefi ts of trade is that two or 
more countries working together can produce more than the same coun-
tries operating separately. Moreover, the size of the gain from trade is 
related to the magnitude of trade, all other things being equal. The more 
trade, the better. 
Under the current trade statistics, the magnitude of trade in data is 
being systematically underestimated. Thus, the benefi ts from trade in 
data are being systematically underestimated as well, which, as we will 
see in the next section, distorts policy decisions. 
Moreover, trade in data has somewhat of the characteristic of a pub-
lic good, since data can be duplicated relatively costlessly. As a result, 
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the fact that the data is created in one country and used in another 
country does not deprive the fi rst country of the use. To give a spe-
cifi c example, one type of intangible capital stock is “entertainment, 
literary, and artistic originals,” including fi lms. Licensing the right to 
show a fi lm in a foreign country currently shows up as an export in the 
national income accounts. However, such a license generally does not 
reduce the ability of American consumers to view the fi lm, and it does 
not reduce the intangible capital stock of “entertainment, literary, and 
artistic originals.” 
As a result, trade in data creates positive externalities and an extra 
boost to global growth. Unlike exports of goods, data can be shipped 
from one country to another without depriving the fi rst country of the 
benefi ts. All other things being equal, growth in cross-border data fl ows 
can be a far more powerful impetus to consumer welfare and economic 
growth than growth in trade in goods and services. This means that data 
trade generates a positive externality for the global economy. If a U.S. 
university produces educational videos about computer science and 
makes them available on the Internet, then students around the world 
can benefi t from those videos. 
Now we turn to the question of how data trade fi gures into calcula-
tions of GDP and economic growth. As noted in an earlier paper, data 
can be “consumed” by individuals; can be used as an intermediate input 
into production; and can be an investment in intangible capital (Mandel 
2012).
For trade in conventional goods and services, there is a well-
established methodology for assessing such trade’s contribution to eco-
nomic growth. In the calculation of GDP, the dollar value of exports is 
a plus, while the dollar value of imports is a minus. For the calculation 
of gross domestic purchases—which are one measure of living stan-
dards—the dollar value of exports of goods and services is a minus, 
while the dollar value of imports of goods and services is a plus. 
The arithmetic does not work quite the same for cross-border data 
fl ows, for two reasons. First, because data that are exported are still 
available domestically, exports don’t need to be subtracted from gross 
domestic purchases. Second, imports of data potentially come in at low 
or zero prices, as discussed above, despite the fact that there is a posi-
tive price to originally producing the data and then transporting it across 
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national borders. As a result, imports of data, valued in dollars, appear 
not to contribute to growth. 
Consider, however, that the alternative to importing the data at a 
low or zero price is to produce it domestically at its full cost, which 
would be higher than the import price. Viewed from that perspective, 
there is a growing body of literature about how to value the contribu-
tion to growth of imports that are priced much lower than comparable 
domestic products. I will show how this approach can be used to value 
cross-border data fl ows.7
To demonstrate how this would work, I will consider the amus-
ing category of YouTube videos of cats involved in different activities 
(Illustration 9.1). Quite a few of these videos are produced in Japan and 
get millions of free views (Lewis-Kraus 2012). They provide pleasure 
for viewers in America and around the world—in that sense they are 
analogous to going skiing or reading a book. Thus, they raise consumer 
welfare in the United States for people who enjoy videos of cats. But 
how should the gain to the U.S economy from these “free” data fl ows 
be measured? The key is to realize that there are two relevant prices 
here. One is the price to Americans of consuming the Japanese-made 
cat video, which is zero. The second is the maximum price, Pcat, that an 
American would pay for viewing a Japanese-made cat video, measured 
either in dollars or in value of time. We assume that there is no way 
of profi tably producing a comparable video with Japanese cats in the 
United States—in other words, in order for someone in this country to 
produce comparable videos domestically, the videos would have to be 
sold at an average price per viewing in excess of Pcat.
So before YouTube, it was as if the price of a Japanese cat video to 
Americans was equal to Pcat, and the volume of videos viewed was zero. 
After the Internet and YouTube, the price P of Japanese cat videos goes 
to zero, and the volume of videos viewed goes to V. 
How much does this change contribute to U.S. gross domestic pur-
chases? For the sake of simplicity, assume that X is the size of gross 
domestic purchases in dollars, excepting cat videos. Let’s also assume 
that there is no infl ation and that X is otherwise not changing. Then the 
straightforward way of calculating growth would be as (X + P × V)/X, 
where P is the price of a cat video after the introduction of YouTube. 
But P is zero, so it looks like there is no gain. 
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In fact, a better approach is roughly analogous to the procedure 
used to calculate chain-weighted GDP growth. I take the geometric 
average of two growth rates—the fi rst assuming that the price of the 
video is always zero, and the second assuming that the price of the 
video is always Pcat : 
? ? ?
?? ? ? ? ??
?
? ?
?? ? ???? ? ??
?
? ??? ?
???? ? ?
?
? ? ?
???? ? ?
??
 .
In other words, the gain to gross domestic purchases from cross-
border data fl ows of cat videos is roughly equal to the revenue that 
would be generated by pricing the videos at the average of the actual 
price (zero) and the price that Americans would be willing to pay, Pcat. 
Illustration 9.1  Maru the Cat, as Seen on a YouTube Video from Japan
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Since this requires no additional domestic resources, it is also the gain 
to consumer welfare. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Trade in data is fundamentally a new phenomenon. While many 
people would like to fi t it into the framework of previous trade deals—
in particular, the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS)—such efforts will not work. We need new analytical tools to 
deal with both measuring cross-border data fl ows and assessing the 
benefi ts. 
This chapter has made the case that, without those tools, the eco-
nomic impact of cross-border data fl ows is being understated. What 
effect does this understatement have on trade and tax policy?
Trade and Tax Policy 
Both trade and tax policy require a series of compromises and 
trade-offs. In the case of trade negotiations, a wide variety of different 
industries and interests—agriculture, low-tech manufacturing, high-
tech manufacturing, fi nance, insurance—are competing for the atten-
tion of policymakers. Trade negotiators have to decide which issues are 
“must-haves” and which ones they can retreat on. 
Similarly, tax policy requires balancing out the need to raise rev-
enue against the negative effect of taxes on different industries. That’s 
especially true in today’s climate, where tax cuts benefi ting one indus-
try will have to be balanced by closing tax loopholes or raising taxes on 
other industries. 
Policymakers and negotiators make these decisions partly by 
assessing political reality and partly by assessing economic strength. 
All other things being equal, industries that have a bigger positive effect 
on jobs and growth will fare better in trade and tax policy. 
The problem is that the positive benefi ts of cross-border data 
fl ows—because they are such a new phenomenon—are signifi cantly 
underestimated in the available offi cial statistics. Reported exports of 
data-related services show up as relatively minor in the larger picture. 
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Under the circumstances, the impact of cross-border data fl ows on eco-
nomic growth will be understated as well, and it will be more diffi cult 
for policymakers to set the right priorities for trade and tax policy. 
There have been several recent proposals for increasing the tax rate 
paid by international Internet companies, or for imposing additional 
regulations on them. In one instance of this, a recent paper from the 
French government suggested a sort of tax on data (Collin and Colin 
2013). Such proposals—which would be likely to discourage cross-
border data fl ows—are more likely to be seriously considered in the 
absence of evidence showing the large positive economic impacts from 
such cross-border data fl ows. 
Impact of Data Localization 
Another example comes from the aftermath of the revelations about 
NSA monitoring, which created a backlash against U.S. Internet compa-
nies and intensifi ed discussions about building “walls” that would keep 
certain types of personal data from leaving countries such as Brazil. 
Several reports have identifi ed the possible negative economic 
consequences of such actions (Castro 2013a,b; Staten 2013). However, 
what’s missing is the ability to actually track the negative consequences 
from data protectionism, since we do not currently track cross-border 
data fl ows. By comparison, if a country erects trade barriers against a 
particular tangible product, the impact of such a policy would immedi-
ately show up in the trade statistics. It’s diffi cult to measure the harm 
from barriers to data trade if we cannot measure the data fl ows to begin 
with. Weller and Woodcock (2013) note that adverse effects may be 
incidental:
It is also the case that regulations that are not explicitly intended 
to apply to Internet traffi c exchange may have that effect. For ex-
ample, restrictions on the ability to export certain data, such as 
customer profi les, intended to protect security and privacy, may 
also limit the development of Internet topology and the growth 
of Internet assets in some regions. Similarly, tax policies in each 
country toward broadband and Internet businesses are likely to af-
fect the choice of the locations for investment in Internet assets. 
(p. 24)
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CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR BETTER DATA ON
CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS 
Businesses in any industry are usually ambivalent about the collec-
tion of government statistics on that industry. On the one hand, objective 
industry-wide statistics can be extremely useful for business decision-
making and planning. On the other hand, the collection process can be 
intrusive, and accurate statistics can potentially attract new competitors 
or unwanted attention from regulators. 
The calculation gets even tougher for rapidly innovating tech 
industries. Tech companies are unlikely to call for additional invest-
ment in statistics that may be quickly rendered obsolete by technologi-
cal change. 
However, the balance changes in a situation where businesses need 
government support in order to avoid bigger problems. In particular, 
better information about cross-border data fl ows will help make the 
case that data protectionism and taxes on data can be economically 
destructive. 
T he bottom line is that the statistical agencies should supplement 
the current trade statistics with additional metrics on cross-border data 
fl ows. This should be part of a large push to better measure data con-
sumption and investment domestically. 
Notes
My thanks to the Sloan Foundation for funding this research. I thank Diana Carew of 
the Progressive Policy Institute, Alan Mauldin of TeleGeography, Steve Bauer and Bill 
Lehr of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Michael Kende of Analysis Ma-
son for very useful assistance. All mistakes and errors are my own.
1. Many large providers own their own undersea cables, have a share of a cable, or 
have long-term rights to use part of the bandwidth. Submarine cable is used to 
carry cross-border data fl ows across oceans but also often between countries on 
the same continent, because it’s often easier and safer to maintain cables that run 
along the coast underwater than across diffi cult terrain. Cables are typically laid 
with multiple strands of optic fi ber, some of which are “lit”—i.e., they have the 
necessary equipment to be used—and some of which are “dark,” or not yet ready 
for use. Capacity can be increased by laying new cables, by lighting dark fi ber, or 
by improving the capacity of already-lit fi ber. 
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2. I thank Alan Mauldin of TeleGeography for providing these estimates. 
3. These fi gures are based on the bidirectional averages of the average for the month 
of April and the peak during April of each year.
4. See also http://ciscovni.com/forecast-widget/index.html.
5. Non-Internet IP traffi c in the United States is mainly consumer video. 
6. 1 exabyte = 1,024 petabytes; 1 petabyte = 1,024 terabytes; 1 terabyte = 8 terabits.
7. This growing body of literature on how to assess growth when import prices are 
less than domestic prices includes Diewert and Nakamura (2010) and Feenstra et 
al. (2009). 
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 production, and outsourcing, 34, 38t
 types of, by educational attainment  
 level, 129, 133–134
Labor Force Survey (LFS), ISCED  
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 construction for FDI and trade,  
 233–234, 259n2
 economic ownership and, 7, 31, 229,  
 259n1
 formulary apportionment and, 240– 
 241, 259–260n7
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 single-unit companies with second  
 establishment in, 96, 108n19
Manual on Statistics of International  
 Trade in Services (UN Statistical  
 Commission), 266
Manufacturing production
 employees for, 34, 36t, 151,  
 152t–153t, 155, 156t
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 control the production process and  
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 company fi nancial, in Form 10-K  
 reports, 85, 107n10
 economic ownership and, 27, 28–30,  
 30f
Romania, benchmark national I-O tables  
 and OECD coverage of, 202n5
Russian Federation, 122, 202n5
 central bank of, 269, 271
 GVC income in, an emerging  
 economy part of BRIIAT and  
 BRIIMT, 6, 137, 138f–139f, 139,  
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 U.S., and FGP reclassifi cation, 103– 
 104
  See also Data traded; Export data;  
 and under Imports, presentation of  
 data
Trade defi cits. See Trade balances
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